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This thesis delves into the most contentious aspect of the power dynamics in the 
employment relationship: managerial prerogative to dismiss an allegedly 
misbehaving employee in order to maintain business viability, against the 
employee’s right to respectful, dignified and just treatment; and to remain within the 
employment relationship. Central to this thesis is the concept that workers can appeal 
management’s treatment of them, by pursuing an unfair dismissal claim through to 
binding arbitration. This thesis advances scholarship about the influences of the 
misbehaviour act itself, the worker’s explanation for such behaviour and the 
managerial dismissal process, on the arbitration decision. It also informs scholars 
about a range of personal and demographic characteristics pertaining to the worker, 
the employer and the arbitrators themselves, that moderate these influences. 
Methodology: Using a quantitative research method, 565 misbehaviour-related, 
unfair dismissal arbitration decisions made by Australia’s federal industrial tribunal 
between July 2000 and July 2010 were examined. This accounted for all misconduct-
related dismissals arbitrated during that period. Through a content analysis, each 
tribunal decision was converted to count data for analysis using logistic regression. 
 
Theoretical advancements: This investigation produces a model of misbehaviour-
related, unfair dismissal arbitral-decision making that successfully infuses employee 
deviance theory founded in organisational behaviour scholarship, with theories on 
arbitral decision-making in the industrial relations setting (Bemmels 1988a, 1988b, 
1990a, 1990b, 1991a, 1991b; Chelliah & D'Netto 2006; Gely & Chandler 2008; 
Nelson & Kim 2008; Ross & Chen 2007). A major discovery is that the employee 
deviance typology (Bennett & Robinson 2000), which was verified for measuring 
employee deviance by organisational behaviour scholars (Stewart et al. 2009), also 
provides a suitable framework for categorising any variety of employee 
misbehaviour acts to measure their influence on disciplinary actions directed at 
workers in an industrial relations context. Further theoretical insight occurred in 
relation to the concept of a ‘conflated rationale’ within the employee explanation 
typology (Southey 2010) which was successfully incorporated as an influential 
factor in the arbitral decision-making model. The impact of the quality of the 
employer’s actions in administering a dismissal on the arbitration decisions 
demonstrated consistency with the theories of distributive, procedural and 
interactional justice (Brown, Bemmels & Barclay 2010; Greenberg 1990; Rawls 
1972, 1999) with the added insight that distributive justice appears to have a stronger 
emphasis on the determination of arbitration decisions, followed closely by 
procedural and interactional justice.  
 
Broad theoretical insights were further collected in relation to attribution theory 
whereby the investigation did not support the contention that externally-attributed 
causes (explanations involving workplace-related triggers for the behaviour) would 
be the most successful defence for a worker. The investigation corroborated exit-
voice theory (Budd & Colvin 2008; Hirschman 1970; Luchak 2003) within the  
arbitral decision-making context, clearly indicating that workers benefit most when 
they use a third party advocate to represent their ‘voice from without’ following their 
ejection from the employer-employee relationship. Also corroborated by the results 
of the research was the award orientation theory (Crow & Logan 1994) which is 
the extent to which an arbitrator determines decisions that either favour management 
or the union, on the premise that people have a subliminal preference for the 
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philosophical stance of either union or management. The findings also have 
implications for the gamut of gender theories (Cooper 1997; Hartman et al. 1994; 
Luthar 1996; Moulds 1978; Staines, Tavris & Jayaratne 1974) used to deduce 
hypotheses about the interacting influence of the arbitrator’s gender and applicant’s 
gender. 
 
Findings: Major findings of the analysis are that aggressive acts against individuals 
influence the arbitrators to sustain the employer’s punishment more so than property 
related misdeeds; suggesting people are valued over property. Workers who provided 
explanations for their behaviour that canvas two, and particularly three themes – 
addressed in Southey’s typology as a ‘conflated rationale’ – destabilises the worker’s 
explanation to the point that arbitrators are more likely to sustain the dismissal. 
Further, the arbitral decision-making process is a stepped process demarcated by the 
arbitrator’s initial assessment of the employer’s respect for distributive justice when 
choosing dismissal as a disciplinary action. To this end, a previous misbehaviour 
incident recorded against the worker improves the employer’s justification to 
dismiss. However, misjudgements in distributive justice see arbitrators reversing the 
dismissal. If distributive justice is appropriate, arbitrators assess, next, the 
employer’s application of procedural justice when performing the actual dismissal of 
the worker. Unlike distributive justice, arbitrators exhibit a small amount of tolerance 
for errors in procedural justice. In particular, heinous offences have potential to 
offset the employer’s obligation to offer a worker time to respond to an allegation.  
 
To improve their chance of a favourable arbitration decision, Australian workers 
should use either legal counsel or union advocates to present their claim to the 
arbitrators, yet employers are unlikely to receive similar advantages if they rely on 
advocacy services. Workers are supported most effectively by union delegates before 
the actual dismissal, rather than seeking this support from colleagues, friends or 
family. Save for women in managerial and professional work, a positive bias towards 
women workers, in general, appears to be at play. Workers with longer service 
periods, workers from the private sector and those with lower skill sets can anticipate 
tougher arbitration outcomes compared to workers with shorter service periods, those 
dismissed from the public sector, or those in higher skilled occupations. Finally, as 
arbitrators determine more unfair dismissal decisions they become more likely to 
support the employer’s decision to dismiss a worker. And it appears arbitrators may 
be influenced by predispositions reflected in their previous employment with either 
employer or union organisations. 
Practical implications: A range of policy and practical implications arise from the 
findings. Some of these implications include: developing a national policy to reduce 
personally aggressive behaviours by promoting workplace cultures that reinforce the 
societal intolerance for personally aggressive acts. Improving public perceptions of 
tribunal neutrality via the annual publication of arbitration decision metrics for each 
tribunal member according to the type of claim and whether it was upheld or 
overturned. As advocacy offers benefits at the arbitration table, a policy of tribunal 
appointed advocates being made available for workers and employers that meet a set 
of hardship criteria, could improve the utility of the tribunal services. And finally, if 
the misbehaviour constituted production deviance, political deviance or property 
deviance and no other recorded occurrence of misconduct exits on the employee’s 
record, all parties may be best served if management avoid immediate dismissal and 
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1.0  Introduction 
The fiercest sanction which backs up managerial authority to direct the workforce 
(is) the power of dismissal. 
 
H. Collins, ‗Justice in Dismissal‘, 1992 
 
It is an extraordinary situation in a free society for one individual to have the legal 
right to impose punishment on another in what amounts to 
 a private system of justice.  
 
H. Wheeler and J. Rojot, ‗Workplace Justice‘, 1992 
 
The opening quotes recognise the superior power of employers in the employment 
relationship and their ability to impose the severest penalty on employees that 
misbehave – terminate the employment relationship. The extremity of the decision to 
terminate a worker was recognised by Haiven (1994, p. 79), who equated the act of 
dismissing an employee to that of an employer executing ‗industrial capital 
punishment‘. To offset the employer‘s power, an employee may be in a position to 
allege an unfair dismissal and involve a third party arbitrator to resolve the claim. 
This leads to the purpose of this thesis, which is to identify influences on arbitral 
decision-making over unfair dismissal claims from workers who have been 
terminated from their employment due to misbehaviour. This purpose is achieved by 
examining arbitration decisions by members of Australia‘s federal industrial tribunal 
when they determine such claims.  
 
The reason for this thesis is to develop an understanding of the influences on arbitral 
decision-making in the Australian context, to inform workers, unions, employers, 
industry and political bodies about the effect that employee misbehaviour has on the 
arbitrator‘s expectation that the employer should maintain the employer-employee 
relationship. At its foundation, this thesis extends our knowledge of the attributes 
influencing the arbitration decisions beyond those prescribed in present arbitral 
decision-making models by Nelson and Kim (2008), Gely and Chander (2008), Ross 
and Chen (2007), Chelliah and D‘Netto (2006) and Bemmels (1990a, 1991a, 1991b).  
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The value of this thesis is twofold – theoretically and practically. Theoretically, it 
advances employee misbehaviour and arbitral decision-making theories particularly 
in relation to how the type of misbehaviour, the employee‘s explanation for such 
behaviour and the employer‘s dismissal process, influences the arbitration outcome. 
From a practical perspective, this thesis informs stakeholders in the employment 
relationship about factors at play which tend to make dismissal either more or less 
appropriate as a method to address employee misbehaviour. In addition, new insights 
about the performance of the arbitral decision-making operations by Australia‘s 
national industrial tribunal may be of interest to industry bodies, employers, unions, 
legal firms, consultants and political parties. 
 
The author‘s curiosity to pursue this research topic arose over a decade ago during a 
period of professional practice involving the investigation, counselling and discipline 
of employee transgressions, some of which resulted in conciliation conferences and 
one of which resulted in an arbitration hearing for unfair dismissal. Moving beyond 
this preliminary inspiration, in this thesis, the author draws upon organisational 
behaviour theories and arbitral decision-making theories to design a model. This 
model provides for statistical analysis concerning the unfair dismissal arbitral 
decision-making process in relation to situations where an employee‘s misbehaviour 
was considered so serious that he or she was dismissed from the workplace.  
 
1.1  Background to the research 
To consider first the employee misbehaviour aspect of this thesis, it is known that 
frontline employees through to executive managers are capable of behaving in a 
destructive way that is injurious to themselves, co-workers, or the organisation as a 
whole (Baron & Neuman 1996; Bennett & Robinson 2000; Griffin & O'Leary-Kelly 
2004). For example, when individuals attend work under the influence of alcohol or 
drugs or do not wear appropriate safety gear on the job, they put primarily their own 
welfare at risk. Alternatively, individuals can cause harm or distress to co-workers 
through acts of verbal abuse, anger, physical violence, gossiping, bullying and 
harassment. Actions of this nature are classified as ‗interpersonal deviance‘ 
(Robinson & Bennett 1995). Further still, an individual can cause harm to the wider 
organisation by engaging in behaviours such as working slow, theft, sabotage or 
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destruction of company property. This type of behaviour is classified as 
‗organisational deviance‘ (Robinson & Bennett 1995). Chapter 2 contains an analysis 
of scholarship describing employee misbehaviour with a view to deriving a definition 
of misbehaviour for this thesis. 
 
In relation to the unfair dismissal arbitral decision-making aspect of this thesis, it is 
known that a variety of factors influence the likelihood of whether an arbitrator will 
award some form of remedy to a dismissed worker. Models by Nelson and Kim 
(2008), Gely and Chandler (2008), Ross and Chen (2007), Chelliah and D‘Netto 
(2006) and Bemmels (1990a, 1991a, 1991b) considered a range of elements affecting 
arbitration cases pertaining to unfair dismissal. Chapter 3 contains a discussion of 
these models. However, these models have not yet considered the influence of the 
type of misbehaviour committed by the employee and the employee‘s subsequent 
explanation for his or her behaviour on the arbitrator‘s decision. Chapter 4 discusses 
the results of piecemeal research on potential influencing factors in the arbitral 
decision-making process which will inform hypothesis development for statistical 
analysis. 
 
Whilst the research problem seeks insights about misbehaviour within an unfair 
dismissal, arbitral decision-making context - which immediately associates the 
problem with industrial relations - this thesis ‗borrows‘ theoretical constructs from 
the organisational behaviour literature (Strauss & Whitfield 1998, p. 22) to examine 
the elements of arbitral decision-making. The use of organisational behaviour theory 
in deductive industrial relations research – as occurs in this thesis - is being used 
increasingly in industrial relations research (Strauss & Whitefield 1998). This thesis 
uses the following organisational behaviour related theories to explore areas of 
influence on arbitrators when determining unfair dismissal claims: the employee 
deviance typology (Robinson & Bennett 1995); and the employee explanation 
typology (Southey 2010b); retributive justice (Mahony & Klass 2008); Heider‘s 
attribution theory (Martinko 1995); cognitive bias (Tversky & Kahnemann 2000); 
exit/voice (Cappelli & Chauvin 1991; Hirschman 1970); gender effects (Bemmels 
1991b; Eveline 2005; Nagel & Hagan 1983); organisational justice (Brown, 
Bemmels & Barclay 2010; Greenberg 1990); and formal/informal human resource 
management (Earnshaw, Marchington & Goodman 2000; Kotey & Slade 2005).  
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1.2  The research problem and research questions 
This thesis is designed to improve our knowledge about how employee misbehaviour 
is tolerated by arbitrators when dismissed workers seek recourse through Australia‘s 
industrial arbitration process. As such, the objective of this thesis is:   
 
To identify factors influencing the arbitral decisions of members in 
Australia’s federal industrial tribunal when they determine unfair 
dismissal claims from workers who have been terminated from their 
employment due to ‘misbehaviour’. 
  
A distinctive feature of industrial relations research is that it aims to understand 
socially defined problems (Strauss & Whitfield 1998). This thesis deals with the 
socially defined problem of balancing managerial prerogative to dismiss a 
misbehaving employee in order to maintain business viability, against the 
employee‘s right to respectful, dignified and just treatment when dismissed due to 
misbehaviour or alleged misbehaviour. Davis (2009, p. 171) states ‗if a substantial 
award of compensation is given when an employee’s dignity has been violated, it can 
be regarded as clear condemnation by society of the employer’s behaviour.‘ With 
this in mind, it appears arbitrators‘ decisions pertaining to misbehaviour in the 
workplace set the public standard (Donaghey 2006) and reflect societal values 
(Thornicroft 1989; Wright 2002) for how tolerant employers and unions must be 
towards employees who engage, or who are believed to have engaged in 
misbehaviour.  
 
It is contended that an arbitration decision is the product of the arbitrator‘s 
predicament of having to balance a range of decision elements (Nelson & Kim 2008) 
which in this thesis are: the type of misconduct; the worker‘s explanation for 
engaging in the behaviour; and the procedural fairness shown towards the employee 
by their employer during the investigation and dismissal process. To date, there is 
limited understanding of how industrial arbitrators make their decisions (Bingham 
1996; Klass, Mahony & Wheeler 2006) particularly in cases where the employee has 
been dismissed because of misconduct, and even less so within the Australian 
context (Chelliah & D'Netto 2006; Southey 2008a). This investigation responds to 
the call to provide disputing parties with empirical research identifying the factors 
influencing arbitrators in their considerations of employee petitions against employer 
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decisions to dismiss them from their job (Blancero & Bohlander 1995). To this end, 
the research objective will be addressed by means of three major questions and four 
sub-questions, each seeking insights into the factors at play during arbitration. These 
questions are:  
 
1.2.1  Research question one 
RQ1: How does the type of misbehaviour in which the worker engaged influence 
the arbitrator’s decision to either overturn or uphold management’s action to 
dismiss the worker? 
 
The investigation draws from the four categories of employee misbehaviour depicted 
in Robinson and Bennett‘s (1995) typology: production deviance, property deviance, 
political deviance and personal aggression. Chapter 4 contains the hypotheses 
developed for statistical testing to predict how each of these four categories of 
behaviours might influence an ‗overturn‘ or ‗uphold‘ decision. The dynamics of 
retribution theory (Mahony & Klass 2008; Miceli 2003; Zaibert 2006) and the impact 
of an apology from the worker, service periods and previous offences (Bemmels 
1990a; Nelson & Kim 2008) are considered in the development of testable 
hypotheses for this question. 
 
1.2.2  Research question two 
RQ2: How does the explanation provided by the dismissed worker influence the 
arbitrator’s decision to either overturn or uphold management’s action to dismiss 
the worker? 
 
The investigation draws from the three categories of employee explanations which 
employees are likely to call upon to defend acts of misbehaviour, described in 
Southey‘s (2010b) typology: workplace related; personal-inside; and personal-
outside explanations. Chapter 4 outlines the hypotheses developed for statistical 
testing to predict how well each of these three categories of explanations might 
influence an ‗overturn‘ or ‗uphold‘ decision. These hypotheses incorporate the 
dynamics of process theories pertaining to attribution theory (Leopold, Harris & 
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1.2.3  Research question three 
RQ3: How does the dismissal procedure used by the employer influence the 
arbitrator’s decision to either overturn or uphold management’s action to dismiss 
the worker? 
 
Chapter 4 outlines the hypotheses developed for statistical testing which are 
informed by two primary sources. First, Blancero and Bohlander‘s (1995) typology 
that describes six categories of reasons given by arbitrators for reversing or softening 
the disciplinary action of management: lack of evidence; ignoring mitigating 
circumstances; too severe punishment; lack of due process; management contributed 
to the conduct; lax or inconsistent policies. Second, the validity and procedural 
justice demands contained in Australia‘s Federal industrial legislation by which 
arbitrators in the federal tribunal must abide. It is suggested both these sources reflect 
the dynamics of process theories pertaining to distributive, procedural and 
interactional justice (Folger & Skarlicki 1998; Greenberg 1990; Greenberg & Alge 
1998; Greenberg & Baron 2007).  
 
 
1.2.4  The sub-research questions 
The four sub-questions consider moderating variables that potentially influence the 
arbitration decision. These sub-questions are: 
 
Sub-question (a): Is the arbitration decision influenced by the presence of expert 
advocates representing the parties? 
 
Chapter 4 contains the hypotheses developed to consider whether the arbitration 
decision is affected by the presence or absence of advocates to represent the 
employee‘s unfair dismissal claim and/or the employer‘s defence. These hypotheses 
incorporate the dynamics of exit/voice theory (Hirschman 1970) in their deduction.  
 
Sub-question (b): Is the arbitration decision influenced by characteristics of the 
dismissed worker? 
 
Chapter 4 contains hypotheses to test for moderating characteristics about the worker 
that may influence the arbitrator‘s assessment of the unfair dismissal claim. These 
potential moderating variables reflect previous research into arbitral decision-making 
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pertaining to the worker‘s: gender (Bemmels 1990a; Southey 2008b) and 
occupational skill level (Cappelli & Chauvin 1991; Caudill & Oswald 1992; Southey 
2008a).  
 




Chapter 4 also contains hypotheses in relation to the moderating effects of 
characteristics about the arbitrator that may influence his or her assessment of the 
unfair dismissal claim. These potential moderating variables are selected on the basis 
of previous research in arbitral decision-making pertaining to the arbitrator‘s: gender 
(Bemmels 1990a); experience and award orientation (work background) (Bemmels 
1991a; Bingham & Mesch 2000; Crow & Logan 1994; Nelson & Kim 2008; Southey 
& Fry 2010).  
 
Sub-question (d): Is the arbitration decision influenced by characteristics of the 
employer? 
 
Finally, Chapter 4 contains hypotheses considering potential moderating 
characteristics about the employer that may influence the arbitrator‘s assessment of 
an unfair dismissal claim. The characteristics identified in the arbitral decision-
making literature include: the presence of human resource management expertise and 
use of formal disciplinary processes which can be a reflection of the size of the 
employer‘s business (Earnshaw, Marchington & Goodman 2000; Kotey & Slade 
2005; Mazzarol 2003); the type of industry in which the business operates (Head & 
Lucas 2004; Klass, Brown & Heneman III 1998); and whether it is a public or 
private sector operation (Boyne et al. 2010; Kirschenbaum, Harel & Sivan 1998).  
 
1.2.5  The conceptual model 
Figure 1.1 is a conceptual model depicting the dependent variable as the ‗arbitration 
decision‘. It also depicts the three main research questions, each addressing a 
separate independent variable and the four sub-questions, each addressing a set of 
moderating influences on the dependent variable. This conceptual model shows that 
an arbitration decision about the dismissal of employee due to misbehaviour, is a 
function of the type of employee behaviour, the employee‘s explanation for such 
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behaviour, and the process used by the employer to dismiss the worker. Chapter 4 




Figure 1.1  Conceptual model of the arbitral decision process regarding unfair 
       dismissal claims from workers dismissed due to misbehaviour 
 
(Source: Developed for thesis) 
 
1.3  Assumptions underpinning this study 
The first major assumption influencing this thesis pertains to the unitarist and 
pluralist ideologies that exist within the choices employers make when managing 
their industrial relations (Ross & Bamber 2009). Unitarism and pluralism (Fox 1971) 
describe competing IR philosophies that underpin how employers and workers 
approach the employment relationship.  
 
To explain further, human resource or organisational behaviour experts might view it 
as an employer‘s prerogative to dismiss a worker if the employer decides the worker 
behaved in a manner so serious that the employer no longer wanted to provide a job 
to the worker: ‗the decision to terminate for a particular reason (or no reason) ... is a 
private right exercised pursuant to contract’ (Donaghey 2006, p. 6). This 
management prerogative and ejection of a ‗dishonourable employee‘ (Watson 2008, 
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p. 214), reflects a unitary frame of reference towards the employment relationship 
which is generally adopted by human resource management and organisational 
behaviour scholars. The unitarist ideology in the workplace context values the 
existence of a common interest between management and workers, and aims to avoid 
fundamental conflicts of interest (Fox 1971). Further, it is management (or 
employers) that have the power to decide how to best serve this common interest. 
Generally, those with a unitarist perspective would advocate that arbitration tribunals 
are an unnecessary means of resolving conflict between employers and employees 
(Harley 2004, p. 320). 
 
Opposite to the unitarist view is the pluralist ideology of ‗loyal opposition‘ and is 
generally adopted by industrial relations scholars (Watson 2008). Pluralists view the 
relations between workers and employers as one of: 
 
... structured antagonism .. in the sense that no matter how harmonious their 
relations, there is always a latent conflict between them of pay, working 
conditions and other terms of employment ... conflict is an inherent feature of 
the employment relationship that is caused by the nature of the relationship 
rather than by the institutional arrangements regulating it (Harley 2004, p. 320). 
 
A major assumption of industrial relations theory is the conflict of interest between 
workers and employers in the employment relationship and that these parties, with 
varying priorities, agree to collaborate in social structures that can facilitate their 
bargaining positions (Dabscheck 1983a; Kochan 1998). Although employers have 
the right to establish rules of conduct, when it comes to exercising their rights to 
punish transgressions by employees via dismissal, the pluralist mechanism would 
advocate that when ‗management acts the union reacts’ (Blancero & Bohlander 
1995, p. 618). Unfair dismissal arbitration caters for the union reaction - or pluralist 
response - by providing an avenue for the dismissed worker to seek a hearing on his 
or her dismissal with a neutral third party. In Australia, it is not a voluntary process 
whereby the employer can elect whether or not to respond to the claim. Instead, the 
unfair dismissal conciliation and arbitration processes summon the employer to 
justify its decision to dismiss the worker.  
 
Therefore, the significance of these two perspectives for articulating the research 
problem is that the dismissal of a transgressing worker pits a typically unitarist action 
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taken by an employer against a mechanism of a pluralist framework, that is, 
regulation of the employer‘s action through arbitration by an industrial tribunal.  
 
The second major assumption of this thesis is that the positivistic paradigm and 
quantitative methodology used in this research, will result in a pragmatic, ‗positive‘ 
model, as opposed to an ideological, ‗normative‘ model (Posner 1984), of the unfair 
dismissal arbitration process in relation to misconduct as it is occurring in Australia. 
This research will measure what is happening in workplaces and arbitration hearings, 
as drawn from arbitration documents, so that we have a picture of ‗where we are‘ as 
opposed to ‗where we ought to be‘ (Dabscheck 1999, p. 16) in our dealings with 
employee misbehaviour and dismissal. This positive model provides a sound 
reference point for discussion about normative models of managing the impact of 
misbehaviour on the employment relationship. At the same time, the statistical model 
developed provides knowledge about how arbitrators are likely to respond to 
different misbehaviours and the subsequent process followed by employers in 
dismissing a worker. Whilst this study has an underlying positive assumption, 
paradoxically it at times examines normative statements by arbitrators in the form of 
their ‗value judgements‘ about what should have, or should have not happened 
during the investigation and dismissal process.   
 
A third assumption of this thesis follows in the tradition of Dabscheck‘s (1983b) 
analysis of the arbitral decisions by Sir William Kirby, where it is assumed that the 
sentiments written in the decisions investigated in this study are accurate reflections 
of the arbitrators‘ beliefs at the time of recording their decisions, meaning ‗the real 
reasons and motivations for (his) decisions were not hidden from public view’ 
(Dabscheck 1983b, p. xii). In this thesis, the integrity of the unfair dismissal 
decisions that have been documented by the arbitrators is not under question. This 
thesis examines the ‗value judgements‘ of arbitrators (Dabscheck 1983b). Thus it is 
essential to assume that each decision is a credible account of the arbitrator‘s genuine 
position. Though, having stated this assumption, it has not prevented the 
consideration of whether bias exists among the arbitrators. For instance, the concept 
of ‗unconscious prejudice‘ contends that bias is not obvious to the perpetrator, and 
can exist in spite of the decision maker believing they are not prejudiced (Mason 
2001).   
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A fourth assumption, related to the third assumption, is that arbitrators‘ decisions are 
‗rational‘ decisions. Rational decisions are those which are consistent and where the 
most beneficial option is selected within specified constraints (Robbins, Millett & 
Waters-Marsh 2008, p. 151). This definition permits one to consider that ‗rational‘ 
decisions would also be ‗consistent‘ decisions. The importance of assuming that the 
arbitrators make rational decisions is that it supports the author‘s pursuit of the 
positivistic ‗measurement‘ of arbitral decision-making by finding the commonalities 
in how arbitrators respond to termination of an allegedly misbehaving worker‘s 
employment, within the legislative constraints in which arbitrators operate.  
 
Finally, a note is to be made about the broad economic framework that is assumed to 
exist in the background of this thesis. It is assumed that the employment practices 
and dismissal processes of interest in this thesis occur within the context of a 
‗competitive market economy‘ or ‗developed market economy‘ (Bamber, Lansbury 
& Wailes 2004). A competitive market economy describes those countries where the 
demand for goods and services by consumers is balanced against the supply of goods 
and services by producers and where the price paid is independently determined 
(Arrow & Debreu 1954). To apply this theory to the workplace setting, it assumes 
employers (the buyers of labour) aim to maximise their investment in their staff 
resources and the employees (the sellers of labour) are incentivised to give their best 
effort. As there are many buyers and sellers of labour in the labour market, no single 
entity controls the price and conditions of labour or the supply of labour.  
 
Also implicit in this thesis is that the dismissal practices under examination occur in 
a country competing in the global economy. Labour market efficiency and 
institutional involvement (along with a range of other societal components) improve 
the level of a country‘s global competitiveness (World Economic Forum 2010) and 
positive ambitions in these areas is assumed in this thesis. Labour market efficiency, 
which in part is ‗the ability to shift workers rapidly and at low cost‘ (World 
Economic Forum 2010, p. 7), is reflected in this thesis‘ interest in an employer‘s 
decision to dismiss an employee whose behaviour is assessed as a threat to the 
business. Institutional involvement is reflected in an industrial tribunal‘s arbitration 
of unfair dismissal claims, fettering the freedom of employers to manage their 
business as they see appropriate. Government interventions need to be sound and fair 
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as they can impose additional costs to business and slow economic development if 
their interactions are bureaucratic, over-regulated or, in the worst case, corrupt 
(World Economic Forum 2010). Thus, in the background of this thesis, it is assumed 
that an efficient and flexible labour market is a national goal, supported by 
government policy and institutions geared towards positively influencing 
competitiveness and growth. 
 
1.4  Justification for the research 
The employment relationship is a central focus for investigators in industrial 
relations, industrial psychology, industrial sociology, labour law, human resources 
management and labour history (Wheeler & Rojot 1992). Therefore, ‗improving our 
understanding of the fundamentals of this relationship could be useful for any and all 
of these fields‘ (Wheeler & Rojot 1992, p. 3). It appears that limited research exists 
on what happens to the employee-employer relationship after an employee engages 
in misbehaviour. Research that has occurred has focused on the impact of 
misbehaviour on: individual employees (Hershcovis & Barling 2010); group 
cohesion (Wellen & Neale 2006); and business unit performance (Dunlop & Lee 
2004). This study recognises the breakdown of the employer-employee relationship 
that occurs due to acts of misbehaviour, and subsequent restorative efforts made by a 
third party. It is in this capacity that this study advances our understanding of the 
employer-employee relationship. This is an investigation that links the employee 
deviance literature with the arbitral decision-making literature.  
 
Employee misbehaviour is a reality for Australian workplaces. For example, the 
Australian Bureau of Statistics reported that 56,900 (9.1 percent) of male-perpetrated 
physical assaults had occurred in the workplace in the preceding 12 month period, 
and further, that 13,700 (20.6 percent) of female to female physical assaults 
happened in the workplace (ABS 2005b). In the Australian Public Service, 17 
percent of staff surveyed reported they had been victims of harassment or bullying by 
colleagues in the previous 12 months (Australian Public Service Commission 2009). 
Meanwhile, small businesses in the retail sector where found to be incurring 64 
incidents of employee theft and 8 incidents of employee fraud for every 100 
businesses surveyed (Taylor & Mayhew 2002). And as a final example, the impact of  
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alcohol consumption on productivity related costs for Australian businesses was 
estimated to be $3.6 billion in 2004–2005, with six percent of workers attending the 
workplace, at least once, under the influence of alcohol, according to the 2004 
National Drug Strategy Household Survey (Australian Drug Foundation 2009; Pidd 
& Roche 2009).  
 
Specifically, this research contributes new knowledge on several fronts: theoretically, 
methodologically, practically, politically and internationally. Each of these 
contributions is explained next.  
 
The major theoretical advancements occur in the areas of organisational behaviour 
theory related to employee deviance, and industrial relations theory on arbitral 
decision-making. Typically the focus of research into employee misbehaviour has 
been concerned with, first, describing different types and contexts of misbehaviours, 
for example, identifying behaviours considered deviant (Bennett & Robinson 2000; 
Hollinger & Clark 1982; Robinson & Bennett 1995), expressing anger in the 
workplace (Domagalski & Steelman 2005), doing personal business at work 
(D'Abate 2005), sexual harassment perpetrators (Lucero et al. 2003), incivility 
between workers (Montgomery, Kane & Vance 2004) and absenteeism among 
salaried professionals (Raelin 1986). Secondly, other misbehaviour researchers have 
focused on isolating individual and organisational antecedents of misbehaviour, for 
example, sabotage in the service industry (Harris & Ogbonna 2002), power as a 
trigger to deviant behaviour (Lawrence & Robinson 2007), and work practices 
influencing deviant behaviour (Domagalski & Steelman 2005; Leck 2005; Litzky, 
Eddleston & Kidder 2006). 
 
This thesis breaks from these common tracks of research and contains work that 
contributes, first, to our theoretical understanding of the explanations employees 
provide in defence of their misbehaviour. It appears this is an area of research that 
has not yet been investigated by other researchers. It is noted that the author‘s 
conceptual work on employee explanations of their misbehaviour, and which forms 
part of this thesis, was published during PhD candidacy in the Journal of Industrial 
Relations, 2010. This thesis progresses this descriptive, conceptual model to 
empirical testing.  
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Second, this thesis advances theory by presenting a model of misbehaviour-related, 
unfair dismissal arbitral-decision making that infuses employee deviance theory 
(Bennett & Robinson 2000, Robinson & Bennett 1995) founded in organisational 
behaviour scholarship, with theories on arbitral decision-making in the industrial 
relations setting (Bemmels 1988a, 1988b, 1990a, 1990b, 1991a, 1991b; Chelliah & 
D'Netto 2006; Gely & Chandler 2008; Nelson & Kim 2008; Ross & Chen 2007). 
This model furnishes new knowledge as to how different kinds of misbehaviour are 
tolerated by arbitrators. This is critical knowledge because the impact of arbitration 
decisions, and the subsequent importance of understanding the arbitration process, 
was identified by Mills and Dalton (1994, p. 59) in their statement:  
 
While relatively few cases reach the arbitration level (i.e., most disputes are 
resolved at an earlier stage), such cases are of immense influence. Arbitration 
cases are precedent setting. Not only do they provide clear guidance to those 
who might subsequently pursue a grievance case to this final level, but they also 
instruct the hundreds of thousands of grievances filed annually.  
 
Importantly, from a pure industrial relations perspective, this research contributes to 
our understanding of employment arbitration which is ―a challenging field that in 
many ways is still in its infancy. We are still trying to answer basic questions about 
the general characteristics of this dispute resolution system‖ (Colvin 2009, p. 11). 
 
The methodological contribution of this research responds to the call for 
organisational researchers to describe organisational and interpersonal deviance 
using non self-report data (Dilchert et al. 2007; Stewart et al. 2009). Misbehaviour in 
the workplace is an area of research where the construct being measured is low, base-
rate behaviour and often covert, which poses difficulties in sourcing data that is 
reliable (Ahart & Sackett 2004; Bennett & Robinson 2003; Vardi & Weitz 2004). 
Much of the research in this area relies on surveys where the respondent records their 
propensity to engage in specific acts of misbehaviour given a set of circumstances, or 
to self-report acts of misbehaviour. Researchers cite the need to undertake research 
into deviance using unobtrusive or non-self reporting data sources in order to reduce 
non response bias and distortion from self reported data sources (Bemmels & Foley 
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From a political perspective, the rights of employers and employees in termination 
of employment and the subsequent access for the Australian worker to seek redress 
for their dismissal was described as a ‗political football‘ since its introduction by the 
Keating Labor government in 1993 (Forsyth et al. 2008, p. 235). The protection of 
unfair dismissal rights is an important issue to Australians. This was demonstrated by 
the protests during the brief but tumultuous WorkChoices era of the Howard 
government when small business employees (of less than 100 workers) were denied 
unfair dismissal rights, whilst employers could dismiss a worker for any operational 
reason (Forsyth et al. 2008). Australians value job security and whilst the majority of 
Australians will not make an unfair dismissal claim, the unfair dismissal conciliation 
and arbitration processes provides a measure of job security (Peetz 2007).  
 
Wheeler and Rojot (1992, p. 3) assert there is always public interest in justice and in 
‘employees being free from arbitrary and oppressive treatment, whether at the hand 
of government or private persons’. The arbitration of termination of employment 
processes, as it exists under Australian legislation, ‘introduces a measure of public 
interest to a private right which would otherwise be regulated only by the common 
law’ (Donaghey 2006, p. 6). This means that employers have the right under contract 
law to dismiss a worker, yet the just execution of such rights, are judged by 
Australia‘s industrial tribunals (primarily Fair Work Australia) thus setting a widely 
applicable public standard of how employers are to behave toward employees in 
matters of dismissal. Due to the significance of the unfair dismissal arbitration 
process to Australians generally, this study contributes knowledge about the 
influencing factors on unfair dismissal arbitral determinations as it occurs in 
Australia‘s federal industrial tribunal. As the data covers a ten year span of decisions, 
it appears to be the largest study to date on unfair dismissal cases determined by 
Australia‘s federal industrial tribunal (the AIRC and FWA). For policy makers 
engaged in the practical work of making laws, this research identifies the vulnerable 
and lesser vulnerable workers in Australian workplaces.   
 
From a labour law perspective, Australia‘s current federal industrial legislation, The 
Fair Work Act 2009 (which was amended in 2012) (and its predecessor, The 
Workplace Relations Act 1996) empowers the arbitrator to consider whether a 
dismissal was ‗harsh, unjust or unreasonable‘.  Notably, the concepts of harsh, unjust 
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and unreasonable are not defined in either Act, forcing arbitrators (generally known 
as commissioners) to make difficult assessments on the appropriateness of a 
dismissal. Consequently, this ‗imprecise question tends to allow a degree of 
subjectivity and impression into the conclusion reached‘ (Donaghey 2006, p. 202). 
The following quote well articulates this issue for Australian arbitrators determining 
cases of employee misconduct. 
 
The process of determining whether, in all the circumstances, the Commission 
will determine that the dismissal was harsh, unjust or unreasonable can be 
fraught with uncertainty. This uncertainty often arises in cases where 
considerations of the gravity of an employee‘s misconduct must be weighed 
against the conventions of what is often, somewhat misleadingly, referred to as 
procedural fairness. Such cases are particularly problematic because they 
involve the further difficulty arising from differences of opinion (between 
applicants and respondents, as well as between members of the Commission) 
regarding what sort of conduct constitutes grounds for dismissal (Ronfeldt 
1998, p. 24). 
 
This quote highlights the challenge for Australian arbitrators to decipher the facts 
from the sentiment, ascertain the procedural process, assess the justness of the 
dismissal according to the severity of the employee‘s actions, assess the integrity of 
each party‘s evidence, whilst anticipating what might be a possible re-assessment of 
their decision by their colleagues in the case of an appeal. To improve our 
understanding on these deliberations, the investigation in this thesis presents a model 
of factors influential in determining a claim. 
 
From an HR/IR practitioner and union perspective, this thesis informs such 
stakeholders of behavioural issues that may be occurring in the workplace, and 
whether dismissing the employee is the appropriate response. ‘Practically, managers 
need to know what the law is in order to follow it. Trade unionists and other worker 
representatives need this knowledge in order to insist effectively on lawful behaviour 
by managers’ (Wheeler & Rojot 1992, p. 2). This thesis provides these parties with 
insight into the arbitration outcomes when considering termination or preparing 
defences for unfair dismissal hearings. Insights will be garnered about the 
circumstances in which dismissal may be an appropriate or inappropriate response to 
misconduct. For instance, if a particular type of behaviour or explanation tends to 
influence the overturning of the employer‘s decision, it may be more appropriate to 
manage the misbehaviour in ways other than termination such as job reassignment or 
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training. Alternatively, if a particular behaviour or explanation is regularly upheld by 
the arbitrator as an offence worthy of termination, it may confirm dismissal as a 
reasonable approach to managing misconduct by employees.   
 
At an international level, Wheeler and Rojot (1992) noted that the challenge of 
effectively dealing with justice issues in the employment relationship increases 
exponentially as both business and labour cross national boundaries in the global 
economy. This thesis provides a reference source about Australian arbitral 
assessments of employee unfair dismissal claims as a basis for international 
comparison. The body of evidence from one country can provide guidance for other 
countries.  
 
1.5  Methodology 
The research reported in this thesis is both exploratory and descriptive in nature.  
Exploratory research occurs where there are very few previous studies for which to 
refer on the matter under investigation (Collis & Hussey 2003). In this thesis, the 
interest lies in identifying whether there are particular types of misbehaviour, and 
whether there are particular types of explanations for engaging in misbehaviour, 
associated with favourable or unfavourable arbitration decisions for the dismissed 
employee. Whilst previous research has been conducted into arbitral decision-
making, there is little that has occurred on it that takes into account the influence of a 
range of misbehaviours or employee defences. This research then progresses beyond 
an exploratory focus to a descriptive focus as it will ascertain a fuller set of variables 
that influence the unfair dismissal arbitration decisions. Descriptive research 
identifies the characteristics of particular problem or issue (Collis & Hussey 2003). 
 
The remainder of this section provides a brief introduction to the research paradigm 
and research process used to investigate the research question. Complete details of 
the methodology and research process are provided in chapter 5 on ‗methodology‘. 
However, to appreciate the contents of this thesis from the outset, an explicit point is 
made that this research is underpinned by a positivist or traditional research 
paradigm. The positivist paradigm is congruent with the overall assumption in this 
thesis that it presents a ‗positive model‘ of arbitral decision-making over unfair 
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dismissal claims, as opposed to the ‗normative model‘ of what ought to happen when 
arbitrators determine claims. The ‗positive model‘ assumption was discussed in 
section 1.3.  
 
The positivist research paradigm has two major design implications in this thesis. 
First, a positivist researcher collects data in a form that is quantitative, detached and 
objective, to address the research questions (Collis & Hussey 2003; Leedy & Ormrod 
2001). The 2011-12 annual report of Australia‘s federal tribunal states that it 
received 14,027 claims from employees dismissed for reasons that included 
misbehaviour. In the same year, the tribunal resolved 551 cases by arbitral 
determination as most cases were resolved through or incidental to the conciliatory 
processes of the tribunal (FWA 2012). This research draws upon the population of 
misconduct-related unfair dismissal arbitration decisions of the federal tribunal, the 
Australian Industrial Relations Commission (AIRC) and Fair Work Australia (FWA) 
between July 2000 and July 2010. (Note, from 1 January 2013, the federal tribunal 
was retitled to the Fair Work Commission (FWC)). These dates represent the time 
from which the decisions commenced electronic publication through to the most 
recent decisions available at the time of collecting the data. With the focus on claims 
where the employee was dismissed for misconduct, the ten year period yielded 565 
arbitration decisions suitable for analysis. 
 
The federal level tribunal decisions of FWA and the AIRC, as opposed to state 
tribunal decisions, are examined due to their online availability and because the 
federal tribunal is the predominant tribunal in Australia covering at least 75 percent 
of the Australian workforce since the Work Choices reforms in 2005 (Stewart 2009, 
p. 8). The industrial relations labour law methodologist, Andrew Frazer (1999, p. 90) 
suggested that a quantitative approach is an appropriate research method for 
understanding ‗how a tribunal will decide a similar issue in the future‘. Accordingly, 
each ‗industrial case‘ is treated as an ‗event‘ and converted to quantitative data for 
statistical analysis (Frazer 1999). In this thesis an ‗industrial case‘ equates to each 
unfair dismissal claim that proceeds to arbitration and its subsequent arbitral 
decision. The methodology chapter explains the process undertaken to access the 
arbitration decisions and conduct a content analysis of them in order to collect raw 
data for statistical testing. 
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Second, a positivist paradigm means this thesis addresses each research question by 
deducing it into a series of variables and hypotheses, using previous literature as a 
guide (Neuman 2003). Logistic regression analysis is performed to statistically test 
the hypotheses and subsequent viability of the conceptualised arbitral decision-
making depicted in Figure 1.1. Logistic regression is appropriate for analysing data 
that is categorical, frequency-type data and where the dependent variable is binomial, 
for example, successful/not successful (Agresti 2002; Lindsey 1995). In this thesis, 
the binominal dependent variable is that the arbitrator either upholds (employer‘s 
favour) or overturns (worker‘s favour) the employer‘s decision to terminate. The 
reason for using logistic regression is discussed in the fifth chapter on ‗methodology‘ 
and the results of the hypotheses testing via logistic regression are presented in the 
sixth chapter. 
 
The last point concerning the methodology used in this thesis, is to elucidate a reply 
to those social science scholars who dismiss the positivist paradigm and quantitative 
methodologies out of concern such approaches promote findings with ‗spurious and 
misleading exactitude‘ (Strauss & Whitfield 1998, p. 17). This critique of the 
positive paradigm suggests that quantitative analysis lacks validity in the social 
science setting. In response, this study mines the narratives of actual arbitration 
decisions pertaining to employee misconduct in genuine workplace settings. It takes 
advantage of the insights available in qualitative, narrative material for quantitative 
analysis (Frazer 1999; Hodson 2008). The benefit of this method is that multiple 
cases of misbehaviour incidents are unobtrusively examined (Trochim 2006), from 
several perspectives (the employee, the employer, the arbitrator). These discussions 
have occurred under Oath in a quasi-legal setting, providing some assurance that the 
accounts of the misbehaviour and dismissal incident are accurate (Southey 2010b). 
The methodology chapter further addresses validity and reliability issues associated 
with the quantitative paradigm. 
 
1.6  Outline of this thesis 
This thesis consists of seven chapters as shown in Figure 1.2. After the introductory 
chapter, chapter 2 and chapter 3 both contain a review of the scholarship into 
employee misbehaviour, arbitral decision-making and issues specific to the 
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Australian context. Chapter 4 contains individual hypotheses pertaining to the 
conceptual model. Chapter 5 describes the research methodology, with chapter 6 
reporting the results of the hypothesis testing. Chapter 7 discusses the results and 




Figure 1.2  The structure of this thesis  
Chapter 2 – Parental literature on 
employee misbehaviour  
This chapter organises the various 
perspectives taken by social science 
researchers into employee misbehaviour. 
Misbehaviour is analysed and defined for 
this study. Industrial discipline is 
considered as a response to misbehaviour. 
Chapter 4 – Hypotheses developed to test the conceptual model 
This chapter analyses the conceptual model that combines employee misbehaviour with 
arbitral decision-making. Each variable of interest raised within the model is reviewed and 
hypotheses presented for empirically testing the research questions. 
Chapter 6 – Results 
This chapter presents the descriptive statistics and results of the empirical analysis. 
Chapter 7 – Discussion of results and conclusions 
This chapter concludes the thesis by presenting a discussion of the results, overall conclusion, 
theoretical and practical implications, as well as suggesting future areas of research. 
Chapter 5 – The research methodology 
This chapter presents the research methodology and the statistical analysis method of logistic 
regression used to test the hypothesis developed and presented in Chapter 4.  
Chapter 1 – Introduction 
This chapter identifies the background in which the research problem is nested and unveils 
the research objective, questions, scope and major assumptions. An overview of the research 
methodology is also provided in this chapter. 
Chapter 3 – Parental literature on 
unfair dismissal arbitration 
This chapter addresses IR and OB theories 
of arbitration as well as ideologies 
underpinning unfair dismissal protection. 
Unfair dismissal worldwide is considered 
before reviewing the Australian context of 
unfair dismissal arbitration. A review of 
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1.7  Definitions 
Key terms used throughout this thesis are presented in Table 1.1. These explanations 
provide a quick reference for terms and concepts associated with the study. Chapters 
2 and 3 provide additional discussions on the constructs of misbehaviour, unfair 
dismissal and arbitration. 
 




Australian Industrial Relations Commission – this was Australia‘s 
federal industrial tribunal until the passing of the Fair Work Act 2009, 
when it was replaced by Fair Work Australia (FWA). 
applicant 
The dismissed worker who made a claim through either the AIRC or 
FWA.  May also be referred to in this study as the ‗grievant‘. 
arbitrator 
In the context of this study, this is the person with the authority in 
either FWA or AIRC who makes the binding decision on the unfair 
dismissal claim.  See also ‗commissioner‘.  
arbitration 
This is the ‗final means of resolving disputes‘ (Bemmels 1990a) 





The arbitrator‘s determination that is ultimately in favour of the 
aggrieved employee or alternatively, favourable to the employer. Also 
referred to in the study as a ‗decision‘. Decisions favourable to the 
employee capture where the arbitrator orders any of the following: 
reinstatement/re-employment, reinstatement with backpay and/or 
continuity of service, or financial compensation for lost wages only. 
commissioner 
Government appointees of the AIRC/FWA (and now FWC) 
responsible for hearing unfair dismissal claims.  Also referred to in this 
study as the ‗arbitrator‘. They can instead bear the titles of deputy 




A course of action taken against an individual when he or she fails to 
conform to the rules of the industrial organisation of which he is a 
member (Jones 1961). Considered in this thesis as either a punitive-
authoritative style or a positive-corrective style. 
federal tribunal 
Australia‘s national industrial relations tribunal installed through 
federal industrial relations legislation, with the authority to determine 
unfair dismissal claims. (See also FWC, FWA, AIRC.) 
FWA 
Acronym for Fair Work Australia. This was Australia‘s federal level 
industrial tribunal that replaced the Australian Industrial Relations 
Commission (AIRC) in 2009. 
 (continued over) 
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Term Explanation 
FWC 
Acronym for Fair Work Commission. This is Australia‘s current 
federal level industrial tribunal. From 1 January 2013, it was renamed 
from Fair Work Australia under the Fair Work Amendment Act 2012. 




Single or multiple incidents committed by one or more employees that, 
in the opinion of the employer, are worthy of the perpetrator(s) 
dismissal from the workplace. 
respondent The employer responsible for the dismissal. 
state State level government in Australia (as opposed to federal government) 
the State 
Under industrial relations theory, the government, as a player in the 
industrial relations system that ‗sets up the framework of rules, 
policies, and institutions (such as tribunals and commissions) by which 
employers, their unions and organisations seek to accommodate their 
differences‘ (Alexander, Lewer & Gahan 2008, p. 17) 
The Act 
This refers to Australia‘s federal level industrial relations act, titled 
‗The Fair Work Act (2009)‘ (the FWA Act) subject to minor 
amendments made by the Fair Work Amendment Act 2012.  The 2009 
Act was introduced by the Rudd Labor Government. The previous 
federal Act was the ‗Workplace Relations Act (1996)‘ (the WR Act) 
which was introduced by the Howard Liberal Government and was 
reformed by the ‗Workplace Relations Amendment (Work Choices) 
Act 2005.  
unfair dismissal 
Unfair dismissal occurs when an employee‘s work contract is 
terminated by his or her employer for reasons which are considered 
harsh, unjust or unreasonable (CCH Australia Ltd 2005). 
 
(Source: Developed for thesis) 
1.8  Research scope 
This section outlines the boundaries of this research and is supplementary to the key 
assumptions discussed in section 1.3 and limitations discussed in section 1.9 (Perry 
1998). This section aims to clarify the ‗population‘ about which the findings in this 
research are made (Perry 1998, p. 14) by highlighting the following five parameters 
about the research subjects. First, the research subjects in this investigation are 
Australian workers, Australian employers, Australian unions, and Australian federal 
industrial tribunal arbitrators. The data collected stems from accounts of Australian 
workers who lost their job because, in their employers‘ opinion, they engaged in 
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behaviour warranting termination of their employment. Subsequently, this study 
reflects the population of workers accessing the arbitration services of the federal 
industrial tribunal in Australia, resulting in a study that cuts across industries, 
occupations, skill levels and gender.  
 
Second, the type of unfair dismissal claim investigated in this study relates only to 
arbitration cases determined by the AIRC/FWA (which is now the FWC) by a single 
arbitrator (commissioner). To avoid double-counting decisions, it excludes 
‗appealed‘ decisions which occur before a ‗full bench‘ of three commissioners 
(Southey 2008a). The Fair Work Commission is the current title for the federal level 
industrial tribunal, although each Australian state, except Victoria, also has a state 
tribunal that conciliates and arbitrates unfair dismissal claims [Victoria surrendered 
its industrial powers to federal jurisdiction (Sappey et al 2006)]. Further, this 
investigation does not examine ‗adverse action‘ claims under the Fair Work Act‘s 
general protection provisions. Adverse action claims can be pursued by a worker if 
they believe they were terminated on discriminatory grounds, because of industrial 
activity, temporary absence due to illness or injury, or for making a complaint or 
inquiry. Although conciliated by the FWC (and FWA previously), binding 
determinations are made by the Federal Magistrates Court (FWC 2013c). The 
decisions of interest in this study are those made by an industrial tribunal over unfair 
dismissal claims, which are distinct from civil claims pursued through tort law and 
determined by common law courts for damages resulting from a dismissal. 
 
Third, the focus of this research concerns acts of misbehaviour committed at the 
individual level within the workplace. This is described as the micro level of analysis 
where the misbehaviour is enacted by an individual or a small group of colluding 
individuals (Ashforth et al. 2008), with the intention to either benefit oneself or to 
inflict minor to considerable damage or destruction, regardless of whether it is 
underhand or obvious (Vardi & Weitz 2004). This micro level of analysis is referred 
to, colloquially, as the ‗bad apples in a barrel‘ (Ashforth et al. 2008; Burke 2009; 
Wellen & Neale 2006; Zyglidopoulos & Fleming 2008).  
 
This means that outside the scope of this research are the macro-level studies aimed 
at organisational-wide misbehaviour: the ‗bad barrels‘ (Ashforth et al. 2008; Burke 
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2009; Zyglidopoulos & Fleming 2008). The ‗bad barrel‘ studies involve actions that 
may be committed by individuals or groups within the workplace but with the 
organisation and or owners/shareholders getting the primary benefit (Vardi & Weitz 
2004). These activities include acts of pollution, price-fixing and collusion and are 
commonly referred to in the literature as corruption, corporate crime or corporate 
deviance (Pinto, Leana & Pil 2008). Also outside the scope are the industry-level 
studies of misbehaviour, or, those concerned with the ‗bad orchards‘, for example, 
the financial services industry for churning insurance policies (Burke 2009).  
 
Fourth, also encompassing a macro-view of organisational behaviour are acts of 
organised, overt, industrial resistance (Collinson & Ackroyd 2005) which occur in 
the form of strikes, petitions, no-confidence votes and mail-outs initiated by 
employee representatives, typically unions. Acts such as these are not within the 
scope of this thesis.  
 
Finally, acts of employee misbehaviour are distinguished in this study from 
unsatisfactory work performance by an employee. There are employees dismissed 
from their work due to their inability to effectively execute their job demands to an 
expected performance standard (Tovey & Uren 2006). Poor job performance is  
associated with employees experiencing problems with: skills, knowledge; incentive; 
motivation; and/or resources to successfully meet job demands (Rossett 1987). 
Unsatisfactory performance is not ‗misbehaviour‘ and outside the scope of this 
thesis. 
 
1.9  Limitations  
Limitations are matters in the design of the research that are beyond the researcher‘s 
control (Perry 1998). Limitations in relation to the research method are discussed in 
chapter 4. This thesis cannot address events where an employee either abandoned a 
claim, or settled his or her claim at conciliation. Between July 2000 and June 2010, 
an average of 7,449 unfair dismissal claims were lodged each year, resulting in 
average of 178 substantive unfair dismissal arbitration decisions each year (refer to 
Table 3.6). Based on these averages, full arbitration finalised around 2.4 percent of 
the claims. Around 75% of the claims were deemed to have been ‗settled‘ via 
conciliation by the AIRC (Southey 2008a) with an increase to 81% by FWA in 2009-
  
 
Southey: Employee misbehaviour and unfair dismissal arbitration                                        Page 25 
2010 (FWA 2010b). Public records are not available for unfair dismissal conciliation 
hearings as they are ‗private conferences‘ (FWA 2010b).  
 
Another limitation results from the Australian context of the investigation where 
influences from government legislation may hinder generalisation to other countries. 
For example, the Australian legislation identifies which Australian workers can – and 
cannot - access the federal tribunal to lodge an unfair dismissal claim. Consequently, 
the factors influencing the arbitration decisions in Australia may not translate directly 
to another country‘s arbitral decision making over misconduct, as Australian 
arbitrators are exposed to a pool of eligible employees which may differ 
internationally. Features of the Australian context are noted in tandem with the 
hypotheses developed throughout chapter 4. These Australia-specific discussions will 
serve as reminders of the omnipresent cultural and legislative parameters of this 
thesis.  
 
1.10  Chapter 1 conclusion 
 
This chapter presented the underpinnings of this thesis. It first apprised the reader of 
its objective to ascertain the significant influences on the decisions of Australian 
arbitrators when they determine unfair dismissal claims from workers dismissed 
from their employment on the basis of misbehaviour. Inspired by the recent portrayal 
of arbitral decision-making in the literature, a conceptual model of possible 
influences was presented. This conceptual model integrates three main research 
questions and four sub-questions that categorise the possible range of factors 
influencing the arbitration decisions: the type of misbehaviour; the explanation given 
by the employee; the process used by the employer in dismissing the employee, the 
role of advocacy, and moderating characteristics of the arbitrator, worker and 
employer. It was noted that a positive assumption underlies this research and 
additional assumptions, scope and limitations pertaining to the research were 
identified. Discussion was devoted to justifying this research on the basis of its 
theoretical, methodological, practical, political, and potential international 
contribution. Preliminary information about the quantitative methodological 
approach was provided, the structure of this thesis was presented and definitions for 
major terms outlined. The following six chapters now present this research.  
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A PREFACE TO THE LITERATURE REVIEW CHAPTERS 
The literature review appears across three chapters in this thesis. Perry (1998) 
recommends including a diagram of the literature review to guide the reader. In view 
of this, Figure 2.1 charts the arrangement of the literature review. 
 
Figure 2.1 Guide to the literature review chapters 
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CHAPTER 2 
 PARENTAL LITERATURE ON EMPLOYEE MISBEHAVIOUR 
 
2.0  Introduction 
The initial two chapters of this three chapter literature review demonstrate the role of 
the parent disciplines and the theoretical and practical background within which the 
research problem is nested (Perry 1998). The research question brings into play two 
conceptual frameworks, employee conduct that is considered misbehaviour, and the 
arbitration of unfair dismissal claims. Accordingly, chapter 2 addresses employee 
misbehaviour; and chapter 3 addresses the unfair dismissal arbitration literature. 
chapter 4 explicitly relates to the research questions and discusses theories and 
findings of previous researchers to deduce testable hypotheses.  
 
This chapter commences with a discussion locating employee misbehaviour research 
within the social science literature, in order to isolate the research problem within the 
broad range of existing disciplinary perspectives (Ellem 1999b). The reasons for 
embracing the perspectives of industrial relations and organisational behaviour to 
investigate the research questions are also discussed. This chapter then proceeds to 
examine the descriptive literature regarding misbehaviour by analysing the 
‗misbehaviour‘ construct through the organisational behaviour and industrial 
relations lens, with the aim to define ‗misbehaviour‘ for this study. This chapter 
concludes by commenting on research that has dealt explicitly with the impact of 
misbehaviour on the employment relationship. 
 
2.1  Disciplinary perspectives of employee misbehaviour 
The parental theories of misbehaviour in the workplace are the focus in this section. 
The social sciences hosts a diversity of disciplines and movements which collectively 
contribute to the study of human behaviour (Williams, Guiffre & Dellinger 2010b) 
with potential to provide ‗societies with a full repertoire of approaches to societal 
problems‘ (Schwartz-Shea 2006, p. 210) and ‗enlightened development‘ through its 
reflections and analysis of society (Schatzki 2006, p. 127). Whilst it is impossible to 
incorporate every social science disciplinary perspective of employee misbehaviour 
into the design of this study, it would be misguided to ignore the special interests and 
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paradigms that exist amongst social scientists that also contribute to understanding 
the research problem (Desrosiers et al. 2002; Ellem 1999b; Rogelberg & Brooks-
Laber 2002; Schwartz-Shea 2006). Further, Dufty (1999, p. 195) suggests that the 
author of an industrial relations thesis ‗should acknowledge the possible relevance of 
factors outside the frame of reference encompassed by the discipline you have 
chosen‘. Therefore, the purpose of this section is to acknowledge that a range of 
theoretical perspectives towards employee misbehaviour exist beyond the industrial 
relations and organisational behaviour underpinnings in this study. This discussion 
contributed to this research in two ways. First, it provided a frame of reference for 
identifying relevant and irrelevant discussions during the literature review process. 
Second, at the point of concluding this research, this discussion illuminated the way 
to acknowledge broader disciplinary implications so that our understandings of 
employee misbehaviour can extend beyond a parochial disciplinary point of view. 
 
2.1.1  Employee misbehaviour in the social sciences  
Figure 2.2 illustrates the author‘s conceptualisation of 13 discipline perspectives of 
employee misbehaviour and inter-relations that exist amongst them. This diagram 
does not capture the full complexity of the social science disciplinary network, a feat 
which may be impossible to capture in a single diagram. Instead, it reflects the 
author‘s interpretation of the co-existence of disciplines contributing to the evolution 
of scholarship. For instance, up to the 1960s, economics, industrial relations and 
human resource management scholars had integrated interests, after which the human 
resource scholars moved away from economics and industrial relations 
macro/institutional focus in their pursuit of understanding the individual employee 
aspect of employment relations by drawing on psychology theory (Kaufman 2002). 
Whereas, industrial relations scholars tended to draw on sociology theory in the 
1970s, economics in the 1980s, and developed an interest in psychology during the 
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Source:  Developed for thesis and based on discipline descriptions from: (Collinson & Ackroyd 2005; 
Dore 2005; Gunderson 2001; Hollinger & Clark 1982; Petzall, Abbott & Timo 2007; Richards, James 
2008; Scott & Jehn 2003; Society for Industrial and Organizational Psychology Inc 2007; Tansey 
2000; Vardi & Weitz 2004; Vaughan 1999; Zyglidopoulos & Fleming 2008) 
 
Figure 2.2 Conceptual diagram of disciplinary perspectives of employee 
misbehaviour, within the social sciences. 
 
The ensuing discussion briefly reflects on the contribution of the disciplines, as 
depicted in Figure 2.2, towards employee misbehaviour research. 
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(i) Psychology 
Psychology is about understanding the human mind which regulates behaviour which 
is ‗an indispensable part of the equipment for work in any of the (social) sciences‘ 
(McDougall 1919, p. 5). The psychological view on misbehaviour in the workplace 
is that it is abnormal and  avoidable (Collinson & Ackroyd 2005) and therefore 
controllable, or at least amenable to modification. To the psychologist, misbehaviour 
is seen as irrational behaviour committed by individuals. Misbehaviour research 
taking a psychological perspective tends to consider the influence of personal 
mediators on misbehaviour, such as: self-esteem (Ferris et al. 2009); personality 
traits (Bolton, Becker & Barber 2010); motivational traits (Diefendorff & Mehta 
2007); degree of self control (Marcus & Schuler 2004); personal ethical ideology 
(Henle, Giacalone & Jurkiewicz 2005); personal attitudes (Bolin & Heatherly 2001); 
negative affectivity (Aquino, Lewis & Bradfield 1999; Penney & Spector 2005); 




Sociologists aim to understand the communal arrangements human beings make 
amongst themselves, as well as how they are organised by others in society, with the 
hope of assisting people to cope and adjust in an ever-changing world and to sustain 
families and community (Beilharz & Hogan 2006; Watson 2008). In terms of dark-
side behaviours, sociologists aim to know how the ‗environment‘ contributes to 
misconduct, the environment being the organisational setting, structure and 
processes, as well as the wider societal context (Vaughan 1999). 
 
Sociologists might view misbehaviour as a form of resistance to a particular 
managerial practice or behaviour (Collinson & Ackroyd 2005) which distinguishes it 
from the industrial sociological and Marxist perspectives that hold the view there 
exists a prevailing opposition between management and workers, generally. 
Investigations into the sociological influences on misbehaviour include: deviance as 
a response to injustices by management (Hollinger & Clark 1982; Kelloway et al. 
2010); supervisors as a source of conflict (Bruk-Lee & Spector 2006), intimidation 
by management (Zoghbi Manrique de Lara 2006); positive and negative management 
behaviours (Litzky, Eddleston & Kidder 2006); perceptions of pay inequity 
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(Greenberg 1990); conflicting role expectations in professional workers (Raelin 
1986); frustration caused by the job (Fox & Spector 1999); and workplace sexuality 
(Williams, Guiffre & Dellinger 1999). An informative essay on the perspectives of 
sociologists interested in misconduct occurs in the work by Diane Vaughan (1999). 
 
(iii) Anthropology 
The distinction between the research activities of anthropologists and sociologists is 
that anthropologists extend their observations of society to foreign races and cultures 
whilst sociologists focus their attention to understanding the arrangement of people 
closer to their home environment (Locke & Golden-Biddle 2002). National cultural 
influences identified in Hofstede‘s five values of national culture (1993), have been 
used in misbehaviour studies, where researchers suggesting that a country‘s level of 
power-distance, collectivist-individualist and uncertainty avoidance can influence the 
frequency and tolerance of workers that deviate from societal-influenced workplace 
norms (Bennett & Robinson 2003; Getz & Volkema 2001; Taggar & MacDonald 
2005). Kim et al. (2008) also took an anthropological perspective in their study of 
cultural differences and offense-types variances between US and South Korean 
workers, as did Cooper‘s investigation of cultural intelligence and employee 
assessments of co-worker behaviour in multinational organisations (Cooper, Doucet 
& Pratt 2007). Intercepting with the economics discipline is Balsa and French‘s 
(2009) study of the potential consequences of abusive drinking on the labour market 
in less developed countries.  
 
An additional point of anthropological relevance is that the literature on 
misbehaviour concerns mainly western perspectives of misbehaviour, even when 
describing those research projects undertaken in non-western cultural settings 
(Collinson & Ackroyd 2005). Dore (2005) identifies the dominant assumption that 
behaviours and models from the US/UK are normative, with other cultures viewed as 
deviant. This highlights the potential opportunities for anthropologists to explore 
misbehaviour outside Anglo-Saxon perspectives.  
(iv) Economics 
Economics involves the study of production, markets and wealth and the influence of 
government policy on the marketplace (Encyclopaedia Britannica 2010a). It 
examines the decisions people make when they are faced with constraints in relation 
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to environmental factors such as time, budget and availability of information – as 
opposed to considering psychological variables influencing decision-making 
(Gunderson 2001; Kaufman 2002). The disciplines of economics and industrial 
relations have been closely associated since the early 20
th
 century, where issues 
falling within the industrial relations domain – such as high employee turnover, low 
work effort and poverty level wages – were researched primarily by (labour) 
economists (Kaufman 2002). More recently, ‗personnel economics‘ integrates 
economics, industrial relations and human resource management as scholars seek to 
measure the benefits and costs of the internal labour market of the firm (Gunderson 
2001). Examinations of employee misbehaviour from an economic perspective might 
consider the influence of wage levels or the availability of skills in the labour market 
on the frequency of misbehaviour, or the overall costs of misbehaviour for business. 
 
(v) Social-psychology 
Operating from a premise that humans are born with a mind that is raw and ‗non-
moral‘, social psychologists aim to understand how the ‗complex mental life of 
societies‘ shape and develop the individual human mind (McDougall 1919, p. 24). 
The central tenet of social psychology is the concept of social influence, which refers 
to the omnipresent effect that people have on our behaviour, thoughts, feelings and 
attitudes (Aronson, Wilson & Akert 2005). Social psychologists investigate both 
negative and positive human behaviours that are triggered by social influences, and 
recognise the impact of cultural and social traditions on human behaviour. A number 
of social-psychology concepts have been adapted for use by other disciplines, for 
example, within the workplace context, job satisfaction and organisational 
citizenship behaviour (also known as pro-social workplace behaviour) are used by 
organisational behaviour theorists and human resource management theorists to 
inform management practices (Baron & Bryne 2000).  
 
Social-psychologists believe that misbehaviour can be committed by potentially 
anyone, given the right social conditions, thus they aim to explore the social systems 
in which individuals become ‗corrupt‘ (Zyglidopoulos & Fleming 2008). Examples 
of social-psychology research into employee misbehaviour include: Sims (2002) 
investigation of social bonding theory on rule breaking by employees; Domagalski 
and Steelman‘s (2005) examination of the effects of supervisors, co-workers and 
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subordinates on the expression of anger; and Penney, Spector and Fox‘s (2003) work 
that combined job stressors with individual personality as predictors of counter-
productive behaviour.  
 
(vi) Industrial-organisational psychology 
The discipline of industrial-organisational psychology applies psychological theory 
to the workplace environment and draws much of its theory from the field of social 
psychology, as well as psychometrics, motivation, learning and personality (Society 
for Industrial and Organizational Psychology Inc 2007).  Its origins are associated 
with early twentieth century Taylorism, or scientific management, in which the 
workforce is deployed to maximise efficiency and eliminate duplication through 
narrow jobs tasks and intensive supervision (Taylor 2005). In the post war era, 
criticisms of Taylorism for its dehumanisation of work saw rise to the humanist 
movement in which scholars discussed the need and benefit of providing jobs which 
engaged people with their work. These schools of thought are parental to the human 
resource management, organisational behaviour and organisational development 
disciplines of today. The research and practice areas for industrial-organisational 
psychologists is extensive, but includes areas such as job analysis, job design, 
recruitment and selection, work motivation, team performance and reward to 
mention only a few. An example of research into employee misbehaviour from an 
industrial-organisational perspective might include, for example, the influence of 
psychological contract breach on workplace deviance (Bordia, Restubog & Tang 
2008). The following two sections will examine the closely aligned discipline areas 
of human resource management and organisational behaviour, and their perspective 
of employee misbehaviour. 
 
(vii) Human resource management 
Underpinned by a unitarist ideology, the aim of human resource management is to 
implement systems that engineer high levels of employee commitment where 
employees are seen as assets or resources (Geare, Edgar & McAndrew 2006; 
Thompson & McHugh 2002). HRM scholars conceptualise the employment 
relationship as one of high trust and ‗symbiotic‘ in nature (Riley 2005, p. 16) and it 
typically involves the human resource manager through to line managers and 
supervisors in people management activities related to job design, recruitment, 
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rewarding and disciplining, training and career development, teamwork and 
continuous improvement. Researchers aim to characterise ‗good‘ jobs or human 
resource systems with a view to developing best practice methods for people 
management in the workplace (Scott & Jehn 2003, p. 248). Studies that have 
investigated employee misconduct from a human resource perspective include: the 
influence of job security and career development opportunities on misbehaviour 
(Huiras, Uggen & McMorris 2000); managing incivility through human resource 
development (Reio & Ghosh 2009); preventing workplace violence (Mack et al. 
1998); appropriately treating whistleblowers (De Maria 1999); pre-selection honesty 
testing predicting employee deviance (Lasson & Bass 1997); managing workers who 
waste-time  (Martin et al. 2010); distributing rewards and using employee assistance 
programs, supervisor training and quality communication channels to reduce 
employee deviance (Everton, Jolton & Mastrangelo 2007); and deterring employee 
theft (Tomlinson & Greenberg 2007). 
 
(viii) Organisational behaviour 
Organisational behaviour (OB) is the study of human behaviour in organisations 
according to three levels of analysis: the individual; the group level and the 
system/structure level, with the goal of  improving organisational effectiveness 
(Robbins et al. 2011). Traditionally, organisational behaviour aims to improve an 
organisation‘s effectiveness by focusing on identifying positive employee behaviours 
and providing methodologies for managers to encourage such behaviours. Recent 
literature also recognises that understanding ‗dark side‘ organisational behaviours 
also informs our understandings of organisational effectiveness (Griffin & O'Leary-
Kelly 2004; Vardi & Weitz 2004). Organisational behaviour draws on a range of 
social science disciplines, in particular: psychology; sociology; social psychology; 
anthropology and political science (Robbins et al. 2011). Research related to 
employee misbehaviour from an OB perspective would include studies of managerial 
power on workplace deviance (Lawrence & Robinson 2007; Sims 2010); revenge in 
response to procedural and interpersonal injustice (Jones 2009); quality of the work 
experience (Hollinger & Clark 1982); ethical climate and codes of conduct (Andreoli 
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(ix) Industrial-sociology  
According to Etzioni (1958) industrial sociology concerns organisations that exist 
primarily for an economic reason, which are organisations that function to produce 
goods and services, to exchange them or to organise and manipulate monetary 
processes, such a industries and financial institutions. This is in contrast to 
organisations with goals that, by nature, are cultural (churches, schools, universities), 
political (government departments, unions) or integrative (such a clubs, volunteers 
organisations). Within these industrial workplaces, industrial sociologists seek to 
understand the relationships amongst the production systems, labour and 
environment. In the last century, industrial sociology has moved beyond machine-
paced production and now further incorporates work processes based on self-
production (Hassard 1989). Since the second world war, a range of theoretical 
frameworks have been developed by industrial sociologists to characterise industrial 
organisations and their social relations, such as: Braverman‘s labour process theory; 
the Tavistock Institute of Human Relations‘ systems thinking; Weber‘s ideal type of 
bureaucracy; Marx‘s discussions on wage labour; and Durkheim‘s theory on the 
division of labour (Brown 1992). 
 
Industrial sociologists take a particular interest in misbehaviour that has negative 
implications for the quality and quantity of work to be accomplished, that is, 
production deviance (Hollinger & Clark 1982). Their interests in misbehaviour are 
underpinned by the premise that workers put forth effort and engage in behaviours 
that they believe are reasonable for the wages received. Consequently, misbehaviour 
forms part of the ‗practical readjustment of  the wage-effort exchange‘ (Collinson & 
Ackroyd 2005, p. 310). Examples of misbehaviour research from an industrial-
sociological perspective are: manufacturing personal works on the factory floor 
(Anteby 2003); engaging in personal business on the job (D'Abate 2005); time 
banditry (Martin et al. 2010); and sabotage behaviour (Ambrose, Seabright & 
Schminke 2002).   
 
(x) Feminism 
Feminism can be considered an umbrella term to cover a range of theories, beliefs, 
social movements and research paradigms, which has applicability to the social 
science disciplines. It is concerned with the experience of women, with particular 
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interest in the oppression and unequal treatment of women (Beilharz & Hogan 2006). 
Amongst themselves, feminists writers splinter into a range of factions, from ‗pro-
sex feminism‘ advocating liberating sexual expression to the sexual oppression of 
‗radical feminism‘ (Williams, Guiffre & Dellinger 1999). The misbehaviour 
literature reflecting the female dimension appears under the term ‗gender studies‘ 
(Richards, James 2008) and broadens the perspective to include female instigation of 
sexual actions in the workplace. Gender studies expose the gendered nature of 
workplace-power relations and promote the importance of gender and sexuality when 
examining employee misbehaviour (Collinson & Ackroyd 2005). Examples of 
feminist or gender studies on employee misbehaviour would be the examination of 
misbehaviour in female dominated workplaces (Pringle 1988); characteristics of 
sexual harassers (Lucero et al. 2003); and boundaries of acceptability according to 
gender and race (Montgomery, Kane & Vance 2004).  
 
(xi) Political science 
Political scientists aim to arrive at theories that explain the behaviour of individuals 
and groups within political organisations that form, or contribute to, a country‘s 
governmental authority (Tansey 2000). In addition to mainstream empirical research, 
some political scientists explore and critique ideology and political theory 
surrounding bureaucracy and democracy, and as such, might be considered the 
philosophers of social sciences (Kettler 2006). Conflict and power theories are 
examples of political science theories adopted by other disciplines such as 
organisational behaviour, industrial-sociology, industrial relations and human 
resource management (Robbins, Millett & Waters-Marsh 2008). Studies, such as 
those by Williams and Dutton (1999); Preston, Sampford and Bois (1998) and Philp 
(2006) have a political science perspective in describing corruption and negative 
behaviours of stakeholders in the political area, such as by politicians, journalists and 
lobbyists, that can be detrimental to individuals, public servants and/or employing 
organisations.  
 
(xii) Industrial relations 
A textbook definition of industrial relations is to study ‗the way in which pay, 
working conditions and work itself are determined and performed by employers, 
managers and employees’ (Sappey et al. 2009, p. 2). Succinctly, industrial relations 
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is: ‘an area that begins with work and income, but ultimately is to do with politics 
and power’ (Ellem 1999a, p. 78). This quote highlights that the scope of industrial 
relations is wide, thus some scholars limit their interest in industrial relations to a 
micro perspective that focuses on the interactions between employers and employees, 
employer associations and unions at the workplace level (Petzall, Abbott & Timo 
2007). This type of industrial relations perspective intersects with the social 
psychology paradigm because it investigates the individual and small group 
interactions in the workplace. Other industrial relations scholars pursue a line of 
investigation that takes a macro view of stakeholders in the employment relationship 
that incorporates the impacts and influences of politicians, government agencies, 
tribunals, employer associations, and unions on the workplace as well influences 
from the local/national/international community (Petzall, Abbott & Timo 2007).  
 
An industrial relations scholar‘s perspective of employee misbehaviour is to 
understand how management policies influence such behaviour and the impact of 
union representation (the labour movement) and legislation. Industrial relations 
scholars and industrial sociologists share the premise that the ‗effort bargain‘ in 
which the level of effort to be expended by the worker in exchange for his/her wage 
is not explicitly set in the contract of employment but fixed through social norms 
(Collinson & Ackroyd 2005; Richards, James 2008).  
 
Studies into misbehaviour from an industrial relations perspective would address 
issues such as: unorganised conflict during enterprise bargaining (Sapsford & 
Turnbull 1993); absenteeism as an alternative form of conflict (Sapsford & Turnbull 
1996); unorganised and unconstitutional conflict (Bean 1975; Dobson 1993); 
management‘s conduct in disciplinary situations (Cooke 2006; Fenley 1998); 
resistance to managerial monitoring by call centre workers (Barnes 2004; Russell 
2008; Taylor, P. & Bain 2004; Townsend 2005; van den Broek 2002); employee 
resistance through blogs (Richards 2008); employee resistance through Mars‘ 
framework of workplace crime (Thornthwaite & McGraw 2012); and formal 
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(xiii) Marxism 
Central to Marxist thought is society‘s class structure, where power sources are 
hidden by the owners of economic resources and means of production (the 
bourgeoisie), traditionally the owners of the factories, which in today‘s language 
generally translates to the employers (Dabscheck 1983a; Hyman 2006; Petzall, 
Abbott & Timo 2007; Williams 1992). It focuses on the suppression of, and negative 
outcomes, for the workers (the proletariat) and the competition amongst the 
capitalists to control the means of production. Marxist theorists believe that it is 
inevitable that the working class organise themselves in ongoing rebellion against the 
control of the capitalist class. Scholars viewing employee misbehaviour from a 
Marxist perspective suggest that such behaviour will always be prevalent in the 
workplace as a manifestation of employees‘ adversarial resistance to managerial 
control and ownership of the means of production (Vardi & Weitz 2004).  
 
Industrial relations texts typically indentify Marxism as a radical approach to 
industrial relations (Petzall, Abbott & Timo 2007; Watson 2008). Marxism has 
registered on the radar of misbehaviour researchers but it appears mainstream 
application of the Marxist perspective of misbehaviour has not generally occurred 
amongst researchers. This is possibly because we cannot clearly identify the 
suppressed working class and powerful capitalist class in advanced industrial 
societies (Petzall, Abbott & Timo 2007). Secondly, the Marxist focus on intra and 
inter class conflict only provides a narrow perspective for explaining misbehaviour 
as an outcome (Ackroyd & Thompson 1999a), meaning that an employee that steals 
company property may be motivated by (Marxist) rebellion, but could equally feel 
compelled by personal needs of financial distress. In any event, the Marxist 
perspective calls us to consider the influence of the entire societal class structure as a 
potential variable in the pursuit of describing and understanding misbehaviour in the 
workplace.  
 
2.1.2  The disciplinary perspective of this thesis 
By choosing a particular discipline one makes a value judgement and ‗implicitly 
decide[s] that the other aspects of the problem are inconsequential, or at least are 
less important’ (Dufty 1999, p. 194). The previous sub-section discussed a range of 
  
 
Southey: Employee misbehaviour and unfair dismissal arbitration                                        Page 39 
social science disciplines that could support research into understanding the 
workplace misbehaviour phenomenon. Thus, the current section contains a 
justification for applying industrial relations and organisational behaviour 
perspectives to this research. It is recalled that this study concerns the treatment of 
unfair dismissal claims by employment arbitrators, where the employee was 
dismissed for misbehaviour, as reflected in the recounted objective of this study:  
 
To identify factors influencing the arbitral decisions of members in 
Australia’s federal industrial tribunal when they determine unfair 
dismissal claims from workers who have been terminated from their 
employment due to ‘misbehaviour’. 
 
As the research question involves ‗arbitral decision-making‘ by an industrial 
tribunal, it suitably places the research question within the industrial relations 
discipline. Moreover, industrial relations theorists tend to assume that a conflict of 
interest exists between workers and employers in the employment relationship, 
although different thoughts exist about the source, scope and the management of 
these conflicts (Kochan 1998). Industrial relations has within its ambit of interest the 
operations of the institutions of industrial relations, such as union organisations, 
political parties, government bodies, and employer associations (Wood 1978, 2000). 
Consequently, dismissed employees that appeal the termination actions of their 
employer using the support of industrial bodies such as unions and/or industrial 
tribunals exemplify a pluralist ideology in action.  
 
Achieving an understanding of ‗employee misbehaviour‘ is an interdisciplinary 
issue, and for this reason, challenging to isolate the most relevant literature for this 
study. However, with its strong multi-disciplinary foundations of psychology, 
sociology, anthropology, political science and organisational-psychology, the 
organisational behaviour discipline inherently gives scope to incorporate theory from 
a range of other disciplines yet with an express focus on people‘s behaviour in 
organisations. Organisational behaviour embraces a unitarist ideology as it, 
‗investigates the impact that individuals, groups and structure have on behaviour 
within organisations for the purpose of applying such knowledge towards improving 
an organisation’s effectiveness‘ (Robbins, Millett & Waters-Marsh 2008, p. 9). The 
HR dimension also has an inherent presence in this study with the discipline‘s 
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unitarist ideology towards managing employees, which is reflected in management‘s 
termination of an employee due to their conduct. 
 
2.2  A definition of ‘employee misbehaviour’ 
To advance this thesis, it is necessary to explain what is meant by the term 
‗employee misbehaviour‘. In this thesis, ‗employee misbehaviour‘ is the umbrella 
term used to nominate the broad range of constructs appearing in the literature that 
describe employee misbehaviour. The following sub-section considers the definitions 
of misbehaviour found in the literature to arrive at a single definition that summarises 
what ‗employee misbehaviour‘ means for this thesis. 
 
2.2.1  An analysis of the misbehaviour construct 
At an intuitive level, one assumes the concept of misbehaviour in the workplace 
would be straightforward to define by suggesting it means engaging in behaviour that 
offends or hurts other people within a workplace context. Such a frank definition has 
not been identified in the literature with scholars developing a fragmented range of 
definitions, each with a semantic twist, to capture the dimensions of misbehaviour in 
the workplace (Ackroyd & Thompson 1999a; Bennett & Robinson 2003; Collinson 
& Ackroyd 2005; Griffin & O'Leary-Kelly 2004; Kidwell & Martin 2005; Lefkowitz 
2009; Neuman & Baron 2005; Richards, James 2008; Vardi & Wiener 1996).   
 
It is argued that a complicated range of definitions have evolved as researchers 
attempted to either develop broad-ranging, umbrella definitions, such as 
‗dysfunctional behaviour‘ (Griffin & Lopez 2005), ‗insidious workplace behaviour‘ 
(Greenberg 2010) or ‗counter-productive behaviour‘ (Spector & Fox 2005, 2010) 
whilst others have formed definitions that apply to particular sets of behaviours, such 
as time banditry (Martin et al. 2010), workplace incivility  (Penney & Spector 2005; 
Reio & Ghosh 2009) or workplace violence (Griffin & Lopez 2005; Neuman & 
Baron 2005). As a result the overlap amongst misbehaviour constructs is extensive. 
This criticism is supported by academic commentary that the definitions of 
misbehaviour are either ambiguous or lack parsimony (Bowling & Gruys 2010; 
Griffin & Lopez 2005; Neuman & Baron 2005; Raver 2007; Richards, James 2008) 
with different constructs owning the same types of behaviour (Ashforth et al. 2008; 
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Branch 2008; Spector & Fox 2005). As one example, deliberately working slow fits 
the definitions of organisational retaliatory behaviour, counter-productive work 
behaviour, organisational deviance, dissent, and insidious work behaviour. 
 
The theoretical premise of each workplace misbehaviour definition is also a veritable 
feast, for instance, employee behaviours that are identified in the literature as 
‗deviant‘ are those involving:  
 
... the voluntary behaviour of organizational members that has the potential to 
cause harm to the organization or to those within, and in so doing violates 
significant performance enhancing norms (Bennett et al. 2005, p. 111).  
 
This definition of deviant behaviour requires the violation of an organisational or 
societal norm. Yet, such a requirement is not identified in the definition of employee 
behaviours that are seen as ‗counter-productive‘. Counter-productive work 
behaviours (CWB) are described as:  
 
Volitional acts that harm or are intended to harm organizations or people in 
organizations. Included are acts of aggression, hostility, sabotage, theft and 
withdrawal (Spector & Fox 2005, p. 151).  
 
Whilst the CWB construct is thought to capture the broadest range of negative 
behaviours in the workplace (Neuman & Baron 2005), according to Spector and Fox 
(2005) it overlaps with constructs of deviant behaviour by Bennett and Robinson 
(2000, 2003; 1995); workplace aggression (Fox & Spector 1999) and retaliatory 
behaviour (Skarlicki & Folger 2004). Yet unlike deviant behaviour and workplace 
aggression, a feature of the CWB is that it is not necessary that the transgressor 
intended to cause harm to co-workers or the organisation (Spector & Fox 2005). For 
example, a person using sick-leave due to a missed promotion may not have 
‗harmful‘ intentions. In this example, taking sick leave aligns more closely with the 
definition of ‗organisational retaliatory behaviour‘ whereby misbehaviour aims to 
‗punish‘ the target as opposed to ‗harm‘ the target. Employee retaliatory behaviours 
are:  
 
... reactions by disapproving individuals to organisational misdeeds. They are 
behaviours that demonstrate censure toward either the misdeed, the doer or both 
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This means an employee engages in retaliatory behaviour to restore a sense of equity 
or justice by punishing the organisation for acts of injustice, regardless of whether 
they are genuine or perceived injustices in the eye of the perpetrator. The aim to 
retaliate or punish can manifest in actions such as damaging equipment, absenteeism, 
working slow, spreading rumours and conducting private business during work. 
To demonstrate the complexity of constructs, and the nuances among them, Table 2.1 
lists 16 definitions of misbehaviour-related activity by workers, identified in the 
literature. Supporting this table is Appendix 1 which provides a summary analysis of 
these 16 misbehaviour constructs across a range of dimensions. For instance, 
underpinned by their discipline paradigm (as discussed in section 2.1.1.), scholarship 
varies in terms of what motivated the behaviour, the target of the behaviour and who 
or what determined if the behaviour was inappropriate.  
 
The author decided not to identify misbehaviour as simply one of the constructs 
appearing in Table 2.1. Instead, misbehaviour will be treated as a broad construct for 
which there are a number of analogous behaviours (Andreoli & Lefkowitz 2009; Jex 
et al. 2010). The reason for this decision lays, primarily, in the nature of this study. 
This study is cross-institutional, cross-organisational and cross-occupational; 
therefore a wide assembly of misbehaviour constructs is appropriate. Additional 
reasons for considering the misbehaviour construct as a multi-dimensional variable 
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First, scholarship on employee behaviours from what Griffin and O‘Leary-Kelly 
(2004) coined the ‗dark side‘ of organisational behaviour, and the variety of 
behaviours that occur in this dark side, is all within the same general realm (Kidwell 
& Martin 2005). Particularly important to this PhD research is to not use one 
particular misbehaviour construct over another otherwise the single construct will 
limit the investigation unnecessarily. For instance, ‗counterproductive behaviour‘ 
and ‗organisational misbehaviour‘ require the act to be intentional. The implication 
of such definitions is that cases where employees either claimed they made a mistake 
or denied their involvement would need to be excluded from the study. As another 
example, ‗deviance‘ requires the employee to violate an organisational or societal 
norm. Thus, it would be questionable whether to include situations where employees 
engaged in behaviour to which line supervisors turned a blind eye – such as taking 
home waste product. The employee engaged in behaviour ‗tolerated‘ by the line 
supervisor and by default, was a behavioural norm for the shopfloor, yet unlikely for 
the wider organisational context.  
 
Second, whilst studies that investigate either antecedents and triggers of specific 
behaviours, or behaviours occurring within specific contexts may require a concise 
definition of the behaviour they are isolating (Bowling & Gruys 2010), it may be that 
a wide assembly of misbehaviour constructs is appropriate for understanding the 
impacts of misbehaviour in the workplace from an employer‘s disciplinary 
perspective. Apart from ‗serious misconduct‘ (No. 16) in Table 2.1, the remaining 
misbehaviour definitions were developed from either the perspective of the 
perpetrator such as ‗retaliatory behaviour‘, or the victim such as ‗mobbing'. In this 
thesis, with its emphasis on arbitral assessments of decisions by employers to dismiss 
workers on misconduct grounds, misbehaviour incidents are primarily identified by 
the solitary fact that the workers engaged in a form of behaviour that their employers 
deemed to be unacceptable. These behaviours can include any of the misbehaviours 
defined in Table 2.1. Thus from an employer‘s perspective, the definition of 
misbehaviour demands a theoretically wide construction of elements.   
 
Fifteen of the sixteen definitions in Table 2.1 were obtained from the organisational 
behaviour literature which reflects a range of psychological and sociological 
influences. The sixteenth definition – serious misconduct – originated in common 
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law and was promulgated by Australian industrial legislators. Yet, ‗serious 
misconduct‘ is not suitable for defining misconduct in this thesis for two reasons. 
First, the ‗serious misconduct‘ construct requires the behaviour to be committed by a 
worker with ‗wilful intent‘. Second, it requires behaviour that has caused ‗serious 
results or risk‘. This type of definition provides a normative guideline for 
determining if an employee‘s misbehaviour should warrant dismissal. However, 
provision needs to be made in this investigation for situations where the behaviour 
was neither wilful nor caused serious results or risk yet the employer still sanctioned 
a dismissal on the employee. Thus, for this PhD research, it becomes necessary to 
broaden the industrial relations construct to incorporate behaviours that have been 
defined in the organisational behaviour literature that incorporate characteristics of 
being less severe in nature and which also cater for unintentional behaviour.  
 
2.2.2  Characterising misbehaviour for this thesis: ‘reprimandable offences’ 
On the basis that no single construct of misbehaviour from Table 2.1 captures 
appropriately all dimensions of misbehaviour that might prompt an employer to 
discipline a worker, the concept of ‗reprimandable offences’ is proposed. 
Reprimandable offences are defined as:  
 
Single or multiple incidents performed by one or more employees for whom the 
employer enforces either disciplinary action or dismissal. In making its 
determination, the employer considers the intentions and motives of the 
perpetrator(s) for engaging in the behaviour, along with the frequency, 
intensity and consequences of the behaviour.  
 
This definition has scope to cater for misbehaviour that could be either a single 
incident, or multiple incidents occurring over time, which was perpetrated by either 
an individual employee or groups of employees whereby the target of the behaviour 
could range from a colleague or colleagues (including supervisors), to a colleague‘s 
property, or directed toward the organisation‘s property, clients, suppliers or business 
in general. It incorporates acts that were either deliberate or unintentional due to 
ignorance or a mistake, where the motives that underlie the behaviour can range from 
wanting to cause harm, retaliate, restore justice, or alternatively, the perpetrator may 
have been naive to the fact that they are engaging in inappropriate behaviour.  It 
caters for behaviour that is severe enough in nature that it harms or exposes workers 
or the organisation to risk, however, this is not a mandatory pre-condition for the 
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behaviour to be judged unacceptable by the employer. Finally, it is not a condition of 
the definition that the actor must have violated a social or organisational ‗norm‘ in 
order for the behaviour to be judged unacceptable by the employer. 
 
This section culminated in characterising what ‗misbehaviour‘ means in this thesis, 
from a synthesis of existing misbehaviour constructs. The next section considers 
managerial responses to employee misbehaviour by specifically focusing on parental 
theories of industrial (or workplace) discipline. Theories of industrial discipline are 
parental to this study as arbitration by a third party has an essential role in the 
disciplinary process to provide a neutral avenue to receive and resolve employee 
dissent at being punished by the employer‘s ultimate act of power: dismissal (Haiven 
1994).  
 
2.3  Discipline in the workplace: theory and practice 
 
Relevant to this thesis, with its focus on dismissal due to misbehaviour and 
arbitration, is the concept of discipline in the workplace. How the concept of 
industrial discipline relates to the context of this thesis will now be clarified, before 
exploring punitive and corrective discipline in the workplace context. This section 
begins by considering global applications of discipline in cases of employee 
misbehaviour and concludes by locating the role of unfair dismissal arbitration 
within industrial discipline. 
 
Industrial discipline of an individual worker has been defined as ‗some action taken 
against an individual because he is failing to do what is expected of him’ (Jones 
1961, p. 3). The industrial or workplace discipline literature describes methodologies 
for reprimanding employees such as oral warnings, written warnings, suspensions, 
demotions, fines and, at the pinnacle, dismissal as the severest sanction an employer 
can administer to a worker (Collins 1982b, 1982a, 1992; Fenley 1998; Jones 1961). 
Disciplinary theorists describe industrial discipline along a spectrum of approaches, 
with ‗corrective-rehabilitative‘ at one end and ‗punitive-retributive‘ at the other 
extreme. Blends of these pure approaches tend to occur in the workplace, for 
instance, Rollinson et al. (1997, p. 285) described the ‗deterrence‘ approach where 
management use punishment to ‗highlight [to the employee] the adverse 
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consequences of any future role transgression‘ in the belief a punitive action can 
have corrective outcomes. In order to illuminate the contrasting disciplinary styles 
that occur in theory, the two seminal philosophies of ‗corrective-rehabilitative‘ and 
‗punitive-retributive‘ are considered in the following sub-sections. However, before 
progressing to these sub-sections, two brief points of clarification are made to set the 
parameters of this discussion. 
 
First, workplace or industrial discipline, in the context of this thesis, differs from the 
concept of the ‗disciplinary regime‘ or ‗group discipline‘ which is the control agenda 
implemented by management to assert its authority over workers (Edwards & 
Whitston 1989; Ferner 2003; Haiven 1994; Sisson & Marginson 2003). For instance, 
a ‗direct or coercive‘/‗management through control‘ regime involves techniques such 
as clocking-on and clocking-off, surveillance technology, low autonomy and peer 
pressure tactics. Conversely, ‗co-operative or hegemonic‘/‗management through 
commitment‘ regimes use methods such as incremental pay and flexible work 
(Haiven 1994; Sisson & Marginson 2003). Whilst the collective nature of the 
disciplinary regime adopted by management may resonate with mechanisms used to 
discipline individuals, such as a ‗hardline‘ management regime using punitive 
discipline (Fenley 1998, p. 352), this thesis addresses industrial discipline from the 
perspective of the disciplinary practices dealt to individuals within the workplace on 
the basis of his or her ‘personal deviation from standards generally accepted by 
other employees’ (Mellish & Collis-Squires 1976, p. 171). 
 
Second, the concept of ‗punishment‘, whilst related, is not addressed specifically in 
this section. Punishment is ‗the presentation of an aversive event or the removal of a 
positive event following a response which decreases the frequency of that response‘ 
(Kazdin in Arvey & Ivancevich 1980, p. 123). The nexus between discipline and 
punishment is that ‗discipline is the attempt to reduce the frequency of a particular 
behaviour through the application of various forms of punishment‘ (Greer & Labig 
1987, p. 509). Punishment theorists, such as Skinner and his seminal 1957 
reinforcement theory, engage with the psychology of punishment to understand the 
variables that influence the effectiveness of punishment. Instead, this section focuses 
on the disciplinary style applied by management towards acts of misbehaviour, rather 
than the semantics of issuing a punishment and variables affecting its delivery. 
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2.3.1  Corrective-progressive discipline 
Corrective disciplinary practices aim to reform an employee‘s behaviour (Fenley 
1998; Huberman 1964; Wheeler 1976). This concept divorces itself from ideas of 
sanctioning and punishing the employee and is associated with principles of co-
operation and responsibility (Fenley 1998; Haiven 1994; Wheeler 1976). Dismissal, 
due to its terminal nature, falls outside the parameters of corrective discipline (Fenley 
1998) as termination has no corrective value and is viewed as a penal response to 
employee behaviour or poor performance. That said, the practice literature assumes 
that corrective and/or progressive discipline is appropriate only for resolving 
performance issues or less offensive behaviour and generally contain the rider that 
behaviours that are ‗heinous‘, such as theft or physical abuse, constitute gross 
misconduct and dismissal would be appropriate (Heery & Noon 2001; Holley, 
Jennings & Wolters 2009, p. 529; Huberman 1964; O'Reilly & Weitz 1980).  
 
The human resource practice literature appears to favour the corrective approach to 
discipline. The normative HR perspective reflects that the employer‘s desire to 
correct an employee‘s behaviour is the reason for pursuing disciplinary action and 
that it can improve workplace efficiency by: setting examples of appropriate 
behaviour; educating employees about the rules of the firm; and maintaining respect 
for supervisors (Holley, Jennings & Wolters 2009). Practitioners of corrective 
discipline recommend a ‗progressive‘ or ‗positive‘ approach to administering 
discipline in the event an employee repeats a similar offence (Fenley 1998; Holley, 
Jennings & Wolters 2009; Huberman 1975; Lawson 1998).  
 
Progressive discipline is not viewed as a negative process or course of punishment. 
Instead, each time the offence occurs, the seriousness of the offence is impressed to 
the employee – initially with oral and then written warnings before proceeding to 
suspensions, with or without pay – whilst being given opportunities to correct the 
work behaviour. More recent ‗revisionist‘ or ‗accommodative-participative‘ views of 
progressive discipline incorporate a role for the employees (with union assistance for 
lower skilled workers) to ‗power with‘ management and with incentives for being 
motivated and self-disciplined to improve behaviour (Campbell, Fleming & Grote 
1985; Chelliah & Tyrone 2010, p. 107; Cooke 2006, p. 690; Fenley 1998; Franklin & 
  
 
Southey: Employee misbehaviour and unfair dismissal arbitration                                        Page 49 
Pagan 2006). Termination – the ultimate sanction – occurs only after the corrective 
process has been exhausted, and essentially signals the corrective process was a 
failure. Termination indicates, as Fenley (1998, p. 354) suggested, the employee is 
‗recognised‘ as being at odds to the legitimate aims of the business, and where 
Huberman (1975, p. 7) suggested the dismissal is ‗but a preventative act to steer 
clear of predictable future trouble’.  
 
The major criticism of the traditional view of progressive discipline is that it 
reinforces the power and hierarchy of management over workers (Chelliah & Tyrone 
2010), which is evident with dismissal the final stage of the progressive disciplinary 
road. Edwards and Whitston (1989, p. 4) refer to it as merely ‘wield(ing) the big stick 
less’ and Jones (1961, p. 4) states that ‗superficially there appears to be little 
difference between the corrective approach and that of retribution ... the corrective 
approach connects the penalty with the purpose of the punishment, and fitting the 
penalty to the individual’s personality’. Simply, Jones has described progressive 
discipline as a calibrated form of punitive discipline. As well, it operates on a 
paradoxical, perhaps flawed, thesis that performance or behaviour will improve in 
spite of harsher treatment (Fenley 1998). Whilst advocated as more appropriate than 
punitive discipline, whether corrective discipline changes behaviour is debatable 
(Cooke 2006), with findings that, whilst pleasantries surrounding the disciplinary 
process might lessen negative emotions arising during the process, it is still unclear if 
it can be credited with changing behaviour (Greer & Labig 1987). 
 
2.3.2  Punitive discipline 
Alternatively, punitive or retributive discipline relies on the authoritarian power of 
the employer to enact punishment on the employee as a deterrent to the transgressor 
(if he or she is not dismissed) and co-workers from committing the same offence. It 
favours harsh and irregular penalties such as summary dismissal, severe reprimands 
and public humiliation or shaming (Cooke 2006; Fenley 1998; Mellish & Collis-
Squires 1976; Wheeler 1976). Haiven (1994) suggests managers using a punitive 
disciplinary approach will engage in limited or no consultation with the individual 
worker or the worker‘s representatives and will prefer to use dismissal over less 
harsh forms of punishment. Given corrective discipline is theorised as the ‗humane‘ 
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and ‗good for business‘ form of discipline (Haiven 1994, p. 75), it leaves one to 
conclude that the opposing approach of punitive discipline would be the inhumane 
and detrimental to business approach to discipline. Clearly, this concept is divorced 
from the educational ideals of ‗corrective‘ discipline and the literature reflects little 
support for it as an approach to employee discipline with a search of industrial 
discipline material unsuccessful in locating papers advocating the use of punitive 
discipline over its alternatives. Yet in practice, the presence of dismissal reversals by 
arbitrators, suggest that punitive discipline is well subscribed by employers. 
 
An international comparison of employer responses to misbehaviour was the subject 
of an investigation in workplace justice by Wheeler and Rojot (1992). Admittedly, 
this study was conducted twenty years ago, but a more recent comparative study of 
this scale (involving ten countries) using a similar research method, was not 
identified during the literature searches for this thesis. This study informed this thesis 
as it addressed misbehaviours toward the ‗serious‘ end of the scale and the 
disciplinary tactic that employers in each country would have most likely adopted 
towards the employee. Table 2.2 contains a summary of the likely employer 
responses to six different acts of misbehaviour from the ten countries. The point was 
made previously that even the corrective discipline literature suggests the use of 
dismissal ‗as a last resort‘ (Cooke 2006, p. 690; Haiven 1994), and all the scenarios 
except ‗off duty conduct‘ ended with the dismissal of the worker. The majority of the 
responses were also punitive in nature as they were considered to warrant instant or 
summary dismissal. 
 
Before discussing the output of Table 2.2, a caveat is noted that Wheeler and Rojot‘s 
study reflected the opinion of only one expert in the field from each participant 
country. Further, the challenge of attempting a one-size-fits-all approach to describe 
a misbehaviour incident is that the respondents could not take into account additional 
factors and mitigating circumstances that could change the outcome. Such limitations 
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Table 2.2 Summary of findings in Wheeler and Rojot’s (1992) international study on  
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Warning – study did not qualify if these were to be written or verbal, but had punitive intent 
Instant dismissal – no notice period nor payment in lieu of notice period (summary dismissal) 
Dismissal with notice – paid notice period or payment in lieu of notice period 
Dismissal – study did not qualify whether the dismissal was likely to be instant or with notice 
 
Source: Developed for thesis from (Wheeler & Rojot 1992, 'Workplace Justice: Employment 
Obligations in International Perspective', University of South Carolina Press ) 
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Wheeler and Rojot (1992, p. 366) arrived at one rudimentary principle they 
considered applied in each country surveyed: employees ‗must avoid behaviours that 
materially damage the functioning of the employment relationship’ suggesting that 
any behaviour that frustrates the employer-employee relationship may irreparably 
damage it. On that note, it appears that all ten countries unanimously support 
dismissal on the first offence where a worker engaged in theft or instigated a physical 
fight and inflicted injury. Thus, there appears to be consensus value amongst the 
nations that theft and physical violence in the workplace is not to be tolerated and to 
be dealt with via an authoritative, punitive disciplinary approach. Nonetheless, 
beyond these two scenarios several notable differences in managerial responses to 
misbehaviour occurred.  
 
The first point to note is that the widest variation occurred in the disciplinary action 
pertaining to attending work under the influence of alcohol or other illicit drug. 
Attending work under the influence of alcohol was likely to attract dismissal in 
France, on the first offence. Alternatively in Israel, being under the influence of 
alcohol at work was unlikely to result in disciplinary action of any serious 
consequence, even in a subsequent offence. In between these two extremes are the 
remaining countries that inclined to accommodate this behaviour by making an 
allowance for whether alcoholism, as an illness, was a cause for the behaviour and 
taking a progressive approach toward it by first issuing warnings. A comparable 
point can be made about the ‗off duty conduct incriminating the employer’s business‘ 
scenario. This scenario also reflected a variation in disciplinary approaches from 
instant dismissal in Belgium to having limited impact on the employment 
relationship in France, Spain, Italy and possibly Canada. So from these two scenarios 
alone it can be seen that France was the harshest in terms of drunkenness yet most 
lenient in terms employee conduct outside work hours. Such variations between 
national systems of justice suggest disciplinary approaches are a reflection of unique 
national factors, suggesting a globally agreed tolerance for workplace misbehaviour 
may not exist. The following points continue to support this suggestion. 
 
The second point noted is that Belgium was most prominent in using instant 
dismissal for the first offence, with the study suggesting Belgian employers would 
take this approach in five of the six misbehaviour scenarios. At the opposite end is 
  
 
Southey: Employee misbehaviour and unfair dismissal arbitration                                        Page 53 
the Canadian employer who is likely to administer immediate dismissal in only two 
of the scenarios. Thus one can speculate on the evidence in the Wheeler and Rojot 
study that a progressive (potentially corrective) approach was most evident in 
Canada and a punitive approach most evident in Belgium (with France and Israel 
close behind in equal seconds) with remaining countries operating somewhere 
between these two points of reference. 
 
Thirdly, three types of punishment are most likely to be used across the ten countries: 
castigatory warnings; dismissal with notice; and instant dismissal. It is noticeable 
that only Italian employers impose financial penalties on their employees by fining 
workers for transgressions in relation to attending work under the influence of 
alcohol and unapproved absenteeism. Meanwhile, managers in the USA were the 
only employers likely to use suspension without pay as a penalty for either verbal 
defiance toward a supervisor or attending work under the influence. It is recognised 
that suspension without pay still has monetary implications for the employees, not 
unlike the fines imposed by Italian employers. 
 
It is proposed that the multiplicity of management responses to misbehaviour reflects 
the various societal norms and cultural values existing in different countries 
influencing which behaviours were considered most detrimental to the functioning of 
the employment relationship (Collinson & Ackroyd 2005; Richards, James 2008). 
Culture is thought to help define the boundaries of acceptable behaviour in an 
organisation (Franklin & Pagan 2006). A brief example of a unique cultural 
characteristic within a country that reveals itself in the country‘s workplace 
environment would be the employee commitment evidenced in Japan and where 
management call workers ‗shain‘ – a word without a western language counterpart – 
recognising them as members of  a community of like minded people (Kuwahara 
2004, p. 289). Kuwahara further suggests that ‗adaptability‘, a characteristic of 
Japanese society, is reflected in its employment relations in terms of loosely worded 
job descriptions and lack of rigid work rules compared to those found in other 
developed market economies. Thus it is argued that the country‘s culture and values 
contribute to the public standard influencing arbitrators and tribunals and strengthens 
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2.3.3  Unfair dismissal as a matter within industrial discipline 
Having outlined the possible disciplinary approach an employer might adopt towards 
misbehaviour and international variations, this section will be finalised by clarifying 
the relationship between unfair dismissal and industrial discipline. So far it has been 
noted that dismissal is the harshest sanction for managers using a ‗punitive‘ 
disciplinary style, and for want of a better term, an ‗escape clause‘ for those using a 
‗corrective‘ disciplinary style. And Wheeler and Rojot‘s (1992) international study 
reveals that, whilst one can detect nuances in cultural values, immediate dismissal 
appears to be adopted consistently for similar acts of misbehaviour.  Subsequent to 
the disciplinary practice of terminating an employee‘s engagement with the 
organisation, unfair dismissal laws allow for the review of the employer‘s 
disciplinary action with a view to balancing the employer‘s liberty to discipline, 
against the rights of the less empowered employee. Collins (1982a, p. 78) describes 
the extent to which the existence of unfair dismissal rights might influence an 
employer‘s disciplinary behaviour: 
 
... the law of unfair dismissal cannot effect a total cure. It is limited to 
dismissals and so can have at most an indirect impact upon lesser disciplinary 
measures ... Nevertheless, the law of unfair dismissal has persisted because it 
apparently reduces the intensity of the contradiction in the liberal ideal of 
freedom of contract by taming the employer‘s power to take the severest of 
disciplinary measures. 
 
This quote suggests that whilst unfair dismissal laws are narrow in their ambit to 
intervene in disciplinary matters within workplaces, the presence of these laws may 
have a wider sobering effect on the industrial disciplinary structure within firms and 
society generally. Riley (2005) offers similar sentiments suggesting that the financial 
remedies that may be ordered against defaulting employers provide an educative 
effect on employers in developing policies to ensure fair dealing with employees. 
The introduction of unfair dismissal laws across industrialised countries has 
contributed to employers formalising their disciplinary practices into written policies 
and procedures, giving warnings and keeping records according to their 
understanding of the legal requirements (Mellish & Collis-Squires 1976).  
 
Yet within these formal disciplinary systems, Franklin and Page (2006, p. 65) 
suggest there exists two sets of rules: the officially sanctioned disciplinary system; 
  
 
Southey: Employee misbehaviour and unfair dismissal arbitration                                        Page 55 
and the intangible, informal system or the ‗operating culture prescribing acceptable 
behaviour for how work really is done‘. Unless these two codes are fully aligned and 
supervisors have the disciplinary style to match, the dissonance may well result in 
inconsistent disciplinary actions within the same organisation. Add to the mix that 
each supervisor‘s disciplinary style is influenced by his or her coping and problem 
solving skills (O'Reilly & Weitz 1980) and personality and demographic attributes 
(Martocchio & Judge 1995). Nonetheless, tribunals expect employers to exhibit 
consistency in their disciplinary actions and at the same time allow for mitigating 
circumstances (Mellish & Collis-Squires 1976). This leads one to consider whether 
consistent disciplinary actions are an achievable feat given the variables arising from 
the formal and informal rules, supervisor characteristics and mitigating 
circumstances. These conflicting circumstances provide scope within the arbitral 
decision-making process for differences in values to arise between an arbitrator‘s and 
employer‘s assessment of a disciplinary situation. Consequently, it is argued that this 
predicament adds to the dialectic underlying this thesis: that arbitration decisions 
pertaining to misbehaviour in the workplace set the public standard (Donaghey 2006) 
and reflect societal values (Wright 2002) for how tolerant employers and unions 
must be towards employees who engage, or who are believed to have engaged in 
misbehaviour.  
 
2.4  Chapter 2 conclusion 
The concept of employee misbehaviour was described from a range of disciplinary 
perspectives, demonstrating the interest of social scientists in the concept. Defining 
the concept of employee misbehaviour for this thesis was burdened by the diversity 
of academic opinion and common usage. To resolve this, the author described the 
idea of ‗reprimandable offences‘: employee behaviours that result in discipline or 
dismissal because the employer judged it to be unsatisfactory behaviour. It was 
pointed out that this definition differs from the existing range of organisational 
behaviour and industrial relations definitions which included either intentional 
motivations, norm-breaking criteria, or serious results or risk to qualify as 
misbehaviour. A definition was required that could cater for behaviours that may 
have less serious consequences but were still judged by the employer to warrant 
some form of sanction. It was posited that the definition of reprimandable offences is 
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inclusive of any conceivable act of misbehaviour. This provides an advantage over 
the constraints existing in the current misbehaviour definitions characterised in the 
literature, any of which if used, would limit various misbehaviour incidents from 
studies pertaining to disciplinary management of misbehaviour. 
 
Section 2.3 introduced the concept of industrial discipline because discipline is the 
logical response to employee misbehaviour. Corrective progressive discipline and 
punitive discipline were considered as opposing approaches to discipline in the 
workplace. It was identified that both corrective and punitive disciplinary approaches 
can involve dismissal. Within the corrective paradigm dismissal may be used when 
all else fails while within the punitive paradigm, dismissal is enacted more readily. 
Next, Wheeler and Rojot‘s international study was reviewed to obtain insight on the 
use of dismissal as a punishment to serious acts of misbehaviour across ten countries. 
It was argued that a ‗global sense‘ of tolerance was not evident as the countries 
observed various calibrations of punishment for the same offence. Finally, the 
discussion made the connection between industrial discipline and the matter of unfair 
dismissal protections and suggested that unfair dismissal hearings provide a forum 
for employees to have the disciplinary action of their employer reviewed. It was 
concluded that, in light of prevailing formal and informal organisational cultures, 
combined with the attributes and personality traits of supervisors, employers are 
challenged to make consistent and appropriate disciplinary decisions, in line with the 
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CHAPTER 3 
PARENTAL LITERATURE ON UNFAIR DISMISSAL 
ARBITRATION 
 
3.0  Introduction 
This chapter of the literature review addresses the unfair dismissal arbitration 
literature, from seven perspectives. First, it will define the concept of employment 
arbitration. Second, it reviews the industrial relations literature on theories of 
arbitration, before, thirdly considering arbitration as a part of the organisational 
behaviour, workplace grievance literature. Fourth, the discussion then considers the 
ideological propositions of autonomy and dignity that need to be afforded to workers 
in the face of dismissal and how common or civil law lacks such protection. The fifth 
perspective considers unfair dismissal arbitration as it occurs globally and sixth, 
within the Australian context. The seventh perspective contains an analysis of 
process theories of arbitral decision-making over dismissal claims. 
 
3.1  Arbitration as a workplace adjudication instrument 
The task of defining ‗arbitration‘ within the workplace setting is more 
straightforward than the complicated task of defining employee misbehaviour 
contained in chapter 2. This thesis investigates arbitration pertaining to the 
involuntary termination of the employment relationship and the literature appears 
consistent in its conceptualisation of such arbitration. A textbook description of 
arbitration within an Australian workplace context is: 
 
‗a more formal (and often public process) that involves adjudicating between 
competing claims. It is used only if conciliation fails to produce an agreed 
outcome ... arbitrations could sometimes resemble court proceedings. But the 
tribunal (is) required to act quickly and avoid technicalities, and it (is) not 
strictly bound by laws of evidence‘ (Stewart 2009, p. 10). 
 
Peer-reviewed publications similarly reflect arbitration‘s role in settling a dispute or 
claim by defining arbitration as: 
 
The definitive stage of a workplace dispute resolution process from which the 
disputing parties are bound to accept a neutral third party‘s absolute 
determination over who was right and who was wrong (Bemmels 1990a; Budd 
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Clearly, arbitration serves an adjudication function for disputing parties (Carlston 
1952). Placed within the context of an unfair dismissal claim, arbitration provides a 
disciplinary forum ‗designed to take certain disputes out of the workplace to a less 
volatile venue where they could be resolved not by force and economic coercion but 
by due process and juristic deliberation‘ (Haiven 1994, p. 79). This means 
arbitration is a quasi-judicial arrangement involving the intervention of an authorised 
third party playing the role of the ‗judge‘ to resolve a dispute, and where both parties 
agree to abide by the determination of the arbitrator. However, arbitration 
judgements are not to be confused with judicial decision-making by judges in formal 
law courts. An arbitrator resolves a dispute according to his or her ‘sense of the 
strength of the conflicting interests’ whereas a judge will ‘apply the relevant norms 
according to their meaning or purpose’ (Collins 1982a, p. 89). More specifically, in 
unfair dismissal, the arbitration process typically involves the arbitrator hearing the 
respective positions of each party while holding the employer ‗to a kind of moral 
standard in its dealings with the employee‘ (Donaghey 2006, p. 6). 
 
Another difference between arbitral decision-making and formal judicial decision-
making, is the source of their jurisdiction (Donaghey 2006). In Australia, arbitrators 
exist as a member of an industrial tribunal with jurisdictional parameters set by state 
or federal industrial legislation, whereas a judge operates within the jurisdiction of 
the law courts and will look to law to first determine if a right or obligation exists 
under the common law. The benefit of arbitration over formal law courts is that it 
offers a faster resolution and lower costs than traditional judicial processes (Bethel 
1993; Brown 2004; Riley 2005). In addition, section 3.4 will discuss how arbitration 
is better equipped to deal with remedying unfair dismissal and the limitations of 
formal courts in dealing with ‗unfair‘ treatment in the termination of employment.  
 
Arbitration can be used to address either ‗rights‘ or ‗interest‘ disputes pertaining to 
the formal and substantive rules associated with awards and collective bargaining in 
order to break deadlocks between management and organised labour (Brown 2004; 
Dabscheck 2004). Whether an unfair dismissal claim is a ‗rights‘ or an ‗interest‘ 
dispute varies according to a country‘s industrial relations framework. Rights 
disputes occur where unfair dismissal occurs as a protected right under legislation. 
An interest dispute is more likely to occur where the unions and employers rely on 
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enterprise level grievance processes whereby the arbitrator ‘imposes a settlement by 
reference to collective interests’ over the rights of the individual employees and 
management (Collins 1982a, p. 90). In Australia, unfair dismissal provisions exist 
within the Fair Work Act 2009 that sanctions the federal industrial tribunal to treat 
unfair dismissal claims as ‗rights‘ disputes (Acton 2010) allowing the tribunal to act 
constitutionally. At the core of an unfair dismissal dispute is whether the dismissed 
worker has the ‗right‘ to be either reinstated or compensated. 
 
Now that arbitration has been characterised, it is timely to review the parental 
literature describing the role of workplace arbitration, first from the perspective of 
industrial relations scholars and secondly, as part of the workplace grievance 
literature developed by organisational behaviour scholars. These perspectives are 
addressed in sections 3.2 and 3.3 respectively. 
  
3.2  Arbitration within the industrial relations literature 
This section outlines theories describing the character of industrial arbitration by 
reviewing descriptive theories that prescribe the raison d’être for arbitration in the 
industrial relations system. Only Wheeler‘s theory describes unfair dismissal 
arbitration specifically. The remaining theories refer to workplace arbitration 
generally, with the inference that unfair dismissal disputes would be one from a 
range of workplace disputes requiring arbitration.  
 
Before addressing these theories, a general assumption underlying them is that the 
arbitrator appears to be motivated by undertones of either judiciary duty or politics 
(Cockfield 1993; Dabscheck 1980, 2004; Romeyn 1980). The judicial thesis is that 
arbitrators will offer a just hearing to arrive at a just solution to the dispute regardless 
of the power and resources available to either party. Whereas the political thesis 
suggests arbitrators will decree a solution acceptable to both parties that also ensures 
the survival of the arbitrators‘ institution. Dabscheck (1980) envisaged that political 
arbitration requires the consent of both parties and can occur in rights or interest 
disputes. This requirement for consent effectively eliminates unfair dismissal 
arbitration from the political thesis assumption. This is because unfair dismissal 
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occurs without the permission of both parties on the basis it is a rights dispute 
initiated by the employee, to which the employer is compelled to respond. 
 
Having established there is a judicial assumption underpinning unfair dismissal 
arbitration, the discussion will now analyse the arbitration theories according to their 
inherent frame of reference. As discussed in the introductory chapter, this thesis is 
unpinned by an assumption that unitarist and pluralist forces are at play in the 
dismissal and arbitration processes. Therefore, some of the theories view the 
arbitration function as reinforcing managerial prerogative or alternatively, providing 
a stage for constructive conflict. Other theories present the ‗neutral‘ perspective 
which one might expect to infiltrate arbitration theories, as the definition of 
arbitration itself involves intervention by a neutral, third party.  
 
Table 3.1 displays the author‘s assignment of the theories presented in this section, 
according to their predisposition, with justification for each allocation provided as 
each theory is discussed. 
 
Table 3.1  Partiality towards either the workers’ or employers’ position inherent in 
     arbitration theories 
 
SUPPORTIVE OF WORKER NEUTRAL FOCUS 
SUPPORTIVE OF 
EMPLOYER 


























 Judicial arbitration  
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3.2.1  Carlston’s ‘communication channel’ model of arbitration 
Carlston (1952) theorised that labour arbitration is a ‗social instrument‘ that offers an 
additional channel of communication between employers and employees where 
institutional grievance procedures have failed to resolve a conflict. Arbitration occurs 
as a judicial investigation outside of court, unfettered by evidence rules, with 
particular emphasis on the skill and expertise of the arbitrator. Arbitration is viewed 
as an extension of a formal, legal contract yet it is different from normal contractual 
arrangements, as the specific terms are not known other than identifying the mode of 
settlement in the event of a relationship breakdown. This heralds an emphasis on the 
uniqueness of arbitration for each hearing with the view that arbitrators‘ rule solely 
for the parties concerned and not the wider community as maintained by formal law 
courts.  
 
In Carlston‘s model, several conditions need to exist to ensure societal confidence in 
the labour arbitration process. Firstly, as arbitration is non-judicial, the State has a 
role to install legislation, tribunals or arbitration service providers to ensure that the 
arbitration decisions have the ambit to be binding on parties. Secondly, the person 
engaged as the arbitrator must offer skill and expertise and be unequivocally aware 
of the specific industry/workplace context with which he or she is confronted. 
Finally, an arbitration decision relates solely to the parties before it – suggesting 
there is no place for precedent that can be applied to any other institutional settings 
other than the institution for which the decision was made. It is on this last point that 
the practice of arbitration by Australia‘s federal tribunal differs significantly. It is not 
uncommon for Australian arbitrators to cite opinions from other cases and 
jurisdictions in their decisions. As just one example, in Ford v Vita Group Ltd [2010] 
FWA 4630, Commission Conner referred to Perkins v Grace Wordwide (Australia) 
Pty Limited [(1997) 72 IR 186] (an Industrial Relations Court of Australia case) in 
considering loss of trust and the practicality of reinstatement. 
 
In relation to Table 3.1, and the sensitivity towards either employers or workers, 
Carlston‘s theory tends to waiver between worker sensitivity and the importance of 
the neutrality of the arbitration process. The theoretical emphasis on context-specific 
arbitral decision-making and appropriately equipped arbitrators suggests neutrality. 
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Whilst the theory‘s further emphasis on the provision of a formal voice mechanism 
to the workers to check managerial prerogatives tends to also flavour this theory with 
a protective approach towards workers. Accordingly, in Table 3.1, Carlson‘s theory 
has been allocated across both dimensions. 
 
3.2.2  Perlman’s ‘administrative’ and ‘autonomous’ models of arbitration 
 
Perlman (1954) investigated the operations of Australia‘s federal industrial tribunal 
from the perspectives of employer and unions in the pastoral, coal and stevedoring 
industries and compared it to legalistic arbitration models in the US. Perlman 
developed a dichotomous theory of arbitral operations reflecting two extremes. The 
first concept is ‗administrative arbitration‘ where he noted the willingness of 
employers and unions to have arbitrators set standards for their industry. The second 
approach is ‗autonomous arbitration‘ where the employers and unions use arbitral 
intervention only as a last resort. As to which mode of arbitration occurs depends on 
market competitiveness and/or labour market conditions in which the industry 
operates. 
 
‘Administrative arbitration’ occurs if both the employer and unions are threatened 
by competitors in an industry that draws on a labour market of diverse workers. 
Faced with uncertainty, the parties appeal to the arbitrators to administer their 
industry.  This means the arbitrator takes on the role of economic regulator, as 
explained by Perlman (1954, p. 208): 
 
From their pens and judgments have flowed a widening series of judicially-
legislated decrees, including the principles of the basic wage, of quarterly 
adjustments, of annual leave with pay, and of long service leave ... What has 
developed is a belief that the judges and commissioners should administer 
industry, that they must for reasons of social efficiency assume a legislative 
mantle, or, in the words of one judge, they must function as the ―economic 
dictators‖ of Australia. 
  
If it occurs that the unions and management are both strong and resourceful, it is 
likely they will prefer to engage in bi-partisan bargaining. Arbitral assistance or 
‘autonomous arbitration’ is only sought when the parties are unable to come to an 
agreement, with both parties presenting strong positions to the arbitrator for a final 
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By and large the partisans of group autonomy and autonomous arbitration 
assume sufficient economic resiliency to permit a relatively great degree of 
unfettered bargaining. In any case these practitioners tend to refrain from direct 
intervention until the parties have clearly formulated their positions and realized 
that a bi-partite developed compromise is not possible.  
 
 
Perlman finalised his theory of autonomous arbitration by reasoning that arbitrators 
require ‗intellectual agility‘ (1954, p. 213) in the challenge of moving back and forth 
between the two approaches, depending on the circumstances and views of the 
parties seeking arbitration. Dabscheck (1981, p. 431) similarly describes 
‘accommodative arbitration’ where the arbitrator hands down a decision reflecting 
the command position of the parties, acting as a ‗rubber stamp‘ to their demands. 
These three modes of operation are classified in Table 3.1 as ‗neutral‘ as each 
scenario suggests the unions and employers are at ease to call upon the arbitration 
process to resolve troublesome situations, with the arbitrators implementing 
whichever approach is required. This theory left a gap for a third mode: where 
arbitral intervention is not welcomed by one or both parties – and is likely the case 
from the employer‘s perspective in the situation of unfair dismissal arbitration. The 
following theory on ‗judicial‘ arbitration can occur without the consent of both 
parties. 
 
3.2.3  ‘Judicial’ arbitration 
‘Judicial’ arbitration involves the arbitrator making a determination based on only 
the evidence presented to him or her by the parties (Dabscheck 1980; Perlman 1954; 
Romeyn 1980). It could be said that the premise of the judicial arbitration model is to 
prescribe an ideal methodology which should be used by the arbitrator to arrive at a 
decision, as opposed to the other arbitrational theories which describe the intention of 
arbitral intervention. Under judicial arbitration, the arbitrator will not base any part 
of his or her decision on personal knowledge about the industry or parties, or on 
interests and facts not established in the record of hearings. The following quote 
captures the parameters of judicial arbitration: 
 
When (arbitrators) yield to the principle of compromise they wrong not only 
both parties to the dispute, but they impair the effectiveness of arbitration as a 
judicial method of settling labor disputes. . . there is but one way to try a case 
on its merits, and that is to try it on the basis of the record made before the 
arbitrator. That record must be an orderly record. The parties must be 
guaranteed that only relevant and material evidence will go into the record. 
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They must be protected in their right to cross-examine those who submit 
evidence against them. They must be given an opportunity to present their cases 
in an orderly fashion, and an opportunity to answer their opponent‘s case in an 
orderly fashion. Such guarantees involve both substantive and procedural rights. 
In fact, I know of no way of protecting the parties in respect to such rights, 
except in accordance with the generally accepted rule of court procedure, which 
we apply in all of the arbitration cases (Morse 1940 in Perlman 1954, p. 211). 
 
Arbitrators operating within a judicial paradigm do not view it as their role to reach a 
compromise in their decisions – as is the case in the administrative and activist 
arbitration models. With its focus on the quality of the evidence and case made 
before the arbitrator, it instead complements the autonomous arbitration model which 
assumes skilled advocacy by the parties appearing before the arbitrator. The 
assumption of neutrality that underpins judicial arbitration positions it within the 
‗neutral‘ category in Table 3.1. 
 
3.2.4  Dabscheck’s ‘activist’ model of arbitration 
Dabscheck (1983b, 2004) studied the activity of Australian tribunal president and 
industrial court judge, Sir William Kelly and developed the model of ‗activist 
arbitration’. The arbitration process exists as a triad of advocators: the union, the 
employer; and the arbitrator, each trying to convince the other two parties that their 
position serves the best interests. However, the arbitrator is motivated to stay in 
touch with the demands of the other two parties, as being at odds may find the 
arbitrator faced with resistance measures from the opposing parties, either singularly 
or in joint force. For instance, in Australia, dissatisfied employer associations worked 
to reduce the federal tribunal‘s influence in employment regulation by proactively 
pursuing the implementation of enterprise bargaining (Dabscheck 2001, 2004; 
Sheldon & Thornthwaite 1999). It appears Dabscheck (2004, p. 397) demonstrated a 
‗neutral‘ perspective of the arbitration process in the development of this theory, as 
evidenced by his statement: ‘... tribunals have not been ‘captured’ by union 
principles ... the successes of arbitration have been due to arbitrators being flexible 
and adaptable in fulfilling the diverse and changing needs of the parties’. In this 
sense, arbitrators sustain their role in the industrial relation system by meeting the 
needs of their clientele: union and management, over fulfilling their own ambitions 
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3.2.5  Wheeler’s ‘industrial discipline’ model of unfair dismissal arbitration 
Wheeler (1976) contended that arbitration existed as a conduit for ‘industrial 
discipline’. Industrial discipline was defined to mean ‘some action taken against an 
individual when he fails to conform to the rules of the industrial organization of 
which he is a member’ (Wheeler 1976, p. 237). Wheeler described similarities 
between industrial discipline and psychological punishment theory suggesting that 
arbitrators and punishment theorists deal with the same subject matter, just in 
different languages. For instance, in the industrial setting, corrective discipline with 
its aim to reform a wayward worker by imposing progressively harsher penalties was 
viewed as equivalent to psychological punishment theorists‘ use of a persistent 
‗noxious stimulus‘ (Wheeler 1976, p. 241) to deter undesirable behaviour.  
 
At the outset of Wheeler‘s theory, the decision to dismiss an employee is described 
as ‗authoritarian‘ punishment resulting from either previous, unsuccessful corrective 
action, or because the gravity of the offence warranted immediate dismissal. 
Arbitrators are empowered to review the punishment and administer their own 
industrial discipline which Wheeler categorised into three types: corrective, 
authoritarian; and humanitarian. Corrective arbitration would occur if the arbitrator 
overturned a dismissal on matters of intensity, intent, policy knowledge, honest 
mistakes or in concern for the worker. Authoritarian arbitration is signalled by 
arbitrators that primarily have a rule enforcement agenda and focus on administrative 
effectiveness and as such uphold the employer‘s decision to dismiss a worker. 
Humanitarian arbitration occurs when the arbitrator is concerned less with rules and 
focuses on the intentions of the offender and over-turns management‘s decision to 
terminate the worker.  
 
It is noted that there appears to be a significant overlap between the humanitarian and 
corrective categories. As such, both are assigned ‗supportive of worker‘ in Table 3.1 
due to investment in the reformative efforts of the employee or to redeem the 
employee altogether. In contrast, the authoritarian arbitration style is a maxim for 
managerial prerogative to punish via termination and allocated as ‗supportive of 
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3.2.6  Thornthwaite’s analysis of bureaucratic structures 
Thornthwaite (1994) analysed the role of specialist industrial tribunals (along with 
other bureaucratic structures) as a mode of government intervention for regulating 
labour. Thornthwaithe‘s analysis identified four roles performed by bureaucratic, 
interventionist structures. First, they perform a containment function for individual 
grievances which may cause disruption in the workplace. Second, they perform a 
surveillance function with opportunities to monitor applications of policies and 
procedures. Third, they perform a validation function by either endorsing the actions 
of management or alerting unions to managerial weaknesses. Fourth, they perform a 
regulatory function by applying legislative interpretations to managerial policies and 
processes. Thornthwaithe (1994, p. 289) suggests that government invented tribunals 
and authorities legitimise managerial control yet also ‘provide workers with some 
clarity and certainty in the employment relationship, and enable workers to 
challenge the arbitrary exercise of managerial discretion’. For this reason, Table 3.1 
reflects both worker and employer focus for arbitral bodies, with the containment 
function more likely to support an employers‘ endeavours to maintain productivity in 
the light of industrial disquiet and the surveillance, validation and regulatory 
functions providing a scaffold for workers to broach the power position of the 
employer.  
 
To conclude this section, the neutral perspective of judicial arbitration provides an 
appropriate arbitration theory to explain the role of the arbitrator in unfair dismissal 
arbitration. Meanwhile, Thornthwaite‘s regulatory and containment functions and 
Wheeler‘s three models of arbitration situated the unfair dismissal arbitrator with 
preferences for providing either a humanitarian, corrective attitude toward the 
dismissed worker, or an authoritarian attitude that supports the employer‘s 
prerogative to terminate the employment contract. Unfair dismissal arbitration, as a 
rights dispute, is likely to be a hostile process for the competing parties, and while a 
number of the theories were considered to have the ‗neutral‘ focus to accommodate 
the inter-party hostility, it appears administrative, autonomous, accommodative and 
activist models are suited only to interests disputes that involve party consent to the 
process, which is unlikely in unfair dismissal arbitration. Furthermore, Australian 
industrial arbitrators adjudicate not only unfair dismissal claims, but a range of other 
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interest and rights disputes; as such, they may regulate their arbitrary style depending 
on the type of case before them and their personal philosophies and/or objectives. 
 
This section considered arbitration within the jurisprudence literature concerning 
industrial regulation. Beyond such a framework, organisational behaviour theorists 
operate within the perspective that workplace arbitration occurs as micro-element of 
behaviour within organisations, specifically as an aspect of the employee grievance 
process. Organisational behaviour scholars seek to explain the grievance process by 
using organisational behaviour theories to describe and predict the behaviours of the 
parties involved. The following section considers arbitration from this perspective. 
  
3.3  Arbitration within the OB workplace grievance literature 
An unfair dismissal claim, and arbitration of it, is within the scope of the ‗workplace 
grievance‘ process – a process of interest to organisational behaviour scholars. This 
section outlines briefly the workplace grievance literature that addresses, as one of its 
dimensions, employee complaints against involuntary termination of their 
employment. This section adapts material published during candidacy by the author 
in a refereed article in the Australasian Journal of Business and Social Enquiry, 
(Southey 2010a). The full journal article reviewed and consolidated organisational 
behaviour theories that have been used to investigate the employee grievance process 
and suggested additional theories that could support grievance research. However, to 
address the arbitral decision-making lens of this thesis, the following material has 
been refined to present theoretical research into the arbitration aspect of workplace 
grievances. 
 
Attending work can come with the unfortunate complication of experiencing 
unfavourable conditions or occurrences in the workplace. As a consequence, a 
workplace grievance may be raised where an employee feels his or her rights under a 
workplace agreement, award, organisational policy or practice have been violated by 
his or her employer or a representative of the employer (Cappelli & Chauvin 1991; 
Hook et al. 1996). To deal with such grievances, organisations can have in place a 
formal grievance process for an employee or a group of employees to appeal alleged 
unjust treatment or disciplinary action by an employer (Bemmels 1990a; Dalton & 
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Todor 1985a; Nurse & Devonish 2007). In addition to resolving a grievance in-
house, a grievance process can include third party intervention or ‗alternate dispute 
resolution‘ (ADR) procedures in the form of mediation, conciliation and/or 
arbitration (Brown 2004; Miceli 2003; Posthuma & Dworkin 2000). The grievance 
literature identifies third parties with authority to resolve grievances as any of the 
following: industrial and common law courts, industrial tribunals, commissions or 
government identified advisory bodies (Brown 2004; Rollinson et al. 1996). 
 
One can argue therefore that unfair dismissal claims and arbitration of such claims 
fall within the ambit of the grievance literature because the termination of an 
employee‘s contract can result in an employee invoking a grievance. 
Notwithstanding, from a pure workplace grievance perspective, an unfair dismissal 
claim occurs outside the organisation‘s formal grievance procedures – because the 
ex-employee now exists outside the jurisdiction of the organisation‘s rules and 
regulations. However, Dalton and Todor (1985a), Bemmels (1991a) and Klass, 
Mahony and Wheeler (2006) specifically include in their research into grievance 
activity, employee initiated appeals against their termination of employment, 
regardless of the finer point that the dismissed employee no longer attends the 
workplace.    
 
Understanding the influences on workplace grievance outcomes has captured the 
attention of organisational behaviour researchers, yet Gordon and Miller (1984, p. 
141) concluded that theory was ‗almost entirely absent in the diverse literature on 
grievances‘. It appeared little changed over the course of the next decade when 
Bemmels and Foley (1996) authored a further comprehensive literature review of 
grievance research and once again noted a largely ‗a-theoretical‘ approach to it. In an 
effort to theoretically underpin future grievance research, Bemmels and Foley (1996) 
classified workplace grievance research into four elements of the grievance process: 
grievable events; grievance initiation; grievance processing; and evaluation of the 
grievance experience. From there they recommended social science theories, largely 
drawn from the organisational behaviour discipline. which could support research in 
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Table 3.2 Examples of social science theories applicable to grievance procedure 




Grievance Topics Applicable Theories 
Grievable Events Management Style and Behaviours; Contract Complexity 
Grievance Initiation 
Expectancy Theory; Exit-Voice Theory; Reactance Theory; 
Attribution Theory; Procedural/Distributive Justice 
Grievance Processing 
Expectancy Theory; Attribution Theory; Escalating 
Commitment; Prospect Theory; Decision Dilemma Theory 
Subjective Evaluations of 
Grievance Procedures 
Agency Theory; Procedural/Distributive Justice; Equity 
Theory 
 
(Source:  Bemmels & Foley 1996, p. 381) 
*  
See Southey 2010b ‗Employee Grievance Research Through an Organisational Behaviour 
Framework‘, Australasian Journal of Business and Social Enquiry, vol. 8 for a discussion 
of the theories listed in this table and their applicability to grievance research  
 
With the aim of unfair dismissal arbitration to absolutely resolve an employee 
grievance, it would be best placed within the ‗grievance processing‘ and ‗evaluation‘ 
stages of Bemmel and Foley‘s classification. At this point it is worth considering the 
theories listed in Bemmel and Foley‘s table that have so far been used to investigate 
arbitration within the employee grievance process: attribution theory and justice 
theories. Aspects of these theories (attribution and justice theories) will be revisited 
in chapter 4 as they contribute to the theoretical deductive approach for developing 
the hypotheses for statistical testing. 
 
3.3.1  Attribution theory as part of grievance arbitration research 
Attribution theory was introduced by Heider (1958) when he instigated the 
philosophy of attributing the behaviour of an individual to a ‗cause‘ which influences 
one‘s judgement of that behaviour. The literature has evolved to categorising the 
‗cause‘ into three areas: internal and controllable (the behaviour occurred based on 
the person‘s level of effort); internal and uncontrollable (the behaviour occurred 
because the person lacked resources or ability) and external causes (the behaviour 
occurred because of issues outside the person‘s control, thus they are not at fault).  
Bemmels (1991a, 1994) used attribution theory to examine how arbitrators decide on 
dismissal cases by assigning either internal or external attributions for the behaviour. 
The investigation found that experienced arbitrators are more likely to make internal 
causal attributions than their less experienced counterparts. It was also found that 
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experienced arbitrators were more confident in judging the individual (internal 
causes) as personally responsible. That is, they tended to reject external causes as the 
reason for the offence and as such handed down decisions that directly impacted the 
individual. Whereas, less experienced arbitrators tended to make external attributions 
for the employee‘s behaviour and consequently tended to mediate a ‗middle ground‘ 
decision. 
 
3.3.2  Justice theories as part of grievance arbitration research 
Scholars have applied theories of justice to grievance processing from three 
perspectives: ‗procedural justice‘, ‗distributive justice‘, and ‗retributive justice‘. 
First, procedural justice is said to occur when the process for making a decision is 
perceived as fair by the recipients of that decision (Rawls 1972). This demands 
transparent and unbiased decision-making. It calls the employer and arbitrator to 
follow ‗natural justice‘ principles that should include a full investigation of the issue 
or grievance, providing an opportunity for the parties to respond to all allegations 
and for that response to be given due consideration (Alder & Henman 2001; Mac 
Dermott 2002). Further, an organisation‘s adoption of procedural justice principles is 
evident if it adjudicates workplace disputes by using clear and accessible processes 
such as ombudsmen, appeal systems, union-management grievance processes and 
open door policies (Dalton & Todor 1985a). In terms of resolving an unfair dismissal 
claim, an employee‘s acceptance of the outcome of a dismissal hearing will be 
enhanced if the employee believes the procedure was fair (Klass 1989). And further, 
Klass, Mahony and Wheeler (2006) asserted that decision makers (arbitrators) are 
influenced not only by the strength of evidence against the employee, but also by the 
procedural compliance by the employer.  
 
Second is the principle of distributive justice. Distributive justice refers to the 
delivery of a fair outcome for all parties concerned, particularly in economic terms 
and importantly, that the person given the judgment considers it fair (Rawls 1972). 
Thus distributive justice has implications for distributing financial rewards and 
benefits, training and promotion opportunities, work timetabling and not 
surprisingly, disciplinary actions. Similar to Klass‘ findings on procedural justice, 
Dalton and Todor (1985a) also found acceptance of a grievance outcome is 
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positively related to the employee‘s perception that the result possessed distributive 
justice.   
 
The third justice principle examined in the grievance literature is retributive justice. 
Retributive justice addresses the rhetorical question: what can be done for the victim 
and to the harm-doer to remove or deal with an injustice (Darley & Pittman 2003). In 
the context of workplace grievances, retributive justice relates to the decision-making 
rationale of an adjudicator (be it an member of management or an external arbitrator) 
in that he or she will attempt to restore justice to those harmed or those who 
complied with norms, as opposed to those who deviated from their obligations or 
accepted norms (Vidmar 2001 in Klass, Mahony & Wheeler 2006). The application 
of this theory in grievance research is that arbitral rulings are more likely to support 
the employer‘s decision to terminate the worker‘s employment where the employer 
produces strong evidence of the dismissed employee‘s misconduct to support the 
employer‘s retaliatory action of dismissing the employee (Klass, Mahony & Wheeler 
2006). And in reverse, arbitrators are more likely to find in favour of the employee in 
an effort to alleviate any injustice served upon the worker if they consider the 
employer committed any injustice during the dismissal process.  
 
The previous two sections established theories of arbitration from an industrial 
relations perspective and organisational behaviour perspective. Scholars have also 
discussed ideological grounds for providing unfair dismissal protections to workers. 
The ideals of maintaining dignity and autonomy for workers are discussed in the next 
section. At this point, the literature transitions from a theoretical discussion of 
arbitration towards a practical orientation.  
 
3.4  Dignity and autonomy and the gap in common law protection 
 
This section discusses how common or civil law contracts are fundamental to the 
employment relationship, yet common law does not protect employees from the 
employer behaving unjustly in a dismissal process. It explains the intervention of the 
State to address this vulnerability, and the principles of dignity and autonomy that 
corroborate the State‘s intervention to keep the exchange between the employer and 
employee on just terms.  
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The employment relationship involves the exchange of a person‘s labour for payment 
from the employer. For the exchange of his or her labour, an employee can 
anticipate, within a market economy framework, to be paid a fair day‘s pay for that 
day‘s labour (Collins 1992). This exchange is the fundamental common law contract 
underpinning the employment relationship (Compton, Morrissey & Nankervis 2002). 
However, the common law contract of the employment relationship can be set apart 
from the commercial transactions more typically associated with common law 
contracts involving the exchange of goods or services for payment.  
 
First, the employment relationship is different due to its unique ‗relational elements‘ 
which obliges both parties to a degree of trust and good faith dealing as they resolve 
aspects of the relationship which may change as circumstances change (Riley 2005). 
Common law has its limits determining when behaviours arising from relational 
changes would constitute a breach of contract (Pittard 1994). For instance, a bus 
driver that loses her or her driver‘s licence has negatively compromised the 
employment relationship, but the case would not be the same for a salesperson at a 
retail outlet where a driver‘s licence was not an essential condition of their job. Thus 
the common law process of applying precedent is complicated by the contextual 
variety of the employment relationship.  
 
Second, the common law stance towards the termination of an employment contract 
is concerned purely with whether the contract was terminated – rightly or wrongly – 
in accordance with the express terms of the contract, for example, whether or not the 
employer observed notice periods. In such cases, a court judge ruling under common 
law can hold the employer accountable for ‗wrongful‘ dismissal of a worker, which 
means the worker was terminated in breach of the contract of employment. Yet in 
arriving at such a decision, it is anticipated a judge will not or cannot place any 
weight on whether the dismissal was conducted in a just and fair manner (Pittard & 
Naughton 2010; Stewart 2006). Although this may change as Gray (1994) suggests 
Australia is behind other common law countries in incorporating fairness dealing as 
an implied term of the employment contract. The courts in Britain and New Zealand 
have held that both parties will act in a manner that maintains the confidence and 
trust between them, which implies the employer should act fairly if considering a 
dismissal. But, this interpretation is yet to occur in Australian courts, based on a 
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recent case which highlights the Court‘s limitation to deal with harshness or 
unfairness. In Griffiths v Rose [2011] the Federal Court of Australia (FCA) ruled in 
favour of the employer (the Department of Resources, Energy and Tourism) for 
dismissing an employee who used a work-issued laptop computer to view 
pornography, at home. The FCA judged it to be a legitimate dismissal as the 
computer was the employer‘s property and as such they had the right to tell the 
worker what he could and could not do with it. However, the Court, knowing its 
limitation that it could not consider the harshness of the dismissal, still recognised a 
level of harshness. It commented, ‗many would think that the Commonwealth‘s 
resources could be better utilised on activities other than the zealous pursuit of (the 
employee) over something he did in his own home which is not against the law‘ 
(CCH 2011, p. 1). Had the Court the jurisdiction to take into consideration the 
harshness and justness of the manner in which the dismissal was administered; one 
might surmise the outcome of this case would be different. 
 
Finally, employees do not earn absolute private ownership (Collins 1992) or 
‗property rights‘ (Pittard & Naughton 2010) over jobs in exchange for their labour, 
as they can expect with a house or car for which property ownership occurs via the 
exchange of money or other item of value. To use a metaphor, employees own the 
income from the fruit of their labour – but they do not own either the fruit they pick 
or the tree that grows the fruit (Collins 1992). This is atypical to other commercial 
contracts where ownership rights transfer between the parties. Again, this point of 
difference limits a judge‘s ambit under common law to provide job security beyond 
rudimentary contract compliance. It also highlights the power of the employer under 
common law, as they are the party that actually retain ‗ownership‘ of the jobs. 
Although it is noted that Riley (2005) argues Australian common law has potential to 
be developed to regulate employment security for workers – in the absence of further 
State protection.   
 
Whilst it has been established that employees do not have property rights over their 
jobs, they are entitled to operate under the knowledge that their job is secure – at 
least whilst they and their employers are in a position to meet the cornerstone of the 
employer-employee exchange of a ‗fair day‘s work for a fair day‘s pay‘. Responsive 
to the shortfalls of common law contract to provide effective job security, the State 
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can intervene to provide employees with protection-enhancing rights to balance or 
restrain the managerial prerogative of employers to determine when they make jobs 
available (Collins 1992; Gray 1994; Pittard 1994). Thus, employment legislation and 
neutral third party interventionist mechanisms (Brown 2004) such as the conciliation 
and arbitration functions of Australia‘s industrial tribunals, are State endorsed 
processes supplementing the common law employment contract for regulating the 
exchange between the employer and employee – on just and fair terms.  
 
Unfair dismissal regulation is not about transferring job ownership to employees. 
Instead it is designed to protect the less powerful worker in the employment 
relationship by prohibiting employers from unjustly terminating the contract of 
employment. According to Collins (1992) employee dignity and employee autonomy 
are the two closely aligned founding principles that substantiate State intervention, 
via legislation, to discourage employers from unjustly terminating an employment 
contract.  
 
The first principle, ‗dignity‘, asks employers to appreciate each employee‘s 
‘independent moral worth and respect for each person’s attempt to bring meaning to 
their life through work’ (Collins 1992, p. 16). Dignity obliges employers to be 
cognisant of the financial, emotional and reputational hardship employees are likely 
to suffer when dismissed involuntarily from their job. The principle of dignity 
expects the employer to be procedurally fair when determining whether to continue 
to provide a place of employment to a worker or workers. In essence, employers 
should balance their right to exercise their power over the allocation of jobs to 
achieve the most efficient outcomes for their business, against the welfare concerns 
for the employee. A further comprehensive discussion on the dimensions of dignity 
across the facets of the employment relationship and employee‘s work life was also 
published by Bolton (2011). For brevity, the seminal work of Collins is discussed. 
 
The second principle, ‗autonomy‘, emphasises that people‘s jobs highly influence 
how they define their status in life, that is, ‗work establishes meaning in their life‘ 
(Collins 1992, p. 18). For this reason, it impresses upon employers to consider three 
responsibilities, notably within the limits of a sustainable business operation. First, 
autonomy asks that employers keep open the opportunity for a person to keep 
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working as access to work provides a person access to other meaningful experiences 
in life. Further the quality of the work opportunity is key to providing autonomy. 
This leads to the second responsibility: employers must be clear about workplace 
rules so that a person does not inadvertently break the rules and lose their work 
opportunity. Third, workplace rules should only regulate employees to the point of 
efficient operation of the business as over-regulation restricts worker autonomy. 
Collins argues that a harsh workplace where the person works in fear or poor 
conditions, limits a person‘s autonomy as much as not having work at all. Ideally, a 
workplace that values autonomy for its workers provides jobs that have a fair level of 
job security, promotion opportunities, a variety of challenges and room to use 
initiative, so that a person is empowered to be the master of his/her own life.  
 
Although not using the word explicitly, the concept of autonomy was reflected by 
Epstein (1984) where he identified the impact that arbitrary dismissal has on the 
remaining employees and their sense of security: 
 
If co-workers perceive the dismissal arbitrary, they will take fresh stock of their 
own prospects, for they can no longer be certain that their faithful performance 
will ensure their security and advancement. The uncertain prospects created by 
arbitrary employer behaviour is functionally indistinguishable from a reduction 
in wages unilaterally imposed by the employer (Epstein 1984, p. 968). 
 
Although Epstein‘s writings indicate his opposition to wrongful discharge rights, 
even still, his quote recognises that a worker‘s autonomy moves beyond individual 
boundaries and is assessed collectively by employees within a workplace. In his 
quote, he reminds employers that they must be aware that when they execute a 
dismissal in a harsh or unjust manner toward a single employee, as a by-product it 
penalises the remaining employees‘ sense of trust because they can envisage the 
same treatment happening to them. In a way, they too feel punished. Epstein equates 
this loss of faith to that of having their wages reduced, which may be an arguable 
point, but certainly the sentiment of this statement is to not underestimate the 
negative impact that arbitrary dismissal has on the remaining employees. This quote 
is not suggesting employers refrain from dismissing a seriously transgressing 
employee. It is important that employees causing dysfunction in the workplace are 
removed – with dignity – because a dysfunctional worker also infringes on the 
autonomy and dignity rights of the remaining engaged and loyal employees. The 
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implications of the principles of dignity and autonomy is that they bind employers in 
their responsibility for maintaining the balance between productive efficiency  and 
the employees‘ rights to dignity and autonomy when considering the involuntary 
termination of an worker‘s employment contract (Collins 1992). It is such a balance 
which arbitrators‘ gate-keep by remedying employers‘ decisions that are unevenly 
weighted toward the economics of the business.   
 
An example of how both dignity and autonomy can be eroded can be found in 
women dismissed from their jobs under the Work Choices legislation. Women 
reported feelings of embarrassment and social withdrawal such as not attending 
church (Baird, Cooper & Ellem 2009). Where alternative work was found it was 
without equivalent benefits, particularly in terms of predictability of work hours, 
which impacted childcare arrangements (Baird, Cooper & Ellem 2009). Such 
experiences reflect that a sudden (and potentially harsh) dismissal can undermine, 
firstly, the dignity of the workers because in this example they endured personal 
hardship through emotional and social withdrawal. And secondly, their autonomy 
because  even though some found another job, they were no longer as empowered to 
plan and navigate their life as they had previously. 
 
This section outlined the shortfall in common law to offer protection from unfair 
dismissal and how the ideals of dignity and autonomy provide moral motivations for 
State intervention to stipulate supplementary unfair dismissal protections through its 
legislation. The next two sections address the adoption of unfair dismissal policies 
from the perspective of other developed market economies and Australia, 
respectively.  
 
3.5  Applications of unfair dismissal arbitration beyond Australia 
The arbitration of unfair dismissal claims is a phenomenon that extends beyond the 
Australian context. This section will first identify the position of the united 
international body that provides guidance on labour relations, the International 
Labour Organization (ILO) toward employer obligations regarding dismissal. The 
discussion will then move its focus to comparing the different mechanisms across 
countries that provide an appeal process for dismissed employees.  
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The Termination of Employment Digest prepared by the International Labour Office, 
Geneva in 2000, is a compendium of 72 countries‘ approaches to providing 
termination of employment protections to its citizens (Antoine et al. 2000). This 
Digest details countries that view protection against dismissal as part of a broader 
human right to job security and as such have given reference to employment security 
in their Constitutions. According to Antoine et al. (2000) these countries include 
Argentina, Bolivia, Brazil, Colombia, Costa Rica, El Salvador, Guatemala, 
Honduras, Mexico, Panama, Paraguay, Peru, South Africa and Venezuela. In 
addition many countries have statutory protections against unjust or unfair dismissal 
providing reinstatement and/or compensation to unduly dismissed workers. Countries 
that fall into this category include: Argentina; Austria; Bulgaria; Canada; Quebec; 
Chile; Germany; Hungary; Italy; Mexico; Netherlands; New Zealand; Poland; 
Singapore; Spain; Sweden; Tanzania; United Kingdom; and Vietnam.  
 
The ILO (2009, p. 14) reported that as January 2009, 34 countries had legislatively 
ratified the three core requirements of ILO Convention 158, Recommendation 166 
on Termination of Employment. Table 3.3 lists these 34 nations. Notably, there are 
177 member countries in the ILO (Bamber, Lansbury & Wailes 2004, p. 330) which 
means less than one fifth of member nations have incorporated the ILO guideline 
into legislation, although it is clear from the preceding paragraph that member 
countries frequently practice similar notions as the ILO guideline in their legislation. 
 
Table 3.3  Countries that have incorporated ILO Convention 158 on termination of 
               employment into legislation (as at January 2009) 
 
 
Antigua and Barbuda, Australia, Bosnia and Herzegovina, Cameroon, Central African 
Republic, Democratic Republic of the Congo, Cyprus, Ethiopia, Finland, France, Gabon, 
Latvia, Lesotho, Luxembourg, The Former Yugoslav Republic of Macedonia, Malawi, 
Republic of Moldova, Montenegro, Morocco, Namibia, Niger, Papua New Guinea, 
Portugal, Saint Lucia, Serbia, Slovenia, Spain, Sweden, Turkey, Uganda, Ukraine, 
Bolivarian Republic of Venezuela, Yemen, Zambia.  
 
Source: (International Labour Organization 2009) 
 
The three core ILO obligations placed upon employers under Convention 158 are to 
provide the employee with a valid reason for termination, a notice period, and the 
right of appeal. Relevant to this thesis is the ‗right of appeal‘ dimension. Article 8, 
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paragraph 1, of the Convention expects that ‗a worker who considers that his 
employment has been unjustifiably terminated shall be entitled to appeal against that 
termination to an impartial body, such as a court, labour tribunal, arbitration 
committee or arbitrator’ (ILO 2009, p. 9). The Convention offers a degree of 
flexibility as to how these core requirements are to be implemented. The ILO Panel 
of Experts at its 79
th
 Session commented on the uptake of Convention 158 amongst 
ILO‘s member countries (ILO 2009, p. 44). 
 
The Committee wishes to note that many more countries than those that have 
ratified the Convention give effect to its basic principles, such as notice, a pre-
termination opportunity to respond, a valid reason and an appeal to an 
independent body. Most countries, be they ratifying countries or otherwise, 
have provisions in force at the national level that are consistent with some or all 
of the basic principles of the Convention. The Committee notes that the 
principles of the Convention are an important source of law for labour courts 
and tribunals in countries that have or have not ratified the Convention. At its 
present session, the Committee noted with satisfaction the rulings handed down 
in March 2006 and July 2008 by the Court of Cassation in France directly 
applying the Convention. As an example of a non-ratifying country, the 
Committee notes from information supplied to it that the courts in South Africa 
have used the Convention in developing its jurisprudence. 
 
 
One of the commonalities in the comparative literature on termination of 
employment is that countries appear to distinguish between economic dismissals and 
summary dismissal. Economic dismissals occur due to operational requirements of 
the business with employees provided statutory protections such as mandatory notice 
periods and consultation with employees and unions (Forsyth 2009; Stieber 1980; 
Wheeler, Klass & Mahony 2004). However economic dismissals are not the focus in 
this thesis. 
 
Immediate or summary dismissal is any dismissal that occurs without paid notice 
provided by the employer. In this thesis, the interest is in the summary dismissals 
occurring on the basis of gross or flagrant misconduct for which the employer cannot 
be expected to continue the employment relationship (Stieber 1980; Wheeler, Klass 
& Mahony 2004). Also of interest in this thesis is the third alternative, where the 
employer gives paid notice of the dismissal, despite the misconduct. However, paid 
notice is more likely when performance issues trigger the dismissal. Be it an 
economic dismissal, summary dismissal or dismissal with notice – it can result in an 
‗unfair dismissal‘ claim if unfair dismissal rights exist within the country.  
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From a global perspective, there is a wide variation in forums within which unfair 
dismissal claims are resolved. Claims are determined by formal law courts in most 
European and Nordic countries such as Belgium, Germany and France, Italy, Spain, 
Finland, Sweden and Norway. This is possibly due to legislative restrictions 
combined with ease in accessing the ordinary or labour courts (Eaton 2000; Finkin 
2008; Wheeler, Klass & Mahony 2004). Ease of access occurs, for example, in 
Germany, where employees tend towards self representation before the labour court. 
A judge attempts conciliation in the first instance, but if unsuccessful, a hearing 
occurs before three judges: a qualified judge and two lay judges representing 
employer and employee perspective (Finkin 2008). Thus in Germany, arbitration 
cannot be substituted even if the individual contract were to provide for it (Finkin 
2008).  
 
In Norway, Italy, Finland and the United States, specialist labour or industrial courts 
do not exist and workers appeal through the ordinary courts (Klass, Mahony & 
Wheeler 2006; Wheeler, Klass & Mahony 2004). Other countries, use both ordinary 
and labour courts, such as Sweden where individual grievances – made through a 
union – are handled by, initially, regional lower civil courts with the specialist 
National Labour Court as the final determinate for all labour disputes 
(Hammarstrom, Huzzard & Nilsson 2004). In France, ‗wrongful‘ dismissal is 
considered a matter of ‗public policy‘ as it violates the law and thus cannot be 
subject to arbitration and instead are heard by the conseil de prud’hommes, a public 
institution consisting of lay judges with bipartiate (employer/employee) presence at 
hearings. The decisions of this body can be appealed to a civil court, which occurs in 
about 60 percent of decisions by the conseil de prud’hommes (Finkin 2008).  
 
In contrast, quasi-judicial arbitration is the (potentially) less expensive and more 
convenient resolution method used in the United Kingdom, Canada, the United 
States, South Africa and Australia (Eaton 2000; Wheeler, Klass & Mahony 2004). 
Countries using arbitration as its preferred unfair dismissal dispute resolution 
mechanism can provide the arbitration forum via State appointed industrial tribunals 
or private providers. For instance, in the United Kingdom, the Employment Rights 
(Dispute Resolution) Act 1988 empowered an independent body, the Advisory, 
Conciliation and Arbitration Service to offer accessible, speedy and informal 
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resolution services as an alternative to the stress and expense of the industrial 
tribunal (ACAS 2009; Colling 2004; Wheeler, Klass & Mahony 2004).  
 
The United States forum for appealing dismissal decisions is via private arbitration, 
which is arbitration provided by mutually agreed, hired arbitrators from professional 
arbitration societies. Finkin (2008, p. 167) calls it ‗justice for hire‘ to distinguish it 
from ‗public justice‘ under State sponsored tribunals and courts. Private 
‗employment arbitrators‘ hear claims from non-represented employees whilst union 
represented workers appear before ‗labor arbitrators‘ (Klass, Mahony & Wheeler 
2006). The United States, is a unique example of an advanced market economy that 
is absent of statutory legislation protecting workers from unfair dismissal. Instead, 
residual influences of the laissez-faire polices of the American courts up to the 1930s 
still mean the United States embraces ‗employment at will‘ policies (Finkin 2008). 
Thus workers only have recourse if a dismissal was unlawful in terms of violating a 
statute (such as anti-discrimination statutes) (Klass, Mahony & Wheeler 2006). Some 
US employers go beyond statutory protections, undoubtedly where there is union 
presence, and install a ‗for-cause‘ standard in collective agreements or employment 
contracts that specify termination must be for a cause.  
 
Countries in Asia also tend to favour arbitration over formal court resolution. South 
Korean legislation established its Labour Relations Commission (LRC) that can 
conciliate, then move to ‗tripartite‘ mediation (employer, worker and public) before 
arbitrating disputes (Park & Leggett 2004). Japan appears to resolve issues 
informally with issues rarely requiring arbitration, but it does have central and local 
labour relations commissions (Kuwahara 2004). Singapore has a Labour 
Commissioner that will investigate unfair dismissal claims, if conciliation fails, and 
make a binding decision which can include reinstatement or compensation (Antoine 
et al. 2000). However, Malaysia uses a specialist industrial court as its forum for 
termination of employment disputes (Wheeler, Klass & Mahony 2004). 
 
The treatment of dismissal and avenues of appeal are fluid dimensions within the 
global industrial relations regime. Dismissal protections in Italy, Spain and Ireland 
have been strengthened, whilst protections have been weakened in UK, France and 
Germany (Eaton 2000). Not to mention that Australia‘s unfair dismissal protections 
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have been particularly turbulent over the last decade. It is proposed that a part of the 
reason for this variety and fluidity could be the morphing of public policy agendas 
considered favourable to economic growth by each country‘s government, in a world 
of contrasting economic fortunes amongst its nations. Frenkel and Harrod (1995) 
explained that the public policy agenda in more industrially advanced countries is 
concerned with providing business and labour relations structures conducive to 
innovation, high standards of quality, equity and customer responsiveness. Whereas 
in newly industrialised nations and developing countries it is change management 
that forms the central feature of public policy that implicates its industrial relations 
structures and instruments.   
 
3.6  The Australian context of unfair dismissal arbitration 
This section outlines unfair dismissal arbitration within the Australian context. The 
reason for summarising relevant features of the Australian context is that it underpins 
an improved understanding of the research problem by providing information on 
issues that, whilst relevant to the research, are not specifics of the research question 
(Cavana, Delahaye & Sekaran 2001). As this study is situated within the unfair 
dismissal aspect of Australia‘s arbitration framework, this section analyses the 
industrial environment of this study which in turn assists the reader to appreciate the 
scope of the study (Perry 1998). This section first provides an historical overview of 
the Australian industrial legislation dealing with unfair dismissal arbitration. This is 
followed with a discussion concerning the ongoing debate in Australia about the 
neutrality of its Federal industrial tribunal. This section concludes with statistics 
describing arbitral decision-making trends by the federal tribunal. 
 
3.6.1  The history of unfair dismissal arbitration 
With Federation occurring in 1901, Australia has had a shorter timeframe to 
legislatively organise its industrial relations compared to industrialised countries in 
the UK, US, Europe and Asia, yet this has not prevented it from adopting a 
distinctive and fluid approach toward industrial regulation. During the 1900s, 
Australia‘s industrial relations landscape was distinct from the rest of the industrial 
world for three reasons: first, the dual operation of state and federal industrial 
tribunals to regulate the employment relationship (Dabscheck 1998; Stewart 2009); 
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second, the power of the federal tribunal to administer compulsory arbitration to 
settle industrial disputes (Walker 1970); and third, the consequent influence of these 
tribunals on the national economy (Brown 2004). The original, 1904 federal 
legislation installed a collective industrial system with unions on one side, employer 
and employer associations on the other side, and a third-party industrial tribunal to 
engage in the conciliation and arbitration of disputes (Cooper & Ellem 2008).  
 
The early federal tribunal, except for its ability to ‗entertain‘ claims and 
‗recommend‘ reinstatement of either unfairly or unlawfully dismissed workers, was 
prohibited from performing the judicial function of arbitrating unfair dismissal cases 
raised by individual employees (O'Donovan 1976, p. 639). Nevertheless, throughout 
the 20
th
 century, it eventually came to dominate the unfair dismissal system with 
authority to resolve individual claims raised by employees. Oddly enough, the story 
of the federal tribunal gaining jurisdiction over unfair dismissal arbitration ran 
contradictory to the federal tribunal‘s fading arbitral role in other aspects of the 
employment contract, such as wage fixation and dispute resolution. Such arbitration 
now plays a secondary role to enterprise bargaining (Alexander, Lewer & Gahan 
2008). To discuss this paradox would detract from the focus of this thesis. Instead, 
Appendix 2 contains an account that traces the slice of industrial relations history 
pertaining to the evolution of Australia‘s system of unfair dismissal arbitration. 
 
The discussion in Appendix 2 describes how Australia‘s industrial relations 
environment has moved from being highly regulated via a myriad of detailed 
industry awards, compulsory arbitration and centralised wage setting mechanisms, 
through to the current, largely deregulated system of ‗modern‘ simplified awards and 
enterprise agreements unpinned by a dominant piece of federal legislation: the Fair 
Work Act 2009. It has taken over a century for Australia to develop a national 
system for providing unfair dismissal protections to workers. It was destined to be 
complicated by a variety of factors, such as early interpretations of the federal 
government‘s authority under the Constitution Act to legislate directly on individual 
employment matters, combined with reluctance from the High Court to grant power 
to a federal tribunal to make quasi-judicial decisions that award remedies to unfairly 
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3.6.2  The Fair Work Act 2009 and Fair Work Amendment Act 2012 
 
This sub-section describes the present federal system of unfair dismissal protection. 
First, it will outline briefly the unfair dismissal protection provisions of the Fair 
Work Act 2009, before discussing the implications of that Act in determining which 
employees are granted unfair dismissal protection under its legislation. It will finish 
with an explanation of Australia‘s current unfair dismissal claim process in the 
federal jurisdiction and minor implication of the Fair Work Amendment Act to the 
unfair dismissal process. 
 
The Fair Work Act 2009 and the instalment of Fair Work Australia – a new 
federal tribunal: In late 2007, the Labor government was returned to power under 
Rudd‘s leadership. One of its major election platforms was its ‗Forward with 
Fairness‘ policy that largely aimed to unwind the restrictive Work Choices 
legislation including employee access to unfair dismissal claims. The newly elected 
government legislated for fresh industrial relations laws, the Fair Work Act 2009. 
Among its changes was the introduction of ten national employment standards, a 
simplified award system called ‗modern awards‘ and replacement of AWAs with 
enterprise agreements that could involve union representation (Sutherland & Riley 
2010).  
 
In terms of unfair dismissal, Part 3-2, of the Act prescribed the ‗Unfair dismissal‘ 
provisions. Under this Part, Section 385 provided unfair dismissal protection to 
employees if a dismissal was: ‗harsh, unjust and unreasonable‘ and it was not a 
genuine redundancy. Further, Section 394 placed the responsibility for settling unfair 
dismissal claims on Fair Work Australia (FWA), a new federal tribunal replacing the 
Australian Industrial Relations Commission (AIRC) in January 2010. The Labor 
government‘s opinion was that appointments to the AIRC were unbalanced with the 
previous Howard government drawing, in the main, people with employer related 
backgrounds (Gillard 2007b; Rudd & Gillard 2007). Described by the Labor 
government as an independent industrial umpire with teeth (Gillard 2008a), Fair 
Work Australia replaced the AIRC, Australian Industrial Registry, Australian Fair 
Pay Commission, Fair Pay Commission Secretariat, Workplace Authority (Gillard 
2008b). FWA was promoted as a ‗one stop shop‘ for industrial relations advice, help 
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and compliance. FWA members were divided into four industry panels and were 
allocated issues that arose in their allocated industries. This means, most members 
were exposed to dealing with termination of employment matters for their allocated 
industry.  
 
The Small Business Fair Dismissal Code: Section 388 of the Act introduced a fair 
dismissal code for use by businesses with fewer than 15 employees. Southey (2008a) 
and Chapman (2009) explained the following about this Code: The Small Business 
Fair Dismissal Code (Department of Education Employment and Workplace 
Relations 2008) allows an employee to be dismissed without warning in instances of 
serious misconduct with examples of theft, fraud, violence or serious breaches of 
safety rules listed in the Code. Otherwise, dismissal can occur only on the basis of 
the employee‘s conduct or capacity to do the job. In this circumstance, the Code 
requires the employee to be warned that a dismissal is imminent if no improvement 
occurs. Whilst the warning does not have to be in writing, the Code places a 
requirement on the employer to allow the employee the opportunity to respond to the 
warning and to assist the employee via training to improve his/her performance. The 
Code allows for the employee to have a representative present during discussions, 
provided the representative is not a hired, legal professional. Finally, the Code places 
onus on the small business owner to substantiate compliance with the Code in the 
event the employee makes a claim. To assist with this aspect of the Code, a checklist 
was developed for employers to guide them in a fair and compliant dismissal process 
before FWA. Use of the checklist is not mandatory, but recommended to be 
completed and retained in the interests of the employer.   
 
Coverage of the unfair dismissal provisions in the Fair Work Act 2009: Sections 
382-384 of the Act set out which employees in Australia are covered by the federal 
provisions. In essence, the provisions apply to any employee hired under the terms of 
a modern award, enterprise agreement, or by a ‗national system‘ employer - which 
includes the majority of businesses in Australia (FWO 2012), provided he or she 
does not earn more than the high-income threshold prescribed by the Act. Table 3.4 
clarifies which workers are covered and those that fall outside this coverage. 
Employees not covered by the Fair Work Act are generally protected by relevant 
state unfair dismissal provisions, or in the case of ‗contractors‘, common law claims 
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as they do not fit the definition of an ‗employee‘. (Definitions and usage of 
‗contractors‘ in Australia‘s labour market is discussed in Vandenheuvel & Wooden 
(1995) and Waite & Will (2001).) 
 
Table 3.4  Coverage of the unfair dismissal protections of the Fair Work Act 2009 
Workers covered Workers not covered 
 
 Workers employed in the State of Victoria, the 
Northern Territory and Canberra 
 Workers employed in waterside, maritime or flight 
crew officers engaged in interstate or overseas 
trade or commerce 
 Workers employed by the Commonwealth 
Government or a Commonwealth authority 
 Workers employed in private enterprise in New 
South Wales, Queensland, South Australia or 
Tasmania 
 Workers employed in local government in 
Tasmania 
 Workers employed by a constitutional corporation 
in Western Australia (including Pty Ltd 
companies)  
 
 workers in a state government in New 
South Wales, Queensland, Western 
Australia, South Australia and 
Tasmania 
 workers in local government in New 
South Wales, Queensland and South 
Australia 
 workers in a non-constitutional 
corporation in Western Australia 




(Adapted from: The Fair Work Act 2009) 
 
Ignoring the for the moment the brief intervention of the limited protections of the 
Work Choices 2005 legislation, there is an overlap in coverage between the Fair 
Work Act and the earlier Workplace Relations Act 1996 in that both protected: all 
workers in the State of Victoria, Northern Territory or Canberra; waterside workers, 
maritime workers or flight crew officers engaged in interstate or overseas trade or 
commerce; and Commonwealth public sector employees (Australian Industrial 
Relations Commission 2005b).  The point of departure between to two Acts is that 
the 1996 Act also covered employees under a federal award or agreement and whose 
employer is a constitutional corporation, whereas the 2009 Act has broader coverage 
by protecting employees of private enterprise in NSW, Qld, SA and Tasmania as well 
as employees in constitutional corporations in WA. Thus, on reviewing the coverage 
list in Table 3.4 it is understandable that the Fair Work Act 2009 provides the 
broadest coverage of unfair dismissal protections in Australia to date, with estimates 
that the 2009 Act covers 79 percent of Australia‘s workforce (McCallum, Moore & 
Edwards 2012).  
 
However, despite the 2009 Act offering the broadest coverage of workers to date, 
there remain particular categories of employees excluded from lodging a federal 
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unfair dismissal claim in the federal tribunal. This has been the case since unfair 
dismissal provisions were first introduced in the 1993 federal legislation reflecting 
the ILO recommendation which in itself excluded specified-period employees; 
specified-task employees and short-term casuals. Since then, the categories of 
employees excluded have undergone several legislative iterations, as depicted in 
upcoming Table 3.5.  
 
Table 3.5 shows that both workers and employers have been exposed to varying 
degrees of vulnerably over the last three years. For instance, the Fair Work Act 2009 
exposes all business to claims from casual employees. At odds to the current Act, the 
Work Choices legislation excluded employees in firms of fewer than 100 workers 
and casual employees and people dismissed for any genuine operational reason. 
Creighton (1994) referred to the members of the workforce affected by the unfair 
dismissal exclusions as the ‗forgotten workers‘, noting that the legislation had still to 
catch up with the post-industrial society where the variations to the employment 
arrangements are far beyond the permanent, wage earning employee.  
 
Key changes to Australia‘s labour market have occurred since the 1970s: increased 
use of casual labour; workers supplied by labour hire businesses; ‗contract work‘ in 
terms of using both independent contractors and/or outsourcing discrete elements of 
the work. These changes have resulted as employers adopt flexible staffing practices 
to meet the demands of operating in a global market and more recently ‗knowledge 
economy‘ (Pittard & Naughton 2010; Wooden 2002). For one category of these 
workers, the casual workers, the Fair Work Act has improved security of 
employment. Casual employees in businesses of more than 15 employees have unfair 
dismissal rights after six months regular service. 
 
Fair Work Amendment Act 2012: The name of the federal tribunal changed to the 
Fair Work Commission. The implication of this amendment on unfair dismissals was 
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Table 3.5  Comparison of employees excluded from unfair dismissal protections 






Act 1996 (Work 
Choices)  2005 









If serving a 3 month or less 
qualifying period or other 
qualifying period provided 
it has been agreed in 
writing before commencing 
and  reasonable for the 
nature of the employment 
 
If serving a 6 month or less 
qualifying period or a 3 
month or less probationary 




If less than 12 months regular 
and systematic employment 
and in a business with less 
than a headcount of 15 
workers.  
 
If less than 6 months regular 
and systemic employment 
and in a larger businesses 
Number of 
employees  
If employed in a businesses 





If dismissed for a genuine 
operational reason which 
includes economic, 
technological or structural 
reasons relating to the 
employer‘s business 
If made genuinely redundant 
because of downturn in 
business or position no longer 
needed provided the 
employer complied with 
consultation obligations and 
explored options for 





If under an employment 
contract for a specified 
period or task 
If employed as a seasonal 
worker or under an 
employment contract for a 
specified period or task 
If at the end of a seasonal or 
specified task employment 
contract 
Trainee / 
apprentice If employed under a 
National Training Wage 
Traineeship 
If employed as a trainee or 
approved apprentice 
If employed as a specific 
period traineeship dismissed 




If employed as a casual 
employee for less than 12 
months 
If employed as a casual 




earners If not covered by an award 
and earning (circa $90,400) 
a year or more in 
remuneration (indexed). 
If not covered by an award 
or workplace agreement 
and earning (circa $106,400) 
or more a year in 
remuneration (indexed). 
If not covered by an award or 
enterprise agreement and 
earning $123,300 (in 2013) a 





If pursuing other termination 
related proceedings 
If pursuing an application or 
complaint of a kind referred 
to in any one of sections 726 
to 732 of the Act in relation 
to the dismissal. 
Claim period 
If it has been over 21 days 
since dismissal 
If it has been over 21 days 
since dismissal 
If it has been over 14  days 
since dismissal* 
 
* revised to 21 days under the Fair Work Amendment Act 2012 
Adapted from: (Australian Industrial Relations Commission 2005b, 2007b; Fair Work 
Australia 2011; Southey 2008a)  
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3.6.3  The process of making an unfair dismissal claim 
As the focus of this thesis is on the arbitral decisions of Australia‘s federal tribunal 
between 2000 and 2010, it is worth outlining the general process adopted by the 
tribunal to resolve an unfair dismissal. The unfair dismissal claim process of the 
current tribunal, the Fair Work Commission (FWC) is not unlike the process used by 
its predecessor tribunals, Fair Work Australia and the Australian Industrial Relations 
Commission (AIRC 2007b) – the later two being the consecutive federal tribunals in 
place during the ‗period of interest‘ in this thesis. Eligible employees commence the 
process by filing a dismissal remedy application claim form (Form F2) available by 
either contacting the FWC helpline or accessing the FWC website. The completed 
form can be filed with the FWC in person, by email, fax or by accessing the FWC 
website. The applicant pays a small application fee, for instance in March 2013 the 
fee was $64.20 (FWC 2013b), indexed annually, but if the General Manager at FWC 
is satisfied payment of this fee will cause the applicant serious hardship, it can be 
waived (Fair Work Australia Regulations  2009).  
 
On receipt of an application form from a grievant worker, the FWC notifies the 
employer of the unfair dismissal application. At this point the employer can object to 
an unfair dismissal claim by completing the employer‘s response to application for 
unfair dismissal remedy form (F3). Forms F2 and F3 inform the conciliator during a 
conciliation conference. In summary, FWC – and its predecessor tribunals – initially 
engage the parties in a private conciliation conference with a specialist conciliator 
from the FWC. These conferences are usually conducted by telephone and the 
conciliation settlement rate reported in the most recent annual report of the FWC is 
listed at 81 percent (FWA 2012). The conciliation settlement rates reported for the 
period of interest in this thesis reported in sub-section 3.6.5. 
 
In the event the dismissed employee is unsatisfied with the conciliation conference, 
he or she can seek an arbitration hearing with a different member of the FWC to 
determine if the dismissal was harsh, unjust or unreasonable. Arbitration hearings are 
public hearings and FWC is required to publish its arbitration decisions, which it 
does on its website (Fair Work Australia 2011). Both the Fair Work Act 2009 and its 
predecessor, the Workplace Relations Act 1996, contain similar guidelines for 
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arbitrators to determine if a dismissal was harsh, just and unreasonable – although 
the current Act is slightly more detailed. The Fair Work Act, Section 387 provides 
the following guideline to FWC members for determining if a dismissal was harsh, 
unjust or unreasonable:  
(a)  whether there was a valid reason for the dismissal related to the person‘s capacity or conduct 
(including its effect on the safety and welfare of other employees); and 
(b) whether the person was notified of that reason; and 
(c)  whether the person was given an opportunity to respond to any reason related to the capacity 
or conduct of the person; and 
(d) any unreasonable refusal by the employer to allow the person to have a support person 
present to assist at any discussions relating to dismissal; and 
(e)  if the dismissal related to unsatisfactory performance by the person—whether the person had 
been warned about that unsatisfactory performance before the dismissal;  
 
Furthermore in determining if a dismissal was harsh, unjust or unreasonable, Section 
382 retained the ‗fair go all round‘ principle founded in the 1996 legislation. This 
means that under Section 387 the FWC member (arbitrator) must also include in their 
considerations the employer‘s position in relation to:  
(a)  the degree to which the size of the employer‘s enterprise would be likely to impact on the 
procedures followed in effecting the dismissal; and 
(b)  the degree to which the absence of dedicated human resource management specialists or 
expertise in the enterprise would be likely to impact on the procedures followed in effecting 
the dismissal; and 
(c)  any other matters that FWC considers relevant. 
 
In the event the FWC arbitrator determines that the worker was unfairly dismissed, 
Section 390 of the Act empowers the arbitrator to provide a remedy of either 
reinstatement or compensation. The application of these two types of remedy is as 
follows. Section 391 allows FWC to order ‗reinstatement‘ which involves re-
appointment to the position employed immediately prior to dismissal, or re-
employment to another position on terms and conditions no less favourable than 
those on which the person was employed immediately before the dismissal. An order 
can also be made to maintain the employee‘s continuity of service, and/or to restore 
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Section 392 allows the FWC to order ‗compensation‘ in lieu of reinstatement. 
According to the ‗fair go all round‘ principle, the arbitrator is required to take into 
account the effect of the order on the viability of the employer‘s business before an 
order for compensation can be made. The Act also prescribes the arbitrator take into 
account the employee‘s length of service and the remuneration he or she would have 
received had no dismissal occurred, less the amount of any remuneration earned by 
the employee from other work since dismissal. Additionally, if the employee was 
dismissed due to misconduct, the arbitrator can ‗appropriately‘ reduce the 
compensation amount. The compensation ‗must not include a component by way of 
compensation for shock, distress or humiliation, or other analogous hurt, caused to 
the person by the manner of the person’s dismissal’. And, as a final requirement, 
compensation is capped at the lesser of half the amount of the high income threshold 
(in March 2013 the income threshold for making a claim was $123,300, capping 
compensation at $61,650 (FWC 2013b)). Arbitral findings for compensation 
payments to dismissed workers are presented in sub-section 3.6.5. 
 
Finally, Section 400 of the Act provides for appeals against the arbitration decision. 
Appeals are heard by a bench of three members of Fair Work Commission. In order 
for the FWC full bench to grant an appeal, the appellant must show that it is in the 
public interest to do so and that the arbitrator‘s decision involved a significant error 
of fact. Appeal rates are discussed in sub-section 3.6.5 on unfair dismissal claim 
statistics. 
 
3.6.4  The debate over neutrality in the federal tribunal 
Former judge of the Commonwealth Industrial Court, Sir Richard Eggleston, said ‗in 
the arbitration jurisdiction everything is relevant, but there is very little which is 
helpful‘ (in Jeffery 2005). Faced with the challenge of wading through endless facts 
and sentiments, as alluded to by Eggleston (and similarly by Ronfeldt 1998), it would 
be unfair and unreasonable to claim arbitrators are purposely biased. However, the 
debate about the neutrality of the federal commission is raised frequently by 
politicians, unions, employer bodies and in the media (Southey & Fry 2010). This 
sub-section considers initially the theoretical potential for bias to occur in the arbitral 
decision-making process. The discussion will then review claims of bias amongst 
members of Australia‘s federal tribunal Fair Work Australia, and its predecessor, the 
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Australian Industrial Relations Commission. To finalise this discussion, responses to 
the bias are addressed.  
 
Two assumptions of judicial type decision-making are that judges or arbitrators will 
think independently and honour societal values. On the matter of independence, 
Brown (2004, p. 455) emphasised: 
 
(Third parties) have to be seen to be independent of employers and of trade 
unions, but also of governments, which often have their own agendas. They 
have to be independent in terms of finance and allegiance. This is necessary if 
one-off conciliation and arbitrations are to be successful. 
 
The second assumption, that judges exercise judgements reflective of society‘s 
values, is argued to be flawed by Justice Wright who writes ‗it is presumptuous to 
assume too readily that all members of society necessarily share even basic values‘ 
(Wright 2002, p. 105) implying that values are variable therefore impractical for 
judges to consistently apply in their decisions. A further two arguments can be 
mounted in support of the debate that judges and arbitrators may be challenged by 
the societal ideal of impartiality.  
 
First, a search of the literature pertaining to judicial decision-making – the type of 
decision-making to which arbitration judgements are associated – identified papers 
that suggested, simply, judges can make mistakes. Articles by  Kirby (1999); Sangha 
and Moles (1997); Seamone (2002); and (Bemmels 1991b) suggested that the judge‘s 
intuition and personal attributes unavoidably effect the interpretation of the evidence 
and consequent judgement of a case. Sangha and Moles (1997) suggested that the 
judge‘s findings are actually a combination of attributions and assertions entangled 
among facts. Whether it is a reasonable expectation from society that judges can 
conjure a neutral mindset was also considered by Mason (2001). Mason 
conceptualised a difference between judicial neutrality and judicial impartiality 
suggesting that neutrality is humanly impossible whilst impartiality, a guiding 
judicial principle, calls the judge to be open minded and act upon differing opinions 
presented to them. Mason (2001) further acknowledged the existence of 
‗unconscious prejudice‘ which contends that bias is not ‗neatly packaged‘ and can 
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Second, in a more frank manner, Dabscheck (1981, p. 444) stated:  
Judges, notwithstanding the mystique of judicial impartiality, hand down 
decisions which reflect their biases and value judgements ... members of 
Australian industrial tribunals have sought to inculcate their values and beliefs 
into the operation of Australian industrial relations.  
 
He suggested that a major critique of judicial decision-making is to assume judges 
can divorce themselves from the influence of the general society and groups to which 
they belong. Recall that in section 3.2 on theories of arbitration, it was illustrated in 
Table 3.1 how some models contained an inherent sympathy for the plight of the 
employer under the authoritarian arbitration model, or the employee, within the 
frameworks of corrective and humanitarian arbitration. And further, Dabcheck‘s 
(1981) theory of ‗activist arbitration‘ suggested arbitrators are ambitious in their 
attempts to impose on the interest groups appearing before them, their personal ideals 
as to how the industrial relations environment should be regulated.  
 
In Australia, the question of whether FWA‘s predecessor the AIRC is completely 
free of bias received regular attention by the Australian media. Southey and Fry 
(2012) outlined claims from union and employer representatives that successive 
federal governments had ‗stacked‘ the AIRC by appointing members with either 
employer or union sympathies. Additional reference to this matter occurs in: Moore 
(2005); Robinson (2004); and Wilson (2005). For the purpose of this discussion, it is 
worth noting that the installation of FWA in 2009 occurred because the (then) Labor 
opposition claimed the appointments made to the AIRC by the Howard government 
were stacked, with only two appointees with union backgrounds whilst 14 had 
management backgrounds (Gillard 2007a). The ALP described the Liberal 
government of possessing ‘a tawdry system of appointing political mates’ to the 
AIRC (Norington & Hannan 2007) and the appointments as ‗one of the last 
desperate acts of a desperate government trying to give its mates a job for life‘ 
(Emerson in Robinson 2004). Thus, one of the ALP‘s election promises before 
winning power in 2007 was to eliminate bias in the tribunal by proposing a new 
selection process for members and replacing the AIRC with Fair Work Australia to 
‘break a cycle that sees each political party in government use appointments to the 
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On winning power, Rudd‘s Labor government committed to a new selection process 
ensuring ‗appointments will not favour one side over the other but will be made 
through a transparent selection process’ (Gillard 2008). In announcing Labor‘s 
appointment process for FWA, then Deputy Prime Minister Gillard acknowledged 
Although Labor too, had not been immune from self-interest in its appointments to 
the AIRC (Steketee 2007). In any event, the composition of FWA was assembled 
from members of the AIRC upon the announcement ‗the existing full time members 
of the Australian Industrial Relations Commission will be offered roles in Fair Work 
Australia‘ (Gillard 2009). Hence, the tally-keeping and ‗stacking‘ debate has 
continued. For instance, in 2010, a press release by the Australian Mines and Metals 
Association (AMMA 2010) read:  
 
While AMMA in no way seeks to undermine the professionalism and capability 
of those the Rudd Government has appointed to FWA, their backgrounds do 
reflect a particularly partisan approach, despite the Government‘s earlier 
promises this would not be the case‘   
 
The AMMA counted that six of the seven appointments to FWA up to June 2010 
were commissioners with union ties, intimating the Labor government was making 
biased appointments. 
 
The focus of the discussion will now consider the counter-argument to the bias 
debate. As a baseline argument, and similar to the principles in the legal system, the 
‗rule against bias‘ operates in the federal tribunal which requires the ‗decision 
maker‘ to be impartial in relation to the case they are deciding (CCH 2009; Van 
Essen et al. 2004). The federal tribunal has promoted its commitment to ensuring the 
impartiality of its judicial officers (Giudice 2002) and one might consider the 
availability of an avenue of appeal against an arbitral decision a safety measure to 
counteract bias. As a case in point, Justice Guidice‘s decision on 21 October 1998 
(Section 45 appeal against decision issued by Commissioner Tolley on 20 May 1998 
Telstra Corporation Limited  1998), quashed the previous decision made by the 
arbitrator on the grounds that the arbitrator‘s conduct during the course of the hearing 
had ‗the effect of conveying an appearance of impermissible bias in the actual 
decision to a reasonable and intelligent lay observer‘ [Vakauta v Kelly at 573]. 
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Dabscheck (1993) noted that the AIRC would at times hand down decisions 
favouring the employee, and at other times favouring the employer, or government, 
and at other times, decisions which favour no one and instead upset all parties 
involved. Arbitration hearings are open to the public and the decisions of the federal 
tribunal are public documents. With the advent of the internet, easy accessibility to 
the federal tribunal decisions occurred in July 2000 when the AIRC commenced 
online publication of its decisions, making unfair dismissal arbitration decisions 
available for the scrutiny of the Australian people. The decisions of the tribunal have 
been described as elaborately informed, reasoned decisions covering arguments and 
evidence (Issac 1981 in Blain, Goodman & Loewenberg 1987). Each decision is 
available for examination by the affected parties and in many cases by the media, 
government and other interested parties (Provis 1997). Undoubtedly, this open 
availability of decisions improves the transparency in the decision-making of each 
commissioner (as well as access to a data source for this thesis).  
 
Successive federal legislation has contained provisions regarding the selection and 
behaviour of the tribunal members; perhaps to help limit the ‗perceived bias of the 
[AIRC] appointment process‘ (Forsyth et al. 2008, p. 231). For instance, The Fair 
Work Act 2009 in Section 627 sets out qualification requirements for each level of 
appointment. As an example, to be appointed as a ‗commissioner‘ the Minister must 
be satisfied that the person possesses knowledge of, or experience in, one or more of 
the following areas: workplace relations; law; business; industry; and/or commerce. 
Section 634 of the Act requires that prior to commencing their duties; members 
undertake an oath to ‗faithfully and impartially perform the duties of the office‘ (from 
Schedule 5.1 Oath and affirmation of office). Section 640 of The Fair Work Act 
requires members to disclose conflicts of interest and Section 641 permits the 
dismissal of a member for ‗misbehaviour‘.  
 
As a final point, one should consider the matter of self-preservation in which the 
tribunal might engage. If the tribunal were to be too extreme or overtly biased, it may 
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The line which divides acceptable and unacceptable decisions may be very fine 
indeed. The interesting question is what will happen if industrial tribunals are 
out of step with those that they regulate ... Unions and employers would take 
action to circumvent the tribunal. This would threaten its survival as an 
institution and force it to make decisions which were not inconsistent with the 
needs of those that they regulate. 
 
This statement, made in 1981, was prophetic of the folding of the AIRC after 
continued accusations of bias led to its 2009 replacement by FWA – which, to all 
intents and purposes, is similar in composition to its predecessor. This has 
demonstrated that the government of the day, still has significant control over 
appointments to the federal tribunal (Forsyth et al. 2008).  
 
The conclusion drawn from this discussion is that the federal tribunal, in spite of its 
obligations and undertakings, can never be free from human fallibility. Theoretically 
it was outlined that there are grounds to suggest that bias can potentially rear its head 
in the judicial decision-making process, and by definition this includes the arbitral 
decision-making of the federal tribunal. The AIRC, by its own admission, had 
engaged in biased behaviour and upheld an appeal on this ground. The positive side 
is that the Australian system has installed legislative and systematic measures of 
providing an appeals avenue, holding public arbitration hearings and providing 
publicly accessible decisions as an offer of transparency and prohibition of bias. 
 
3.6.5  Unfair dismissal claim statistics 
This section aims to explain the workload of Australia‘s federal tribunal in resolving 
unfair dismissal claims and the general outcomes of such claims, for the period under 
examination in this thesis. The data for this thesis are drawn from the arbitral 
decisions of the federal system from the start of July 2000 to the end of June 2010. 
During this period, decisions were made by two successive tribunals. The vast 
majority were made by the Australian Industrial Relations Commission (AIRC) until 
July 2009 after which Fair Work Australia (FWA) was commissioned as the 
country‘s federal industrial tribunal. The majority of AIRC members had their 
appointments from the AIRC transferred to FWA (and in 2013 to FWC). 
 
Unfair dismissal claims account for a substantial amount of the tribunal‘s work. 
Table 3.6 presents statistics pertaining to the number of claims lodged and their 
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manner of disposal under the requirements of federal legislation. Claims can be: 
settled by conciliation, dismissed because they failed on matters of jurisdiction, or 
resolved by substantive arbitration. Substantive arbitration involves the arbitrator 
deciding whether or not the dismissal was harsh, unjust or unreasonable after hearing 
the respective responses of the employer and dismissed worker. Claims achieving 
substantive arbitration may be subsequently subjected to appeals, thus appeal 
statistics are also provided. The descriptive statistics in Table 3.6 enable one to make 
several general observations about the pattern of unfair dismissal claims by 
Australian workers during the last decade.  
 
First, unfair dismissal claim lodgements increased by 62 percent from the 
commencement to the end of the data period (8,109 to 13,054 lodgements). A 
noticeable annual increase occurred in the 12 months from June 2009 with a 61 
percent jump in claims alone (7,994 to 13,054 lodgements). Legislative changes may 
have accounted for the increase with the Fair Work Act assuming coverage of the 
majority of Australian workers, along with the reinstatement of dismissal protection 
that Work Choices denied employees in firms of less than 100 workers or those 
dismissed for any operational reason. The Work Choices legislation may have also 
accounted for a dip in lodgements between 2004-05 and 2006-07 with numbers 
starting to recover in 2007-08. 
 
Second, for the ten year period, the numbers show that for nine years the conciliation 
rate sat between 73 and 77 percent, with a jump in the final year to 81 percent. This 
is due, presumably, to the introduction of the Fair Work Act. On average, 75 percent 
of claims were resolved as a consequence of, or subsequent to, conciliatory 
intervention. Conciliation provides a service that ultimately protected the majority of 
the parties from the stressful events of arbitration. The statistics also showed that, on 
average, 1,109 annual claims either settled or discontinued, after conciliation but 
prior to an arbitration hearing. This indicates employees would frequently take a 
claim to conciliation but not pursue their claim through the arbitration process. 
Uncertainty, cost or complexity of the arbitration process could be plausible 
explanations for why they walk away from their claims. Alternatively, workers may 
have been settling with their (ex) employer after conciliation and not informing the 
Commission of their resolution.  
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Table 3.6  Unfair dismissal claim statistics in the federal tribunal from 1
st
 July 2000  






























8109  7461 7121 7044 6707 5758 5173 6067 7994 13054 7449 
CONCILIATION STATISTICS 
Finalised at or 
prior to 
conciliation 





1422 1648 1209 1139 985 1143 922 930 913 780 1109 
Conciliation 
settlement rate H 
73% 75% 75% 75% 77% 73% 73% 73% 75% 81% 75% 
UNSUBSTANTIVE ARBITRATION STATISTICS 
Dismissed:  
out of time 
85 105 87 77 41 62 87 135 142 111 93 
Dismissed:  
no jurisdiction 
129 156 154 129 120 128 255 382 437 228 212 
Dismissed: 
vexatious claim  
(new category from 2006) 15 14 19 11 15 
SUBSTANTIVE ARBITRATION STATISTICS 
Dismissed on 
merits 
142 148 136 117 115 55 58 34 59 67 93 
Compensation 
order 
96 96 81 84 96 52 35 17 22 51 63 
Reinstatement 
order 
42 47 24 22 18 17 8 18 14 22 23 
Breach without 
a remedy order 




291 291 241 223 202 124 101 69 95 142 178 
Claim upheld 
rate V 
51% 49% 44% 48% 43% 56% 43% 51% 38% 53% 48% 
APPEAL STATISTICS 
No. of appeals 87 63 52 53 44 40 37 38 43 41 93 
Appeal rate # 30% 22% 22% 24% 22% 32% 37% 55% 45% 29% 32% 
Upheld 27 28 17 16 14 18 14 9 6 11 23 
Dismissed 60 35 35 37 30 22 23 29 37 30 34 
Appeal upheld 
rate I 
31% 44% 33% 30% 32% 45% 38% 24% 14% 27% 32% 
 
*  claims lodged are not always finalised in the same year  
H
  conciliation settlement rate is provided in each annual report 
V  
 (compensation + reinstatement + breach without order) ÷ finalised by substantive arbitration 
# 
  number of appeals ÷ finalised by substantive arbitration 
I
   appeals upheld ÷ number of appeals  
 
Source: Developed for thesis with base statistics from: (Australian Industrial Relations 
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Third, the impact of different legislative eras on the disposal of claims can be 
identified in the statistics. Claims deemed to be ‗out of jurisdiction‘ increased in 
2006-07, spiking in 2008-09, probably due to the 2005 Work Choices amendments 
declaring extensive exclusions to categories of employees that could lodge unfair 
dismissal claims (these exclusions were discussed previously in Table 3.5). The ‗out 
of jurisdiction‘ claims declined in 2009-10 under the effects of The Fair Work Act 
2009. The introduction of Work Choices also coincided with a four year decline in 
the number of fully fledged, substantive arbitration claims determined from 2005-07, 
before showing a recovery in 2009-10. These are predictable results arising from the 
tough Work Choices limitations on allowable claims. The number of claims moving 
through to a full arbitration hearing declined over the decade: with 291 decisions 
issued in 2000-01 compared to 142 decisions in 2009-10. This may be explained by 
legislative changes affecting the jurisdictional viability of claims with 129 rejections 
in 2000-01 compared to 228 in 2000-10, or softening on attitudes towards ‗out of 
time‘ claims which increased from 85 rejections in 2000-01 compared to 111 in 
2000-10. 
 
A fourth point is made of the likelihood of success at the arbitration table. The 
chance of an employee convincing an arbitrator to overturn management‘s dismissal 
action was, on average, 48 percent. Although from year to year there appears to be a 
noticeable variation in the successful claim rate. For instance, the highest successful 
claim rate with 56 percent of claims falling in favour of the employee occurred in 
2005-06 and the lowest success rate occurred in 2008-09 with 38 percent of claims 
favouring the employee. In the event the decision favoured the employee, the 
arbitrator was more likely to award compensation instead of reinstatement. Riley 
(2005, p. 234) suggested that industrial tribunals show reluctance to order 
reinstatement, most likely on the basis that trust and confidence has been destroyed. 
However, an anomaly to this preference occurred in 2007-08 where 18 reinstatement 
orders were made compared to 17 compensation orders. 
 
A final point is made about the appeal rates. The ten year average showed that 
32 percent of decisions as to whether a dismissal was harsh, unjust or unreasonable, 
were appealed to the full bench. The average appeal success rate – which reflected 
the chance of getting the arbitrator‘s decision overturned by a bench of three 
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members of the AIRC/FWA – was also 32 percent. As either party could make an 
appeal on the single arbitrator‘s decision, the success rate does not distinguish appeal 
decisions favourable to the employer from those favouring the worker. Moreover, 
appeal rates reflected a measure of full bench support of the single arbitrator‘s 
reasoning and administration of the hearing process by a panel of his or her peers. 
Logically, one would think the lower the appeal success rate, the more confidence 
one can have in the arbitral decision-making of single members of the tribunal. 
Whether a 32 percent overturn rate is low enough to inspire confidence is a matter 
for debate, but the chance that a single arbitrator can err (or be overturned) on nearly 
a third of his or her decisions may have inspired some parties to make an appeal.  
 
Appeal rates peaked in 2007-08 and 2008-09 at 55 percent and 45 percent 
respectively. At the same time, the appeal success rate was at its lowest with 
24 percent and 17 percent, respectively, overturning the arbitrators‘ initial decision.  
Again this trend could be attributed to the Work Choices legislation where arbitrators 
were compelled to administer new restrictions, particularly in relation to defining the 
scope of the legislation permitting employers to dismiss workers ‗for any operational 
reason‘. Thus it is postulated that many of these appeals would have been from 
workers that, under previous legislation, would have considered their treatment to be 
harsh, unjust and reasonable, but due to the dismissal for ‗any operational reason‘ 
exclusion of Work Choices, they no longer had a viable claim – which was 
confirmed by the appeals bench. Not seen in these statistics is the effect of Section 
400 Appeal Rights in the Fair Work Act 2009, whereby an appeal will not be heard 
unless it is in the public interest and only if the original decision involved a 
‗significant error of fact‘. 
 
This chapter has so far defined the role of arbitration, considered industrial relations 
theories of arbitration and arbitration as a part of a workplace grievance within the 
organisational behaviour literature, philosophical ideals to support unfair dismissal 
protections, as well as international and Australian perspectives of unfair dismissal 
arbitration. The remainder of chapter 3 is devoted to analysing arbitral decision-
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3.7  Theories of ‘arbitral decision-making’ over dismissal claims 
To finalise this chapter, the discussion turns to a critical examination of theories on 
the arbitral decision-making process itself, in the context of termination of 
employment. Since the 1970s, researchers from predominantly the US and Canada 
have examined influential factors in the arbitral decision-making process. The next 
chapter will contain a consideration of the findings from such investigations, as they 
will contribute to the development of testable hypotheses for this thesis. Moreover, in 
this section, the contributions of several authors are featured due to either, their 
prominence in the literature on the unfair dismissal arbitration decision process, or 
because they have authored the most recent conceptualisations of the arbitral 
decision-making process regarding dismissal claims. This section concludes with an 
explanation of this thesis‘ conceptual model, which proposes a revised theory of 
arbitral decision-making within the termination of employment context. 
 
3.7.1  Nelson and Kim’s model 
Nelson and Kim published their statistically validated model in the esteemed Journal 
of Economy and Society in 2008. The model submits that the testimony of both 
parties in an unfair dismissal claim will consist of facts to which both parties agree 
whilst other facts will be disputed. Their model suggests the arbitrator engages in 
two roles to arrive at an arbitration decision. First, from the assembly of facts, they 
isolate those of relevance. Second, they assess each fact by assigning a mental weight 
as to how much of a deciding factor it is to be in determining the outcome of a case. 
The combination of ascertained facts and subsequent weighting of them, combined 
with the uncontested facts, form the crucial elements of the arbitrators‘ decision. 
Further, the model suggests an arbitrator‘s characteristics will influence their 
treatment of the contested facts in terms of identifying those considered significant 
and the degree of importance they assign to them in making a decision. These 
dynamics are reflected in Figure 3.1 showing Nelson and Kim‘s conceptual model. 
 
Nelson and Kim‘s method to test this model involved a logistic regression analysis 
using responses from 74 arbitrators registered with the American Arbitration 
Association. The arbitrators responded to quantitative survey questions after reading 
a 17 page summary of a dismissal case involving the discharge of a crane operator at 
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a large steel plant after a series of alcohol related offences. The case contained two 
facts agreed between the parties: that the final incident leading to discharge occurred 
outside of work hours, and that the worker had broken a promise to not drink. Two 
facts were also contested by the parties: whether or not the worker was a reformed 
alcoholic with membership in Alcoholics Anonymous, and whether or not the 
worker‘s job performance was being affected. The arbitrators assessed, on a five 
point scale, whether they ‗strongly disagreed‘ to ‗strongly agreed‘ with each of the 
contested and uncontested facts and assigned, again using a five point scale, whether 




Figure 3.1  Nelson and Kim’s model of the arbitral decision-making process 
 
(Source: Nelson & Kim 2008, p. 269) 
 
The data collected to measure the arbitrator‘s characteristics were experience, 
education, occupation and age. Experience was measured by whether or not the 
arbitrator was a member of the National Academy of Arbitrators that has a threshold 
requirement to hear at least 50 cases in the previous five years. Education was 
measured according to whether or not the arbitrator held a law degree. Occupation 
was measured according to whether or not being an arbitrator was their primary 
occupation. Arbitrators were asked to record their age in years. The dependent 
variable – the arbitration decision – was measured by the arbitrators indicating 
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Nelson and Kim found their conceptual model to be statistically supported to the 
extent that decision elements – a combination of how much the arbitrator accepted 
the truth of the facts and the importance assigned to each – were significantly 
influencing the arbitration decision. The most significant influence on the decision 
was the weight assigned to the uncontested fact where the final incident occurred 
outside the workplace – an irregular (and controversial) feature of most dismissal 
cases and a fact which Wheeler and Rojot‘s (1992) global study found was least 
likely to attract dismissal. The measurement of the decision elements may have been 
different if the uncontested fact were that the behaviour occurred in the workplace, 
reflecting the context of the majority of dismissal cases. Methodologically, the 
limitation of this model is that involves a single dismissal scenario using an ‗on the 
papers‘ assessment by the arbitrator, potentially limiting the model‘s ability to 
generalise to other dismissal scenarios. It also restricted the arbitrators to a 
dichotomous decision: reinstate or not reinstate, whereas compensation, as a third 
possible remedy may have changed the outcome. However, the survey aspect of the 
research methodology enabled the investigators to measure part of the arbitrator‘s 
cognitive process which would not have been possible if a text analysis of decisions, 
as a methodology, were used.  
 
A finding that could be generalised to the broader arbitral decision-making 
phenomenon is that the analysis showed that the arbitrators‘ characteristics swayed 
how much weight the arbitrators placed on each fact – but also found their 
characteristics were not directly impacting their final decisions. Specifics of this 
aspect of Nelson and Kim‘s findings will be discussed further in chapter 4 in relation 
to sub-question (c) pertaining to the influence of arbitrator characteristics on the 
arbitration outcome. 
 
In summary, Nelson and Kim‘s main focus appears to have identified the mental 
scoring an arbitrator performs when assessing if a ‗fact‘ is of value or not, and if so, 
how much impact it had on the final decision. Whilst this is a valuable contribution 
towards understanding the arbitral decision-making process, the model did not take 
into account the arbitrator‘s consideration of the natural justice and procedural 
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3.7.2  Gely and Chandler’s model 
Gely and Chandler‘s (2008) model was published in the Journal of Collective 
Negotiations. They investigated 175 arbitral decisions made by US arbitrators 
involving alleged workplace violence, focusing on cases in which the ‗union wins‘, 
vis-a-vis, the ‗worker wins‘ the case. The authors argued that arbitrators consider the 
variety of issues before them by ‗lumping‘ issues together, rather than by dealing 
with each one in isolation. To identify influential factors on arbitral decisions, a 
mixed method analysis was performed: a qualitative comparative analysis (QCA) 
followed by logistic regression analysis.  
 
Initially, the union‘s defences were examined to identify the arrangement of the 
union‘s argument, according to four categories of ‗causal conditions‘. Figure 3.2 
displays the four categories of ‗causal conditions‘, any of which may or may not 
exist in the arbitrator‘s deliberations, with 16 possible configurations emanating from 
these four categories. The QCA revealed four, predominant combinations where the 
decision favoured the union/worker in at least 51 percent of the cases.  
 
 
Figure 3.2  Gely and Chandler’s conceptualisation of combinational arbitral 
                  decision-making 
(Adapted from: Gely & Chandler 2008) 
 
Secondly, from these four combinations, logistic regression analysis was then used to 
identify any defence configurations that were statistically significant. As a result, two 
configurations were statistically significant in which the decision favoured the 
worker: ‗factual strength of the case‘ + ‗due process‘ + ‗work history‘; and ‗factual 
strength of the case‘ + ‗work history‘ + ‗equal protection‘. Gely and Chandler 
concluded that arbitrators are more likely to favour the union‘s defence, when 
confronted with arguments specifically arranged in either one of those two orders, 
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compared to cases were defences were not captured by that arrangement. In the 
subsequent logistic regression analysis, several factors were controlled for to reflect 
the ‗broader environment‘ in which the grievance took place. These factors were: 
worker‘s gender; whether the ‗victim‘ of the violence/aggression was a supervisor; 
whether physical contact was involved; and whether the union used an attorney at the 
arbitration table. Of these factors, only the use of an attorney was found to have a 
significant, positive relationship with ‗union wins‘. 
 
The authors concluded that unions, by focusing their defences on either: 
inconsistency in the employer‘s treatment of the worker (equal protection), or the 
employer‘s due process in administering the investigation and dismissal, could 
overshadow the facts relating to the act of aggression or violence in the arbitrator‘s 
considerations. Additionally, if the union combined their defence with evidence of a 
positive work history, it further bolstered the likelihood of a union wining their claim 
on behalf of the worker (along with using an attorney).  
 
The authors‘ focus on the configurations of the argument, contributed new insight 
into arbitral processes. This insight, though, came at the compromise of limited 
control variables being included in the subsequent logistic regression analysis. It is 
also possible that the model‘s underpinnings of aggressive or violent behaviour, 
defined in the study as either ‗physical or verbal acts that significantly affect the 
workplace, generate a concern for personal safety, or result in physical injury or 
death‘ (Gely & Chandler 2008, p. 290), may limit the ability to generalise its 
findings to other less aggressive types of misbehaviour, such as theft.   
 
3.7.3  Ross and Chen’s model 
Published in 2007 in the Labor Law Journal, Ross and Chen presented a conceptual 
model of arbitral decision-making after reviewing five US labour arbitration case 
reports. The cases concerned employees in the health care industry terminated due to 
infractions in handling personal, medical information. The dynamics of the 
arbitrator‘s decision-making process in these cases are reflected in Figure 3.3 
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This model contains four initial inputs to the arbitral decision-making process. The 
first input is the employer‘s application of just cause provisions when dismissing the 
worker. Second is whether the employee or another party were to profit from the 
nature of the offence. Third are employee characteristics of gender, tenure and work 
record to incorporate findings from existing published research. The fourth input is 
the type of punishment administered and whether it was progressive in nature. It is 
from these four dimensions that the arbitrator will develop perceptions in relation to 
the motive underlying the employee‘s behaviour and the degree of procedural and 
distributive justice employed during the dismissal process.  
 
 
Figure 3.3  Ross and Chen’s model of the arbitral decision-making process 
 
(Source: Ross & Chen 2007, p. 126) 
 
 
The model contends that these perceptions are influenced by the arbitrator‘s personal 
characteristics such as education and experience. The arbitrator‘s decision is 
conceptualised to ultimately arise from the arbitrator‘s assessment of the perceived 
procedural justice as to whether a due process was followed and distributive justice 
as to whether the punishment was proportionate to the behaviour. Whilst from a 
positivist‘s paradigm this model is at the conceptual stage and requires validation, the 
conceptual integration of the justice components into the model is a valuable 
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3.7.4  Chelliah and D’Netto’s model 
Chelliah and D‘Netto‘s (2006) model was published in Employee Relations and it 
examined arbitral decision-making in Australia using 342 randomly selected unfair 
dismissal decisions by commissioners in the AIRC from 1997 to 2000. The authors 
considered influences on three hierarchies of dependent variables. First, they 
considered influences on whether or not the employee‘s complaint was either 
‗denied‘ or ‗upheld‘. Second they considered influences on the amount of ‗damages‘ 
ordered for reinstated employees. The third dependent variable considered influences 
on the amount of money awarded as ‗compensation‘ in lieu of reinstatement. Figure 
3.4 presents Chelliah and D‘Netto‘s conceptual model. 
 
 
Figure 3.4  Chelliah and D’Netto’s conceptual model of arbitration outcomes 
 
(Adapted from: Chelliah & D'Netto 2006, p. 488) 
 
Logistic regression and ordinary least squares analysis was used to test for 
influences, from a variety of independent variables, on the three levels of dependent 
variables. The independent variables examined were selected from the 1990 
unpublished, doctorial thesis by Eden on unjust dismissal in the Canadian federal 
jurisdiction.  
 
The authors identified the following independent variables that were statistically 
significant. First, in terms of whether an upheld or denied claim was awarded, they 
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found an ‗upheld‘ unfair dismissal complaint was significantly and positively 
correlated with the workers‘ ‗years of service‘; and three aspects of the ‗employer‘s 
discharge process‘: a) failure to apply progressive discipline; b) failure to provide 
warnings; and c) improper promulgation of rules. At the same time, a ‗denied‘ claim 
was significantly and positively associated with dishonesty – a value in the variable, 
‗type of offence‘. Further, the amount of ‗damages‘ paid to ‗reinstated‘ employees 
was found to be significantly and positively correlated with the ‗period since 
dismissal‘ – a logical result as arbitrators attempt to compensate for lost wages 
reflective of the period out-of-work. Finally, where a dismissal complaint was upheld 
but the employee was not reinstated, the analysis showed that ‗compensation‘ 
awarded by the arbitrator was significantly and positively correlated with ‗years of 
service‘ and significantly yet negatively correlated if the ‗employee was at fault‘ – 
although the article did not explain how this variable was measured. 
 
Overall, Chelliah and D‘Netto‘s investigation was exploratory in nature providing 
initial insight into some aspects of Australia‘s arbitration outcomes. Knowledge was 
obtained about how Australian arbitrators respond to, managerial errors in the 
dismissal process, and three particular types of misbehaviour: insubordination; 
dishonesty and alcohol related offences. These findings can be taken into 
consideration during hypothesis development for subsequent decision-making 
models. As also identified in the previous conceptual and/or econometric models 
discussed in this section, a gap also exists in Chelliah and D‘Netto‘s analysis where it 
did not take into account the arbitrator‘s consideration of the worker‘s defence for 
their behaviour. Additionally, arbitrator characteristics, union advocacy and HR 
expertise variables, which were not incorporated into the Chelliah and D‘Netto 
model, will be incorporated into the conceptual model (presented in sub-section 
3.7.6) to undergo analysis in this thesis. 
 
3.7.5  Bemmels’ investigations 
Bemmels is noted as a seminal scholar in the dismissal arbitration literature 
(McAndrew 2000) due to his studies examining gender influences on discipline and 
dismissal arbitration decisions published during the late 1980s and early 1990s. 
Table 3.7 provides a summary of these publications, which predominantly contained 
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the finding that, when controlling for factors such as the type of offence and 
managerial processes, gender effects existed in the arbitration process, whereby male 
arbitrators were more lenient on female grievants compared to male grievants. 
 





NAME SIGNIFICANT EFFECTS DETECTED 
 









from 1981 to 1983 
heard by male 
arbitrators 
 
Used text analysis 
with logit analysis 














with partial loss 
of pay 
 
 Length of 




















Yes: Female grievants, appearing before 
male arbitrators, are twice as likely to win 
a sustained claim – and win full 




Yes: Semi-skilled and 
supervisory/professional level employees 
more likely to win a sustained claim than 












557 United States 
‗suspension‘ cases 
(not discharge) from 
1976 to 1986 
 
Used text analysis 
with logit analysis 











with partial loss 
of pay 
 
 Length of 
































Yes: Male arbitrators more likely to 
sustain the grievances of female claimants 
than male claimants. 
 
Yes: Less likely to overturn suspensions 
for shorter than two weeks. 
 
Yes: Less likely to overturn suspensions 
for insubordination or dishonesty/theft.  
 
Yes: Unblemished record positively 
related to a sustained decision. Previous 
offences less likely to win a sustained 
decision.  
 
Yes: Grievants from the non-
manufacturing sector more likely to 





Yes: Where the union argued some form 
of mitigating factors (such as long service 
record or inconsistent rules enforcement) 
increased the odds of a sustained 
grievance. 
 
Yes: male arbitrators have become more 
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1,812 United States 
discharge cases  
 
Determined from 
1976 to 1986 
 
Used text analysis 
with logit analysis 
and OLS regression 
 
 















 Length of 






































Yes: female workers before male 
arbitrators positively related to sustained 
decisions with either full reinstatement or 
length of suspension. 
 
Yes: dishonesty/theft and assault/fighting 
negatively related to a sustained decision. 
Insubordination negatively related to 
reinstatement. Attendance and work 
performance positively related to length of 
suspension. 
 
Yes: Unblemished record positively 
related to a sustained decision. Previous 
offences negatively related to a sustained 
decision. Both negatively related to length 
of suspension. 
 
Yes: Public sector positively related to a 
sustained decision. Non-manufacturing 
sector positively related to length of 
suspension. 
 
Yes: Where the union argued some form 
of mitigating factors (such as long service 
record or inconsistent rules enforcement) 
positively related to a sustained grievance 
















from 1977 to 1982 
 
Used text analysis 
with logit analysis 
and OLS regression 
 





 Full exoneration 
(Reinstatement 
with no loss of 
pay or penalty) 
 
 Length of 





















single or panel 
 
 
Yes: Female grievant more likely to be 
fully exonerated (rather than a reduced 







Yes: Previous offences negatively related 





Yes: Panel of arbitrators positively 











deciding 2001 cases  





















Yes: older arbitrators more likely to find 
in favour of the worker than younger 
arbitrators 
 
Yes: female arbitrators gave shorter 
suspension periods. 
 
Yes: PhD qualified arbitrators less likely 
to award full reinstatement 
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1976 to 1986 
 
Used text analysis 
with logit analysis 
& OLS regression 
 
 
 Length of 















Yes: Arbitrators with Law qualifications 
less likely to award full reinstatement than 
any of the other occupations. 
 
Yes: Former business professors most 
likely to award a full reinstatement than 
any of the other occupations 
 
 









131 US arbitrators 
completed a survey 
about a dismissal 
due to inadequate 
performance. 
 
Used a field 
experiment with 
logit analysis and 
OLS regression 
 




 Claim sustained  
 
 Length of 


































Yes: Those with an academic background 










230 male arbitrators 
completed a survey 
about a dismissal 
due to inadequate 
performance. 
 
Used a field 
experiment with 














with partial loss 
of pay 
 
 Length of 

































Yes: Male arbitrators more lenient 
towards women grievants then male 
grievants in relation to being fully 
reinstated or, if suspended, length of 
suspension was shorter. 
 
Yes: Management responsible positively 
associated with a sustained claim and full 
reinstatement; and grievant responsible 
negatively related to a sustained claim and 
positively related to length of suspension. 
 
Yes: More likely to sustain a grievance if 
there was high ‗consensus‘ (other 
employees exhibit same behaviour as the 
grievant) and high ‗distinctiveness‘ 
(whether behaviour that led to dismissal is 
a first time behavioural issue). Less likely 
to sustain a grievance if high ‗consistency‘ 
existed (grievant exhibited same 
behaviour in the past). Full reinstatement 
more likely if high ‗consensus‘ existed 
and full reinstatement less likely if high 
‗consistency‘ existed. 
 
Yes: More experienced arbitrators more 
likely to attribute responsibility for the 




(Adapted from: Bemmels 1988b, 1988a, 1988c, 1990b, 1990a; 1991a, 1991b) 
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The literature shows that Bemmels‘ investigations provided methodologies and 
insights followed by future grievance researchers. These studies occurred within 
either US or Canadian contexts, where the focus on gender effects and arbitrator 
characteristics resulted from to the ability of grievant and respondent to select their 
arbitrator. These findings provide insights that can be used for international 
comparison, especially in countries where arbitrators cannot be selected by the 
parties (such as Australia). Even within the context of these two countries, Bemmels‘ 
investigations uncovered contradictory findings, particularly the 1990 study (number 
6 in Table 3.7) involving a field experiment with US arbitrators completing an ‗on 
the papers‘ assessment of an unfair dismissal. In this study, most of the independent 
variables returned insignificant results, perhaps reflecting a weakness in the design of 
the field experiment. Meanwhile, the studies that relied on analysing actual 
arbitration decisions returned, in the main, consistent findings. This consistency adds 
support to the use of a similar data collection method – as a reliable method – for use 
in this thesis. 
 
3.7.6  The conceptual model investigated in this thesis 
The objective of the conceptual model, and forthcoming analysis of the model in this 
thesis, is to synthesise a new area of enquiry pertaining to employee defences 
provided at the arbitration table, with an array of existing, but disconnected, 
knowledge about employee misbehaviour and dismissal arbitration. The conceptual 
model, presented in Figure 3.5, is illustrative of this major research objective, which, 
recalled from the introductory chapter, is: 
 
To identify factors influencing the arbitral decisions of members in 
Australia’s federal industrial tribunal when they determine unfair 
dismissal claims from workers who have been terminated from their 
employment due to ‘misbehaviour’. 
 
It is also recounted from the first chapter that this research objective is underpinned 
by three main research questions and four sub-questions, as follows: 
 
RQ1: How does the type of misbehaviour in which the worker engaged influence 
the arbitrator’s decision to either overturn or uphold management’s action to 
dismiss the worker? 
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RQ2: How does the explanation provided by the dismissed worker influence the 
arbitrator’s decision to either overturn or uphold management’s action to dismiss 
the worker? 
 
RQ3: How does the dismissal procedure used by the employer influence the 
arbitrator’s decision to either overturn or uphold management’s action to dismiss 
the worker? 
 
Sub-question (a): Is the arbitration decision influenced by the presence of expert 
advocates representing the parties? 
 
Sub-question (b): Is the arbitration decision influenced by characteristics of the 
dismissed worker? 
 
Sub-question (c): Is the arbitration decision influenced by characteristics of the 
arbitrator? 
 
Sub-question (d): Is the arbitration decision influenced by characteristics of the 
employer? 
 
The conceptual model, as introduced in the first chapter is revisited in Figure 3.5 to 
remind the reader how each of the research questions and sub-questions ‗relate‘ to 




Figure 3.5  Conceptual model of arbitration decisions regarding unfair dismissal 
                   claims from workers dismissed due to misconduct (reprised) 
 
(Source: Developed for thesis)  
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Figure 3.5 shows that the ‗output‘ or the dependent variable is the ‗arbitration 
decision‘. This reflects whether the arbitrator decides to either uphold the employer‘s 
decision to dismiss the worker, or, overturn the employer‘s decision. An ‗overturn‘ 
decision occurs if the arbitrator decides one of the following: to reinstate the worker 
without backpay; reinstate the worker with backpay for lost wages; or pay financial 
compensation to the worker but without reinstatement.  
 
The model also shows that the arbitration decision is influenced by three decision 
‗inputs‘ or ‗predictor/independent variables‘ (PATH A): the type of misbehaviour in 
which the employer states the worker engaged; the worker‘s explanation for 
engaging in this behaviour; and the process used by the employer to terminate the 
worker‘s employment contract.  
 
Whilst the three major research questions address the principal predictor or 
independent variables in the model, the forthcoming analysis would be insular 
without the inclusion of sub-questions that present a compilation of additional, 
independent variables that could have some influence on the arbitration decision 
(Block & Stieber 1987). Accordingly, the model allows for control factors/variables 
(PATH B). These factors are not direct decision inputs, but they may indirectly 
influence the arbitrator‘s decision. The control variables address factors associated 
with the use of advocates to present a case, as well as characteristics of the worker, 
employer and arbitrator.  
 
3.8  Chapter 3 conclusion 
This chapter commenced by defining the role of arbitration to adjudicate disputes 
pertaining to the employment relationship and that unfair dismissal claims are 
generally perceived as a dispute concerning an employee‘s rights. Ultimately, 
arbitrators can provide court-like decisions without the burden of court formalities 
and expense. The second section of the chapter contained a broader discussion 
concerning theoretical explanations for the existence of arbitration arising from the 
workplace. This discussion reviewed the writings of Carlston, Wheeler, Perlman, 
Dabscheck and Thornthwaithe on theories of arbitration and bureaucratic structures, 
as well as the scholarly perspective of ‗judicial arbitration‘. Recognising that the 
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unfair dismissal arbitration process is likely to be adversarial by nature between the 
parties, the theories in this part of the discussion were analysed in terms of whether 
they showed partiality towards either the plight of the worker, or were more sensitive 
to the managerial prerogatives of the employer.  
 
Up to this point the chapter mainly reflected industrial relations perspectives of 
arbitration. Consequently, in the third section of the chapter the organisational 
behaviour perspective was considered in terms of unfair dismissal arbitration as a 
dimension of the workplace grievance literature within organisational behaviour. 
This section reviewed published works aimed at understanding the implication of 
attribution and justice theories on unfair dismissal arbitration outcomes.  
 
It was noted that the literature also prescribed an ideological proposition to support 
the practice of providing unfair dismissal protections to workers. Thus, the fourth 
section of the chapter transitions from a theoretical discussion of arbitration towards 
a practical orientation. The short-comings of common law in giving workers a voice 
against employment termination when the employer treats them in a harsh or unjust 
manner were discussed. It acknowledged that the State (the government) intervenes 
to provide protection supplementary to the common law contract. This is in the form 
of an industrial mechanism: unfair dismissal. It was argued that unfair dismissal 
legislation and its associated administration through tribunals is underpinned by 
principles of providing workers with dignity and autonomy as a balance to the 
employer‘s need to make a profit.  
 
The fifth section of the chapter explored global perspectives of unfair dismissal 
arbitration by considering the variation in application of unfair dismissal protection 
policies in other developed market economies. The sixth section of the chapter 
considered present day unfair dismissal protections under the Fair Work Act. The 
process for how current day Australians can make an unfair dismissal claim, through 
to resolution by arbitration, was outlined. A discussion was presented on the ongoing 
political and public interest debate about the neutrality of Australia‘s federal tribunal. 
This section was finalised by presenting descriptive statistics pertaining to the work 
of Australia‘s federal tribunal in resolving unfair dismissal claims for the period of 
interest in this thesis, between 2000 and 2010. 
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The final section of this chapter featured the most recent, or prominent, arbitral 
decision-making models identifying influences on arbitration decisions over 
termination of employment claims. Previous research suggests that perceptions of 
truth, justice and motivations, and characteristics of the arbitrator and the worker, 
may be influencing the arbitrator‘s decision. It was noted that one dimension not 
considered in the existing models was the influence of specific types of employee 
defences for their behaviour. This section culminated in the presentation of the 
conceptual model that will form the basis of the statistical examination in this thesis. 
This model contends that an arbitration decision is a function of three elements: the 
type of misbehaviour in which the employee purportedly engaged; the employee‘s 
explanation for their behaviour; and the process used by the employer in dismissing 
the worker. Using a theoretical deductive process, hypothesis for testing each aspect 
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4.0  Introduction 
This final chapter of the literature review discusses the independent variables in the 
conceptual model using the hypothetical-deductive approach of a positivist paradigm 
(Strauss & Whitfield 1998). This is achieved by referring to existing theories to 
develop logical assumptions about the impact of each variable on arbitral decision-
making in misbehaviour cases. The aim of this chapter is to arrive at testable 
hypotheses to facilitate the statistical analysis of the conceptual model on arbitral 
decision-making over dismissal due to misbehaviour.  
 
The design of this chapter is that it will first re-cap the research objective and its 
supporting three main research questions and four sub-questions. After which, the 
remainder of this chapter provides for the deduction of each research question into a 
series of testable hypothesis by drawing on both descriptive and process theories, as 
well as Australian contextual issues, which might indicate the direction of influence 
each variable will cast on the arbitration outcome. The later chapters of this thesis 
will test these hypotheses against empirical facts drawn from genuine arbitration 
decisions.  
 
4.1  A reprise of the research objective and questions 
To maintain the focus of this thesis, it is worth recalling from the outset of this 
chapter that the major research objective is: 
 
To identify factors influencing the arbitral decisions of members in 
Australia’s federal industrial tribunal when they determine unfair 
dismissal claims from workers who have been terminated from their 
employment due to ‘misbehaviour’. 
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RQ1: How does the type of misbehaviour in which the worker engaged influence 
the arbitrator’s decision to either overturn or uphold management’s action to 
dismiss the worker? 
 
RQ2: How does the explanation provided by the dismissed worker influence the 
arbitrator’s decision to either overturn or uphold management’s action to dismiss 
the worker? 
 
RQ3: How does the dismissal procedure used by the employer influence the 
arbitrator’s decision to either overturn or uphold management’s action to dismiss 
the worker? 
 
In addition, these four sub-questions consider whether moderating variables are 
influencing the arbitration decision: 
 
Sub-question (a): Is the arbitration decision influenced by the presence of expert 
advocates representing the parties? 
 
Sub-question (b): Is the arbitration decision influenced by characteristics of the 
dismissed worker? 
 
Sub-question (c): Is the arbitration decision influenced by characteristics of the 
arbitrator? 
 




The steps for building the hypotheses will proceed as follows: after introducing the 
nature of the question, where appropriate, the ‗descriptive‘ theory will be outlined to 
define and measure the independent or control variable. After which, where 
applicable, ‗process‘ theories drawn generally from the organisational behaviour 
literature, will be identified that enable one to make a prediction as to the impact the 
variable may have on whether or not the arbitration decision is to uphold or overturn 
the dismissal. This will be followed by a review of the literature to identify results of 
previous investigations, which may also influence the expectations of what might be 
found in the analysis. Then, as this thesis occurs within the Australian context, where 
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necessary, conditions particular to the Australian experience will be identified. 
Finally, taking a collective view of the theoretical propositions and investigative 
findings, a hypothesis or multiple hypotheses will be presented for use in the 
statistical analysis in chapter 6.  
 
4.2  Research question 1 – the employee’s behaviour 
The first research question aims to incorporate the employee misbehaviour 
dimension into the arbitral decision-making model, by measuring the impact of the 
type of misconduct in which the worker purportedly engaged on the arbitration 
outcome.  
 
4.2.1  Measuring ‘misbehaviour’ using the employee deviance typology 
The independent variable of focus in research question one is ‗the type of 
misbehaviour‘. The descriptive theory used to measure this variable was drawn from 
the seminal article by Robinson and Bennett (1995) in which the authors introduced a 
four-quadrant typology of deviant workplace behaviour consisting of: production 
deviance; property deviance; political deviance and personal aggression. This 
typology also incorporates a two-point scale to indicate if the behaviour is either 
minor or serious. The typology identifies whether the behaviour is targeted at either 
the organisation as a whole or individuals within the organisation. Table 4.1 provides 
a summary of the typology.  
 









Serious misconduct targeted at 
the organisation 
Sabotaging equipment; accepting 
kickbacks; lying about hours worked; 
stealing from the firm 
Production deviance 
Minor misconduct targeted at 
the organisation 
Leaving early; taking excessive breaks; 
working slow; wasting resources 
Personal aggression 
Serious misconduct targeted at a 
co-worker or co-workers 
Sexual harassment; verbal abuse; 
stealing from co-workers; endangering 
co-workers 
Political deviance 
Minor misconduct targeted at a 
co-worker or co-workers 
Gossiping; showing favouritism; 
blaming co-workers; competing non-
beneficially 
 
 (Adapted from: Bennett & Robinson 2000; Robinson & Bennett 1995)  
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This typology provides a framework that enables the classification of any type of 
misbehaviour identified in the dismissal cases. The Robinson and Bennett typology 
has been statistically validated as a measure of workplace deviant behaviours in the 
organisational behaviour literature (Bennett & Robinson 2000). This typology has 
since held up to re-examination by Stewart et al. (2009). Any form of misbehaviour 
that might occur in the workplace could be assigned to any of the four categories in 
the typology, further improving the utility of this typology for measuring an 
inconceivable array of employee acts of misconduct that have resulted in their 
dismissal. 
 
Identifying a measure of misconduct is the first step in addressing the independent 
variable of interest in research question one. The actual knowledge gap that research 
question one is seeking to address is to discover which direction these different 
categories of misbehaviour might influence the arbitration decision. The theory of 
‗retributive justice‘, discussed next, may provide an indication as to how arbitrators 
may be influenced to either uphold or overturn a dismissal. 
 
4.2.2  How ‘misbehaviour’ influences decisions using retributive justice 
Within the sociology and criminology literature is retribution theory which explains 
how society sanctions the exacting of a punishment or negative allocation such as 
costs or losses, on an offender so that he or she pays for his or her offence 
(Cottingham 1979; Törnblom & Jonsson 1987). A fundamental principle of 
retributive justice is that of ‗proportionality‘ between the offence and the punishment 
(Mahony & Klass 2008; Miceli 2003; Zaibert 2006). In colloquial terms: the harm-
doer must be punished and the punishment must fit the crime. Thus, the objective of 
retributive justice is to take action against the harm-doer, to remove or otherwise deal 
with an injustice that he or she inflicted on his or her victim (Darley & Pittman 
2003). The manner, in which retributive justice applies in the dismissal arbitration 
context, is discussed next. 
 
In dismissal disputes – unlike criminal prosecutions – either or both parties are 
potentially liable of being found at fault: the employee who is accused of poor 
performance or misbehaviour, or the employer who is accused of contractual 
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violations (Mahony & Klass 2008). Either party can face questions of accountability, 
blame and punishment as a consequence of arbitration (Darley & Pittman 2003). In 
this thesis, it is contended that it is not the arbitrator‘s role to administer 
‗punishment‘ to employees if they were found to engaged in misconduct, because, 
punishment has already occurred at the hands of the employer. Instead it is proposed 
that the arbitrator is more likely to be influenced by behaviours that are higher in 
severity, to uphold employers‘ decisions to ‗punish‘ employees by terminating their 
employment (Klass, Mahony & Wheeler 2006). Alternatively, if employers are found 
to be errant in their dismissal, retribution takes the form of employers either paying 
financial compensation, or re-employing workers that they once dismissed. 
 
However, two factors could operate to alter the arbitrator‘s perception of 
proportionality between the attribution of blame and an appropriate retribution. First, 
employees may be able to mitigate the severity of the retribution or punishment by 
providing additional information that might affect the perceived fairness of the 
dismissal sanction, which means they increase the likelihood of shifting blame to the 
employer (Klass, Mahony & Wheeler 2006; Mahony & Klass 2008). To achieve this, 
dismissed workers might emphasis their seniority or length of service to the 
organisation (Chelliah & D'Netto 2006; Knight & Latreille 2001; Saridakis et al. 
2006; Simpson & Martocchio 1997). Employees might also demonstrate that 
management was delinquent in their responsibilities toward them during the 
dismissal process (Gely & Chandler 2008; Simpson & Martocchio 1997). And, 
making an ‗apology‘, which demonstrates remorse, regret and concern, can be used 
in a bid to restore a sense of self-respect and remedy relations, potentially mitigating 
the severity of the punishment (Brownlee 2010; Friedman 2006). The apology is an 
impression management tactic that may soften the arbitrator‘s decision (Eylon, 
Giacalone & Pollard 2000). Skarlicki & Kulik (2005, p. 198) also support the notion 
that ‗contrition‘ can soften punishment, in their statement: 
 
The more contrite a transgressor, the greater the third party’s confidence that 
the individual will not violate the rule again ... the violation is seen as less 
purposeful and less threatening to the social order. 
 
On the other hand, management may justify the severity of the punishment by 
emphasising the severity of the behaviour, and/or previous offences or weaknesses 
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about the employee‘s service (Ross & Chen 2007). Severity of the offence is 
believed to be an important control measure when analysing arbitral decision making 
(Dalton et al. 1997; Mesch 1995; Scott & Shadoan 1989). Previous investigations 
have found that the likelihood of a dismissal sanction being upheld increased for 
employees with shorter tenure and/or prior disciplinary incidents (Bemmels 1988a, 
1991b; Harcourt & Harcourt 2000; Klass, Mahony & Wheeler 2006; Simpson & 
Martocchio 1997). An Australian study into arbitral decision making by Chelliah and 
D‘Netto (2006) did not find this effect for an employee with a prior disciplinary 
record, in spite of finding a positive relationship between overturned decisions and 
years of service. 
 
4.2.3  Previous empirical findings about misbehaviour as a factor in arbitration 
So far in this section, the theoretical premise has been developed that the type of 
behaviour and mitigating factors can influence the arbitrator‘s decision. This sub-
section examines the results of previous empirical investigations. First considered are 
investigations that found the type of misbehaviour in which the worker engaged had 
no significant impact on the arbitrator‘s decision. Caudill and Oswald‘s (1992) 
Canadian study considered three types of misconduct: non-attendance, 
insubordination and dishonesty/theft, with the finding that none of them were 
significantly associated with the arbitration result. This study echoed the findings of 
Bemmels‘ (1988b, 1988c) dual Canadian studies that also considered non-
attendance, insubordination and dishonesty/theft. Likewise, Harcourt and Harcourt‘s 
(2000) Canadian study considering ‗insubordinate‘ behaviour found it was not a 
significant factor that influenced an arbitrator‘s decision. At the same time, Harcourt 
and Harcourt (2000) also that found behaviours that had ‗imminent potential to 
harm‘ were not significantly related to the arbitration decision. More recently, Gely 
and Chandler‘s (2008) US investigation found that incidents involving physical 
contact, regardless of its severity, did not influence the arbitrator‘s decision. 
 
In contrast, other studies reported significant relationships between the type of 
misbehaviour and the arbitration decision. Bemmels‘ (1991b) US based study 
broadened his earlier studies (referred to above) to include additional types of 
misbehaviours in the form of ‗assault/fighting‘ and ‗drugs/alcohol‘. This study 
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revealed that acts of insubordination and dishonesty/theft were significant factors 
influencing an arbitrator to dismiss the grievance. One that appears more recently in 
the literature is the Australian study by Chelliah and D‘Netto (2006) which found 
that acts of theft or fraud committed by the employees were significantly related to 
an upheld decision in favour of the employer. The other types of misconduct 
considered in the Chelliah and D‘Netto investigation were: absence without 
permission; insubordination; and alcohol related offences. These acts were found to 
be insignificant in influencing the arbitration decision.  
 
Another notable article that considered the broadest range of misconduct types 
indentified in the literature, was Block and Stieber‘s (1987) US study that 
considered: excessive absenteeism; absence from work without permission; threat or 
assault on a fellow employee; threat or assault on a management representative; 
insubordination; falsification of records; theft; damage to or misuse of employer‘s 
property; refusal of an assignment or order; possession or use of drugs; possession or 
use of intoxicants; obscene or immoral conduct; and abusing customers or clients. 
From all these types of misconduct, it was found that excessive absenteeism, and 
threatening or assaulting a supervisor, were the only misbehaviours that had a 
significant influence on decisions, with both activities influencing the arbitrator 
towards rejecting a grievance claim made by the worker.  
 
There were also investigations that incorporated a single, broad concept of 
‗misconduct‘ as the reason for dismissal and its relationship with an arbitration 
decision. For instance, Knight and Latreille‘s (2001) British study found that 
‗misconduct‘ as a broad construct, was a significant factor influencing upheld 
arbitration decisions, particularly in the case of female grievants. Similarly, 
Southey‘s (2008b) Australian study found that ‗misconduct‘ was associated with 
upheld decisions supporting the employer‘s dismissal action. McAndrew‘s (2000) 
study of New Zealand employees dismissed on ‗misconduct‘ grounds identified 
significantly different arbitration decisions whereby misconduct was treated more 
harshly by arbitrators depending on the geographic region in which the claim was 
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In yet another approach, studies were identified that considered a single 
misbehaviour incident as a test case under analysis. This approach was identified in 
Nelson and Kim‘s (2008) US study with the result that the specific act of drinking in 
the workplace was significantly related to findings favouring the employer, if the 
arbitrator believed the worker‘s on the job performance had been implicated. Alcohol 
consumption in the workplace was also used as the test case in Bigoness and 
DuBose‘s (1985, p. 489) US study which revealed that ‗mock‘ arbitrators viewed the 
alleged offence as ‗a serious offence warranting stern punishment‘. Similarly, Eylon, 
Giacalone and Pollard (2000) used the case of a drunk and disorderly worker to 
examine arbitral decision making and found that serious consequences, in terms of 
causing injury, aligned with more severe rulings.  
 
Due to the disperse nature of these findings, it is proposed that the incorporation of 
the four type deviance typology for defining and operationalising ‗misbehaviour‘ in 
this thesis, will provide the most structured approach, to date, for statistically 
analysing a diverse range of misbehaviours according to their underlying similarities 
as defined by Robinson and Bennett‘s (1995) and Bennett and Robinson‘s (2000) 
typology.  
 
4.2.4  Misbehaviour matters relevant within the Australian context 
This sub-section will consider the Australian context of this thesis and how acts of 
employee misbehaviour may be, in some way, reflective of the Australian 
circumstance. As noted in the introductory chapter, comments on the Australian 
context of this thesis will be incorporated throughout this chapter. Australian 
contextual factors, such as culture, economic environment and legislation, are viewed 
as inherent, ubiquitous influences, not directly testable in the hypotheses. However, 
some recognition is given to these latent features in these discussions as they may 
have implications at the time of drawing research conclusions and identifying future 
research possibilities. 
 
Both national culture and organisational culture are believed to influence managerial 
styles and employee behaviour (Hoogervorst, van der Flier & Koopman 2004; Lok & 
Crawford 2003). Further, it is thought that a country‘s national cultural values and 
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attitudes, which are collectively formed by its citizens, are brought into the 
workplace and infiltrate the organisational culture (Hofstede 2001; Lok & Crawford 
2003). National culture is described as a ‗collective programming of the mind: it 
manifests itself not only in values, but in more superficial ways: in symbols, heroes 
and rituals‘ (Hofstede 2001, p. 1). As national culture permeates organisational 
culture and consequently influences employee behaviour, it is worth identifying the 
most prominent features of Australia‘s national culture as these aspects of Australian 
values and approaches to life may be serving as potential ‗Australia specific‘ 
antecedents of employee misbehaviour, as much as they are of good employee 
behaviour.  
 
To this end, the prominent work by Geert Hofestede into national culture offers 
insight into Australia‘s culture. Table 4.2 displays how Australia ranks in terms of 
the five dimensions of national culture.  
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According to Hofestede (2001) each of the five cultural dimensions represents a 
fundamental societal issue regardless of one‘s country: power distance; uncertainty 
avoidance; individualism; masculinity; and long term orientation. The results of 
Table 4.2 paint the picture that Australia‘s cultural dimensions are split into 
extremities, with Australia being one of the lowest-ranked: power-distance; 
uncertainty avoidance; and long term orientated countries, yet one of the highest-
ranked masculine countries and an extremely high individualist country. 
 
Based on the implications for each of Australia‘s rankings, also provided in Table 
4.2, it could be reasoned that Australian workplace cultures are imprinted with a 
collective character that suggests employees (and management themselves) are not 
fearful of authority, tending to see the next-in-charge as an equal, and challenging 
them if necessary. ‗Bending the rules‘ may be commonplace at work, whether testing 
the boundaries oneself, or witnessing management and co-workers do it. As workers 
are not inclined toward the idea of a ‗job for life‘, they will be more transient in their 
loyalties if they are unhappy in their job, or if work does not align with personal and 
family life. Workers will guard their personal time, tending to ‗work to live‘ not ‗live 
to work‘, taking full responsibility for being masters of their domain in their own 
career and personal life. Male and female workers are likely to pursue stereotypical 
behaviours and roles. And perhaps, as a society, Australians prefer to live and enjoy 
the moment, without being driven, from an early age, to achieve personal stability 
and virtuous living as a lifelong goal. 
 
The values described in Hofestede‘s national cultural dimensions appear to be 
congruent with ‗popular culture‘ materialisations of life in Australian workplaces. 
Educational materials prepared for migrant and student workers new to the 
Australian workplace experience, have characterised Australia‘s workplaces as being 
highly informal and relaxed in their management and communication styles, where 
employees frequently joke amongst themselves and address their supervisors by their 
first name (Department of Education and Training 2009). Descriptions offered to 
international students by Victoria University (2008) on common cultural 
characteristics of the Australian workplace included:  
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 Informal communication style – the use of Australian slang is common, as is the 
discussion of non-work matters  
 Socialising – workers often socialise at lunchtime, during breaks or after work.  
 Sense of humour – a good sense of humour is also valued in the workplace, as long 
as no one gets offended.   
 The Australian workplace is usually not overly formal and hierarchical but there are 
clear lines of authority and decision-making.  
 Workers usually talk on an equal basis with their superiors, sometimes using 
humour or irreverence which can be seen as a sign of disrespect in other cultures.  
 Being a good team member is an important skill sought by Australian employers.  
 Workers in lower level positions (e.g. cleaners, filing clerks and delivery people) 
are usually treated with respect and as equals by those above them.  
 
Based on the previous description of life in Australian workplaces, it is plausible to 
consider that other countries might differ on their exposure to inappropriate 
workplace behaviours triggering dismissals. As an example, the accepted use of 
informality and humour, such as it occurs in Australian workplaces, may be misused 
as a cover for underlying aggression or subversive attitudes towards colleagues 
(Ackroyd & Thompson 1999b). Such an effect may not be found in a country where 
humour is not expressed commonly in the workplace. Another example arises from 
Australian‘s proposed comfort for questioning authority and avoiding rules. This 
latitude may reduce the incidence of insubordination-related dismissals compared to 
countries where workers tend to be submissive to management.  
 
So far, this discussion described the collective nature of Australia‘s workplaces. Not 
all workplaces in Australia would match this description; however, national culture 
theory suggests that each country has a collective mindset that leaves an imprint on 
each societal structure within it: families, institutions, organisations, governments – 
and workplaces. This sub-section made explicit Australia‘s national values which 
will underpin any findings, when generalising to other countries.  
 
As a final contribution in this sub-section on employee misbehaviour in the 
Australian context, some insight about the amount of tolerance demonstrated by 
Australia‘s government and legislators towards misbehaviour in the workplace can 
be found in the Australian federal industrial legalisation, The Fair Work Act 2009 (a 
provision introduced by the Work Choices legislation). The current Act‘s dismissal 
protections allow the arbitrator to discount the amount of compensation that can be 
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paid to a worker dismissed due to misbehaviour and for whom it was arbitrated to 
have been an unfair dismissal. Specifically, the Act states the following:  
 
Misconduct reduces amount 
(3) If FWA is satisfied that misconduct of a person contributed to the 
employer‘s decision to dismiss the person, FWA must reduce the amount it 
would otherwise order under subsection (1) by an appropriate amount on 
account of the misconduct (Part 3-2; Division 4, Section 392). 
 
Although a provision to deduct a penalty was not explicit in the Workplace Relations 
Act 1996, tribunal members at that time relied upon Section 170CH(4) that 
empowered the Commission to make any order appropriate; and the ‗fair go all 
round‘ requirements noted in Section 635(2). The practice and eventual provisioning 
for arbitrators to make a deduction for misconduct, even if the employee was found 
to be either harshly, unjustly or unreasonably dismissed, suggests that even in being 
‗pardoned‘, Australian worker‘s, regardless of their culpability, must pay a penalty if 
their behaviour was perceived by their employers to be inappropriate.  Senior Deputy 
President Duncan in Scott vs Centrelink 2001, (PR907822) demonstrated this in his 
statement: 
 
The order that will issue will provide for Mr Scott to be reimbursed for all 
salary lost as a result of the termination less monies earned during the period 
prior to the reinstatement and further less the sum of $1500. This reflects my 
view that while management was misguided and over-reacted it nevertheless 
was exercising authority which it was entitled to exercise. 
 
 
Drawing on the previous discussion about national culture, the financial penalty set 
by Australia‘s legislators may be reflecting Australia‘s highly individualistic culture, 
whereby people are responsible for, and accountable for, the management of their 
own lives and careers and management of their behaviour in the workplace – 
regardless of the circumstances that may trigger negative behaviours. 
 
4.2.5  Hypotheses deduced about the type of ‘misbehaviour’ 
In summary, the discussion for the first research question, after introducing the 
deviant behaviour typology, considered how the retributive justice theory enables 
one to speculate when misbehaviour is more likely to be associated with an 
arbitration decision that either favours the worker or management. The logic 
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underpinning the forthcoming hypothesis is that the behaviours considered ‗serious‘ 
in nature are worthy of a ‗serious‘ consequence in terms of dismissal, however, the 
severity of the punishment may be alleviated to some degree if the dismissed worker 
convinces the arbitrator that the employer was not entirely blameless. It was also 
discussed how previous empirical investigations have not yet replicated consistent 
findings on the variety of misbehaviour types, and moreover, that a piecemeal 
approach has occurred to identify the influence of the type of misbehaviour – a 
matter which this thesis aims to address by using the deviance typology. Finally, 
awareness of the Australian context of this thesis was raised by describing how 
Australia‘s innate national cultural factors and compulsory legislative requirements 
are latent influences on the tolerance of misbehaviour amongst arbitrators. In view of 
this, three hypotheses have been developed to analyse the first research question: 
 
H0(1) The type of misbehaviour in which the worker engaged will not influence 
arbitration decisions favourable to the worker. 
 
H1(1) All four categories of Robinson and Bennett’s typology of misbehaviours will 
be negatively related to arbitration decisions favourable to the worker.  
 
H0(2) The severity of the misbehaviour will not influence arbitration decisions 
favourable to the worker. 
 
H1(2) The severity of the misbehaviour act will be negatively related to arbitration 
decisions favourable to the worker. 
 
H0(3) There is no statistically significant relationship between the years of service 
by the worker; the presence of an apology; or a clean disciplinary record and 
arbitration decisions favouring the worker. 
 
H1(3)  Each of these factors will have a separate, positive relationship with 
arbitration decisions favouring the worker: 1) years of service 2) a clean 
disciplinary record; 3) the presence of an apology from the worker.  
 
4.3  Research question 2 – the employee’s explanation 
The second research question introduces the employee‘s defence as an aspect of the 
decision making considerations of the arbitrator. The findings from this question, by 
incorporating the employee explanation typology (Southey 2010), encapsulate a 
major contribution to our understanding of arbitrating misconduct-related unfair 
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dismissal claims. In this thesis, an employee‘s defence refers to the explanation or 
response the employee provides for engaging in the behaviour.  
 
4.3.1  Defining ‘explanations’ using the employee explanation typology 
The major variable of interest in this question can measured according to the author‘s 
typology of employee explanations for misbehaviour (Southey 2010b). The 
explanation typology categorises the self-reported and potentially sanitised defences 
that employees provide for their behaviour, when confronted with the ‗please 
explain‘ question by their employer. Cognitive dissonance theory (Festinger 1957) 
and neutralisation theory (Robinson & Kraatz 1998; Sykes & Matza 1957) provided 
a premise for suggesting employee defences may be more a product of self 
preservation rather than reflecting actual reasons for their behaviour, but 
nevertheless, are taken as evidence by the arbitrator.  
 
Organisational conditions and individual characteristics have been found to influence 
employees in their decisions to engage in deviance (Avery, Wernsing & Luthans 
2008; Domagalski & Steelman 2005; Harris & Ogbonna 2002; Leck 2005). The 
employee explanation typology, as displayed in Figure 4.2, identifies three domains 
of rationalisation: personal-inside; personal-outside; and workplace related, with the 
potential that these domains can overlap and result in the worker providing a 
conflated rationale to defend single or multiple acts of deviant behaviour. The themes 
collated under each of the domains in the typology are levelled at the employer 
(organisational) and/or due to personal reasons (individual characteristics).  
 
The typology reflects that ‗personal-inside reasons’ are intangible in nature. That is, 
reasons based on: cognitive processes; reactions; and/or emotions of the employee. 
Examples of personal-inside reasons are those where the employee denied the 
behaviour or reported that they felt the need to act in self-defence, or that they 
reacted in response to feelings of tension or inequity. The remaining personal reasons 
could be attributed to physical aspects surrounding the employee. These dimensions 
are classified as ‗personal-outside reasons‘ and are defined as those reasons which 
are non-work related and exist in a tangible or measurable form. Examples are family 
responsibility, illness, financial stress and use of mood altering substances. 
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Figure 4.2  A typology of employee explanations of their misbehaviours 
        (Source: Southey 2010) 
 
 
The employer focused reasons occur in a single domain devoted to ‗workplace-
related reasons‘. Workplace-related reasons are defined as rationales that pertain 
either directly or indirectly to the workplace. The conceptual model also recognises 
that multiple themes from within and across categories can occur. These explanations 
are viewed as having a ‘conflated rationale’ in the model. For example, an employee 
might rationalise that his behaviour occurred because he had to meet a family 
commitment, he was unwell and he misunderstood a company policy. Such an 
explanation invokes both ‗personal-outside reasons‘ and ‗workplace related reasons‘ 
in the model.  
 
It is not contended that the dimensions listed under each of the three categories in 
Figure 4.2 would address the full range of reasons. The full range of reasons would 
be as varied as there are individuals in the workplace. Of more importance and 
contribution, is that the model provides a framework for classifying a comprehensive 
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will provide a categorical measure for identifying and incorporating employee 
explanations for misbehaviour into the statistical modelling. 
 
4.3.2  How employee explanations influence decisions using attribution theory 
Having outlined a framework for categorising employee explanations in this thesis, it 
is worth considering attribution theory for its ability to make an association between 
the type of explanation (or defence) provided by the dismissed worker and its 
potential influence on the arbitrator‘s decision to hold the employee responsible for 
the behaviour. Attribution theory suggests that people will judge another‘s behaviour 
on the basis of whether they consider the behaviour to have been internally or 
externally caused, with externally caused behaviour more likely to be judged less 
severely than behaviours over which a person had full control (Heider 1958; Judge & 
Martocchio 1996; Klass, Mahony & Wheeler 2006; Robbins et al. 2011). For 
example, arriving to work late due to a car accident – an external cause – is judged 
less harshly by a supervisor than arriving to work late due to oversleeping – an 
internal cause. Attribution theory can be applied from either an interpersonal or 
intrapersonal context to describe the factors that people use to make assessments (or 
place attributions) about the behaviours of other people, or their own behaviour 
(Leopold, Harris & Watson 2005; Martinko 1995). Bemmels (1991a) used attribution 
theory to underpin his experiment with 230 male labour arbitrators to determine how 
much external and internal attributions influenced their decision. It was found that 
attribution theory held, whereby an arbitrator that assessed the dismissed worker‘s 
behaviour resulted from an external cause, was more likely to find in favour of the 
worker.  
 
In this thesis, attribution theory is applied from the interpersonal perspective; 
wherein one person, the arbitrator, judges another person, the employee on their 
conduct. Further, it is contended the arbitrator will consider if the employee‘s 
explanation for his or her behaviour was based on either internal or external 
attributions to determine if the worker was culpable. The external-internal ascriptions 
of attribution theory align with the domains of the employee explanation typology, 
whereby ‗workplace related‘ explanations ascribe external attributions, and the 
‗personal-inside‘ and ‗personal-outside‘ explanations ascribe internal attributions. 
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4.3.3  Previous empirical findings about employee explanations in arbitration 
This is an area of arbitral decision-making where the literature appeared to contain 
very few investigations. Apart from Bemmels‘ (1991b) study, otherwise identified 
was Southey‘s (2010) review of 92 Australian arbitration decisions revealing that of 
the three categories, the externally-attributed workplace-related reasons were most 
frequently associated with a sympathetic response from the arbitrator.  
 
4.3.4  Complexity of the explanation 
The employee explanation typology led the author to consider whether the dismissed 
worker would be better placed to provide either a single explanation or multiple 
explanations to persuade the arbitrator to award a favourable result. The author‘s 
development of the employee explanation typology (Southey 2010b) conceptualised 
that employees may give multiple explanations for their behaviour in a conflated 
rationale. The analysis of descriptive data on dismissal cases reported in Southey 
(2010), suggested that 41 percent of cases were won by dismissed employees 
providing a single explanation of their behaviour compared to 33 percent where the 
employee provided multiple explanations. It was reasoned that the clarity of a single 
explanation provided less opportunity for an arbitrator to experience a cognitive bias 
that might otherwise occur whilst trying to assess several explanations.  
 
The opportunity for cognitive bias to occur in judicial type decision-making was 
considered by Hastie and Pennington (2000, p. 212) who proposed that the first task 
for the decision-maker is to construct a mental model of the events, by 
comprehending a ‗large base of implication-rich, conditionally dependent pieces of 
evidence ... using inference rules’. The idea of such mental summarising of 
information is logical if one considers that a judgement that repeated the entire 
transcript of the proceedings, would offer little value to the parties (Sangha & Moles 
1997). Thus, it is from this ‗representative summary‘ of evidence that it is contended 
the arbitrator makes the decision, rather than on the original, unprocessed evidence. 
The use of inference rules in this mental summarising, involves the use of cognitive 
heuristics (rules of thumb) and selectivity to assess information during decision-
making, and whilst these decisions may produce reasonable results, the risk is they 
  
 
Southey: Employee misbehaviour and unfair dismissal arbitration                                        Page 134 
can also incur systematic biases (Korte 2003; Malin & Biernat 2008; Sangha & 
Moles 1997; Tversky & Kahnemann 2000).  
 
Systematic biases are also thought to contribute to the differences in decision 
outcomes among individuals (Hastie & Pennington 2000; Korte 2003). Numerous 
cognitive biases have been discussed in the literature Hogarth (1987) and Das and 
Teng (1999) suggested one such bias, that may have relevance to an arbitrator 
managing multiple explanations from workers, is the reliance on ‗prior hypothesis 
and focus on limited targets‘. This bias suggests the decision maker is influenced 
innately by his or her prior experiences, orientations and mental models and will 
focus on selected interests and outcomes and possibly ignore conflicting information. 
It is suggested that this bias may be amplified when employees provide multiple, 
perhaps disparate explanations for their behaviour.  
 
4.3.5  Hypothesis deduced about the ‘employee’s explanation’ 
In the first part of this section, the descriptive domains of the employee explanation 
typology were presented, which were then considered in combination with the 
procedural elements of attribution theory. This enables the deduction of two 
hypotheses about the influence of an employee‘s explanation for his or her 
behaviour, on the arbitral decision. Thus, the first testable hypothesis to address 
research question two is: 
 
H0(4) There is no statistically significant relationship between the type of 
explanation rendered by the worker and arbitration decisions favouring the 
worker. 
 
H1(4a) ‘Workplace-related’ explanations will be positively related to arbitration 
decisions favouring the worker. 
 
H1(4b) ‘Personal-inside’ explanations will be negatively related to arbitration 
decisions favouring the worker.  
 
In the second sub-section it was suggested that the mental summary arbitrators build 
during complex decision-making, provides scope for cognitive bias to occur, 
particularly when more complex explanations are provided by the worker. This leads 
to the following hypothesis, which finalises the testable hypotheses pertaining to 
research question two: 
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H0(5) There is no statistically significant relationship between the number of 
explanations provided by the worker and arbitration decisions favourable to 
the worker. 
 
H1(5) The number of reasons to explain behaviour will be negatively related to 
decisions favourable to the worker. 
 
4.4  Research question 3 – the employer’s process 
The independent variable of focus in the third research question concerns the process 
used by management to dismiss the worker. Arbitration decisions are influenced by 
factors, beyond the misbehaviour act itself, that led to the dismissal (Oswald & 
Caudill 1991). Thus, a factor which can be expected to influence the arbitrator‘s 
decision is the management – or the mismanagement – of the dismissal process by 
the employer. This factor can be underpinned by organisational justice theories 
(Nelson & Kim 2008), which will be discussed after first clarifying that the dismissal 
process will be measured in terms of errors made by management when performing a 
dismissal. If no errors were made, it is assumed the dismissal process was fair and 
reasonable. 
 
4.4.1  Defining the ‘dismissal process’ by using the dismissal errors typology 
Workers can be exposed to unscrupulous dismissal processes at the hand of the 
employer. Although many advanced economies provide workers with protection 
from unlawful or wrongful reasons for termination of employment, fewer countries 
offer protection against unfairness and procedural inadequacies – which are within 
the ambit of ‗unfair dismissal‘ protection. To explain further, in Australia, all 
workers are protected from unlawful termination under the general protection and 
unlawful termination provisions under the Fair Work Act 2009 (Part 3-1, Division 5, 
Section 351 and Part 4-1, Division 2, Section 772(1)) on the basis of their race, 
colour, sex, sexual preference, age, physical or mental disability, marital status, 
family or carer‘s responsibilities, religion, political opinion, national extraction or 
social origin. Yet, if an employee is dismissed due to other reasons, such as 
performance, redundancy or misconduct, and if the worker comes under a permitted 
category under the legislation (see chapter 3 sub-section 3.6.2, Table 3.5 listing 
permitted and excluded categories of employees), there exists additional, unfair 
dismissal protections in the Act (Part 3-2 Sections 385 to 387). Such protections 
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empower the federal tribunal to determine if the employee was terminated in a fair 
and reasonable manner.  
 
One may tend to assume that when an employer makes an error in their process, the 
dismissal is automatically unfair. However, this is not always the case. According to 
Leventhal (1976, p. 34) ‗the relative weight of procedural rules may differ from one 
situation to the next, and one procedural component to the next.‘ Therefore, it is 
possible that errors can be made by management in the dismissal process that will 
not result in the arbitrator overturning the employer‘s decision to dismiss the worker. 
As an example, in Mabior V Baiada Group Pty Ltd, U2010/12656, Commissioner 
Steele of Fair Work Australia decided that, due to the gravity of the worker‘s abusive 
behaviour, the procedural faults were not sufficient of themselves, to conclude that 
the dismissal was unfair. 
 
Another example occurs in Pritchard v Timberglen, FWA 5144, wherein the 
employer failed to provide details of sexual harassment allegations to the accused 
worker and denied him an opportunity to respond. In this case, these procedural 
errors were not considered by the arbitrator to outweigh the worker‘s poor judgement 
and behaviour. Thus, in this thesis, there is value in incorporating a variable that 
measures the influence of deficiencies that occurred in the dismissal process, on the 
direction of the arbitration decision. And, if deficiencies occurred, which kinds of 
errors were made, as some errors may be more influential in the direction of a 
decision than others. 
 
In order to measure an independent variable that will capture the process used by 
management to dismiss the worker, it is of interest in this thesis that Blancero and 
Bohlander (1995) identified six prominent managerial errors committed by 
employers when dismissing workers. An explanation of each type of error follows. 
 
(a) Weak or flawed evidence: This means management‘s accusations of the 
employee‘s wrongdoing were not supported by sufficient substantive evidence. It 
means the employer had not gathered valid evidence to uphold the discipline 
imposed. Alternatively, the employer may have acted on a strong suspicion of 
misconduct without solid documentation or collaborative evidence.  
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(b) Mitigating circumstances surrounding the situation that led to the dismissal: In 
this situation, the misbehaviour was undisputed, but the employer was negligent in 
considering additional circumstances that may reduce the severity of a dismissal. 
Examples of mitigating circumstances could be: the employee was otherwise 
considered a good corporate citizen; the employee was seen to be genuinely 
remorseful; the employee had a long and satisfactory work record; the employee was 
experiencing difficult, personal or family situations 
 
(c) Management was neither clear nor consistent with its rules and policies: Whilst 
management has the power to make the workplace rules and policies, they are 
responsible in four areas when making its rules: first, it must make rules only within 
the boundaries necessary for safe and efficient operations of the business. Second, it 
must make rules which are clear and unambiguous. Third, they must effectively 
communicate these rules to all employees. And, fourth, enforce rules consistently 
and without bias. An error in this category means that the employer breached one or 
more of these rule-making responsibilities. 
 
(d) Lack of due process: Concerned with natural justice, this error refers to 
employers who failed to provide a procedurally fair process to the worker when 
considering his or her dismissal. Examples of lack of due process would be: the 
worker was denied union or other support person; the employer did not conduct an 
investigation or conducted a poor one; the employer did not give the opportunity for 
the worker to respond to allegations; and/or not taking corrective action within an 
appropriate time period of completing the investigation. 
 
(e) Too harsh a punishment: This means the arbitrator considered that whilst 
procedurally the dismissal was executed correctly, the consequences of the dismissal 
from the workplace was too severe (or harsh) for the degree of seriousness of the 
misbehaviour. An example of this would be Webster v Mercury Colleges (2011) 
where SDP Drake (the arbitrator) ruled:  
 
The termination of Mr Webster‘s employment was harsh because of the serious 
financial consequences to Mr Webster and the social dislocation which was 
clearly inevitable on summary termination of his employment. Mr Webster was 
required to leave the country and dislocate his life within twenty-eight days of 
the termination of his employment. As an employer of sponsorship visa 
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employees I have concluded that the employer was likely to know of these 
consequences. Termination of employment in these circumstances, with this 
knowledge, was harsh. 
 
(f) Management in some way contributed to the situation: The arbitrator may find 
that management‘s own conduct contributed to the incident for which the employee 
was dismissed. An example of a management infraction of this nature would be 
where the employee acted on bad or wrong information provided by a supervisor, or 
the employee acted under direction of someone assumed to be – but was not – in 
authority. Another example would be where management (or supervisor) neglected 
to provide the necessary equipment or materials to perform the work or maintain 
equipment to a standard to perform. A third example would be if management (or 
supervisor) concurred with the behaviour or rule violation – possibly due to ‗custom 
and practice arrangements‘ – that operate counter to organisational rules. A final 
example might be if the manager (or supervisor) and employee were involved jointly 
in the incident, but only the employee was disciplined. 
 
In the main, the errors described by Blancero and Bohlander (1995) resonate  with 
breaches of justice. For instance, ‗lack of due process‘ encapsulates mistakes in 
procedural justice and possibility interactional justice, whilst ‗too harsh a 
punishment‘ shows a weakness in distributive justice. This point will be explored 
further in the remaining sub-sections under research question three. 
 
4.4.2  How the ‘dismissal process’ influences decisions within a  justice framework 
 
The focus of this discussion is to theorise how justice theories might influence the 
result of an arbitration decision when the arbitrator reviews the process used by 
management to dismiss the worker. Tribunals and courts use three cornerstone 
principles of ‗natural justice‘: the right to a fair hearing; an unbiased decision-maker; 
and that the decision be based on only the evidence provided (Forbes 2006). Whilst 
arbitrators must meet the demands of natural justice when conducting their arbitral 
hearings, likewise, arbitrators expect to see that employees, under investigation by 
their employer, were also afforded these same principles before the employer made 
the decision to terminate the worker.  Natural justice principles – whilst primarily 
relevant in legal and quasi-legal proceedings – have themes that permeate the 
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broader justice system in the workplace and in other aspects of business (see for 
instance Van Essen et al. 2004).  
 
In addition to ‗natural justice‘, ‗organisational justice‘ appears in the literature as an 
umbrella term for the collection of fairness theories in relation to the employee‘s 
perceptions of the structural and social processes that occur in the workplace (Brown, 
Bemmels & Barclay 2010; Greenberg 1990). It has been established in the literature 
that an employee‘s sense of fairness, or perhaps moreover, a sense of being treated 
unfairly, is a powerful catalyst that will affect his or her feelings and actions. For 
example, scholars suggest a worker‘s sense of justice is believed to influence how he 
or she will respond to managerial authority and accept its decisions, his or her level 
of job satisfaction and organisational commitment, and his or her likelihood of 
engaging in anti-social behaviours, violence or theft (Aquino, Galperin & Bennett 
2004; Aquino, Lewis & Bradfield 1999; Aquino, Tripp & Bies 2006; Giacalone & 
Greenberg 1997; Greenberg & Baron 2007; Törnblom & Vermunt 2007; Zoghbi 
Manrique de Lara 2006).  
 
The first theory considered within the organisational justice framework is 
‗distributive justice‘ – a development from Adam‘s (1966) equity theory of pay 
injustices. Distributive justice accounts for a person‘s perceptions of the fairness of 
the distribution of a resource or decision – whether it concerns economic goods, or 
psychological, physiological, economic or social aspects that affect a person‘s 
wellbeing – and whether the ‗end result‘ or outcome matched the expectations of 
what was believed to be a person‘s ‗just deserts‘ (Kabanoff 1991; Törnblom & 
Vermunt 2007, p. 3). Distribution is related to power relationships (Kabanoff 1991) 
and in the workplace is it evident in the power the employer has to dismiss the 
employment contract. The employer‘s application of distributive justice principles is 
under examination throughout the arbitration hearing whereby the arbitrator reviews 
the evidence pertaining to the misbehaviour the employee was alleged to have 
committed, and determine whether employer was justified to occasion a dismissal, as 
a disciplinary outcome, on the employee.  
 
However, ‗the distribution of a punishment is only the final set in a sequence of 
events‘ (Leventhal 1976, p. 17). Therefore, related to distributive justice is 
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‗procedural justice‘, as it is not possible to judge a distributive justice result in 
isolation from the ‗system‘ by which it was generated (Rawls 1999). Procedural 
justice is concerned with the method used to arrive at an outcome, which must be 
performed in a consistent, transparent and unbiased manner by the actors that 
administered the process (Bemmels, Brown & Barclay 2004). Thus procedural 
justice considerations are reflected in the arbitrator‘s examination of the process 
management used to arrive at a decision to dismiss the worker.  
 
Interactional (or interpersonal) justice relates to the interpersonal dynamics that 
unfold while a decision is being put into practice, with the expectation that 
management engage in sincere and respectful actions towards the employee whilst 
engaging in organisational procedures (Brown, Bemmels & Barclay 2010; Folger & 
Skarlicki 1998; Greenberg & Alge 1998; Zoghbi Manrique de Lara 2006). As an 
example, a member of management making a malicious or intimidating comment, or 
displaying a dismissive attitude during a disciplinary investigation or dismissal, 
breaches interactional justice expectations. Thus interactional justice expectations are 
inherent in the administration of procedural justice, with the power to moderate the 
arbitrator‘s perception of the quality of both procedural justice and distributive 
justice (Brown, Bemmels & Barclay 2010). Therefore, in the scope of unfair 
dismissal arbitration, an accurate process, yet administered in a discourteous manner, 
may reduce the arbitrator‘s willingness to find in favour of the employer. 
 
4.4.3  Previous empirical findings about the process as a factor in arbitration  
Few studies have captured insight about the range errors in the dismissal process 
actioned by the employer. This may be a reflection of a challenge in measuring 
‗procedural errors‘ as a well defined variable in an analysis, with scholars tending to 
incorporate procedural errors as a broadly measured construct, if at all. For example, 
due process factors were absent entirely in Nelson and Kim‘s (2008) analysis, whilst 
Simpson and Martocchio (1997) used a broad, dummy variable of ‗management 
conformed with due process/management did not conform with due process‘ to 
capture errors in justice during the dismissal. In this thesis, the influence of Blancero 
and Bohlander‘s (1995) typology for categorising errors, aims to improve the 
measurement of managerial errors in dismissal as an independent variable, which is 
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hoped will lead to more insight into the impact of different types of errors on the 
arbitral decision.  
 
In the meantime, the following findings about the influence of procedural errors on 
the arbitration decision have been identified in the literature. Scholars have tended to 
find that an unfair dismissal almost never gets overturned when management 
complies with organisational justice expectations (Simpson & Martocchio 1997). For 
instance, in an Australian study, it was found the chance of having a dismissal 
overturned is 97 percent where the employer failed to provide warnings – a possible 
procedural deficiency (Chelliah & D'Netto 2006).  
 
However, procedural justice errors on their own were insufficient to cause a 
significant impact on the arbitration decision according to Gely and Chandler (2008) 
and Klass, Mahony and Wheeler (2006). Gely and Chander (2008) suggested that 
unions cannot rely on a defence that argues due process errors alone, and that a an 
upheld claim is most likely when unions present a defence that combines an attack 
on the factual strength of the incident along with identifying faults in the dismissal 
process. Furthermore, in arriving at an arbitration decision, Klass, Mahony and 
Wheeler (2006) found that arbitrator‘s assign the most weight to the strength of 
evidence against the employee, the employee‘s work history and evidence of 
discrimination, before assigning weight to procedural compliance issues.  
 
4.4.4  Dismissal process matters relevant within the Australian context  
As this variable is concerned with identifying errors that the employer may have 
made in dismissing the worker, it is relevant to consider how the Australian federal 
tribunal approaches the matter of determining whether an employer erred in its 
dismissal process. An underpinning notion in the unfair dismissal legislation in the 
Fair Work Act 2009 (Part 381) – and likewise in the previous federal legislation – is 
that the federal tribunal is to ensure a ‗fair go all round‘ is accorded to the worker to 
present his or her case and the employer to defend its decision. This means the 
dismissed worker needs to be provided with an avenue of appeal to the tribunal, 
whilst at the same time the tribunal must show concern for the employer‘s viability, 
in the event it determines a remedy for dismissals that are found to be unfair.  
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The federal tribunal is bound to consider whether a dismissal was ‗harsh, unjust or 
unreasonable‘. Sub-section 3.6.3 listed the provisions of Part 3-2 Section 387 of the 
Fair Work Act 2009 that contains the criteria arbitrators need to take into account 
when considering whether a dismissal was harsh, unjust or unreasonable. Apart from 
these guidelines, the Act does not go so far as to define the concepts of ‗unfair‘, 
‗unjust‘ or ‗unreasonable‘.  
 
However, this lack of clarity is likely an intentional strategy by legislators. Justice 
Sheldon, in summarising his concerns about the use of ‗adjectival tyranny‘ to 
determine if the tribunal had permission to intervene, stated, ‗The less fetters there 
are on the discretion the better (none appear in the Act) but it is all important that it 
should be exercised soundly‘ (in Loty and Holloway v Australian Workers‘ Union  
(1971) AR(NSW)95). Some insight into the intent of the terms, ‗harsh, unjust or 
unreasonable‘ occurs in a High Court finding – frequently cited in arbitration 
decisions – relating to Byrne v Australian Airlines Ltd (1995)185CLR. This finding 
states, in part: 
 
It may be that the termination is harsh but not unjust or unreasonable, unjust but 
not harsh or unreasonable, or unreasonable but not harsh or unjust. In many 
cases the concepts will overlap. Thus, the one termination of employment can 
be unjust because the employee was not guilty of the misconduct on which the 
employer acted, may be unreasonable because it was decided upon inferences 
which could not reasonably have been drawn from the material before the 
employer, and may be harsh in its consequences for the personal and economic 
situation of the employee or because it is disproportionate to the gravity of the 
misconduct in respect of which the employer acted ... procedures adopted in 
carrying out the termination might properly be taken into account in 
determining whether the termination thus produced was harsh, unjust or 
unreasonable. 
 
A final point that contextualises the Australian nature of the dismissal process is that 
arbitrators frequently document in their decisions, their considerations about the 
notion of a ‗valid reason‘ for dismissal and the characteristics of one. Developed by 
previous legislation, and now enshrined in Section 387 of The Fair Work Act 2009, 
federal arbitrators refer to the opinion from Justice Northrop in Selvachandran v 
Peteron Plastics Pty Ltd (1995) 62IR371 to describe the elements of a ‗valid reason‘: 
 
―valid‖ should be given the meaning of sound defensible or well founded. A 
reason which is capricious, spiteful or prejudiced could never be a valid reason 
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... at the same time, the reason must be valid in the context of the employee‘s 
capacity or conduct, or based upon the operational requirements of the 
employer‘s business. 
 
Across several fronts: legislatively, court rulings and arbitral decisions, it is clear that 
justice principles bind Australian employers to fulfil legal obligations to administer 
the dismissal of a misbehaving worker, in a fair and reasonable manner – clearly 
distinguishing it from ‗employment at will‘ policies prevalent in the US whereby 
‗just cause‘ for termination is not a feature of the employment relationship (Arrow-
Richman 2010; Battaglio 2010). 
 
4.4.5  Hypotheses deduced about the ‘employer’s process’ 
Table 4.3 has been prepared to tie together the three areas of discussion presented for 
this major variable.  It demonstrates how each  of  the justice principles discussed in 
sub-section 4.5.2 can be aligned to managerial errors identified in Blancero and 
Bohlander (1995), which are further reflected in the themes of Australia‘s legislative 
protections against ‗unfair, unjust or unreasonable‘ dismissal.  
 
Table 4.3  Alignment of justice principles with managerial dismissal errors and 
Australian unfair dismissal legislative terminology 
 
Justice principle 
Blancero and Bohlander (1995) 
managerial dismissal errors 
Unfair dismissal provisions 
in FWA Act 2009 
Part 3-2 Section 387 
Natural justice: right 
to a fair hearing and 
unbiased decision 
maker 
Lack of due process 
Management was neither clear nor 
consistent with its rules and policies 
Section 387 (a) valid reason 
Section 387 (b) notified of reason 
Section 387 (c) chance to respond 
Section 387 (d) support person 
Natural justice: 
evidence rule 
Lack of due process 
Weak or flawed evidence 
Section 387 (a) valid reason 
Distributive justice Too harsh a punishment 
Section 387 (a) valid reason 
Section 387 (f) size of enterprise 
Section 387 (g) absence of HR 
Procedural justice Lack of due process Section 387 (b) notified of reason 
Section 387 (c) chance to respond 
Section 387 (d) support person Interactional justice Lack of due process 
 
(Source: Developed for thesis) 
 
Unfair dismissal provisions are underpinned by a justice framework and mindful of 
the discussion on retributive justice addressed in section 4.3.2, and Australian case 
history discussed in section 4.5.4, it is proposed that the arbitrator will weigh the 
seriousness of the behaviour against any errors made by management in dismissing 
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the worker. That is, management may be able to mitigate flaws in their process by 
arguing that they were managing an extremely serious behavioural issue. Reflective 
of the preceding theoretical and practical discussions, the following hypotheses to 
test research question three have been developed: 
 
H0(6) There is no statistically significant relationship between the type of errors in 
judgement or processes in actioning the dismissal and arbitration decisions 
favourable to the worker. 
 
H1(6) Errors in judgement or processes in actioning the dismissal will be positively 
related to arbitration decisions favourable to the worker. 
 
H0(7) Regardless of the severity of the offence, there is no statistically significant 
relationship between the type of error made by the employer in actioning the 
dismissal and arbitration decisions favourable to the worker. 
 
H1(7) As the severity of the misbehaviour increases, errors in the employer’s 
dismissal process, will be negatively related to arbitration decisions 
favouring the worker. 
 
THE SUB-QUESTIONS 
The remainder of this chapter will be devoted to the four sub-questions. The 
literature was scoured to identify additional, potentially relevant variables which 
were integrated into the four sub-questions. These moderating variables enabled the 
statistical analysis to be more sensitive to the differences that existed between the 
principal, independent variables discussed in the three major research questions and 
their relationships with the dependent variable (Lord 1960).  
 
4.5  Sub-question (a) – advocacy 
The first moderator variable of interest incorporated into the conceptual model 
captured whether, or not, the dismissed worker and/or the employer, engaged the 
services of a representative to present their case to the arbitrator. 
 
Advocacy was included as a moderating variable as the expertise of a trained 
advocate, familiar with the rules and procedures of unfair dismissal arbitration, 
should place their client – be it the employer or the dismissed worker – in an 
improved position to present their case. Workers that represented their own case 
(litigant-in-person) may be intimidated by the employers‘ presence and 
disadvantaged by their ‗lack of familiarity with the law, difficulty with the language, 
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prolixity and excess of emotion‘ (Mourell & Cameron 2009, p. 68). Skilled advocates 
can concisely communicate the facts to an arbitrator (Crow & Logan 1994) and they 
may utilise every possibility of winning a case to achieve better outcomes for the 
client (Jones 1961; Latreille & Knight 2005). On the negative side, involvement of 
legal counsel in arbitration settings was found to be associated with significant time 
delays between the actual dismissal and adjudication (Ponak et al. 1996; Sherman 
1989; Thornicroft 1994). 
 
4.5.1  Exit-Voice theory as a justification for worker advocacy 
Workers may have either a public or personal reason to ‗fight‘ for the return of their 
job and the theory of exit-voice (Hirschman 1970) suggests that whilst employed, 
employees can show dissatisfaction with the treatment received from their employer 
by exhibiting ‗exiting‘ behaviours, such as job hunting or resigning. Alternatively 
they may exhibit ‗voice‘ behaviour, whereby they aim to constructively improve 
their work conditions, such as union engagement (Cappelli & Chauvin 1991).  
 
However, a dismissed worker exists on the outer of the employment relationship. 
Thus, exit-voice theory contains an element providing for ‗voice from without (after 
exit)‘ (Hirschman 1970, p. 104) or a ‗representative voice‘ whereby a third party 
advocates for the discounted worker (Luchak 2003, p. 118). This element in the 
theory presents a reactionary option for a dismissed worker, and it is present in 
arbitration as the employee‘s representative presents his or her narration of events as 
they occurred to the worker (Budd & Colvin 2008). Unions, consultants or legal 
representatives can offer employees a formal ‗voice‘ mechanism that may improve 
the employee‘s dismissal circumstances through reinstatement or compensation.  
 
4.5.2  Previous empirical findings about advocacy in dismissal arbitration 
Research focusing on the role of union advocacy in unfair dismissal arbitration 
appears limited. Mesch and Dalton (1992) found a positive relationship between 
union representation and successful arbitration, and in a later study, Bingham and 
Mesch (2000) found that arbitration with union involvement is more likely to have 
reinstatement as an outcome. More recently, Gely and Chandler (2008) found union 
advocacy was beneficial if the dismissal was due to aggressive behaviour.  
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Research that focused on the effects of an imbalance in the representation of either 
party was slightly more extensive. Latreille and Knight (2005), Crow and Logan 
(1994), Wagar (1994), and Block and Stieber (1987) all found that if there was an 
imbalance in the representation, the ‗better represented‘ party gained a significant 
advantage  - ‗better represented‘ meaning: a legal representative facing a non-legal 
advocate or self-represented party; or a non-legal advocate facing a self-represented 
party. In variation to this, Harcourt (2000) and Thornicroft (1994) found this thesis 
held true in so far that a represented employee had an advantage if the employer was 
not represented. But, unfortunately for the employer, it gained no comparative 
advantage by hiring a lawyer when the employee did not.  
 
Viewing matters from the employer’s perspective of using an advocate, McAndrew 
(2000) found that employers were less likely to win a case without an advocate. 
McAndrew‘s (2000) investigation further discovered employers were, paradoxically, 
disadvantaged if they had used an advocate when it came to the arbitrator making 
compensation orders.  
 
Advocates that tap effectively into both legal tactics and facilitative techniques are 
conceptualised to be most deft type of advocate (Posthuma & Swift 2001).  Thus, 
also in contention in the literature is whether the type of advocate engaged to 
represent a party, can provide additional advantage. Crow and Logan (1994) and 
Block and Stieber (1987) found that legally qualified advocates offered greater  
advantage than non-legal advocates in dismissal arbitration, such as human 
resource/industrial relations experts and union representatives, whose daily duties 
demand from them a range of obligations. These ‗lay‘ advocates are at a comparative 
disadvantage to legal advocates, whose speciality is adversarial defence.  
 
However, counter to this position, is that the lay-representation service offered by 
unions affords the worker some assurance of a legitimate claim, when a union elects 
to represent them. That is because union officials are able to make ‗expert 
judgements about the viability of the case’, whereas, legal representatives are in a 
position where their income ‗relies not on the pursuit of successful claims but the 
pursuit of any claim’ (Sherman 1989, p. 223). Although today, lawyers may be 
choosing cases more carefully as many operate on a ‗no win-no fee‘ basis and elect 
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to charge uplift fees in the event of success (Legal Services Commission 2012). This 
opinion was supported by Harcourt‘s (2000) finding that legally qualified advocates 
are no more or less likely than non-legal representatives to win a claim for a 
dismissed worker. It appears that few studies failed to find some form of a significant 
relationship between representation and arbitration outcomes, although, one that 
failed to find a statistical significance between use of representations and arbitration 
result was by Kirschenbaum, Harel & Sivan (1998) on voluntary arbitration in the 
Israeli industrial tribunal. 
 
4.5.3  Advocacy matters relevant within the Australian context  
Representation in Australia‘s federal tribunal at an unfair dismissal hearing by a paid 
agent, such as a professionally qualified lawyer/solicitor or a non-legal advisor from 
an industrial advocacy service, is subject to approval by the arbitrator. Section 596(4) 
of the Fair Work Act permits legally qualified representation if the advocate is an 
employee of the ‗person‘; or the employee of an organisation representing the 
person, such as a peak council, association or bargaining agent. However, Section 
596(1) of the Act places limitations on when a person can be legally represented in a 
matter before FWA. Similar rules also operated under the arbitration process of 
FWA‘s predecessor, the AIRC. Legal representations may be approved if the 
arbitrator considers: 
 
a) it is a complex matter that may be dealt with more effectively by legal experts; or 
 
b) one of the parties is unable to represent him or herself effectively; or 
 
c) the ‗power balance‘ between the two parties would make it unfair for one not to be 
represented. 
 
Leave to allow legally-qualified representation is not uncommon, despite the aim of 
successive federal industrial legislation to limit it (Mourell & Cameron 2009). In 
instances where the parties elect to ‗self represent‘, the tribunal appears to 
accommodate the lack of skill in defending and cross examining a case. For example, 
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Both parties appeared unrepresented at the arbitration of the matter ... 
unsurprisingly, the oral evidence was, to put it kindly, free flowing, and 
conducted without an adherence to the correct procedure for asking questions 
and answering them. Understandably, the Tribunal was minded to give the 
parties relatively free rein in their oral evidence and, doing the best I can from 
this approach, I am able to glean the following evidence relevant to the case. 
 
An additional point that has implications for the use of union advocacy in Australia, 
relates to the decline in union density in Australia, in all industries, in all occupations 
and in all demographic groups during the last 30 years (Bray & Underhill 2009; 
Burgess 2000; Campbell & Brosnan 1999; Cooper 2005; Lewis 2004; Wooden 
2002). Bray and Underhill (2009) reported that in 1990, union density in Australia 
was 40 percent across all industries, and by 2006 this figure had declined to 20 
percent. Australia is reflecting a world-wide decline in union membership (Bender & 
Sloane 1999; Broadbent 2005). Australia‘s decline has been attributed to successive 
‗neoliberal‘ legislative changes since the Howard Coalition government in relation to 
wage setting, bargaining structures and Award modernisation, which have, from time 
to time excluded, and at the least, limited, union involvement (Bray & Underhill 
2009).  
 
Further, labour market changes have been seen as a major contributor, where union 
membership was viewed as less relevant due to increases in casual and part-time 
work, youth workers, and labour hire workers (Burgess 2000; Lewis 2004). This 
factor, combined with the growth in personal and knowledge based service industries 
that are traditionally less unionised than goods producing industries (Wooden 2002) 
contributed to declining unionisation. An unfortunate implication of shrinking union 
membership, in relation to unfair dismissal claims, is that employees without union 
support, particularly ‗lower-power employees‘, may be reluctant to pursue arbitration 
without union support, limiting accessibility to the federal industrial tribunal to those 
workers who are perhaps in most need of such a means of workplace redress 
(Bacharach & Bamberger 2004, p. 537).  
 
4.5.4  Hypotheses deduced about advocacy 
In this section, it was discussed that advocacy, theoretically, should provide the 
parties with an advantage, particularly noting the power of legal advocacy, at the 
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arbitration table. And, it appears that the majority of empirical investigations have 
found statistical significance supporting the use of advocacy. Advocacy in the 
Australian setting was also discussed, in terms of the legislative parameters 
surrounding the use of advocates and the potential influence of declining union 
density. This trend may have had implications for dismissed workers as they had less 
access to union advocacy. To finalise this first sub-question, a range of hypotheses 
about the influence of advocates on unfair dismissal arbitration decisions results have 
been developed based on the preceding discussions: 
 
H0(8) There is no statistically significant relationship between union advocacy and 
arbitration decisions favourable to the worker. 
 
H1(8) Union advocacy will be positively related to arbitration decisions favourable 
to the worker.  
 
H0(9) There is no statistically significant relationship between the type of advocacy 
used by the worker and arbitration decisions favourable to the worker. 
 
H1(9) Worker advocacy by independent lawyers will have a greater positive 
relationship to decisions favouring the worker than other advocacy services, 
who in turn will have a greater positive relationship to those workers that 
self-represent their claim at the arbitration hearing.  
 
H0(10) There is no statistically significant relationship between the type of advocate 
used by the employer and arbitration decisions favourable to the worker. 
 
H1(10) Employer advocacy by independent lawyers will have a more negative 
relationship to decisions favouring the worker than other types of advocates.  
 
H0(11) There is no statistically significant relationship between self-representation 
and arbitration decisions favouring the worker. 
 
H1(11a)  ‘Self-representation’ by a dismissed worker will reflect the strongest, 
positive relationship with decisions favouring the worker. 
 
H1(11b) ‘Self-representation’ by an employer will reflect the strongest, positive 
relationship with decisions favouring the employer. 
 
4.6  Sub-question (b) – worker characteristics 
This sub-question considers characteristics about the worker that may have 
influenced the arbitration decision. The worker characteristics examined come from 
the arbitral decision-making literature and are: the worker‘s gender, occupational 
skill level, and industry in which the employment was held. 
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 4.6.1  Worker’s gender (and interaction with arbitrator’s gender) 
The effect of the worker‘s gender on the arbitration decision was inextricably linked 
with the gender of the arbitrator in the literature. Thus, whilst ‗pure‘ effects of the 
worker‘s gender on the arbitration decision were considered in the analysis, so were 
the interaction effects with the arbitrator‘s gender. The reason for considering gender 
interaction effects in arbitration related to four different theses identified in the 
literature about judicial-type judgements made towards women.  
 
For the purpose of this thesis, these theories were assembled into a matrix shown in 
Figure 4.3 to convey how the four theories can underpin predictions about gender 
interaction effects in arbitration. The four theories displayed in Figure 4.3 pertain to 
decisions rendered to female grievants, with the implication that female grievants 
may be treated either more favourably or harshly when compared to the decisions 
rendered to male grievants. 
 
 










4. EVIL WOMAN 
  
Unfavourable decisions to female grievants 
 
Figure 4.3  Potential gender interaction effects in arbitration 
 
 
(Source: Adapted from Southey & Innes 2010) 
 
Quadrant 1: The ‗maternalism‘ thesis (author‘s labelling) suggests women in power 
positions show a tendency to nurture women in lower status roles (Luthar 1996). 
Women who break through to positions of leadership (in this case the female 
arbitrator) are anticipated to possess a ‗feminine‘ attribute of ensuring women‘s 
advancement (Eveline 2005). Furthermore research has shown women, more so than 
men, perceived more discrimination against women in the workplace (Gutek, Cohen 
& Tsui 1996). This thesis thus suggests that female arbitrators are more likely to be 
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Quadrant 2: The ‗queen-bee‘ syndrome suggests that women in authority or 
leadership positions (in this case the female arbitrator), have high expectations of 
other women, based on their own experience of having to work hard to get to their 
position of power (Cooper 1997; Eveline 2005). It is aligned to ‗hostile sexism‘, 
wherein women place other women in positions with a silent desire to see them fail 
(Ryan & Haslam 2007). Thus one might deduce that female arbitrators will be 
harsher on female grievants than they are with male grievants.  
 
Quadrant 3: Paternalism and chivalry have been used to reason preferential 
treatment of women in the criminal justice system, suggesting that male judges 
harbour fatherly, benevolent, protective attitudes towards female grievants (Franklin 
& Fearn 2008; Herzog & Oreg 2008; Staines, Tavris & Jayaratne 1974). This notion 
suggests that male arbitrators are more likely to be lenient on female grievants than 
they are with male grievants.  
 
Quadrant 4: The ‗evil woman‘ theory envisages that a male arbitrator will treat a 
female grievant more harshly because, through her misdemeanours, she has offended 
the female stereotype that women are good and moral beings (Herzog & Oreg 2008; 
Moulds 1978; Nagel & Hagan 1983; O'Neil 1999). Essentially, women are judged on 
two fronts: their wrong doing, and their gender-deviant behaviour. This theory would 
support the suggestion that male arbitrators might be harsher in their findings 
towards female grievants compared to male grievants. 
 
The themes associated with Quadrants 2 and 4, which suggest the females are treated 
more harshly by both male and female arbitrators, have also been combined in the 
literature and referred to as the ‗Garden of Eden effect‘ (Hartman et al. 1994). The 
underlying tenant of this effect is that women that misbehave may be seen as 
temptresses who have provoked the punishment. As a result, decision makers are 
more likely to enforce tougher discipline on females than males.  
 
4.6.2  Previous research about gender effects  
Investigations conducted on gender effects in arbitral decision-making over dismissal 
or workplace discipline claims revealed a variety of findings, under an array of 
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different conditions. Statistically significant relationships between female grievants 
and favourable arbitration decisions from male arbitrators, or predominantly male 
arbitrators – reflective of the paternalism/chivalry thesis – were detected in the 
investigations by: Southey and Innes (2010); Knight and Latreille (2001); 
McAndrew (2000); Bingham and Mesch (2000) (in terms of the amount of  
backpay); Saridakis et al. (2006); Wagar and Grant (1996), Bemmels  (1988b, 1988a, 
1988c, 1990b, 1990a, 1991a) and Oswald and VanMatre (1990).  
 
Alternatively, significant effects in terms of female grievants actually receiving 
harsher penalties than male counterparts, regardless of the arbitrator‘s gender – 
reflecting the ‗queen bee‘, ‗evil women‘ theses and ‗Garden of Eden effect‘ – were 
found in the studies by Hartman et al. (1994) and Oswald and Caudill (1991). 
Women were also found to be receiving lower compensation payments in 
investigations by Mesch (1995), Rollings-Magnusson (2004) and Southey (2012). 
One study was identified that supported the ‗maternalism‘ thesis, which was Caudill 
and Oswald‘s (1993) study detecting female arbitrators were more lenient with 
female grievants.  
 
Another group of studies also considered whether female arbitrators made harsher or 
more lenient judgements, compared to male arbitrators, regardless of whether the 
grievant was male or female. No significant effects could be detected to suggest 
female arbitrators rendered either softer penalities – thus rejecting the ‗maternalism‘ 
thesis – in investigations by Rollings-Magnusson (2004), Scott & Shadoan (1989), 
Bemmels (1990b) and Bigoness and DuBose (1985), or harsher penalties - thus 
rejecting the ‗queen bee‘ thesis (Bemmels 1988a, 1991b). Some authors commented 
on the problematic nature of small female to female sample sizes, where, for instance 
Crow and Logan (1994) had only had one case of female to female interaction. 
 
Meanwhile, studies that reported female workers were no more likely to be treated 
favourably than male grievants, regardless of the arbitrator‘s gender – thus not 
supporting any of the theories contained in Figure 4.3 – were: Gely and Chandler 
(2008); Chelliah and D‘Netto (2006); Harcourt and Harcourt (2000); Bingham and 
Mesch (2000); Dalton et al. (1997); Thornicroft (1995a); Steen, Perrewe & 
Hochwarter (1994); Oswald and Caudill (1991); Bemmels (1991b); Scott and 
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Shadoan (1989); Malin & Biernat (2008); Block and Stieber (1987); Dalton, Owen 
and Todor (1986) and Bigoness and DuBose (1985).  
 
A cautionary note about all these findings is that women workers will drop a claim 
more often than men, according to Gwartney-Gibbs and Lach (1994). Plus, not all 
cases present with an equal probability of being won (Dalton & Todor 1985a), thus 
Gwartney-Gibbs and Lach (1994) contended that arbitration reports may well reflect 
female-based cases that are unusual in strength – which may explain the number of 
significant effects detected in analytical investigations. Furthermore, the dearth of 
data on female orders, due to low numbers of female arbitral appointments, could 
mean we are simply studying the arbitral decisions from the pioneering female 
arbitrators that are under pressure to conform to, or have assimilated to, existing 
males norms of tribunal members (Neave 1995). These factors could be potential 
limitations to the aforementioned findings. 
 
4.6.3  Gender matters relevant within the Australian context  
Australian society has moved beyond the ‗husband supporting a wife and three 
children‘ (Ridout 2005), with women active participants in the workforce. It is worth 
considering gender patterns in Australia‘s workforce as it may have implications for 
the gender patterns seen at arbitration. Table 4.4 presents the latest available statistics 
showing full-time and part-time employees, by gender, in Australia‘s workforce in 
2005, the mid-point during the period of interest in this thesis.  
 
Table 4.4  Gender mix of full-time and part-time* employees in Australia in 2005 
 
MALES FEMALES Total 
combined 
workforce Part-time Full-time Total Part-time Full-time Total 
Count 775,500 4,502,700 5,278,200 1,971,500 2,328,300 4,299,800 9,578,000 
In group 
% 
15% 85% [100%] 46% 54% [100%] 100% 
National 
% 
8% 47% [55%] 21% 24% [45%] 100% 
 
* Part-time employment occurs where the person usually works less than 35 hours per week (in all jobs) 
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Table 4.4 shows that Australian women comprised 45 percent of Australia‘s total 
workforce. Only fifteen percent of men worked part-time compared to 46% of 
women. Part-time female workers accounted for 21 percent of Australia‘s total 
workforce, in comparison to part-time male workers who accounted for 8 percent. 
With changing social attitudes toward mothers participating in the workforce, the 
ABS (2005a) reported that life-cycle patterns were evident in the female labour force 
participation patterns, with women of peak child-bearing ages combining work with 
family commitments. The ABS (2005) statistics revealed that the tendency to work 
part-time, for both men and women, as they progressed through life, follows roughly 
the same pattern, with people in early career and family rearing years performing 
higher levels of part-time work.  
 
The trends also showed that the highest full-time participation rate amongst males (in 
2005) were those born around the mid 1930s. In comparison, the highest full-time 
participation rate amongst females was the cohort born around the late 1960s/early 
1970s. Furthermore, there were more full-time female than male workers until 
women reached around 45 years, after which full-time female participation steadily 
declined. This suggested Australia‘s full time labour force was (and still is) staffed 
by elderly males nearing retirement and middle-aged females that were predicted to 
leave the workforce in a short time.  
 
The gendered nature of the full-time/part-time composition of Australia workforce 
and its relationship with union membership is also worth considering as research 
suggests union members are more likely to pursue a grievance claim than non-union 
members (Bemmels 1994; Bemmels, Reshef & Stratton-Devine 1991). In spite of the 
propensity for women to work in part-time (and casual) positions, women were as 
likely as men to join a union (Bray, Waring & Cooper 2011) and in 2010, female 
membership overtook male membership, with an estimated 18.7 percent of female 
workers and 17.9 percent of male workers members of a union (ABS 2011c).  
 
Table 4.5 displays an estimated comparison of union membership to non-union 
membership by gender and employment type for workers in their primary job. This 
table shows that in 2010, 19 percent of workers joined the union associated with their 
primary job. Further, it reflects the representative gender balance discussed in the 
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literature, with 10 percent of male workers and 9 percent of female workers members 
of a union in their main job. 
 
Table 4.5  A comparative of union and non union membership in main job by gender  
       in Australia’s workforce in 2010 
 
 
MALE UNION MEMBERS FEMALE UNION MEMBERS Total 
union 


















MALE NON-UNION MEMBERS FEMALE NON-UNION MEMBERS Total 
non-union 

















* Part-time employment occurs where the person usually work less than 35 hours per week (in all jobs) 
 
(Source: Australian Bureau of Statistics 2011c) 
 
The final point noted about the Australian context refers to ‗occupational 
segregation‘, which is the objective measure of the proportions of male and female 
workers in an occupation collected from workforce datasets (Miller & Hayward 
2006). Historically, Australia has possessed a strongly gendered workforce reflecting 
Western stereotypes of which jobs should be performed by men, and which jobs 
should be performed by women (Barns & Preston 2010; Cobb-Clark & Tan 2011; 
Moskos 2012; Pocock 1998; Preston & Whitehouse 2004; Sappey et al. 2009; 
Strachan 2010; Watson 2008). The risk perceived with occupational segregation is 
that it can provide the environment for an  ‗in-group‘ bias to occur, where rules may 
be applied rigorously to outsiders but flexibly to insiders (Williams 2003). For 
instance, a male nurse might be subjected to more extreme disciplinary response for 
misbehaviour (such as dismissal) compared to a female nurse who may only be given 
a warning.  
 
Table 4.6 displays the percentage of females according to the collapsed occupational 
categories to be used in this analysis, based on labour force statistics produced by the 
ABS (2012a).  In line with Western, gendered roles, Table 4.6 demonstrates that the 
female-dominated occupational categories were community services workers, 
personal services workers, clerical, administration and sales workers. The male-
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dominated occupational categories were managers and professionals, technical and 
trade workers, machinery operators, drivers and labourers.  
 
Table 4.6  Dominant gender in occupational categories in Australia 2012 
 
Occupational classification % female  
managers and professionals 46%  = male dominated 
technical or trade worker 14%  = male dominated 
community/personal service 68%  = female dominated 
clerical/admin or sales worker  71%  = female dominated 
machinery operators, drivers, labourers 24%  = male dominated 
  
Source: (Australian Bureau of Statistics 2012a) 
 
4.6.4  Hypotheses deduced about gender effects 
It was discussed in this sub-section that the literature identifies theoretical 
propositions explaining why gender effects might occur when either a male or female 
worker appears before either a male or female judge. Further, there was a clear 
ambiguity of empirical results pertaining to gender effects in arbitration and research 
in this area needs to continue. Australia‘s labour market, with its declining union 
density, occupational segregation and constitution of around one-third part-time 
workers, may be influencing the number of men and women being dismissed and/or 
accessing the unfair dismissal claim service of the federal tribunal. Therefore, the 
following hypotheses have been developed in relation to gender effects: 
 
H0(12) There is no statistically significant relationship between the worker’s gender 
and arbitration decisions favourable to the worker.  
 
H1(12) Females will be more positively related to arbitration decisions favouring 
workers than males. 
 
H0(13) There is no statistically significant relationship between the arbitrator’s 
gender and arbitration decisions favouring the worker.  
 
H1(13) Male arbitrators will be more positively related to awarding arbitration 
decisions favouring the worker than female arbitrators. 
 
H0(14) There is no statistically significant relationship between female arbitrators 
and favourable arbitration decisions awarded to dismissed, female workers.  
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H0(15) There is no statistically significant relationship between employment status, 
gender and arbitration decisions favouring the worker.  
 
H1(15) Females that performed part-time hours will be positively related to 
favourable arbitration decisions.  
 
H0(16) Women dismissed from jobs typically performed by men, are not statistically 
significantly related to arbitration decisions favourable to the worker.  
 
H1(16a) Females employed in an area of male dominated work, will be negatively 
related to favourable arbitration decisions. 
 
H1(16b) Females working in female dominated occupations will be positively related 
to favourable arbitration decisions. 
 
4.6.5  Occupational skill level of the dismissed worker 
Occupation, or inherently, the skill level required to perform the occupation, was 
included as a potential variable on the premise that differentials in power and job 
prestige associated with the skill, education and/or training needed to perform 
different types of jobs may expose workers to different work situations. That is, job 
prestige is thought to predict occupational conditions such as work complexity, 
control over work, degree of supervision, routinisation and occupational conditions 
which have a consequent effect on a person‘s sense of self-worth and self-belief 
(Gecas & Seff 1989; MacKinnon & Langford 1994).  
 
The job prestige hierarchy is believed to be near standard across modern 
industrialised countries, in spite of wide cultural variations (Inkeles 1960; Inkeles & 
Rossi 1956). Therefore, there appears to be a stable, global view of the hierarchical 
order of occupations. Seminal theories on the way in which occupations are 
structured in society appear in the writings of Karl Marx and Max Weber. It is not 
within the scope of this thesis to disentangle and critique the works of Marx (in 
Hyman 2006) and Weber (1978), however, these methodologies provided insight 
into why it was worth considering occupational skill level as a variable that might 
impact the arbitration outcome for a dismissed worker.  
 
4.6.6  Occupational differentials: Marxist and Weberian viewpoints 
Occupations demand from their incumbents varying levels of skill, education and/or 
training, leading to inherent differentials in power and job prestige, which 
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subsequently influence the quality of a person‘s work-life and social status. 
Generally, those with higher status occupations have access to the most resources to 
achieve personal goals and self-fulfilment (Otto & Featherman 1975). Both Marx (in 
Hyman 2006) and Weber (1978) theorised that people are located hierarchically in 
society into ‗classes‘, which coincide, in the main, with the status derived from the 
type of work they perform (Inkeles & Rossi 1956; Watson 2008).  
 
Marx believed two classes existed, the class that owned and controlled the creation 
of wealth that dominated and exploited the class of people that performed the work. 
Weber believed in a steeper, hierarchal class structure: the people that owned the 
‗capital‘ or businesses and that made an income from such capital or businesses; 
senior and junior classes that manage and administer these business; those that 
provide professional services; a clerical and shopkeeper class; and a manual working 
class.  
 
Both Marxist and Weberian methodologies incorporate a power inequality dimension 
whereby the occupationally-defined classes continuously struggle to achieve, 
maintain or improve the level of status and reward that they believe the members of 
their class are entitled, and moreover, the resistance and contestation each incurs 
from the other classes, toward such efforts (Watson 2008; Wegener 1987). In current 
times, and relevant to this thesis, is the occupational-power struggle apparent when a 
dismissed worker takes their employer to task over his or her dismissal – whether the 
employer is a private business owner that ‗owns the means of production‘, or, the 
managerial expert acting as an ‗agent‘ for the owner -  with a view to recovering the 
sense of dignity and the autonomy to navigate life, that comes with earning an 
income (Collins 1992).  
 
4.6.7  Previous empirical findings about occupational skill differentials 
Arbitral decision-making as a function of the employee‘s occupational skill level has 
received limited attention from researchers. One study found lower skilled workers, 
particularly male, were more likely to face higher disciplinary and dismissal actions 
(Antcliff & Saundry 2009). Less sympathy towards lower skilled workers was also 
found in previous studies by Cappelli and Chauvin (1992), Bemmels (1988b), 
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Caudill and Oswald (1992) and Block and Stieber (1987). Then, there existed the 
investigations that revealed skill level was an insignificant factor influencing the 
arbitration result, such as Saridakis et al. (2006) and Knight and Latreille (2001).     
 
However, other investigations found employees engaged in lower or semi-skilled 
occupations were more likely to receive a favourable arbitration decision than 
employees working in high skilled occupations (Southey 2008b) and particularly 
where the decision was administered by a female arbitrator (Southey & Innes 2010). 
Meanwhile, Rollings-Magnusson (2004) and Southey‘s (2012) examinations of 
interaction effects between skill level and the gender of the grievant found that 
females in higher level positions (executive/professional, middle and lower-level 
management) received less compensation compared to men in higher level positions.  
 
4.6.8  Occupational skill differentials within the Australian context 
This sub-section describes Australia‘s labour market during the first ten years of the 
21
st
 century (the period of interest in this thesis). It specifically describes the 
occupational skills that were less sought after and those which were in higher 
demand. It was workers in the lowest skilled occupations in Australia that faced a 
tougher job market compared to those occupations requiring managerial and 
professional level skills. Technology and automation capable of producing repetitive, 
routine work was displacing low skilled workers in each industry, except for the 
wholesale and retail trade industry (Kelly & Lewis 2001). Consequently, lower 
skilled workers, both blue and white collar, faced reducing work opportunities 
because they were the least equipped to adjust to rapid technological advances. Low 
skilled workers also faced redundancy as organisations pursued productivity 
improvements or dealt with non-renewed contracts due to fluctuating financial 
markets (Pappas 1998 in Lewis & Ong 2000).  
 
As Australia‘s labour market was increasingly integrating with a global labour 
market, many lower skilled workers became ‗vulnerable‘ occupational groups, such 
as machine operators and assembly workers, as well as intermediately qualified 
workers such as clerical workers, secretaries and word-processing operators 
(Richardson & Tan 2008; Shah & Burke 2003). These groups were said to be 
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vulnerable because their services or products were most subject to substitution by 
overseas workers or products. In comparison,  higher skilled groups of professionals 
and associate professionals were either ‗advantaged‘ by being able to sell their skills 
and knowledge on the global labour market, or ‗insulated‘ from its effects as the 
personalised nature of the services they provide offered them a degree of protection 
(such as doctors, teachers, community service workers, elementary sales and service 
workers).  
 
Labour demand in Australia was for highly skilled workers with increases in 
managerial, professional and para-professional occupations as well as trade workers 
(Gollan, Pickersgill & Sullivan 1996; Kelly & Lewis 2001; Lewis 2004; Richardson 
& Tan 2008). This reflected a corresponding growth in tertiary qualifications over 
vocational and trade qualifications (Richardson & Tan 2008).  
 
The number of new entrants into trade work declined during the 1990s and stagnated 
in 2002 – due to trouble attracting young people to take on trade apprenticeships – 
but growth in the mining and construction industries triggered some modest 
employment growth from 2003 (Richardson & Tan 2008). The reducing availability 
of trade skills was compounded by an ageing workforce with the baby boomer 
generation setting to retire within the next ten years, combined with declining 
fertility rates which had not adequately replenished the supply of young people 
entering the workforce and trade apprenticeships specifically (Jorgensen 2005a, 
2005b; Patrickson & Ranzijin 2004). Consequently, Australia faced shortages of 
people to perform the required work whilst the current workforce coped with the 
extra demand to develop new skills at a much faster and frequent rate than previously 
(Schienstock 1999 in Jorgensen 2005a). In response, Australian industry bodies and 
governments suggested older workers delay retirement (Patrickson & Ranzijin 2005) 
and remain active participants in the labour market. 
 
4.6.9  Hypothesis deduced about occupational skill differentials 
This sub-section first considered that a person‘s occupation equates to a person‘s 
social status and that power struggles exist between the occupations, in terms of 
either protecting themselves from an unscrupulous dismissal by business owners or 
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management; or gaining a skill set desirable in the labour market. Having established 
Australia‘s context of a turbulent existence for lower skilled workers, it could be that 
the arbitrators aim to counteract the vulnerability and power differential experienced 
by those in the lower end of the occupational class structure. Whereas, higher skilled 
workers, due to their protected position in the local market and competitive position 
in the global labour market, are less vulnerable in the workplace and labour market. 
The following hypothesis has been deduced about the potential influence of 
occupational skill on arbitration outcomes: 
 
H0(17) There is no statistically significant relationship between the worker’s 
occupation and arbitration decisions favouring the worker.  
 
H1(17) Lower-skilled occupations will be more positively related to arbitration 
decisions favouring the worker than higher-skilled occupations. 
  
4.7  Sub-question (c) – arbitrator characteristics 
This sub-question considers characteristics about the arbitrator that may be 
influencing the arbitration decision.  The arbitrator characteristics examined from the 
arbitral decision making literature are: the arbitrator‘s gender; the arbitrator‘s 
professional background-award orientation; and the arbitrator‘s experience in 
arbitrating unfair dismissal claims. Colvin (2009) called researchers to explore the 
relationship between arbitral decisions and the characteristics of the arbitrators. Crow 
and Logan (1995) noted researchers are finding effects between arbitrator 
characteristics and decisions, but they tend to be explaining only a small percentage 
of the arbitral decision-making and clarification is needed. Crow and Logan‘s (1995, 
p. 113) statement suggests further investigation into the linkages between arbitrator 
characteristics and their decisions is required, despite challenges in doing so: 
 
... no scholar has stated flatly that personal characteristics do not influence 
arbitral decision making. Our sense of the related commentary and research is 
that in some small way personal characteristics do affect arbitral decision 
making, but the nature of the relationship resists measurement.  
 
4.7.1  Arbitrator’s gender  
On the basis of the gender interaction effects that may be present in arbitration, the 
arbitrator‘s gender was incorporated with the discussion on worker‘s gender under 
sub-question (b), section 4.6.1. 
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4.7.2  Arbitrator’s professional background – award orientation 
In terms of whether an arbitrator holds either management sympathies or union 
sympathies, Crow and Logan (1994) contended that arbitrators may philosophically 
orientate to one side over the other. This contention is underwritten by the suggestion 
that an arbitrator or judge‘s personal attributes unavoidably influence their 
interpretation of the evidence and consequent decision (Bemmels 1991b; Crow & 
Logan 1995; Heneman III & Sandver 1983; Kirby 1999; Sangha & Moles 1997; 
Seamone 2002). Mason (2001) contended that ‗unconscious prejudice‘ is often at 
play in judicial-type decisions, because we cannot expect to see bias ‗neatly 
packaged‘, and that a prejudice can exist in spite of the decision maker believing they 
are not prejudiced.  
 
Aligned with the contention of the arbitrator‘s work background leading to potential 
bias, is the concept of ‗award orientation‘. Defined as ‗the extent to which his/her 
bias in awards favors either management or the union, or demonstrates a propensity 
for modifying awards’ (Crow & Logan 1995, p. 114). Award orientation is seen as a 
window to the arbitrator‘s value system and that people hold an innate preference for 
the philosophical stance of either union or management, so ultimately arbitrators, 
even at a subliminal level, would too. Award orientation is thought to be influenced 
by an arbitrator‘s work history (Simpson & Martocchio 1997, p. 256). As a 
consequence, arbitral-decision making researchers have included the arbitrator‘s 
work history as a factor to be explored in arbitral decision making. 
 
4.7.3  Previous empirical findings on professional background-award orientation 
This sub-section presents, first, those studies that found the arbitrator‘s background 
to be significantly related to the arbitration decision, followed by those which did not 
identify a significant relationship between the two variables. To be expected, each 
researcher has measured this variable differently. Thus, a variety of findings have 
emerged. For a start, arbitrators with a legal background were less likely to reinstate 
a dismissed worker, compared to those arbitrators with an academic background 
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In a similar vein, Bemmels measured professional background according to whether 
the arbitrator had a management, union, legal or academic background and found 
that arbitrators with a management background were ‗acutely avert‘ to awarding 
partial reinstatements (Bemmels 1990b), whilst academics gave more lenient 
suspension penalties than the other professionals (Bemmels 1990a). In Australia, 
mildly significant award-orientation effects were found by unfair dismissal 
arbitrators in the federal tribunal (Southey & Fry 2010) whereby those with employer 
backgrounds returned favourable decisions more frequently to management and 
those with union backgrounds returned favourable decisions more frequently to 
employees. These ‗logical‘ patterns were reflected similarly in the findings in the US 
study by Crow and Logan (1994). 
 
Alternatively, employment background was found not to influence arbitral decisions 
in a study by Nelson and Kim (2006) where the arbitrator was assessed as either a 
full-time arbitrator or worked professionally elsewhere. Heneman and Sandver 
(1983) considered the most comprehensive range of past occupations (business 
academic, IR academic, economics academic, law academic, attorney, federal 
employee, state employee, arbitrator, consultant, management employee, union 
employee and ‗other‘) but did not report a significant relationship between any of the 
occupations and arbitral decisions. 
 
4.7.4  Professional background-award orientation within the Australian context 
The work history of Australian arbitrators, prior to their appointment on the federal 
tribunal, is of interest in Australia as social and political commentators have debated 
claims that successive governments ‗stack‘ the tribunal with members that reflect the 
ideological position – union or management – of the political party in power. 
Accounts of this debate were discussed in sub-section 3.6.4, and in Southey and Fry 
(2010, 2012) which were articles prepared by the author during the period of 
candidacy for this thesis. The results produced in this thesis are of significance to this 
debate as it will contribute further insight into a range of factors influencing 
Australian arbitrator‘s in their decisions, including whether their previous 
employment, in either union or management allied positions, are significant 
predictors of their arbitration decisions. 
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4.7.5  Hypotheses deduced about professional background-award orientation 
The majority of the previous research into the arbitrator‘s work history supported the 
contention that this factor has some level of influence on the arbitral decision, if only 
minor. Australian social and political commentators have been pre-occupied with 
concerns about unbalanced appointments – colloquially referred to as ‗stacking‘ – the 
federal tribunal. The concerns contained in this commentary can be theoretically 
underpinned by the award-orientation philosophy recorded in the arbitral decision-
making literature. Yet little empirical research on this matter within Australia has 
been conducted beyond the author‘s earlier works. Consequently, the following 
hypothesis has been deduced in relation to the influence of arbitrators‘ previous work 
history on their decisions:  
 
H0(18) There is no statistically significant relationship between an arbitrator’s work 
background and arbitration decisions favouring the worker. 
 
H1(18) A union background will be more positively related to decisions favouring the 
worker than a management background. 
 
4.7.6  Arbitrator’s experience in arbitrating unfair dismissal cases 
Scholars posit that experienced arbitrators are more familiar with the principles of 
arbitral proceedings and detecting whether a person is telling the truth, suggesting 
they are better able to ‗judge‘ (Nelson & Kim 2008, p. 270). It is also posited that 
more experienced arbitrators would be appointed to more senior status arbitrator 
roles because more experienced arbitrators have been found to be harsher on the 
worker and more likely to support the employer‘s decision to terminate (Nelson & 
Curry 1981; Nelson & Kim 2008; Oswald & Caudill 1991; Simpson & Martocchio 
1997) or award longer suspensions (Caudill & Oswald 1993). It appears they are 
prepared to make the tough call of denying reinstating or financially compensating a 
dismissed worker, a decision that can have potential, serious consequences on the 
worker‘s right to dignity and autonomy.  
 
Similarly, Bemmels (1991a) found that more experienced arbitrators were more 
prepared to make a clear-cut call in terms of either denying a claim outright, or, 
reinstating a worker with full backpay. Whereas, less experienced arbitrators were 
more likely to make ‗compromise‘ decisions by substituting a dismissal with a 
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suspension. At the same time, there were scholars that found arbitral experience 
appears not to bear an influence on an arbitral decision in the employment 
termination arena (Bemmels 1990a, 1991a; Bingham & Mesch 2000; Crow & Logan 
1994; Heneman III & Sandver 1983; Thornton & Zirkel 1990; Westerkamp & Miller 
1971).  
 
4.7.7  Hypothesis deduced about arbitrator’s experience 
On the basis that to date the results of previous investigations have returned mixed 
findings, and the logic that either more experience or higher levels of seniority 
should equate to more confidence to deny claims that can have serious negative 
implications on the worker‘s life, the following hypothesis has been deduced:  
 
H0(19) There is no statistically significant relationship between either the experience 
an arbitrator has in determining unfair dismissal claims or their seniority, 
and arbitration decisions favouring the worker. 
 
H1(19) Each of these factors has a separate, negative relationship with arbitration 
decisions favouring the worker: 1) decision making experience; 2) seniority. 
 
 
4.8  Sub-question (d) – employer characteristics 
This sub-question is concerned with identifying characteristics about the employer 
that may be influencing the arbitration decision.  The employer characteristics which 
will be examined as moderating variables have been identified in the arbitral decision 
making literature: the presence of human resource management expertise and use of 
formal disciplinary processes which can reflect the size of the employer‘s business; 
the type of industry in which the business operates; and whether it is a public or 
private sector operation.. 
 
4.8.1  Formality, business size and the presence of HR expertise 
There exists a growing body of evidence supporting a positive relationship between 
the degree of human resource management expertise or ‗sophistication‘ within an 
organisation, and positive employee behaviour and corporate performance (Guest 
1997, 2011a; Huselid 1995; Kehoe & Wright 2010; Michie & Sheehan-Quinn 2001). 
Moreover, researchers are being called to map the direct effects of HR practices to 
external measures of organisational performance, such as increased sales or export 
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growth (Combs et al. 2006; Guest 2011b); and such effects are being found for 
instance in Khavul, Benson and Datta (2010) and in Deng, Menguc and Benson 
(2003). In general, it appears that consensus exists in the academic community that 
HR practices influence organisational citizenship and employee stability (Ahmad & 
Schroeder 2003; Arthur 1994; Cho et al. 2006; Liu et al. 2007). 
 
The dismissal of employees is a human resource management responsibility 
(Blancero & Bohlander 1995) in which HR managers are expected to administer the 
dismissals with justice and due process. Formalised dismissal policies and 
procedures, if followed correctly by management can guide, and should legally 
protect management  (Antcliff & Saundry 2009). Formal practices involve providing 
an employee under the threat of a dismissal with a just process that involves written 
notice specifying the event that has led to the predicament, the opportunity for the 
employee to engage a union/legal representative/or support person, opportunities for 
the employee to consider, then respond to accusations, and written confirmation of 
the process (Antcliff & Saundry 2009). To this end, empirical support was found by 
Knight and Latreille (2001) whereby formal dismissal processes were positively 
related to arbitral findings that supported the employer‘s dismissal action.  
 
However, smaller firms are unlikely to employ an HR expert to develop the more 
methodical or formalised HR processes of larger firms (Kotey & Slade 2005; 
Mazzarol 2003; Southey 2007). Therefore, hypothetically, a contention exists 
between larger firms that have HR expertise, and the smaller firms that operate using 
informal HR practice, in the matter of appropriately terminating an employment 
contract. It could be argued that a number of smaller firms administer their dismissal 
without HR or legal expertise and could inadvertently administer a dismissal without 
due process.  
 
4.8.2  Previous empirical findings about formality, business size-HR expertise 
Based on their research of small establishments in the UK hotel industry, Head and 
Lucas (2004) suggested that employees in smaller businesses that were subjected to 
disciplinary action were more likely to be approached in an informal manner, which 
may not have incorporated the opportunity for the employees to defend accusations. 
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In essence, lack of formal disciplinary procedures where the owner/manager held the 
locus of control for HR related decisions (Harris 2002; Matlay 2002) increased the 
‗possibility of arbitrary management practice‘ with potential to be ‗detected‘ by the 
arbitrators (Head & Lucas 2004, p. 697/705).  
 
The study by Saridakis et al. (2006) supported the proposition that small businesses 
without HR expertise are less likely to secure a favourable decision. This 
investigation of British employment tribunal applications detected a trend. ‗Small 
businesses were more likely to lose (compared) to medium firms who in turn, were 
more likely to lose than large firms… with an HR Department‘ (Saridakis et al. 2006, 
p. 26).  It is noted that this analysis included, in addition to unfair dismissal cases, 
other types of claims such as wages, breach of contract and discrimination. Similarly, 
the presence of a human resource expert was positively related to Australian 
arbitration decisions upholding management‘s action to dismiss the worker, 
suggesting employers with HR expertise are better able to defend to their actions 
(Southey & Innes 2010).  
 
Earnshaw, Marchington and Goodman (2000, p. 67), in their investigation into 
dismissal arbitration in small business, found that ‗employers won more cases than 
they lost‘. The context of the study was small and medium enterprises within the 
transport and communication, hotels and catering, and engineering industries in the 
UK. However, the authors‘ found that in nearly every instance where the SME 
employer lost a case, it was not because of the reason they dismissed the employee, 
but for the way in which they actioned it. For example, an employee may not have 
been given an opportunity to respond to an accusation as part of the disciplinary 
process, the employer may not have conducted a sound investigation, denied the 
employee a support person or representation, or entered the disciplinary meeting with 
a predetermined stance to terminate the employee‘s contract. The potential result of 
small businesses relying on informal HR practices could be that they risk denying 
employees ‗procedural justice‘ when dealing with a problem employee.   
 
Another challenge to managing dismissal in small businesses, noted by MacMahon 
and Murphy (1999), Earnshaw, Marchington and Goodman (2000) and Marlow and 
Patton (2002), is that sociable relationships are fostered by the close proximity in 
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which the owner/manager and employees work. Earnshaw, Marchington and 
Goodman (2000, p. 71) stated concern that arbitrators: 
 
May not understand how small firms operate and do not give sufficient weight 
to size and administrative resources when making a decision [and] will not 
understand the challenge of remaining unbiased for a small business manager. 
 
In the event that the owner/manager needs to discipline or terminate an employee, 
ultimately, they are compromised in maintaining the ‗personal distance‘ and 
unbiased opinion required to manage the process objectively. 
 
4.8.3  The Australian context of business size 
Australia is characterised by a heavy reliance on small and medium sized businesses 
as employers. In 2009, 89 percent of businesses employed less than 20 employees; 
10 percent of businesses engaged 20 to 199 employees and less than one percent of 
Australian businesses operated with 200 or more employees (ABS 2010d). Several 
protections for the small business sector appear in the current legislation. First, 
Section 387 of The Fair Work Act requires the arbitrator to consider as part of his or 
her deliberation, the size of a business – a feature of the 1996 Act - and whether it 
has dedicated HR expertise. HR expertise first appeared in the Workplace Relations 
Amendment (Termination of Employment) Act 2001.   
 
Further, before a worker in a small business can lodge an unfair dismissal claim, 
Section 383 of the Act imposes that the worker must have performed a 12 month 
minimum service period with the employer. Comparatively, workers that are not 
employed by a small business need serve only six months with their employer to be 
eligible for unfair dismissal protections. Another element of the legislation 
concerning business size is the ‗Small Business Fair Dismissal Code‘ (the Code) 
under The Fair Work Act 2009. This means the Code was in effect during the final 
year of the period of interest in this thesis. The Code was implemented in recognition 
of the particular circumstances of small business operations, specifically, their 
limited HR expertise and redeployment opportunities (Chapman 2009).  
 
The history of the Code is that prior to the 2005 Work Choices industrial relations 
amendments, the Australian Chamber of Commerce and Industry, along with 
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industry groups and peak employer bodies lobbied the Federal government 
extensively about the costs of unfair dismissal provisions to small firms and their 
subsequent reluctance to hire staff (Sheldon & Thornthwaite 1999). At the time, the 
lobbying was effective, and motivated with concern that unfair dismissal regulation 
may be preventing small business from hiring staff (Harding 2002; Harris 2002; IRM 
Letter 2005; Ridout 2005), the Federal government exempted small businesses (of up 
to 100 workers) from unfair dismissal laws in the Work Choices amendments to the 
Workplace Relations Act 1996. However, this was to be short-lived, with the 2007 
election of the Labor Party, the new government had the mandate to unwind the 
Work Choices legislation and, in the main, it returned dismissal protections to 
employees of small businesses. 
 
Consequently, the current Code provides support to businesses with a headcount of 
fewer than 15 employees in that a dismissal cannot be claimed if the employee was 
engaged for less than 12 months. Further, the Code states: ‗If an employee is 
dismissed after this period and the employer has followed the Code then the 
dismissal will be deemed to be fair’ (DEEWR 2008, p. 4). The Code provides a 
checklist for the employer which offers insight into the level of justice the Tribunal 
expects a small business employer to afford a worker. For example, ‗serious‘ 
misconduct can see the worker terminated without notice or warnings, if the 
employer ‗believes on reasonable grounds that the employee’s conduct is sufficiently 
serious to justify immediate dismissal. Serious misconduct includes theft, fraud, 
violence and serious breaches of occupational health and safety procedures’ 
(DEEWR 2008, p. 4).  
 
Less serious misconduct (or performance) places higher procedural expectations on 
the employer. It must: allow the worker a support person if requested (cannot be a 
lawyer); provide a warning to the employee, either verbal or written advising the 
worker to improve his or her conduct otherwise dismissal could be a consequence; 
and provide a reasonable amount of time for the worker to improve conduct. In the 
event a dismissal then occurs, the Code requires the employer to provide a reason for 
it and an opportunity for the employee to respond. The checklist also suggests the 
employer keep records of any meetings and warnings, implying that written 
documentation is expected to be maintained by the employer. Completing the 
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checklist does not guarantee an employer will avoid an unfair dismissal claim, and in 
the event the federal tribunal differentiates on the employer‘s application of the 
‗reasonable grounds‘ standard (Chapman 2009), it is still possible for a small 
business employee to be successful in having their dismissal deemed unfair.  
 
4.8.4  Hypotheses deduced about formality and HR expertise-business size 
It was discussed how smaller businesses tend to operate without HR experts on 
board. Based on the complexity of the industrial relations regulations and the level of 
expertise needed to navigate dismissing an employee (Goodman et al. 1998; Pratten 
& Lovatt 2005), it could be fair to suggest that arbitration decisions favourable to the 
employer are more likely for organisations that have a higher degree of human 
resource and/or industrial relations expertise with formalised procedures in place. As 
a consequence the following two hypotheses have been formulated: 
 
H0(20) There is no statistically significant relationship between the formality of the 
dismissal process; or the presence of a support person for the worker during 
the dismissal process; and arbitration decisions favouring the worker. 
 
H1(20) Each of these factors has a separate, negative relationship with arbitration 
decisions favouring the worker: 1) the formality of the process; 2) presence 
of a support person for the worker. 
 
H0(21) There is no statistically significant relationship between the presence of HR 
expertise and/or the size of the business; and arbitration decisions favouring 
the worker. 
 
H1(21) Each of these factors has a separate, negative relationship with arbitration 
decisions favouring the worker: 1) employers with HR experts; 2) larger 
businesses. 
 
4.8.5  Industry sector 
An ‗industry‘ is a segment of business activity or commercial enterprise that can be 
isolated from others (WebFinance Inc 2011). Industry is included as a potential 
moderating variable in this thesis, on the basis that industry values are believed to 
vary due to the nature of their competition, their customer requirements and the 
social expectations placed upon them, which drive industry specific cultures (Gordon 
1991; Porter 1980). Viewed as being influential on a firm‘s profitability, McGahan 
and Porter (1997) advise it would be misguided to discount the influence of the 
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industry parameter, from the organisation and its operations. Whilst sub-section 4.3.4 
suggested national culture could be influential on an organisation‘s practices, it is 
likewise proposed that industry values could also be influential on managerial 
practices and behaviours orientated towards ensuring an organisation‘s 
competitiveness and profitability (Gordon 1991; Porter 1980).  
 
It is proposed that industry values and environments contribute to industry variations 
in employment relations and human resource management approaches, such as those 
associated with communication, authority, interpersonal work relationships (Phillips 
1994) and discipline and dismissal (Green & Weisskopf 1990). And, Cappelli and 
Chauvin (1991) proposed that industry variations in wages and alternative job 
opportunities may account for differences in employee behaviours such as grievance 
initiation rates.   
 
4.8.6  Previous empirical findings about industry 
Bemmels (1988a, 1988c, 1991b) compared manufacturing to non-manufacturing 
industries and suggested that variations in grievance activity could be caused by 
differences in union and management policies or the quality and clarity of collective 
agreements. Other scholars suggested the manufacturing industry consists of ‗high 
disciplinary workplaces‘ characterised by lower skilled workers, lower unionisation 
and high turnover (Antcliff & Saundry 2009; Green & Weisskopf 1990). Several 
analyses support this contention.  
 
Evidence collected in Australia suggests that dismissal rates vary between the 
manufacturing industry and other industry classifications. Specifically, Klass, Brown 
and Heneman III (1998) used the data collected in the 1991 Australian Industrial 
Relations Survey of 1,596 workplaces to analyse the determinants of dismissal usage. 
This analysis identified that, compared to the manufacturing industry, fewer 
dismissals occurred in mining, communications, utilities, construction, 
transportation, financial services, public administration and community services. A 
similar finding was noted in Green and Weisskopf (1990) where more aggressive 
approaches to discipline were noted in the US industries that involved physically 
demanding work, those operating in harsh environments, or those in secondary 
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industries (that is, those involved in manufacturing) wherein the frequent threat of 
dismissal was used as a disciplinary tactic. 
 
In addition, the literature suggests that ‗service-related‘ industries face challenges in 
relation to the management of workplace grievances, born of the management styles 
prevalent in the industry. For instance, the level of human resource expertise was 
described in the British hospitality industry by Head and Lucas (2004) as 
exemplifying ‗hard‘ human resource principles where staff are treated as a 
commodity with few participatory opportunities. The hospitality industry belongs to 
the general categorisation called the ‗service sector‘. Service sector industries, as 
defined by Mills and Dalton (1994), are those industries that trade in the intangible, 
are not easily inventoried and are complicated in their delivery. Possibly, this 
complication arises from the human involvement with delivery of the service. 
Employers in service related industries encounter challenges in managing staff 
performance because the humanised, service nature of the work equates to 
‗imprecise‘ standards and expectations. The intangible nature of the work makes 
grievances involving performance, behaviours, attitude and output particularly 
complex to resolve (Mills & Dalton 1994) rendering parties involved in the service 
sector vulnerable to grievances escalating to arbitration for settlement. 
 
4.8.7  The Australian context of industry 
This sub-section offers insight about Australia‘s industry profile. Table 4.7 displays 
Australian industry demographics, revealing that in 2011 the health care and social 
assistance industry, closely followed by the retail trade industry, employed the 
highest numbers of workers in Australia (ABS 2011b). However, regional variations 
exist (ABS 2011a). The construction industry employed the most workers in the 
Northern Territory and professional, scientific and technical services industry was 
the highest employing industry in the ACT. The retail industry dominated the 
remaining States.  
 
Table 4.7 shows that no particular industry dominates the employment market, 
although perhaps the needs of the aging population are reflected in the health care 
and social assistance industry being a leading employing industry. The strength of 
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retail trade industry in Australia also reflects our end-user dependence for 
manufactured products and food supplies. Overall, Australian industries are 
populated towards the ‗tertiary sector‘ (those that supply services to the consumer, be 
it profit motivated, non-profit or public sector service), reflecting Australia‘s status 
as an advanced economy.  
 








Agriculture, Forestry and Fishing ++ 313,000 3 
Mining ++ 226,000 2 
Manufacturing # 945,600 8 
Electricity, Gas, Water and Waste Services ** 141,700 1 
Construction # 1,031,800 9 
Wholesale Trade # 406,800 4 
Retail Trade ** 1,220,000 11 
Accommodation and Food Services ** 780,200 7 
Transport, Postal and Warehousing # 583,500 5 
Information Media and Telecommunications ++ 204,400 2 
Financial and Insurance Services ** 431,100 4 
Rental, Hiring and Real Estate Services ** 193,900 2 
Professional, Scientific and Technical Services ** 877,700 8 
Administrative and Support Services ++ 407,200 4 
Public Administration and Safety ++ 734,400 6 
Education and Training ++ 866,900 8 
Health Care and Social Assistance ++ 1,322,900 12 
Arts and Recreation Services ** 208,400 2 
Other Services ++ 449,400 4 
Total employees across industries 11,344,700  
 
 # part of manufacturing cluster ; ** part of service cluster; ++ other  
                                                  Counts adapted from: (Australian Bureau of Statistics 2011b) 
 
Based on the discussion in this sub-section it is necessary to cluster the industries for 
wording the hypothesis. Therefore, in Table 4.7, industries clusters are coded: # for 
industries associated with manufacturing; and ** for industries associated with the 
service sector; and remaining industries falling into ‗other‘ industries denoted by ++.  
 
4.8.8  Hypothesis deduced about industry 
This sub-section discussed the research literature that generally supported the 
proposal that differences occur across industries in the management of their human 
resources which could affect the way employees within each industry are treated 
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when they are being disciplined or have a grievance. It was noted that the 
manufacturing sector is associated with a harsher disciplinary focus. Meanwhile, the 
service related industries face particular human resource management difficulties 
because of the intangible nature of the work performed, which may lead to poorer 
managerial judgements about an employee‘s behaviour. Both these factors may lead 
to inappropriate dismissal actions by management in these two industrial sectors. 
Thus, the following hypothesis has been deduced about the influence of industry as a 
moderating factor on arbitration decisions: 
 
H0(22) There is no statistically significant relationship between the type of industry 
in which the employing business operated and arbitration decisions favouring 
the worker. 
 
H1(22) Employees dismissed from workplaces associated with either the 
manufacturing industry or service industries will be more positively related 
to arbitration decisions favouring the worker, than those from other 
industries. 
 
4.8.9  Public or Private Sector 
Akin to the industry in which a business operates, is also whether the business is 
within the public sector or private sector. The public sector consists of employers 
where their operations are ‘either in State ownership or under contract to the State, 
plus those parts which are regulated and/or subsidised in the public interest’ (Flynn 
2007, p. 2). The following definition by Dolton & Makepeace (2011, p. 274) also 
provides insight into distinguishing the public sector from the private sector.  
 
The definition of the public sector is those workers who are employed by an 
organisation that is financed by the government and for which the government 
has direct financial responsibility. All other individuals work in the private 
sector. This definition places some institutions in the private sector, such as 
universities that receive large amounts of public money ... together with many 
people providing services to the public sector such as many cleaners in 
hospitals. Further, some public sector services, such as refuse collection, will be 
contracted out to the private sector. 
 
The underpinning philosophy for including this variable as a possible moderator is 
that the public and private sector workplaces are thought to incur differing 
environments, constraints, incentives, standards and cultures which influence their 
people management techniques (LaVan 2007; Perry & Rainey 1988). In spite of 
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attempts to increase customer responsiveness and flexibility, public sector 
organisations continue to stay close to the values of a bureaucratic and hierarchical 
organisational culture (Parker & Bradley 2000). Public sector politics and 
bureaucracy are believed to constrain personnel practices (Rainey & Bozeman 2000) 
including making dismissal of a public sector employee ‗difficult‘ (Boyne et al. 
2010) and in the event a dismissal occurs, Kirschenbaum, Harel and Sivan (1998) 
argued that public sector employers are most likely to have their actions challenged 
because it is the largest, most diverse employer.  
 
In the private sector, Antcliff and Saundry (2009) found that in the UK, private 
sector businesses were ‗high discipline‘ workplaces resulting in high levels of 
dismissals, and (Byron 2010) found that dismissals on discriminatory grounds are 
higher in the private sector. However when it came to arbitrating dismissal claims, 
Block and Stieber‘s (1987) US research, along with Bemmels (1988b), Caudill and 
Oswald (1992), Thornicroft (1994), Wager‘s (1994) Canadian investigations, and 
Knight and Latreille‘s (2001) UK investigation failed to identify a significant 
relationship between public or private businesses and the arbitration decision.  
 
4.8.10  Public or private sector in Australia 
The ABS (2010a) reported that in June 2010, 16 percent of Australia‘s workforce 
consisted of public sector employees, comprised of 243,700 employees in 
commonwealth government, 1.4 million in state government and 185,400 in local 
government. Table 4.8 displays the breakdown of industry interests of the public 
sector, compared to the number of workers employed by both sectors. It reveals that 
the majority of the public sector workforce engages in public administration and 
safety; education and training, and health care and social assistance. The figures 
suggest that the private sector also shoulders a reasonable proportion of the 
responsibility for providing these services. 
 
Union density differs significantly between the public and private sectors. Forty-one 
percent of public sector workers were union members in August 2010 (falling from 
46 percent the previous year). Union membership amongst private sector employees 
sat at 14 percent (ABS 2010c). Wages differentials between the sectors show that as 
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at August 2011, a full-time, adult public sector employee earned a weekly average of 
$1,462, compared to a private sector counterpart who earned $1,352 per week (ABS 
2011d). Possibly, the collective agreements negotiated by the more highly 
represented public sector workforce are being reflected in the wage differential. 
 







Electricity, Gas, Water and Waste Services 141,700 59,900 
Construction  1,031,800 13,200 
Transport, Postal and Warehousing 583,500 107,100 
Information Media & Telecommunications  204,400 11,500 
Financial and Insurance Services  431,100 11,800 
Rental, Hiring and Real Estate Services  193,900 9,400 
Professional, Scientific & Technical Services  877,700 28,500 
Public Administration and Safety  734,400 578,00 
Education and Training  866,900 578,00 
Health Care and Social Assistance 1,322,900 413,300 
Arts and Recreation Services  208,400 16,800 
Agriculture, Forestry and Fishing 313,000 
16,000 
 
Mining  226,000 
Manufacturing  945,600 
Wholesale Trade 406,800 
Retail Trade 1,220,000 
Accommodation and Food Services 780,200 
Administrative and Support Services  407,200 
Other Services  449,400 
Total employees all industries 11,344,700  1,843,500 
 
                            Adapted from: (Australian Bureau of Statistics 2010a) 
 
4.8.11  Hypothesis deduced about public or private sector 
This moderator variable considered the demographic variation of whether the 
dismissed worker was employed in either the public or private sector. It was 
identified that the public sector is historically considered a bureaucratic culture, 
binding management to a number of formalised procedures regarding dismissal, 
whilst the private sector is thought to have a lower tolerance for disciplinary matters. 
The public sector employee may be benefiting from higher union density and 
support, subsequently a dismissal is more likely to occur in accordance with a 
formalised process under the watchful eye of a union representative. Therefore, the 
following hypothesis has been deduced: 
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H0(23) There is no statistically significant relationship between the sector in which 
the employing business operated and arbitration decisions favouring the 
worker. 
 
H1(23) The private sector will be more positively related to arbitration decisions 
favouring the worker than those from the public sector. 
 
4.9  Chapter 4 conclusion 
This chapter addressed descriptive and process theories relevant to each of the 
principal independent variables and, where appropriate, moderator variables that 
appear in the conceptual model. Relevant Australian contextual issues were 
incorporated into the discussion after providing specific literature reviews for each 
research question. Finally, each research question and sub-question was 
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CHAPTER 5 
THE RESEARCH METHODOLOGY 
5.0  Introduction 
The research objective and questions underpinning this thesis were designed to 
determine the viability of a range of variables that are thought to be influencing 
arbitral decision-making over an unfair dismissal claim, in the event the worker was 
dismissed due to misbehaviour. The aim of this chapter is to describe the 
methodological approach used to investigate the research questions. This aim 
involves, first, an introduction to the research paradigm in which the author operated, 
before describing content analysis as the chosen method for collecting data. 
Attention is paid to explaining the process used to administer the content analysis 
and discussing the benefit of using secondary source data. The implications of 
validity and reliability of the method – essentials for successful research – are then 
addressed. The final section of the chapter is devoted to discussing logistic regression 
as the selected statistical analysis technique for testing the hypotheses developed in 
the previous chapter. Part of this discussion involves providing the results of the data 
diagnostics; which are preliminary data checks fundamental for a sound logistic 
regression.    
 
5.1  The positivist research paradigm 
The previous chapter presented a range of testable hypotheses about the influences 
on arbitral decision-making in cases of employee misbehaviour and dismissal. These 
hypotheses now require treatment via statistical analysis to determine their viability. 
This type of approach for verifying the feasibility of the conceptualised arbitral 
decision-making model alludes to a ‗traditional‘, ‗scientific‘ or ‗positivist‘ paradigm, 
whereby the researcher addresses each research question by deconstructing it into a 
series of variables and hypotheses, using previous literature as a guide (Neuman 
2003). Researchers working within a positivist paradigm collect data in a form that is 
quantitative, detached and objective to measure the variables of interest in their 
hypothesis, and subject such data to statistical analysis (Collis & Hussey 2003; 
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The purist application of the positivist paradigm contains the tenet of ‗absolutism‘, 
meaning that research is to be theory driven, and that through replication, it is 
possible to verify a theory to be accepted as ‗universally true‘ (Allen, Titsworth & 
Hunt 2009). However, social scientists have debated whether it is possible to accept 
‗universally true‘ theories about human behaviour, given the infinite variations of 
human behaviour. Thus, advocates for using a positivist approach in social science 
pose an altered stance on ‗absolutism‘. That is, the positivist paradigm is regarded by 
the social scientist as an approach that allows the researcher to draw generalisations 
about patterns of behaviour within the population – these patterns are not assumed to 
be universally true (Allen, Titsworth & Hunt 2009). Allen, Titsworth and Hunt 
(2009) suggested that these patterns aim to either identify how behaviours may differ 
from one group to the next, or how one type of behaviour is related to other types of 
behaviour. Importantly, they state ‗patterns are just that, patterns. Any statement 
about a pattern of human behaviour does not imply that all people act in a certain 
way or perceive certain phenomena similarly’ (Allen, Titsworth & Hunt 2009, p. 8). 
It was with this interpretation in mind that the results of the analysis are discussed in 
the final chapter. 
 
5.2  Content analysis as the research method 
Content analysis is used by scholars who believe a text document can provide a 
window into human experiences (Bernard & Ryan 1998). A content analysis 
involves studying an artefact of communication in an objective, systematic and 
quantitative manner to determine the shared meaning of the message contained in the 
artefact. A researcher performing a content analysis can examine images, sounds, or 
the texts of documents such as newspaper stories, speeches, diaries, interviews or 
official publications in an attempt to interpret their message and identity their impact 
or influence on people (Krippendorff 2004). In this thesis, the texts of the arbitration 
decisions provide the communication artefact.  
 
The data yielded by a content analysis are suitable for making predictions or drawing 
inferences because a content analysis classifies textual material and reduces it to 
manageable pieces of data (Krippendorff 2004). Content analysis can be used to 
identify cultural patterns in groups, institutions or societies and to identify the focus 
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of individuals, groups, institutions or societal attention (Weber 1990). Thus, in this 
thesis, the content analysis of the texts of the arbitration decisions – which are 
authored by the arbitrators themselves – will provide information about the matters 
upon which arbitrators focus their attention in order to discern whether or not to 
uphold or overturn a managerial decision to dismiss an employee due to his or her 
conduct. 
 
5.2.1  Content analysis within the industrial relations discipline 
Content analysis is a method commonly used in history, literature, anthropology, 
sociology, psychology, marketing, organisational behaviour and communication 
disciplines. This section serves to assure the reader that a content analysis can also 
provide insights for industrial relations methodologists. The following quote supports 
both a content analysis as a method, and the use of tribunal cases as source of data, in 
industrial relations research: 
 
There are several ways in which cases may be useful in industrial relations 
research ... (one) approach depends on treating cases as sources of data. Legal 
decisions are also events and, like other social phenomena, may be studied 
using the standard tools of social science analysis. Using recognised sampling 
methods, it is possible to analyse a number of cases using quantitative statistical 
methods. Such methods can range from simple arithmetic calculations (means, 
percentages) to more complex tests like regression and factor analysis.  ... 
finally cases are texts and can be approached using a variety of techniques of 
textual analysis ranging from discourse analysis to quantitative methods such as 
content analysis (Frazer 1999, p. 90). 
  
Tribunal or court decisions provide rich, narrative material for quantitative re-
analysis (Frazer 1999; Hodson 2008) and in this thesis the tribunal decisions 
reflected real episodes of employee misconduct in genuine workplace settings. A 
benefit of the content analysis method was that multiple cases of misbehaviour 
incidents were unobtrusively examined (Trochim 2006), with the content of each 
arbitration decision recording the incident from several perspectives: the employee, 
the employer, and the finally arbitrator‘s interpretation. And, as the discussions 
recorded in the decisions occurred under Oath in a quasi-legal setting, it provided 
some assurance that the accounts were accurate (Southey 2010b). Examples of peer-
reviewed studies that have used this methodological approach with tribunal decisions 
are: Nelson and Kim (2008), Gely and Chandler (2008), Southey (2008a), Chelliah 
and D‘Netto (2006), Rollings-Magnusson (2004), Knight and Latreille (2001), 
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Blancero and Bohlander (1995), Crow and Logan (1994), Thornicroft (1994), Wagar 
(1994) and Knight (1987). 
 
5.3  Data source  
The data source for this investigation was the unfair dismissal arbitration decisions of 
Australia‘s federal industrial tribunal, published in Word format on the Fair Work 
Australia website <www.FWA.gov.au>. Each decision, generally between 10 and 15 
pages in length, contained factual information about the parties, arguments from both 
parties regarding the claim, and the arbitrator‘s reason for his or her decision. The 
use of genuine arbitration decisions as a source of data might typically be identified 
by researchers as a ‗secondary data‘ source, as these decisions originated for a 
purpose outside this investigation (Pienta, McFarland O'Rourke & Franks 2011).  
 
However, for the purposes of this thesis, with its investigative focus on quasi-legal 
decision making in an industrial relations context, it is argued that the arbitral 
decisions offered a primary source of data pertaining to the termination of 
employment due to misconduct. Tribunal decisions resemble court judgements and 
contain a wealth of information about the facts of the dispute, the positions of each 
party involved in the claim, the applicable legislation and the justification for the 
decision (Frazer 1999, p. 89). Essentially, if one is to investigate the decisions of an 
industrial tribunal, the primary data source would be the decisions made by the 
tribunal itself (Rollings-Magnusson 2004).  
 
Furthermore, this data source differed from the type of data sources typically 
associated with secondary data research. To explain, secondary source data sets such 
as the Household Income and Labour Dynamic of Australia (HILDA) or 
Longitudinal Studies of Australian Youth (LSAY) exist as metadata formats found in 
established data archives and disseminated by government or other bodies (Pienta, 
McFarland O'Rourke & Franks 2011). Markedly, in this thesis, the arbitration 
decisions did not arrive in a pre-assembled format. Instead an intensive review of 
over 500 arbitration decisions occurred to assemble the necessary insights for the 
analysis. There was a benefit derived from the unassembled form of the secondary 
data, which was that the investigation was not compromised by complex sampling 
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designs (Shrout & Napier 2011). The author was spared from investing time and 
start-up costs in learning a particular dataset, and running the analysis unaware of 
problems and errors in the data, which can occur with metadata formats (Donnellan, 
Trzesniewski & Lucas 2011). However,  it cannot be assumed the author pursued an 
‗easy‘ methodology on the perception that there was no ‗tricky‘ data collection phase 
(Smith 2008, p. 61). The demands of the data collection phase for this thesis are 
demonstrated throughout this chapter. 
 
5.4  The population 
This investigation drew upon all misconduct-related unfair dismissal substantive 
arbitration decisions of the Australian Industrial Relations Commission (AIRC) and 
Fair Work Australia (FWA) that occurred between 1 July 2000 and 30 June 2010. 
These dates represent a ten year period commencing from when the decisions started 
to be electronically published, through to the most recent decisions available at the 
time of downloading the decisions from the FWA website for the purposes of this 
investigation. This time period yielded 565 arbitration decisions dealing with 
misconduct related unfair dismissal claims.  
 
To avoid computation difficulties in the statistical analysis, the rule of thumb is to 
have 10 to 20 cases in the dataset for every predictor variable (Peng, Kuk & Ingersoll 
2002; Petrucci 2009). The number of independent variables, including dummy 
variable, totals 34. This provided about 16 cases per variable. However, given the 
number of values within each variable, the analysis was run with a count of around 7 
cases per predictor. One implication was that the database was too small to support 
the regression analysis of the specific acts of misconduct under each of the deviance 
categories, and the specific reasons provided by the workers under each of the 
explanation categories. However, details of these specific acts of misconduct and 
specific reasons have been provided in the form of descriptive statistics presented in 
Table 6.1 and Table 6.2 in the results chapter. 
 
The decisions provided the raw data source, but the investigation still required a 
primary investigator in order to design, collect and analyse the data set (Donnellan, 
Trzesniewski & Lucas 2011). Extensive fieldwork was required to collect the data 
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via the ‗content analysis‘ to systematically convert the text in the decisions to 
numerical codes (Collis & Hussey 2003) and to then input the numerical data into 
SPSS for analysis. Thus, the next step in the method was to harvest the relevant 
information from the arbitration decisions.   
 
5.5  Operationalising the independent and dependent variables  
The ‗measures document and coding protocol‘ contained in Appendix 3, describes 
first, the logic of how both independent and dependent variables were defined, and 
second, the codes denoting values within each variable for the purpose of identifying 
and recording their presence in the texts of the arbitration decisions. The ‗measures 
document and coding protocol‘ was produced with a view to achieving a consistent 
interpretation of each variable during the coding exercise (Willms 2011; Zikmund 
2003). Zikmund (2003) warned that if a variable is too abstract, and/or contains too 
few values, it may limit the ability to make more concrete statements from the 
analysis. With the view that the values might later be collapsed for the analysis, the 
opportunity was taken during the initial coding to collect data with a number of 
values in each variable. The final list of variables, with their associated values as 
they appear in the statistical analysis, is presented next. 
 
5.5.1  An operational definition of the dependent variable 
The arbitration decision (ARBITRATION_DECISON): Dichotomous in nature, 
the dependent variable captured whether the arbitrator either found in favour of the 
worker or the employer. Decisions made in the employer‘s favour are analogous to 
an upheld decision and reflected claims where the arbitrator agreed with the 
employer‘s decision to dismiss the worker. Alternatively, an overturned decision 
reflected one that was in the worker‘s favour because the arbitrator reversed the 
employer‘s dismissal by either reinstating the worker to his or her job (with or 
without backpay) or ordered the employer to pay financial compensation to the 
dismissed worker. For the regression analysis, the arbitration decision was coded as a 
dummy variable: 
 
EMPLOYER‘S FAVOUR (CLAIM DISMISSED) (0) 
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5.5.2  Operational definitions of the independent variables 
The following section provides a summary of the definitions, values and codes for 
the independent variables. (The full rationale for the definitions and values for each 
variable is contained in the ‗measures document and coding protocol‘ in Appendix 
3). The major variables of focus in the analysis were: 
 
Type of misbehaviour: The acts of misbehaviour the employee allegedly engaged in 
– according to the employer – that led the employer to make the decision to terminate 
the employment contract. This variable contains four categories based on the deviance 
typology published by Bennett and Robinson (2000; 1995). This major variable of 
interest appears in the regression analysis as a dummy coded variable for each 
category of misbehaviour to capture multiple responses: 
 
PROPERTY_DEVIANCE  (0 no; 1 yes) 
PRODUCTION_DEVIANCE (0 no; 1 yes) 
PERSONAL_AGGRESSION (0 no; 1 yes) 
POLITICAL_DEVIANCE  (0 no; 1 yes) 
 
Severity of the misbehaviour (SEVERITY): Measures how obnoxious, offensive, 
harmful and/or violent the most prominent act of misbehaviour, originally on a five 
point scale ranging from ‗not particularly serious‘ to ‗extremely serious‘ (Bigoness & 
DuBose 1985; Scott & Shadoan 1989). As this was an ordered, nominal scale it was 
possible to use this measure as an interval variable in the analysis. With low counts in 
the not particularly serious category, it was combined with somewhat serious, with 
this variable appearing in the regression analysis as:  
 
somewhat serious (1) 
serious   (2) 
very serious  (3) 
extremely serious (4) 
 
Employee’s explanation for misbehaviour: The reasons/defences employees 
provide to arbitrators for engaging in the alleged misbehaviour. This variable contains 
three categories based on the explanation typology published by Southey (2010b).  
This major variable of interest appears in the regression analysis as a dummy coded 
variable for each category of explanation to capture multiple responses:  
 
WORKPLACE-RELATED  (0 no; 1 yes) 
PERSONAL-INSIDE  (0 no; 1 yes) 
PERSONAL-OUTSIDE  (0 no; 1 yes) 
 
Complexity of explanation (COMPLEXITY): Measures the number of across-
categorical explanations provided by the worker. As this was an ordered, nominal 
scale it was possible to use this measure as an interval variable in the analysis. 
Appears in the regression analysis as: 
 
single category explanation  (1) 
dual category explanation  (2) 
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Managerial errors in the dismissal process: The arbitrator‘s assessment of 
managerial errors in the employer‘s administering of the dismissal process. It can 
occur that even when an arbitrator favours the employer in the final decision, they can 
still find fault with the employer‘s process. This variable contained nine categories 
based on insights from Blancero and Bohlander‘s (1995) descriptors of dismissal of 
errors, combined with the Australian industrial legislative context. This major variable 
of interest appears in the regression analysis as a dummy coded variable for each type 
of error to capture multiple responses. Furthermore, due also to low counts in two of 
the categories (denied union/support person with 5 occurrences and rules violation 
with 22 occurrences) it was necessary to collapse into seven categories appearing in 
the regression analysis as: 
 
POOR_EVIDENCE_OR_ REASON  (0 no; 1 yes) 
MITIGATING_FACTORS   (0 no; 1 yes) 
PUNISHMENT_TOO_HARSH   (0 no; 1 yes) 
PROBLEMATIC_INVESTIGATION  (0 no; 1 yes) 
PROBLEMATIC_ALLEGATION  (0 no; 1 yes) 
PROBLEMATIC_RESPONSE   (0 no; 1 yes) 
MANAGEMENT_CONTRIBUTED  (0 no; 1 yes) 
 
 
The control variables incorporated into the analysis were: 
 
Worker’s gender: (WORKER_GENDER)  
 
  male   (0) 
female   (1) 
 
Length of service: (SERVICE) How long the dismissed employee had worked for the 
employer before his or her dismissal. Initially collected on a ratio scale, to overcome 
the problem of missing data, this variable was organised into the following nominal 
categories for the regression analysis: 
 
up to 2 years   (1) 
2 up to 5 years  (2) 
5 up to 10 years  (3) 
10 up to 15 years  (4) 
15 up to 20 years  (5) 
20 plus years  (6) 
not identified  (7) 
 
Disciplinary record: (RECORD) Whether or not the dismissed worker had been in 
the receipt of any form of previous warnings from his or her employer – be it verbal or 
written – for some aspect of their behaviour at work. Appears in the regression 
analysis as: 
 
unblemished record  (1) 
previous offences  (2) 
not identified  (3) 
 
Occupation: (OCCUPATION) The dismissed worker‘s occupation on the basis of his 
or her skill level and skill specialisation. They were classified according to the eight 
‗major‘ groups of the Australian and New Zealand Standard Classification of 
Occupations (ANZSCO). Due to low counts in three of the categories, it was 
necessary to collapse into five categories, appearing in the regression analysis as:  
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manager/professional  (1) 
technician/trade   (2) 
community/personal service  (3) 
clerical/admin/sales   (4) 
operator/driver/labourer  (5) 
 
Support for worker during dismissal process: (SUPPORT) The presence, or not, of 
a person to provide moral support at any meeting where the employee was being 
investigated and/or terminated. Appears in the regression analysis as: 
 
union present  (1) 
companion present  (2) 
no-one present  (3) 
not identified  (4) 
 
Formality of dismissal process: (FORMALITY) The employer‘s approach to 
documenting the dismissal process. As this was an ordered, nominal scale it was 
possible to use this measure as an interval variable in the analysis. Appears in the 
regression analysis as: 
 
informal   (1) 
semi-formal   (2) 
formal   (3) 
 
Industry: (INDUSTRY) The type of industry in which the employment relationship 
occurred according to the 19 major industrial categories identified in the most recent 
version of the Australian and New Zealand Standard Industrial Classification 
(ANZSIC). Due to low counts in nine of the categories, it was necessary to collapse 
into ten categories, appearing in the regression analysis as: 
 
agriculture, mining    (1) 
manufacture, wholesale   (2) 
construction, utility supply   (3) 
retail     (4) 
hospitality, recreation   (5) 
transport, postal, warehousing  (6) 
communication, technical, professional ser. (7) 
admin and support services   (8) 
public admin and safety   (9) 
 education, health, social assistance  (10) 
 
Business size: (FIRM_SIZE) The number of employees working for the employer‘s 
business, using the four categories determined by the Australian Bureau of Statistics 
(2002), Small Business in Australia, Cat. No.1321.0. Due to a low count in the ‗micro‘ 
business category (up to 5 workers), it was necessary to combine it with the up to 19 
(small) business category, appearing in the regression analysis as: 
 
 
up to 19 (small)   (1) 
20 to 199 (medium)   (2) 
200 plus (large)   (3) 
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Business sector: (SECTOR) The two major sectors in which the employment 
relationship occurred, dummy coded for the regression analysis as:  
private sector    (0) 
public sector    (1) 
 
Human resource expertise of employer: (HR_EXPERTISE) Whether or not the 
employer had the ‗benefit‘ of HR expertise, either through some type of HR 
manager/officer or if the employer approached a HR/legal consultant to take advice 
about administering a dismissal. Appearing in the regression analysis as: 
 
no HR expert   (1) 
yes HR expert   (2) 
not identified   (3) 
 
Employment status: (STATUS) Whether the worker was performing either full time 
or part-time hours before his or her dismissal. Dummy coded for the regression 
analysis as: 
 
full-time (permanent/casual)  (0) 
part-time (permanent/casual)  (1) 
 
Worker apology or remorse: (REMORSE) Whether or not the worker apologised 
and/or indicated regret about their behaviour or incident leading to their dismissal. For 
reasons explained in Appendix 3, the sincerity of the apology was not measured. 
Dummy coded for the regression analysis as: 
 
no apology or remorse indicated (0) 
yes apology or remorse indicated (1) 
 
Worker advocacy:  (WORKER_ADVOCACY) Whether an advocate appeared on 
behalf of the dismissed worker at the arbitration hearing itself. Appearing in the 
regression analysis as: 
  
self-represented  (1) 
union   (2) 
         independent lawyer     (3) 
not clear   (4) 
 
Employer advocacy: (EMPLOYER_ADVOCACY) Whether an advocate appeared 
on behalf of the employer at the arbitration hearing itself. Appearing in the regression 
analysis as: 
self-represented  (1) 
association   (2) 
independent lawyer  (3) 
not clear   (4) 
 
Arbitrator’s gender: (ARBITRATOR_GENDER) 
 
  male   (0) 
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Arbitrator’s professional background: (ARBITRATOR_BACKGROUND) The 
arbitrator‘s work history before joining the tribunal. Appearing in the regression 
analysis as: 
 
history working for management (1) 
history working for unions  (2) 
history shows no strong preference (3) 
 
Arbitrator’s experience: (ARBITRATOR_EXPERIENCE) The number of 565 
decisions determined by each arbitrator, as an indication of his or her experience in 
making unfair dismissal arbitration decisions pertaining to misbehaviour. Appearing in 
the regression analysis as: 
 
up to 5 decisions   (1) 
6 to 10 decisions   (2) 
11 to 15 decisions   (3) 
16 to 20 decisions   (4) 
21 to 25 decisions   (5) 
26 or more decisions   (6) 
 
Arbitrator’s seniority: (ARBITRATOR_SENORITY) The status of the arbitrator 
amongst his or her tribunal peers according to the hierarchal structure of the tribunal. 
Appearing in the regression analysis as: 
 
commissioner     (1) 
deputy president     (2) 
senior deputy president /vice president/justice (3) 
 
 
5.5.3  Data collection using a coding sheet 
To record the pertinent information in each decision, a ‗coding sheet‘ containing the 
codes outlined in the previous sub-section capturing the dependent and independent 
variables was completed for each arbitration decision. A copy of the coding sheet is 
contained within Appendix 3.  
 
The coding sheet was completed manually as two independent coders reviewed the 
arbitration decisions and identified occurrences in the text that were analogous to the 
constructs described in the measurement document. Manual collection was required 
over the use of text analysis software such as Leximancer and Nvivo, as these 
programs primarily enable a researcher to organise tracts of text into qualitative, 
thematic dimensions. In contrast, the quantitative focus of this research was to 
identify separately, for each decision, the occurrence of a number of specific items, 
so that the completed coding sheet for each decision was not unlike a completed 
survey (Kelly 1999) capturing responses to the variables of interest for each research 
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participant. Section 5.7 on ‗reliability‘ clarifies the process used to pilot test the 
coding sheet and prepare the coders for their duties. 
 
5.5.4  Supplementary fact finding 
After the coding exercise was performed, further fact finding missions were 
undertaken by the author, in cases where the arbitration decisions did not provide 
insights about: the number of workers employed in the business, the presence of HR 
expertise within the business, or the industry in which a business operated. Searches 
were performed on newspaper articles on the FACTIVA and Australia/New Zealand 
Reference Centre databases, combined with searches on the Australian Exporters 
website at <http://www.australianexporters.net/>, IBIS World website at 
<http://www.ibisworld.com.au/enterprise/home.aspx>, as well as general internet 
searches of business websites. These searches returned, with a reasonable degree of 
success, additional data for such missing pieces of information. This process reduced 
the number of ‗not identified‘ values in the dataset. Table 5.3 presented further in 
this chapter reports the occurrence of non-response values for each variable.  
 
5.6  Validity 
A valid study is one that assesses what it claims to assess across several dimensions: 
construct, content, and external validity (Collis & Hussey 2003; Leedy & Ormrod 
2001). It is noted that different research methods vary in their ability to maximise 
different types of validity, and rarely attain all forms of validity (Strauss & Whitfield 
1998). The use of a content analysis method, due to its reliance on a pre-existing 
source of data, could be anticipated to be generally strong on external validity and 
reliability but weaker on construct and content validity (Strauss & Whitfield 1998). 
This point is further explained in the following sub-sections devoted to validity 
issues evident in this study.  
 
5.6.1  Construct validity  
This is the degree to which the variables that are measured accurately reflect the 
theoretical construct they are designed to measure (Strauss & Whitfield 1998) within 
the constraints that a single study cannot establish the construct validity of a scale 
(Widaman et al. 2011). Thus the operational definitions used to measure the main 
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constructs of misbehaviour; worker explanations and dismissal errors were drawn 
from the experiences of previous researchers as published in the literature. Construct 
validity relates to measuring characteristics which cannot be directly observed 
(Leedy & Ormrod 2001) for example, job satisfaction or happiness. In this thesis, the 
constructs measured had equivalent behavioural analogues (described in the 
measurement document and coding protocol in Appendix 3). For example, theft from 
the company equated to property deviance and theft from a co-worker equated to 
personal aggression. Thus the constructs did not measure internalised, cognitive and 
emotional states. These behavioural analogues improved the construct validity of the 
investigation. 
 
5.6.2  Content validity  
Content validity identifies whether the study is sufficiently comprehensive of all 
aspects of the domain under investigation (Widaman et al. 2011). Existing literature 
guided which variables central to the domain of arbitral decision-making needed to 
be incorporated. For instance, the arbitral decision-making models by Nelson and 
Kim (2008) Gely and Chandler (2008), Ross and Chen (2007), Bemmels (1998, 
1990, 1991), and Chelliah and D‘Netto (2006) suggested a range of variables to 
include in this study.   
 
5.6.3  External validity  
This is the degree to which the results can be generalised to the population (Strauss 
& Whitfield 1998). The data were drawn from genuine arbitration decisions and the 
ten year timeframe of decisions by the AIRC/FWA involving misconduct reflected 
the population of such decisions for that time period. This reduced, if not 
eliminated, errors that can be made in sampling. Secondly, as the decision contained 
evidence provided by parties to the unfair dismissal claim that was provided under 
Oath, it improved the external validity because the responses were more likely to be 
truthful reflections of dismissal and arbitration events as they occur in reality, than if 
a person were to self-report the incident in a survey or report. The Australian context 
of the investigation has been provided throughout this thesis, so that the reader can 
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5.7  Reliability 
A reliable study allows another person to reproduce the same results as those 
reported by the original researcher (Collis & Hussey 2003). Supporting the reliability 
of this investigation is the ‗open source‘ nature of arbitration decisions from which 
the data was extracted. The ‗open source‘ nature of the decisions improved the 
‗transparency‘ of the investigation, with the raw data available to any person who 
may wish to replicate the study (Donnellan, Trzesniewski & Lucas 2011, p. 5). 
However, two main threats to the reliability of a content analysis methodology, as 
used in an investigation of this type, can occur. First, the inherent bias of the 
investigator during the data collection phase of the content analysis can risk 
distorting the results of the study. And, second, the data codes themselves may not be 
accurately applied to the events occurring in the decisions. The remainder of this 
section describes how these two threats to reliability were addressed. 
 
First, the use of multiple, independent coders serves the purpose of limiting the bias 
that may exist if only one coder or the primary investigator were to perform all the 
coding (Lacy & Riffe 1996). Additionally, it improves the likelihood of a shared 
meaning of the work with future readers of the research (Lombard, Snyder-Duch & 
Bracken 2002). The use of multiple coders promotes an efficient, yet more thorough, 
interpretation of the documents being coded (Burla et al. 2008). For these reasons, 
two, independent research assistants performed the coding of the arbitration 
decisions in this investigation. The coders worked independently (in different cities) 
which avoided ‗covert‘ (Krippendorff 2004, p. 217) agreement that might otherwise 
arise when coders are in contact. 
 
Despite their physical separation, the literature dictates that it is paramount both 
coders apply a common frame of reference or mental schemata when making their 
judgements about which code to assign to the content. Intercoder (or interrater) 
consistency measures can indicate the extent to which the coders have applied a 
shared meaning to their work (Kolbe & Burnett 1991; Lombard, Snyder-Duch & 
Bracken 2002). Poor intercoder consistency is likely to be caused by systematic bias 
of the coders which may be the result of unclear definitions, poor design of coding 
protocols, or inadequate coder training (Kolbe & Burnett 1991; Lombard, Snyder-
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Duch & Bracken 2002). Whilst intercoder agreement and reliability indices do not 
establish the validity of how a construct was measured, without it, the interpretations 
derived from the data analysis lack credibility (Kolbe & Burnett 1991; Krippendorff 
2004; Lombard, Snyder-Duch & Bracken 2002).   
 
Strong, intercoder reliability indicators were calculated in this study. However, to 
demonstrate intercoder consistency, according to Lombard, Synder-Duch and Braken 
(2002), a range of items about the data coding process, in addition to the reliability 
coefficients, should be reported. These matters and how they materialised in this 
investigation are addressed in the following sub-sections. 
 
5.7.1  Pilot testing and preparing coders to use the data collection instrument 
An initial coding sheet for recording the data, as a numerical code, from each 
arbitration decision was prepared by the author, along with an accompanying 
‗measures document and coding protocol‘ – referred to forthwith as the ‗coding 
guidelines‘. Appendix 3 contains the final version of the coding sheet and coding 
guidelines. To test the useability and clarity of the coding sheet and coding 
guidelines with the coders, ten arbitration decisions were coded individually by each 
coder under the guidance, and in consultation, with the author. This exercise resulted 
in refinements to the coding sheet and coding guidelines particularly for variables 
measuring formality of the dismissal process, advocacy, and managerial errors. The 
revised coding sheet and coding guidelines were then issued to both coders. 
 
5.7.2  The reliability sample 
At the time of preparing the intercoder sample, it was estimated that the number of 
cases to be analysed in the final analysis would be around 550 decisions. Thus a 20 
percent reliability sample size – as recommended by Lacy and Riffe (1996) - equated 
to 110 decisions. The reliability sample of 110 decision was drawn randomly from 
the years 2010, 2009, 2007, 2006 and 2003. Decisions occurring in those years were 
selected due to their convenience of being available (that is, they had been 
downloaded from the FWA website and printed) at the time when the coders were 
ready to commence work. This reliability sample later formed a subset of the 
population of decisions coded for the analysis. As each decision in this reliability 
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sample resulted with 2 completed coding sheets, 55 of coder A‘s sheets were 
included in the final analysis, and 55 of coder B‘s sheets were included in the final 
analysis.  
 
5.7.3  The reliability indices 
‗Different people should code the same text in the same way’ (Weber 1990, p. 12). 
Reliability indices were therefore used to check whether this had occurred by scoring 
the degree of consistency between the coders. The nature of the data dictated the type 
of reliability index that should be calculated (Tinsley & Weiss 1975). Thus, where 
data were collected on a numerical scale, for example, length of service, interrater 
reliability represents ‗the degree to which the ratings of different judges are 
proportional when expressed as deviations from their means‘ (Tinsley & Weiss 
1975, p. 359). However, where data were measured on a nominal scale – for 
example, type of behaviour – the reliability measures reverted to interrater (or 
intercoder) agreement which represents the extent to which each coder made exactly 
the same judgments (Burla et al. 2008; Tinsley & Weiss 1975). As it is not possible 
to calculate a mean and standard deviation for unordered, categorical data, it is 
limited to indicators of absolute agreement (Tinsley & Weiss 1975); a point relevant 
to most of the data collected in this thesis.  
 
In this thesis, a large majority of the data were unordered, categorical data, with very 
few variables measured on a numerical scale. For the unordered, categorical data, the 
literature largely supports the use of Cohen‘s Kappa to measure intercoder agreement 
as a more ‗advanced strategy‘ – than merely reporting percentage agreement (Burla 
et al. 2008, p. 114; Lacy & Riffe 1996; Lombard, Snyder-Duch & Bracken 2002; 
Tinsley & Weiss 1975). Cohen‘s Kappa coefficient takes into account (a) the number 
of concurring codes between the coder; (b) the number of conflicting codes; and (c) 
allows for the number of agreements that could be expected due to chance (Burla et 
al. 2008).  Kappa values between .41 and .60 are regarded as moderate, values 
between .60 to .80 suggest satisfactory or ‗solid‘ agreement, and those above .80 are 
regarded as ‗nearly perfect‘ agreement (Burla et al. 2008, p. 114). Krippendorff 
(2004) recommended that researchers should only rely on reliability values above .8, 
and consider values between .667 and .8 only for drawing tentative conclusions. 
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Lombard, Synder-Duch and Braken (2002) advised researchers to report an 
intercoder reliability coefficient for each variable (as opposed to a single, overall 
reliability coefficient combining the variables – which can mask variances). 
Table 5.1 presents the results of the intercoder consistency for all nominal level 
variables appearing in the analysis. The reliability coefficients for each variable were 
calculated in SPSS (version 19) using the 110 decisions sample, and appear in 
Table 5.1 in descending order according to those variables with the highest Kappa 
values (highest agreement) to those with lower agreement. Reiterating that a Kappa 
value above .8 is considered ‗near perfect‘ agreement (Burla et al. 2008); all the 
variables shown in Table 5.1 sit comfortably within this category. 
 
Table 5.1  Kappa coefficients of intercoder reliability for variables measured on a  







WORKER_GENDER 100% 1.0 
ARBITRATION_DECISION (dependent variable) 100% 1.0 
ARBITRATOR_GENDER 100% 1.0 
ARBITRATOR_SENIORITY 100% 1.0 
STATUS 99.1% .955 
OCCUPATION 95.4% .946 
REMORSE 98.1% .939 
INDUSTRY  95.4% .938 
SUPPORT 94.5% .923 
RECORD 94.5% .917 
TYPE_OF_MISBEHAVIOUR 94.5% .910 
EMPLOYER ADVOCACY 93.6% .893 
MANAGERIAL_ERRORS_IN_THE_DISMISSAL 92.7% .890 
WORKER ADVOCACY 91.8% .886 
HR_EXPERTISE  93.6% .871 
EMPLOYEE_EXPLANATION 90.0% .847 
FIRM_SIZE 90.0% .845 
SECTOR 89.0% .835 
 
* ARBITRATOR_EXPERIENCE and ARBITRATOR_BACKGOUND contained default 
values that did not require coder judgement, thus not included in the Table. 
**p = .000        
(Source: Developed for thesis) 
 
However, not all data in this investigation were categorical in type. In this 
investigation, SERVICE was recorded as ratio data, and SEVERITY, 
COMPLEXITY and FORMALITY were recorded as anchored scaled data. Whilst 
Kappa values provide indications about direct agreement between coders on the 
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assignment of the same rating, it is a ‗conservative‘ measure, particularly when 
applied to ratio and ordinal data, as scant credit is given where decisions are ‗close‘ 
(Lombard, Snyder-Duch & Bracken 2002, pp. 591-2).  
 
Thus, to assess consistency for this type of data, the literature suggested analysing 
the variance of the ratings from the mean, by determining the intraclass correlation 
coefficient (ICC) (Nichols 1988). As the reliability sampling required each case to be 
rated by the same two judges (selected from a population of potential judges), and as 
the study will not average their scores, according to Shrout and Fleiss (1979) the ICC 
tests need to be in a format of a two-way random effects ANOVA using single 
measures (as opposed to average measures). ICC values have an upper limit of 1 but 
no lower limit, with scores of .7 to .8 indicating strong agreement and more than .8 
suggesting almost perfect agreement (Nichols 1988).  Table 5.2 contains the results 
of the intraclass correlation analysis for the variables that reflect ratio and ordinal 
data measures. The reliability coefficients were calculated in SPSS (version 19) on 
the 110 decisions sample. 
 
Table 5.2  Intraclass correlation coefficients of interrater reliability for variables 






































* p = .000 
 (Source: Developed for thesis) 
 
Table 5.2 reveals that all four variables had intraclass correlation values above .8, 
suggesting ‗almost perfect‘ alignment (Nichols 1988) between raters in their 
assignment of values to the constructs during the coding exercise. The variation 
between the Kappa and ICC values illustrates how the conservative Kappa ignores 
the incremental attribute of a numerical scale. On the other hand, ICC values are 
sensitive to incremental variations, enabling it to reflect degrees of agreement. Thus, 
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whilst the KAPPA values reflect that the raters did not score exactly the same on the 
scales, their mean scores varied by less than .28 of a year for SERVICE 
(approximately three months), .06 of an increment for FORMALITY, .02 of an 
increment for SEVERITY, and .06 of an increment for COMPLEXITY.    
 
5.8 Analysing the data  
Information from the completed coding sheets was input into SPSS (version 19) to 
create a dataset suitable for statistical analysis. As the kind of data generated by this 
study is categorical, and in the main, ‗unordered‘ or ‗nominal‘ in nature, the type of 
analysis needed to take into account that data of this nature has ‗no notion of scale or 
order ... no notion of a smooth probability function‘ (Hand, Mannila & Smyth 2001, 
p. 188).  
 
The data yielded was also ‗frequency‘ and not ‗count‘ data, a ‗distinction not 
emphasised in the categorical data literature‘ (Lindsey 1995, Preface). Frequency 
data represents independent events occurring to different individuals (Lindsey 1995). 
In comparison, count data is when an event re-occurs repeatedly to the same 
individual. Categorical, frequency-type data has no ‗scale‘, and lacks a normal 
distribution (Lindsey 1995) and it has limitations supporting statistical techniques 
describing causal connections such as structural equation modelling (Blunch 2008) 
and does not meet the assumptions of parametric analysis such as linear regression 
(Burns & Burns 2008). Instead, its benefit is that it offers discrete, informative 
measurements for comparisons and correlations (Leedy & Ormrod 2001) enabling 
one to address questions pertaining to relationships between unordered, mutually 
exclusive ‗characteristics‘ on a likewise dependent variable (Petrucci 2009). Logistic 
regression, as the most appropriate analytical technique for the type of data that 
dominated this investigation, is discussed in the next section. 
 
5.8.1  Logistic regression as the statistical analysis technique 
Logistic regression can be used to analyse categorical, frequency-type data, where 
the dependent variable is binomial, for example, successful/not successful (Agresti 
2002; Lindsey 1995). The arbitral decision-making process, with its dichotomous 
dependent variable and its largely unordered, categorical predictor variables, meant 
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that the logistic regression function could determine the likelihood of either success 
for the worker (an ‗overturn‘ decision) or success for the employer (an ‗upheld‘ 
decision). Therefore, logistic regression as the statistical analysis method was used in 
this thesis because the type of data and variable measurements accurately aligned 
with the logistic regression assumptions, which, according to Burns and Burns 
(2008) are: 
 
a) The relationship between the dependent and independent variables is not linear; 
b) The dependent variable has two possible outcomes; and 
c) The independent variables are not linearly related, and they may be categorical or 
non-parametric in nature. 
 
The logistic regression model, presented in the following results chapter, was 
developed using a sequential block design, which is useful for examining the impact 
of each independent variable as it is added to the model, controlling for those 
previously included into the model (Menard 2010). Adding blocks of related 
variables sequentially into the model provided insight into how the addition of each 
set of variables changed the explanatory power of the model.  
 
The design of the blocks of variables is recommended to follow ‗ascribed‘ then 
‗achieved‘ characteristics (Menard 2010, p. 120). Therefore, socio-demographic 
characteristics or those which the parties to the arbitration hearing have little control 
were entered in the first block, followed by ‗achieved‘ characteristics which reflect 
variables over which the parties had some control. In summary, the logistic 
regression analysis in this thesis represents a series of multivariate analysis, 
hierarchically arranged into two blocks, in order to examine the importance of 
variables independent from logically prior variables.  
 
Other statistics presented in the results chapter are the: overall test for model fit (–
LogLikelihood); a pseudo model r squared (Nagelkerke); chi square significance test 
for each block in the hierarchical model; and a table of predicted probabilities (Peng, 




Southey: Employee misbehaviour and unfair dismissal arbitration                                        Page 199 
5.8.2  The logistic regression equation and model specification 
The following insights about the logistic regression equation are based on writings 
by Burns and Burns (2008), Kleinbaum and Klien (2002), Peng, Kuk and Ingersoll 
(2002), Hosmer and Lemeshow (1989) and SPSS (2010). The logistic regression 
function calculates a coefficient for each independent (or predictor) variable 
indicating their respective contribution to the dependent variable. As the dependent 
variable must have two outcomes (a dichotomous value), logistic regression aims to 
identify the probability that a set of circumstances – consisting of the predictor 
variables – is more likely to result in one of the outcomes over the other. The general 
equation for the logistic regression is: 
 









The terms on the right side of the equation in Formula A take into account the 
independent variables and the intercept in the regression equation. The left side of 
the equation in Formula A calculates the ‗natural log of odds‘ – or the logit of the 
event of interest occurring. The logit, can range from negative infinity to positive 
infinity, whereas probabilities (odds) can only range from 0 to 1. To calculate the 
probability of an event occurring, the natural log of odds (or logit) needs to be 
converted to odds in the logistic regression equation. This is called the logit 
transformation (UCLA Academic Technology Services 2012a).  Thus the use of the 
logit transformation in the logistic regression equation results in a model that has 
many of the desirable features of a linear regression model (Hosmer & Lemeshow 
1989) because the logit transformation has the effect of making the relationship 
between the probability of the outcome occurring and it predictors, linear (Peng, Kuk 
& Ingersoll 2002). Reiterating that the logit (natural log of odds) of the event 
occurring is neither the same as the odds ratio of the event occurring nor the odds of 
the event occurring (Peng, Kuk & Ingersoll 2002), the relationship between the odds 
ratio and the odds of an event occurring is stated as: 
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The equation in Formula B defines the odds of an event occurring as the ratio of the 
probability of the event occurring, divided by the probability of the event not 
occurring. Thus, the two equations presented in Formula A and Formula B must be 
combined to perform the logit transformation and to calculate the actual odds of the 
event occurring. Relating the formulas suggested by Burns and Burns (2008) and 
Peng, Kuk & Ingersoll (2002) to the variables in this thesis, the probability that an 





p = The probability that the arbitration decision falls in the worker‘s favour.  
Using dummy coding protocols for the dependent variable in logistic regression 
will result in a model for the occurrence of the event– which is that the arbitrator 
overturns the dismissal of the worker (the same as finding in favour of the worker) 
with the alternate event, dismissal upheld, defaulting to the reference category for 
comparison.  
e = The base of natural logarithms (the exponential function). This parameter is a 
conversion of the odds ratio enabling the probability of the event occurring to be 
calculated. This function is built into the regression software (SPSS 2010; Hosmer 
& Lemeshow 1989). 





The coefficients of the first, second, and third independent variables.  
This parameter is calculated using the maximum likelihood function (Hosmer & 





The first, second and third independent variables which are: type of misbehaviour 
(X1,); employee‘s explanation for misbehaviour (X2); and managerial errors in the 
dismissal process (X3). 
k = The coefficient for each independent variable entered into the formula. 
Xk = The total independent variables entered into the formula. Reflects those in the 






 independent variables 
listed above are: SEVERITY (X4); COMPLEXITY (X5); WORKER_GENDER (X6); 
SERVICE (X7); RECORD (X8); OCCUPATION (X9); SUPPORT (X10); FORMALITY 
(X11); INDUSTRY (X12); FIRM_SIZE (X13); SECTOR (X14); HR_EXPERTISE (X15); 
STATUS (X16); REMORSE (X17); WORKER_ADVOCACY (X18); EMPLOYER 
_ADVOCACY (X19); ARBITRATOR_GENDER (X20); ARBITRATOR_BACKGROUND 
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5.8.3  Hypotheses testing using the results of the logistic regression analysis 
The hypotheses developed during the literature review predicted the direction of 
influence each variable might have on the arbitration decision. The overall aim of the 
analysis was to provide answers to these hypotheses. To do so, the SPSS logistic 
regression output reported the exact level of significance (as a two-tail p-value) for 
each independent variable entered into the model. The p-value represents the 
likelihood that the coefficient calculated for each variable is due to random chance: 
its value decreases as ‗chance‘ findings decrease (Kemp & Kemp 2004). In essence, 
the p-value provides evidence that a relationship actually exists: the lower the p-
value the stronger the evidence (Thompson 2009).  
 
To determine whether the p-value is suitable for rejecting the null hypothesis, 
researchers frequently assign a predetermined level of significance ( ) (Kline 2009). 
A cut-point of .05 is commonly adopted as the tolerance level for (Collis & 
Hussey 2003; Hill, Griffiths & Judge 2001; Kemp & Kemp 2004). However, it is 
possible to specify a more liberal cut-point if .05 appears to be ‗too severe‘ for a 
model that has sound goodness-of-fit and variance explained measures (Cohen 1988; 
Kline 2009; Menard 2010, p. 119). It is the p-value itself that is more informative: it 
reflects the degree of confidence that the coefficient reported for each variable was 
not due to chance.  
 
This investigation modelled all the decisions related to misconduct related unfair 
dismissal claims for a ten year period – a situation where the whole population of 
instances was available. Full population studies have a major benefit, as Pyle (1999, 
p. 160) suggested: 
 
... anything that is learned, is by definition, present in the population ... all that 
needs to be done to ―predict‖ the value of some variable, given the values of  
others, is to look up the appropriate case in the population. 
 
Thus, an a priori significance level ( ) of .05 to reject the null hypothesis in favour 
of its alternative was considered a realistic cut-off. An a priori significance level of 
.05 suggests there is up to a 5 percent probability that a result as extreme as the one 
observed could occur (in future random samples) if the null hypothesis was in fact 
true. A significance level of .05 reduces the risk of making a Type I error than if a 
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more liberal cut-point was used. A Type I error means the researcher rejects the null 
hypothesis when in fact the null hypothesis should have been retained (Zikmund 
2003). The danger of a Type I error is that potentially flawed new knowledge is 
advanced. However, a conservative cut-point increases the chance of making a Type 
II error. A Type II error occurs when the null hypothesis is retained when in fact the 
alternative hypothesis should have been accepted (Zikmund 2003). Perhaps less 
serious than a Type I error, a Type II error inevitability limits the advancement of 
new knowledge. It is noted though, that as this investigation analysed a full 
population of misconduct arbitration decisions, p-values that showed slightly above 
.05 are duly discussed in the final chapter.  
 
5.9  Data diagnostics 
This section summarises the data screening that was conducted prior to running the 
regression analysis. Data screening is advisable for identifying, and if necessary  
managing, the effects of underlying problems in the data that may violate the 
assumptions of the regression model, which can result in either ‗biased, inefficient or 
inaccurate statistical inference‘ (Menard 2010, p. 126).  
 
5.9.1  Missing data 
The dataset was initially scanned to identify variables that may have gaps in the 
values assigned to them, and importantly to consider whether these gaps were due to 
the data source and collection method, rather than a matter of the missing values 
reflecting patterns in the population (Hair et al. 1998). Categorical data, as used in 
this analysis, allow the researcher to eliminate the impact of missing data on the 
sample size (Cohen et al. 2003). To give an example, the use of the ratio measure of 
service period in this thesis would ultimately reduce the number of eligible cases that 
could be analysed. Table 5.3 shows that the numerical scale data pertaining to the 
actual number of years worked by the employee had 68 incidences of missing data. 
In this instance, it was converted to a categorical variable, with the final category 
recording those cases that did not refer to an employment period. The design of 
nominal scale codes can ensure all information about each case is recorded, including 
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Table 5.3  Missing values and non-response categories 
 

















WORKER_GENDER 565 0 0 
PROPERTY_ 
DEVIANCE 
565 0 0 
SERVICE_IN_YEARS 
(on a numerical scale) 
497 68 N/A 
PRODUCTION_ 
DEVIANCE 
565 0 0 
SERVICE 
(on a nominal scale) 
565 0 68 
PERSONAL_ 
AGGRESSION 
565 0 0 
RECORD 565 0 10 
POLITICAL_ 
DEVIANCE 
565 0 0 
OCCUPATION 565 0 0 SEVERITY 565 0 0 
SUPPORT 565 0 191 
WORKPLACE_ 
RELATED 
565 0 0 
FORMALITY 565 0 0 PERSONAL_INSIDE 565 0 0 
INDUSTRY 565 0 0 PERSONAL_OUTSIDE 565 0 0 
FIRM_SIZE 565 0 52 COMPLEXITY 565 0 0 
BUSINESS_SECTOR 565 0 0 
POOR_EVIDENCE_OR
_REASON 
565 0 0 
HR_EXPERTISE 565 0 25 
MITIGATING_ 
FACTORS 
565 0 0 
EMPLOYMENT_STATUS 565 0 0 
PROBLEMATIC_ 
INVESTIGATION 
565 0 0 
REMORSE 565 0 0 
PROBLEMATIC_ 
RESPONSE 
565 0 0 
WORKER_ADVOCACY 565 0 115 
PROBLEMATIC_ 
ALLEGATION 
565 0 0 
EMPLOYER_ADVOCACY 565 0 131 
PUNISHMENT_TOO 
_HARSH 
565 0 0 
ARBITRATOR_GENDER 565 0 0 
MANAGEMENT_ 
CONTRIBUTED 
565 0 0 
ARBITRATOR_ 
ACKGROUND 
565 0 0     
ARBITRATOR_ 
EXPERIENCE 
565 0 0     
ARBITRATOR_ 
SENIORITY 
565 0 0     
 
(Source: Developed for thesis) 
 
In this thesis, when a value for any of the variables could not be gleaned with 
certainty from the text or supplementary data searches, it was assigned a ‗not 
identified‘ code during the coding exercise. Thus, the missing data and non-response 
categories report, presented in Table 5.3 shows that all the variables measured on a 
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nominal scale have nil missing data, allowing the full 565 cases to be used in the 
statistical modelling.  
 
A final observation drawn from Table 5.3 is that it demonstrates the usefulness of the 
arbitration decisions as a data source: in spite of its inherent disadvantage that it was 
a secondary data source. The table shows that the majority of variables could be 
ascribed a value other than a ‗non-response‘ value. All variables measuring the major 
predictors of interest contain a value (listed on the right side of Table). And, only six 
of the moderator variables contained missing data recorded as a ‗non-response‘ 
value. The variable showing the highest number of non-response values at 191 was 
the variable ‗support‘. This variable captured whether or not the worker had an ally 
or witness with him or her when being investigated or interviewed by the employer. 
Mining the arbitration decisions for ‗support‘ information was least successful with 
34 percent of the decisions absent of this detail. Nevertheless, valuable data about 
support practices were provided in the remainder of the decisions. Similar comments 
can be made in relation to the other five control variables that recorded non-response 
values. Missing values can result from the data source itself (Hair et al. 1998) which 
was the case in this study as it relied on secondary source data, rather than it resulting 
from a pattern in the population. 
 
5.9.2  Multicollinearity 
Multicollinearity occurs when an independent variable contains values that mimic, or 
closely mimic, those of another independent variable. High degrees of 
multicollinearity should be minimised in a model as it can result in a model with 
statistically insignificant, independent variables and large standard errors (Hill, 
Griffiths & Judge 2001; Kline 2009; Menard 2010). When a pair, or a group, of the 
independent variables contain little variation between, or amongst, their respective 
values, the model is less able to isolate the impact of each of those variables (Hill, 
Griffiths & Judge 2001).  
 
Ideally, the more variation amongst the values in the independent variables, the more 
precisely their coefficients can be estimated in the model (Hill, Griffiths & Judge 
2001). Therefore, measuring two variables reflecting similar values results in 
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redundant variables being included in the regression, when only one of the variables 
needed to be analysed (Kline 2009). For instance in this thesis, it could be suspected 
that business size, HR expertise and formality of the dismissal process have the 
potential to be highly correlated. This is because most small business do not have a 
HR manager, while most large business do possess one, and those with HR expertise 
are likely to produce formal HR processes. Thus, it could be that including the 
degree of HR expertise as an independent variable alone, might also be able to serve 
as a proxy for business size and formality. To detect correlations among groups of 
variables – as collinearity relationships may implicate several independent variables -  
requires the use of a tolerance statistic that estimates the variance in each 
independent variable, explained by all of the other variables (Menard 2010).   
 
Multicollinearity will be found where the dummy variable and their sum are linear 
combinations of one of the other variables. This combination occurs between (a) the 
three dummy variables: PERSONAL_INSIDE; PERSONAL-OUTSIDE and 
WORKPLACE _RELATED and (b) the three numerical values in the 
COMPLEXITY variable. As this reflects a ‗special kind‘ of multicollinearity that 
produces a redundancy between the variables: one of the variables needed to be 
excluded (Kline 2009, p. 245). The decision was made to withhold the 
PERSONAL_OUTSIDE variable on the basis that the COMPLEXITY variable 
contained values segregated in a manner essential for testing hypothesis 5 pertaining 
to the theoretical proposition that combinations of reasons may be harder for the 
arbitrator to decode. It also meant that the COMPLEXITY variable implicitly 
captured the effect of the PERSONAL_OUTSIDE variable, which meant care in 
interpreting the estimation for the COMPLEXITY variable. 
 
A collinearity diagnostic table containing the tolerance value and variance inflation 
factor (VIF) for each independent variable in this thesis, was prepared using the 
linear regression function in SPSS (Menard 2010). Tolerance values measure the 
correlation between the predictor variables on a scale between 0 and 1 with values 
moving closer to zero as the strength of the correlation increases (Brace, Kemp & 
Snelgar 2009). Tolerance values of less than .20 indicate potential multicollinearity 
problems and those with less than .10 indicate serious problems (Menard 2010). The 
VIF is a direct measure of the impact that multicollinearity inflicts on the precision 
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of the model (SPSS 2010). A rule of thumb for the VIF is elusive, but values above 4 
or 5 may warrant further investigation (SPSS 2010). The results for the multi-
collinearity measures are presented in Table 5.4.  
 
Table 5.4   Collinearity measures between independent variables in the equation 
 
Independent variable Tolerance Variance inflation factor 
PROPERTY_DEVIANCE .395 2.534 
PRODUCTION_DEVIANCE .314 3.184 
PERSONAL_AGGRESSION .327 3.060 
POLITICAL_DEVIANCE .655 1.526 
SEVERITY .816 1.225 
WORKPLACE_RELATED .654 1.528 
PERSONAL_INSIDE .709 1.410 
PERSONAL_OUTSIDE - - 
COMPLEXITY .757 1.321 
POOR_EVIDENCE_OR_REASON .828 1.208 
MITIGATING_FACTORS .825 1.212 
PROBLEMATIC_INVESTIGATION .934 1.071 
PROBLEMATIC_RESPONSE .623 1.606 
PROBLEMATIC_ALLEGATION .694 1.440 
PUNISHMENT_TOO_HARSH .811 1.233 
MANAGEMENT_CONTRIBUTED .872 1.147 
WORKER_GENDER .812 1.232 
SERVICE  .862 1.160 
RECORD .854 1.171 
OCCUPATION .840 1.191 
SUPPORT .857 1.167 
FORMALITY .653 1.531 
INDUSTRY .663 1.508 
FIRM_SIZE .724 1.382 
SECTOR .749 1.336 
HR_EXPERTISE .728 1.375 
STATUS .861 1.161 
REMORSE .870 1.150 
WORKER_ADVOCACY .768 1.303 
EMPLOYER_ADVOCACY .814 1.228 
ARBITRATOR_GENDER .710 1.408 
ARBITRATOR_BACKGROUND .838 1.193 
ARBITRATOR_EXPERIENCE .723 1.383 
ARBITRATOR_SENIORITY .915 1.093 
     
 
(Source: Developed for thesis) 
 
Statistical experts suggest to expect a degree of multicollinearity amongst its 
independent variables, and it is only the high correlations that can affect the 
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reliability of the coefficients in the model (Hill, Griffiths & Judge 2001; Kleinbaum 
& Klien 2002; Menard 2010). Returning to the earlier suggestion in this sub-section 
that FIRM_SIZE, HR_EXPERTISE and FORMALITY may harbour a collinear 
relationship in the dataset: such a concern was allayed by their tolerances (.724, .728 
and .653) and VIFs (1.3, 1.3 and 1.5) reported in Table 5.4, respectively. In 
summary, all the scores for both tolerance and VIF measures in the ‗revised‘ column 
fell comfortably within the bounds of acceptability. 
 
5.9.3  Zero cells and potential data separation 
If a zero count occurs in a cell in a contingency table containing the occurrences 
between an independent variable and the dependent variable, the regression 
calculation is likely to incur either partial (quasi-complete) or complete separation 
(Hosmer & Lemeshow 1989; Menard 2010). A zero cell count occurs when there is 
no overlap in the distribution in one of the dependent variable‘s values across one of 
the independent variable‘s values. This means all cases in one category of the 
independent variable had the same response or ‗perfectly predicted‘ one of the 
independent variable‘s categories.  
 
Complex diagnostics are required to determine whether complete or partial 
separation have occurred (Hosmer & Lemeshow 1989). In either event, the 
consequence of such data structures is that the regression equation is unable to 
calculate a finite maximum likelihood estimate (Hosmer & Lemeshow 1989; UCLA 
2012a). However, a zero cell count and separation does not result in an incorrect 
model or a model that has been specified poorly, rather it is about identifying the 
effect that data patterns can have on the computation of the model (Hosmer & 
Lemeshow 1989). Hosmer and Lemeshow (1989, p. 131) suggested that separation is 
more likely caused by ‗numerical coincidence‘ with it being a ‗problem [we will 
have] to work around‘.   
 
During the screening of the data, it was identified that three of the seven independent 
variables representing the errors made by management in dismissing a worker, 
possessed a zero count cell in their respective contingency table: POOR_EVIDENCE 
_OR_REASON; MITIGATING_FACTORS and PUNISHMENT_TOO_HARSH. Table 
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5.5 displays the contingency tables for these three variables which contain counts 
that allow us to predict ‗with certainty‘ (Hosmer & Lemeshow 1989, p. 130) that if 
management commits any one of the three errors, the outcome will not be in the 
employer‘s favour (due to the 0 count cells). Ultimately, the maximum likelihood 
estimates will either not be found, or they will produce inflated coefficients and 
standard errors for these variables, as an overlap must exist in the distribution of the 
covariates in the model (Hosmer & Lemeshow 1989). 
 
Table 5.5  Two-by-two contingency tables of the three independent variables with a 













no yes total no yes total no yes total 
employer’s favour  311 0 311 311 0 311 311 0 311 
worker’s favour  141 113 254 221 33 254 139 115 254 
Total 452 113 565 532 33 565 450 115 565 
 
(Source: Developed for thesis) 
 
The literature contains suggestions that a variable with a zero cell count and potential 
separation can be managed in one of three ways: collapse some categories of the 
offending independent variable; exclude the offending variable from the model; or 
‗do nothing‘ (Hosmer & Lemeshow 1989; Menard 2010; UCLA 2012a). The first 
option was discounted in this analysis, as it was not logical to combine any of the 
three managerial error variables with any of the other variables measuring 
managerial errors. In addition, as these particular variables are dummy coded (0 for 
‗error not present‘; 1 for ‗error present‘) it was not possible to further collapse 
internal values in variables.  
 
The second option involved excluding the offending variables from the model, which 
could mean the coefficients for the remaining variables in the model could be biased 
by providing scope for less important predictors to take primacy in the model. The 
third option was to leave the variables in the model, but to ignore them, because the 
remaining coefficients for the other independent variables remain valid. Whilst this 
  
 
Southey: Employee misbehaviour and unfair dismissal arbitration                                        Page 209 
third option was the preferred course of action, a combination of the second and third 
option had to be adopted. The reasons for this are outlined next. 
 
First, the model did not populate efficiently when the three problem variables along 
with the remaining independent variables were entered into the model. True to the 
form that zero cell counts ‗will cause problems in the modelling stage‘ (Hosmer & 
Lemeshow 1989, p. 128) including the full set of independent variables in the model 
manifested in SPSS warnings that ‗estimation had failed due to numerical problem‘. 
(The SPSS output showing the failed estimation is attached in Appendix 4). It was 
detected, by a process of running a series of tests that progressively included and 
excluded the three variables of concern, that it was only the inclusion of the 
POOR_EVIDENCE_OR_REASON variable that resulted in the failed estimation 
warnings. Therefore, if a model were to be produced at all, no option existed other 
than to drop the POOR_EVIDENCE_OR_REASON predictor from the model: the 
second option for managing a variable with a zero cell count. On the positive side, it 
was detected that the other two ‗problem‘ variables, MITIGATING_FACTORS and 
PUNISHMENT_TOO_HARSH could be entered into the model without distorting 
the coefficients for the other variables (although the two variables themselves 
obtained unstable coefficients). The benefit of leaving these two variables in the 
model was that it improved the validity of the estimates for the remaining effects in 
the model. This meant that the third option identified in the literature for managing a 
variable with a zero cell count could be implemented in respect to 
MITIGATING_FACTORS and PUNISHMENT_ TOO_HARSH. 
 
To manage the concern that the exclusion of the POOR_EVIDENCE_OR_REASON 
variable might result in biased estimates for the model, Hosmer and Lemeshow 
(Hosmer & Lemeshow 1989, p. 131) suggest the use of ‗some careful‘ bivariate 
analyses to show the unadjusted effects of variables. Consequently, a bivariate 
analysis, in the form of a series of simple regression models, were run to identify 
estimates for the influence of each independent variable – without controlling for the 
effects of the other independent variables – on the dependent variable. These results 
appear alongside the multivariate analysis output in the results chapter. The dual 
output allowed for a direct comparative of unadjusted versus adjusted parameters in 
the model.  
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5.9.4  Influential points in the data 
Once a ‗baseline‘ regression model was developed, it was necessary to administer 
tests on the data to detect any single cases that had excessive influence on the 
regression coefficients or p-values. Influential points in the dataset affect the ability 
to generalise results to the population, because it means the regression equation 
heavily depended on a few influential cases (SPSS 2010). Therefore, influence points 
may distort the inferences drawn from the model (Sarkar, Midi & Rana 2011).  
Influential points can be categorised according to their appearance as an outlier, a 
high leverage case, or an influential case. An ‗outlier‘ is an atypical case – hard to 
predict because its values deviate from the expected range for the cases in the model, 
producing an extremely large residual in the model and potentially suppressing the 
explanatory level of the model (Sarkar, Midi & Rana 2011). Whereas, a high 
leverage observation results when a data point in one of the independent variables 
within an observation possesses a high deviation from the mean of all the data points 
for the independent variables (Sarkar, Midi & Rana 2011). As a result, it may have a 
strong influence on the full model. An ‗influential‘ case relates to the ‗extremeness 
of an observation‘ (Sarkar, Midi & Rana 2011, p. 27) and has a disproportionate 
effect on the regression coefficients (SPSS 2010).  
 
However, excessive testing to check for influential points is not recommended. All 
datasets are likely to contain cases that do not fit the regression equation and 
excessive testing will probably return an excessive number of influential points. 
SPSS analysts recommend using more than one measure of influential points, and to 
concentrate on the cases returning values ‗far above‘ the rule of thumb or cut-off 
values (SPSS 2010). To this end, diagnostic tests available within the logistic 
regression function of SPSS performed were: Cook‘s distance to detect influential 
cases, standardised residuals to detect outliers, and leverage values. The results of 
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5.9.4.1  Cook’s distances 
This is an influence measure designed to indicate how much change would occur if a 
single observation were deleted from the analysis (Menard 2010; SPSS 2010).  Its 
measurement relies on the studentized residual and leverage statistics -  two of  the 
tests recommended as minimum diagnostics (Menard 2010). The rule of thumb 
presented in the literature suggests observations with a value above 1 warrant closer 
examination (Menard 2010; SPSS 2010).  Figure 5.1 displays 22 cases in the baseline 
model had an influence statistic above 1. 
 
 
Figure 5.1  Scatterplot of Cook’s distances showing influential cases 
        in the baseline model 
(Source: Developed for thesis) 
5.9.4.2  Identifying outliers using standardised residuals  
Residuals can be used to identify observations that may be outliers. Standardised 
residuals operate with the rule of thumb that residuals of less than -3 or greater than 
+3 warrant further inspection (Menard 2010). Conservative researchers consider 
observations with values of less than -2 and greater than +2 for further attention 
(Menard 2010). If the +or–3 guide is applied to the baseline model, the scatterplot in 
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Figure 5.2 shows that no cases had values above this rule. However, 22 cases are 
identified in Figure 5.2 when the more conservative rule of +or–2 was applied. 
 
 
Figure 5.2  Scatterplot of standardised residuals showing outlier cases 
              in the baseline model 
(Source: Developed for thesis) 
5.9.4.3   Leverage points 
In logistic regression, leverage values are constrained between 0 where a case 
potentially has no influence on the parameters in the model, and 1 to indicate a case 
that might completely determine the parameters in the model (Menard 2010). The 
word ‗potentially‘ is used because a high leverage on its own does not automatically 
mean it is an influential case (Menard 2010). The rule of thumb for interpreting the 
leverage value is to give attention to cases which are ‗several times over‘ the 
expected value of (K+1)/N (Menard 2010, p. 143). In this investigation K = 34 (the 
number of independent variables) and N = 565 (the total number of observations). 
Thus 34÷565 = .06 and ‗several‘ times this value (a multiple of three was used) 
resulted in cases with leverage values over .18 worthy of further consideration. The 
scatterplot in Figure 5.3 shows the distribution of leverage points for all the 
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arbitration decisions in the base model. Noticeably, near half of the cases are above 
the .18 value, suggesting half the cases have high leverage points. Common sense 
suggests that this is a pattern in the data (if one were to consider removing such 
cases, half the data set would be discarded). Of more interest are the five extreme 
leverage points identified clearly by the scatterplot that exhibit a leverage value 
above .5.  
 
 
           Figure 5.3  Scatterplot of leverage values showing extreme leverage cases in 
       the baseline model 
(Source: Developed for thesis) 
 
5.9.4.4  Managing influential points in the data 
The observations identified via the Cooks, Leverage and Standardised residuals were 
collated into Table 5.6. A profile of the cases listed in Table 5.6 is contained in 
Appendix 5. The unusual or unexpected cases identified by the influence and outlier 
diagnostics were, first, reviewed to ensure accurate data entry. Second, a visual 
inspection of the cases was conducted with a view to detect peculiarities in the 
decisions. The profile of independent and dependent variables in these cases did not 
present any apparent peculiar or abnormal characteristics. The cases involved 
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decisions that both overturned and upheld the worker‘s dismissal and they also 
appeared to reflect a mix the values associated with the independent variables.  
 
Table 5.6  Summary of outliers, influential and leverage arbitration decisions in the  




High influence cases 
n = 21 
Extreme leverage cases 
n = 5 
AIRC1097 AIRC1097 
 AIRC1127 AIRC916 
 AIRC564 
  FWA1164 FWA1164 
 FWA2605 FWA3096 
 FWA3690 FWA3690 
  FWA3940 
 PR900405  PR901937 PR917287 
PR902030 PR902030 PR952785 




PR909750 PR909750 PR981805 
PR919842 PR919842 
 PR924004 PR923310 
 PR935561 
  PR936112 PR936112 
 PR939942 PR939942 
 PR941688 
  PR952744 PR952744 
  PR954640 
 PR971014 PR971014 
 PR973914 PR973914 
 PR975252 PR975252 
  PR976481 
 PR976758 PR976758 
  
(Source: Developed for thesis) 
 
The literature suggests that the removal of an ‗influential‘ case from the model can 
substantially change the coefficients in the model, and ‗failure to detect outliers and 
hence influential cases can have a severe distortion on the validity of the inferences 
drawn from the modelling exercise‘ (Sarkar, Midi & Rana 2011, p. 27). On the other 
hand, eliminating outliers and influential observations is likely to improve the model 
fit but at the cost of introducing an element of bias into the model (Jennings 1986). 
Thus, it is also argued in the literature that outliers and influential points – that have 
not resulted from a mistake in the data collection or data entry – contain perfectly 
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valid data (Pyle 1999). Neither do they indicate a problematic model, particularly 
when modelling matters of ‗individual human choice which can produce less than 
perfect predictions of human behaviour‘ (Menard 2010, p. 143).  Pyle (1999) 
reminds us that in every dataset there will always be the most extreme observation; 
and Menard (2010, p. 143) mentions that random variation alone will produce four to 
five percent of observations containing suspicious standardised and deviance 
residuals (Menard 2010). In any event, the literature appears to be strongly 
advocating that deletion of outliers and influential points must be well justified by 
the investigator (Hosmer & Lemeshow 1989; Kleinbaum & Klien 2002; Menard 
2010; Pyle 1999; SPSS 2010). Therefore, whilst outliers and influential points might 
produce unusual results, as long as the results are plausible, a case should be retained 
(Menard 2010).  
 
Another point considered in relation to the treatment of outliers and influential cases 
in the model drew from the fact that the dependent and independent variables in the 
model were measured on nominal scales. This meant the values assigned to every 
observation were bounded by the values nominated for each variable. Furthermore, 
this meant outliers and influential points were observations that in some way were 
reflecting extremes within an available range (Pyle 1999, p. 323). This is an 
important distinction from outliers and influential points that can occur when 
variables are measured on an unbounded, continuous scale that has the potential for a 
value of any magnitude to be assigned to a variable. 
 
Therefore, after ensuring the absence of data collection or data entry errors, it was 
decided not to delete any one of the outlier or influential arbitration decisions for the 
following reasons:  
 
a) Peculiar patterns could not be identified by a visual inspection of the decision 
profiles.  
b) The extremity of each decision was bounded by the constrained values assigned 
to categorical variables. 
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5.10  Chapter 5 conclusion 
The aim of this chapter was to inform the reader about how the investigation for this 
thesis was actually executed. This chapter commenced by defending the use of a 
positivist research paradigm within the social sciences, on the basis this paradigm 
enables a researcher to quantitatively measure constructs and make generalisations 
about patterns of human behaviour across a population. A content analysis of the 
texts of genuine arbitration decisions was justified as an appropriate, and effective, 
research method for uncovering insights about arbitral decision-making in unfair 
dismissal claims. The source of the arbitration decisions was revealed, along with 
how the insights contained in these documents were harvested. The reliability and 
validity of the data procurement methods were discussed. It was found that the 
design of this investigation resulted in high reliability: as shown by the results of the 
intercoder reliability indicators. And, claims of external validity, construct validity 
and content validity were made. The chapter progressed to provide operational 
definitions of the variables that would be examined in order to test each of the 
hypotheses. This aspect was supported largely by the material in Appendix 3.  
 
Having defined the variables to include in the analysis, the statistical analysis 
technique of logistic regression was defended as the most appropriate technique for 
modelling the largely unordered, categorical data that occurred from the content 
analysis. The chapter concluded by presenting the results of the data diagnostics in 
terms of missing data, multicollinearity, zero cell counts, influential cases, outliers 
and high leverage cases. As any issues identified by these diagnostics may impact on 
the validity or useability of the results of the regression analysis, it was discussed 
how the results of these diagnostics were managed. It was discussed how the analysis 
was plagued by the challenge of a zero cell count for the independent variable, 
POOR_EVIDENCE_OR_REASON which resulted in ‗perfect prediction‘ of the 
arbitration decision for that variable. A justification for excluding this variable from 
the model was provided and remedial analysis in the form of simple regressions, to 
account for its removal, was discussed. The implication of this challenge is that 
results must interpreted with caution. The point has now come to report descriptive 
statistics for the dataset, results of the logistic regression and associated hypothesis 
tests in chapter 6.  
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CHAPTER 6 
THE RESULTS 
6.0  Introduction 
The research objective and research questions central to this thesis aim to determine 
the viability of a range of variables thought to be influencing arbitral decision-
making over unfair dismissal claims from employees that allegedly misbehaved. This 
chapter provides the results of the statistical analysis. Editorial comments about the 
results are presented in chapter 7.   
 
The contents of chapter 6 unfold as follows. The initial section presents a summary 
of the general descriptive statistics for the dependent and independent variables 
included in the analysis. Following this, the next section presents the outputs of the 
logistic regression modelling combined with an explanation of the models. The final 
section of this chapter responds to each of the hypotheses developed during chapter 4 
and discusses whether the null or the alternate hypotheses are supported by the 
regression models.   
 
6.1  Descriptive statistics 
Descriptive statistics relevant to each research question are presented in the form of a 
stacked bar graph. Graphically presenting data offers the reader more immediate 
awareness of distributions and outstanding characteristics that otherwise may be 
overlooked during tabular inspections of the data (Kemp & Kemp 2004). The stacked 
bar graphs show the distribution of the arbitration decisions that favoured either the 
worker or the employer, for each value used to measure the variable. The graphical 
presentations of the descriptive statistics were derived from a contingency table of 
data counts for each variable. These contingency tables are provided in Appendix 6.  
 
Before delving into the details of the descriptive statistics for each research question, 
provided first are four brief insights about the population of the arbitration decisions 
examined in the analysis. First, Figure 6.1 depicts that 45 percent of the arbitration 
decisions favour the worker, that is, the arbitrator agrees with the worker‘s claim that 
his or her dismissal was unfair and overturns the employer‘s dismissal action.  
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Figure 6.1  Pie chart of misbehaviour related unfair dismissal arbitration decisions,  
         July 2000 to June 2010 
 
Second, the pie chart contained in Figure 6.2 shows that within the 254 decisions 
favouring the dismissed worker, the employer is ordered to pay compensation – in 
lieu of reinstatement – in 59 percent of cases. For the remaining 41 percent of cases, 
the employer is ordered to reinstate the worker to a former position or, at least, re-
employ him or her to a similar position. 
 
 
Figure 6.2   Pie chart of reinstatement and compensation orders contained in the 
                    254 arbitration decisions made in the worker’s favour 
 
Third, the distribution of decisions across the ten year period, as displayed in Figure 
6.3, reveals 2006 as the busiest year for the arbitrators during the 10 year time span. 
And, whilst 2005 produces the least number of decisions, it is also the toughest year 
for the worker, with only 27 percent of claims favouring them. In comparison, 2002 
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Figure 6.3  Stacked bar graph of the outcomes of misbehaviour related unfair 
                   dismissal claims from 2000-2010, by year 
 
 
Finally, Figure 6.4 exhibits the distribution of arbitration decisions according to 
tribunal locations across Australia.  
 
Figure 6.4  Stacked bar graph of the outcomes of misbehaviour related unfair 
                   dismissal claims from 2000-2010, by Tribunal location 
 
Melbourne and Sydney are the busiest tribunals, each determining over 200 
misbehaviour-related unfair dismissal claims. Melbourne arbitrators produce an 
almost 50/50 split in their decisions favouring either the worker or employer.  
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Comparatively, Sydney-based arbitrators show a leaning towards the employer, with 
58 percent of their decisions in the employer‘s favour. Wollongong and Hobart issue 
the least number of arbitration decisions. Leaving aside the small number arising in 
Wollongong (1 decision), hearings occurring in Hobart and Adelaide produce the 
most decisions favouring the worker, at 67 percent and 62 percent respectively. 
Alternatively, employers fare better in hearings held in Perth and Brisbane, with 
favourable decisions at 66 percent and 63 percent, respectively.  
 
The descriptive statistics for each of the research questions are now presented. 
 
6.1.1  Descriptive statistics for research question 1 
6.1.1.1  Type of misbehaviour 
Figure 6.5 depicts production deviance as the most common type of misbehaviour 
associated with a worker‘s dismissal. The graph also suggests that workers who were 
accused of property deviance are the least likely to win their claim, with favourable 
claims occurring in only 38 percent of the decisions. On the other hand, workers 
accused of political and production deviance show the highest success rate winning 




Figure 6.5  Stacked bar graph of the outcomes of misbehaviour related unfair 






























Type of misbehaviour 
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It was addressed in the methodology chapter that data about specific acts of 
misbehaviour were harvested from the decisions and that regrettably this depth of 
detail could not be incorporated into the regression analysis. Nevertheless, for the 
reader‘s interest, Table 6.1 provides descriptive statistics on the specific actions in 
which employees purportedly engaged that led to their dismissal. Acts of 
misbehaviour were recorded as a multi-response variable, thus Table 6.1 accounts for 
643 separate acts identified in the 565 actual decisions.  
 
The results reveal that acts of verbal or written aggression, followed closely by not 
following procedures or instructions are the most frequently cited reasons for 
dismissal (105 and 102 incidents, respectively). In relation to the specific acts of 
misbehaviour, it is the worker who was dismissed for purportedly engaging in theft 
from co-workers or customers, or theft from the business who is least likely to 
receive a favourable decision (wining only 14 percent and 30 percent of claims, 
respectively). Alternatively, a worker dismissed for a safety violation or due to 
tardiness, absenteeism or dishonesty about hours worked is most likely to receive a 
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Table 6.1  Descriptive statistics of specific acts of misbehaviour leading to dismissal 
 









theft from firm 
Count 33 14 47  
% 70% 30%   
% of Total    7.3% 
wilful damage or sabotaging  
equipment or property 
Count 13 8 21  
% 62% 38%   
% of Total    3.3% 
fraud/misuse of assets or property 
Count 32 24 56  
% 57% 43%   
% of Total    8.7% 
other property deviance 
Count 2 2 4  
% 50% 50%   
% of Total    .6% 
PRODUCTION DEVIANCE: 
 
tardiness, absenteeism or  
dishonesty about hours worked 
Count 20 23 43  
% 47% 53%   
% of Total    6.7% 
not following policy procedures or  
disregarding supervisor‘s instructions 
Count 58 44 102  
% 57% 43%   
% of Total    15.9% 
safety violation 
Count 39 45 84  
% 46% 54%   
% of Total    13.1% 
misusing or wasting resources 
Count 21 18 39  
% 54% 46%   
% of Total    6.1% 
other production deviance 
Count 8 8 16  
% 50% 50%   
% of Total    2.5% 
PERSONAL AGGRESSION: 
 
verbal or written acts of aggression 
Count 59 46 105  
% 56% 44%   
% of Total    16.4% 
physical acts of aggression 
Count 36 28 64  
% 56% 44%   
% of Total    10.0% 
sexual harassment: verbal and/or 
physical 
Count 12 7 19  
% 63% 37%   
% of Total    3.0% 
theft from co-workers or customer 
Count 6 1 7  
% 86% 14%   
% of Total    1.1% 
POLITICAL DEVIANCE: 
 
gossiping or breaching confidentiality 
Count 6 6 12  
% 50% 50%   
% of Total    1.7% 
disreputable actions towards others  
Count 10 9 19  
% 53% 47%   
% of Total    3.0% 
other political deviance 
Count 2 2 4  
% 50% 50%   
% of Total    .6% 
TOTALS 
Count 358 285 643  
% 55% 45%  100.0% 
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6.1.1.2  Severity of misbehaviour 
A trend is displayed in Figure 6.6 that aligns with an expectation that the more severe 
the behaviour, the less likely the worker will win their unfair dismissal claim. The 
graph displays that a worker accused of behaviour that is ‗somewhat serious‘ is 
successful in their claim in 68 percent of cases. At the other end of the severity 
spectrum, a worker accused of ‗extremely serious misbehaviour‘, won his or her 
claim in only 32 percent of cases.  
 
Figure 6.6  Stacked bar graph of the outcomes of misbehaviour related unfair 
                   dismissal claims from 2000-2010, by severity of misbehaviour 
 
6.1.1.3  Worker’s disciplinary record 
 
Figure 6.7  Stacked bar graph of the outcomes of misbehaviour related unfair 
                   dismissal claims from 2000-2010, by worker’s disciplinary record 
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Figure 6.7 reveals that a worker with an unblemished disciplinary record wins his or 
her claim in 54 percent of the cases. This statistic compares favourably to a worker 
with a previous disciplinary record, who wins his or her unfair dismissal claim in 
only 40 percent of the cases.  
 
6.1.1.4  Worker’s service period 
The graph in Figure 6.8 provides no indication of a trend supporting the suggestion 
that longer service periods are associated with a worker getting a favourable outcome 
at arbitration. Although a worker with over 20 years service won his or her claim in 
54 percent of cases, this is not greatly different from a worker who had less than 2 
years service, winning his or her claim in 52 percent of cases. And, curiously, it 
appears a worker with 10 to 15 years of service faces the harshest prospects, wining 
his or her claim in only 36 percent of cases.  
 
Figure 6.8  Stacked bar graph of the outcomes of misbehaviour related unfair 
                  dismissal claims from 2000-2010, by worker’s period of service 
 
 
6.1.1.5  Remorse 
Figure 6.9 depicts that around one-fifth of the arbitration cases contain evidence that 
the worker either apologised and/or was remorseful for his or her behaviour. Also 
noticeable is that those workers who did indicate remorse or apologised, achieve a 
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Figure 6.9  Stacked bar graph of the outcomes of misbehaviour related unfair 
                   dismissal claims from 2000-2010, by remorse 
  
6.1.2  Descriptive statistics for research question 2 
6.1.2.1  Employee’s explanation for misbehaviour 
Figure 6.10 indicates that workers most frequently use a ‗personal-inside‘ reason to 
explain their behaviour. However, it is the worker who provides a ‗workplace-
related‘ reason that wins a favourable claim in 61 percent of the decisions. ‗Personal-
inside‘ and ‗personal-outside‘ reasons appear to provide much less likelihood of the 
worker winning his or her claim, with favourable decisions associated with these 
explanations in only 44 percent and 43 percent of decisions, respectively. 
 
Figure 6.10  Stacked bar graph of the outcomes of misbehaviour related unfair 


























Category of explanation provided by worker 
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As mentioned in the methodology chapter, data about the specific reasons a worker 
provided in defence of his or her purported misbehaviour, was also harvested from 
the decisions. However, this detail could not be supported by the size of the dataset 
to include it in the regression analysis. Nevertheless, for the reader‘s interest, Table 
6.2 provides descriptive statistics on the specific reasons employees provided to 
defend their behaviour at the arbitration table. Specific reasons were recorded as a 
multi-response variable, thus the Table 6.2 accounts for 839 separate reasons 
identified in the 565 actual decisions.  
 
Table 6.2  Descriptive statistics of specific explanations for misbehaviour dismissal 
SPECIFIC EXPLANATION  








accepted employer practice 
Count 26 25 51  
% 51% 49%   
% of Total    6.1% 
poor communication/poor instructions 
Count 10 10 20  
% 50% 50%   
% of Total    2.4% 
poor employer policy or practice 
Count 23 29 52  
% 44% 56%   
% of Total    6.2% 
influence from another person 
Count 14 11 25  
% 56% 44%   
% of Total    3.0% 
job changes 
Count 8 8 16  
% 50% 50%   
% of Total    1.9% 
faulty equipment/hazardous conditions 
Count 13 8 21  
% 62% 38%   
% of Total    2.5% 
unreasonable performance expectations 
Count 19 31 50  
% 38% 62%   
% of Total    6.0% 
other workplace related reason 
Count 8 5 13  
% 62% 38%   
% of Total    1.5% 
PERSONAL-INSIDE: 
denial 
Count 140 87 227  
% 62% 38%   
% of Total    27.0% 
felt inequity or tension 
Count 15 18 33  
% 45% 55%   
% of Total    3.9% 
self defence 
Count 27 17 44  
% 61% 39%   
% of Total    5.2% 
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SPECIFIC EXPLANATION  







made a mistake 
Count 42 52 94  
% 45% 55%   
% of Total    11.2% 
intentional behaviour 
Count 13 10 23  
% 57% 43%   
% of Total    2.7% 
ignorance of rules 
Count 15 7 22  
% 68% 32%   
% of Total    2.6% 
frustration 
Count 17 12 29  
% 59% 41%   
% of Total    3.5% 
other personal-inside reason 
Count 8 11 19  
% 42% 58%   
% of Total    2.3% 
PERSONAL-OUTSIDE: 
personal health issues 
Count 32 22 54  
% 59% 41%   
% of Total    6.4% 
family commitment/health issues 
Count 10 11 21  
% 48% 52%   
% of Total    2.5% 
financial pressures 
Count 2 1 3  
% 67% 33%   
% of Total    0.4% 
personal tragedy 
Count 2 1 3  
% 67% 33%   
% of Total    0.4% 
mood altering substances/addictions 
Count 6 4 10  
% 60% 40%   
% of Total    1.2% 
other personal-outside reason 
Count 5 4 9  
% 56% 44%   
% of Total    1.1% 
TOTALS 
Count 455 384 839  
% of Total 55% 45%  100.0% 
(Source: Developed for thesis) 
 
The statistics reported in Table 6.2 reveal that denial is the defence most frequently 
cited by workers, with 227 incidents occurring amongst the decisions. This is 
followed by employees pleading that they made a mistake in 94 of the cases. A 
worker who used the ignorance of rules explanation to defend his or her behaviour 
appears to have the least success at arbitration, winning only 32 percent of such 
claims. Alternatively, a worker that cites either unreasonable performance 
expectations or poor employer policy or practice shows the highest success rate, 
winning 62 percent and 56 percent of claims, respectively.   
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6.1.2.2  Complexity of the explanation 
The graph in Figure 6.11 displays the association between the complexity of the 
explanation and the arbitration decision. It appears that if a worker incorporates three 
facets to his or her explanation, the likelihood of winning a claim decreases 
compared to where he or she relies on one or two explanations. The worker‘s success 
is 45 percent with a single explanation, 47 percent with a dual explanation, but drops 
to only 36 percent with a triple explanation.  
 
 
Figure 6.11 Stacked bar graph of the outcomes of misbehaviour related unfair 
                    dismissal claims from 2000-2010, by complexity of the worker’s 
                    explanation 
 
 
6.1.3  Descriptive statistics for research question 3 
6.1.3.1  Managerial errors in the dismissal process 
Figure 6.12 displays that the most common mistake by employers was a failure to 
provide an appropriate opportunity for the worker to respond to the allegations of 
misbehaviour (problematic response). This is followed closely by administering a 
punishment that was disproportionate to the offence (too harsh) and dismissing the 
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The first three bars in Figure 6.12 display the type of errors made by management, to 
which the arbitrators are completely intolerant, and find in favour of the worker in 
every decision. However, the last four bars in the graph show that an error in the 
dismissal process does not always mean the worker will win the claim. Employers 
that erred in their investigation process (problematic investigation) still manage to 
have 28 percent of the decisions fall in their favour. The final three bars reflect errors 
that are progressively less tolerated by the arbitrators and offer the potential for a 
decision to be returned in the employer‘s favour. 
 
 
Figure 6.12  Stacked bar graph of the outcomes of misbehaviour related unfair 
                     dismissal claims from 2000-2010, by managerial errors 
 
 
6.1.4  Descriptive statistics for sub-question (a) 
6.1.4.1  Worker’s advocacy 
Figure 6.13 shows that a worker who elects to use an independent lawyer to present 
his or her unfair dismissal at the arbitration table, had the most chance of success, 
with cases presented by independent lawyers showing a favourable decision for the 
worker 50 percent of the time. Not far behind this result is the use of union advocates 
(who may use a lawyer) and non-legally qualified advocates (such as consultants) 
that result in favourable decisions to the worker in 46 percent and 47 percent of 
cases, respectively. At the other extreme, a worker electing to present his or her own 













































Managerial errors in the dismissal process 
  
 




Figure 6.13  Stacked bar graph of the outcomes of misbehaviour related unfair 
                     dismissal claims from 2000-2010, by advocacy used by the worker 
 
6.1.4.2  Employer’s advocacy 
Figure 6.14 displays that most employers appear to use independent lawyers to 
defend their dismissal activities.  
 
 
Figure 6.14  Stacked bar graph of the outcomes of misbehaviour related unfair 
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The graph shows that lawyers are (again) the most successful at defending their 
client‘s interests. An employer, who uses an independent lawyer, manages to defend 
itself against an unfair dismissal claim from a worker in 59 percent of cases. The 
least effective advocate for the employer is an employer (or industry) association 
advocate who only earns a favourable decision for the employer in 43 percent of 
cases. However, the chi-square results suggest these findings may be reflecting 
random variation in the data. The 2 result fails statistical significance, with p > .05. 
This suggests no obvious association exists between the type of advocacy used by the 
employer at the arbitration table and the outcome of the arbitration decision. 
 
6.1.5  Descriptive statistics for sub-question (b) 
6.1.5.1  Gender of the dismissed worker  
Figure 6.15 displays that male workers had a proportionately larger number of 
misconduct-related unfair dismissal claims settled at arbitration. However, 
favourable arbitration outcomes for male and female workers are similar, 45 percent 
and 43 percent respectively. This pattern is supported by the statistically insignificant 
chi-square results, with p > .05. This preliminary assessment suggests there is no 





Figure 6.15  Stacked bar graph of the outcomes of misbehaviour related unfair 




Southey: Employee misbehaviour and unfair dismissal arbitration                                        Page 232 
6.1.5.2  Employment status of the worker 
Figure 6.16 reflects the extensive proportion of claims made by full-time workers 
compared to workers performing part-time hours. It appears the part-time worker has 
more success at the arbitration table, winning 51 percent of claims, compared to the 
full-time worker who receives a favourable outcome in 44 percent of claims.  
 
Figure 6.16  Stacked bar graph of the outcomes of misbehaviour related unfair 
                     dismissal claims from 2000-2010, by worker’s employment status 
 
 
6.1.5.3  Occupation of the dismissed worker 
Figure 6.17 displays that the majority of unfair dismissal claims came from 
machinery operators, drivers and labourers Technicians and tradespeople are least 
likely to receive favourable arbitration decisions, winning only 39 percent of their 
claims. Clerical and administration workers are the most successful at winning their 
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Figure 6.17  Stacked bar graph of the outcomes of misbehaviour related unfair 
                   dismissal claims from 2000-2010, by occupation 
 
6.1.6  Descriptive statistics for sub-question (c) 
6.1.6.1  Gender of the arbitrator 
Figure 6.18 contains the data pertaining to the gender of the arbitrator. It reveals that 
male arbitrators make the majority of the arbitration decisions. It also shows that 
male and female arbitrators award the same proportion of decisions, with both 
determining 45 percent of claims in favour of the worker.  
 
 
Figure 6.18  Stacked bar graph of the outcomes of misbehaviour related unfair 
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6.1.6.2  Professional background of the arbitrator 
The graph in Figure 6.19 displays that arbitrators, who possess a résumé of union-
related occupations before they became a tribunal member, determine arbitration 
decisions that favour the worker in 53 percent of cases.  
 
 
Figure 6.19 Stacked bar graph of the outcomes of misbehaviour related unfair 
                   dismissal claims from 2000-2010, by arbitrator’s work background 
 
Whereas, a favourable decision is awarded to the worker in only 37 percent of cases, 
if the worker appears before an arbitrator that previously worked for management. In 
between these two extremes are the decisions made by those arbitrators whose 
previous work was for neither union nor employer (such as academics or public 
service workers), or a mix of management and union positions. These arbitrators 
award a favourable decision to the worker in 45 percent of cases. 
 
6.1.6.3   Arbitral decision-making experience of the arbitrator 
The graph in Figure 6.20 depicts the arbitrator‘s experience at making unfair 
dismissal arbitration decisions in misbehaviour cases. It suggests least experienced 
arbitrators - who had issued up to five unfair dismissal decisions - favour the worker 
in 65 percent of the claims. Inversely, arbitrators with the most experience – having 
issued 26 or more unfair dismissal decisions - favour the employer in 65 percent of 
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Figure 6.20  Stacked bar graph of the outcomes of misbehaviour related unfair 
                     dismissal claims from 2000-2010, by arbitrator experience 
 
 
6.1.6.4  Seniority of the arbitrator 
 
Figure 6.21  Stacked bar graph of the outcomes of misbehaviour related unfair 
                     dismissal claims from 2000-2010, by arbitrator seniority 
 
The graph in Figure 6.21 displays that the large majority of decisions are delivered 
by arbitrators designated as commissioners – the junior level in the tribunal 
  
 
Southey: Employee misbehaviour and unfair dismissal arbitration                                        Page 236 
hierarchy. This is followed by decisions issued by senior deputy presidents, who 
issue more decisions than the more junior deputy presidents. The commissioners, 
senior deputy presidents and vice presidents/Justices reflect similar proportions of 
decision outcomes, with workers receiving favourable claims in 46 percent, 45 
percent and 46 percent of their decisions, respectively. The deputy presidents show 
anomalous proportions, by issuing only 35 percent of their decisions in the worker‘s 
favour.   
 
6.1.7  Descriptive statistics for sub-question (d) 
6.1.7.1  Formality of the dismissal process 
The graph in Figure 6.22 displays a strong trend. As the formality of the dismissal 
process increases, the decisions tend to favour the employer. Those dismissals that 
are actioned in an informal manner - primarily undocumented and relied on verbal 
discussions - fall in favour of the worker in 82 percent of decisions. This compares to 
only 39 percent of decisions falling in favour of the worker when the dismissal 
process is formalised through documentation.  
 
 
Figure 6.22  Stacked bar graph of the outcomes of misbehaviour related unfair 
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6.1.7.2  Support person 
Figure 6.23 represents arbitration decisions in light of the presence or absence of a 
support person available to the worker during the meetings and investigations 
associated with the dismissal process. It shows that where either a union or 
companion is available, the employer‘s dismissal action is more likely to be upheld 
(in 60 and 66 percent of cases respectively). When it is clear workers had no 
collegial support, they win 54 percent of their claims.  
 
 
Figure 6.23  Stacked bar graph of the outcomes of misbehaviour related unfair 
                     dismissal claims from 2000-2010, by presence of a support person 
 
6.1.7.3  Business size 
Figure 6.24 demonstrates that the vast majority of arbitration decisions are 
administered to workers who were dismissed from large businesses employing 200 
or more workers. The graph also shows that workers from these large businesses are 
also the least likely to win their claim, with only 42 percent of the arbitration 
decisions in this category favourable to the workers. A mild trend is also evident in 
the graph, with the likelihood of an employee receiving a favourable claim increasing 








Figure 6.24  Stacked bar graph of the outcomes of misbehaviour related unfair 
                     dismissal claims from 2000-2010, by business size 
 
 
It is also possible that the ‗not identified‘ cases are more than likely smaller 
businesses, as larger business are more likely have an internet presence making them 
easier to identify through supplementary fact finding (discussed in section 5.5.4 in 
the methodology chapter). In support of this contention, the ‗not identified‘ cases 
reflect almost identical counts to those possessed by the ‗up to 19‘ business size. 
 
6.1.7.4   Presence of human resource expertise in the business  
Figure 6.25 indicates that the vast majority of decisions involve employers who had, 
during the dismissal process, human resource management expertise at their disposal. 
The statistics suggest that a worker dismissed by an employer that engages an HR 
expert in the dismissal only wins his or her claim in 42 percent of cases. Whereas a 
worker dismissed by an employer that did not use an HR expert wins his or her claim 










Figure 6.25  Stacked bar graph of the outcomes of misbehaviour related unfair 
  dismissal claims from 2000-2010, by presence of HR experts in the    
  employer’s business 
 
 
6.1.7.5  Industry 
It is noticeable in Figure 6.26 that the majority of arbitration decisions occur from 
claims arising from workers within the transport, postal and warehousing and the 
manufacturing industries. This is followed by health care and social assistance, then 
retail trade. The most successful claimant is the worker in education and training 
who receives a favourable decision in 65 percent of cases, compared to the worker in 
financial and insurance services who receives a favourable decision in only 




Southey: Employee misbehaviour and unfair dismissal arbitration                                        Page 240 
 
 
Figure 6.26  Stacked bar graph of the outcomes of misbehaviour related unfair 
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6.1.7.6  Business sector   
The final graph for the descriptive statistics, in Figure 6.27 displays the distribution 
of decisions between those occurring for workers dismissed from a public sector 
employer compared to those dismissed from a private sector employer. Private sector 
workers receive favourable outcomes in 46 percent of cases, compared to only 40 
percent of favourable cases for the public sector worker. 
 
 
Figure 6.27  Stacked bar graph of the outcomes of misbehaviour related unfair 
                     dismissal claims from 2000-2010, by business sector 
 
 
The next section of this chapter expands the analysis beyond the descriptive and 
uncontrolled bivariate relationships reported above, and progresses the analysis to 
determine the degree of influence that these variables have, both individually and 




Southey: Employee misbehaviour and unfair dismissal arbitration                                        Page 242 
6.2  The logistic regression analysis 
This section contains details of the econometric modelling results using the logistic 
regression technique. This analysis was performed in IBM SPSS version 19 software, 
which generated tables of substantial length. These tables have been redesigned for 
space-efficiency and reader-friendliness in this section. The actual SPSS output of 
the logistic regression analysis is contained Appendix 7.  
 
In this section, the results of the multiple regression analysis for the model specified 
in section 5.8.2 of the methodology chapter, is presented in two tables. First, the 
logistic regression analysis of misbehaviour-related unfair dismissal arbitration 
decisions favourable to the workers is contained in Table 6.3. This is followed by a 
discussion about the diagnostics of the model fit and independent variables. 
Following, Table 6.4 contains the conversion of the odds ratios of worker wins to 
relative percentage probabilities (where the worker enters arbitration with a 45 
percent baseline chance of winning a claim). This chapter reaches its climax where 
the results of the regression models contained in Tables 6.3 and 6.4 are used to 
determine whether or not each of the alternate hypotheses proffered throughout 
chapter 4 are to be upheld. 
 
Provided as extra insight, yet in order not to distract the reader from the primary 
focus in this analysis, Appendix 8 contains a hierarchically arranged, logistic 
regression model of POOR_EVIDENCE_OR_REASON for a dismissal identified by 
arbitrators. Recalling that this particular independent variable caused the model to 
‗collapse‘ and needed to be excluded from the hierarchical modelling (see 
methodology chapter, section 5.9.3), this appendix was prepared with a view to 
informing the interested reader of the factors that appear to have influenced 
arbitrators in determining whether an employer dismissed a worker for what could be 
considered an ‗invalid reason‘.  
 
6.2.1  The model of misbehaviour-related arbitration decisions on unfair dismissal 
claims 
 
Table 6.3 displays the results of two sets of logistic regression: simple and 
multivariate. The left-side of the table presents a series of simple regressions: one for 
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each independent variable. The simple regression models estimate the autonomous 
influence of a single independent variable on the dependent variable without controls 
or adjustments for the other variables at play in the arbitration decision (Hosmer & 
Lemeshow 1989).  It is recounted from the methodology chapter discussion that the 
primary reason for including results from the simple regressions was to observe the 
variation that occurred between controlled and uncontrolled effects, due to the fact 
that the multiple regression model could not sustain the inclusion of the POOR_ 
EVIDENCE_OR_ REASON variable. 
 
Meanwhile, the right-side of Table 6.3 presents the multiple regression models 
arranged hierarchically into two blocks. The hierarchical blocks provide information 
about the impact of additional variables as they enter the model in a logical order, 
whilst simultaneously controlling for those previously included in the model 
(Southey & Innes 2010). The blocks were sequenced rationally so that pre-ordained 
variables, such as personal characteristics, demographics and firmagraphic factors, 
were entered initially into the base model; followed by the full model which 
contained the variables pertaining to the arbitration event such as type of 
misbehaviour, explanations and advocacy. To test several of the hypotheses it was 
necessary to include in the model, interaction effects between WORKER_GENDER 
and ARBITRATOR_GENDER; WORKER_GENDER, and OCCUPATION; 
WORKER_GENDER and STATUS; and finally DISMISSAL ERRORS and 
SEVERITY. These interactions were entered as the last items in the full model 
because any effects would be the result of ‗enduring combinations of factors 
controlling from the previous blocks ... the most conservative method for showing a 
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Table 6.3  Logistic regression output of misbehaviour-related unfair dismissal arbitration decisions in the worker’s favour # prepared in   






SIMPLE REGRESSIONS HIERARCHICALLY ARRANGED, MULTIPLE REGRESSION 
UNADJUSTED, SINGLE PREDICTOR 
MODELS 












SECTOR (public) -.225 .354 .798 .002 -.125 .353 .126 .723 1.026 .696 2.173 .140 2.789 
INDUSTRY:  .705  .015   8.004 .534   12.361 .194  
manufacture, wholesaling .444 .329 1.559  .278 .511 .295 .587 2.038 1.559 1.711 .191 7.678 
construction, utility supply .575 .299 1.778  .368 .633 .338 .561 2.051 1.846 1.234 .267 7.774 
retail .384 .459 1.469  .166 .608 .074 .785 1.633 1.604 1.036 .309 5.117 
hospitality, recreation .212 .688 1.237  -.091 .648 .020 .888 -.925 1.881 .242 .623 .396 
transport, postal, warehousing .310 .493 1.364  .258 .512 .255 .614 2.710 1.536 3.113 .078* 15.026 
communication, technical, professional ser. .575 .260 1.778  .819 .596 1.887 .170 1.791 1.659 1.166 .280 5.997 
administration & support services .955 .083* 2.598  .978 .657 2.219 .136 .777 1.736 .200 .655 2.175 
public administration & safety .432 .443 1.541  .823 .701 1.377 .241 .000 1.759 .000 1.00 1.000 
education, health, social assistance .065 .894 1.067  .235 .593 .157 .692 .658 1.627 .163 .686 1.930 
FIRM_SIZE:  .160  .012   1.557 .669   3.698 .296  
20 to 199 workers (medium) -.341 .387 .711  .112 .452 .061 .805 -.874 .986 .786 .375 .417 
200 plus workers (large) -.490 .124 .613  .229 .462 .245 .621 .801 .980 .667 .414 2.227 
not identified .049 .904 1.051  .545 .484 1.269 .260 .643 1.049 .376 .540 1.902 
HR_EXPERTISE:  .033  .016   .354 .838   1.745 .418  
yes, HR expert -.517 .019** .596  -.074 .364 .041 .840 -.085 .828 .011 .918 .918 
not identified .048 .914 1.049  .216 .511 .180 .672 1.390 1.182 1.381 .240 4.014 
FORMALITY: -.202 .017** .817 .057 -.668 .186 12.827 .000** -.563 .464 1.469 .225 .570 
  
 




SIMPLE REGRESSIONS HIERARCHICALLY ARRANGED, MULTIPLE REGRESSION 
UNADJUSTED, SINGLE PREDICTOR 
MODELS 












SUPPORT:  .032  .021   2.841 .417   7.465 .058*  
companion present -.273 .440 .761  -.292 .397 .542 .462 -3.518 1.690 4.331 .037** .030 
worker unaccompanied .552 .013** 1.737  .314 .280 1.261 .261 .581 .619 .882 .348 1.787 
not identified .144 .498 1.155  .184 .242 .576 .448 -.266 .579 .211 .646 .767 
WORKER_GENDER (female) -.086 .686 .917 .000 -.109 .265 .168 .682 1.741 1.279 1.852 .174 5.704 
OCCUPATION:  .691  .005   5.733 .220   5.374 .251  
manager or professional -.237 .372 .789  -.655 .354 3.434 .064* 1.703 .854 3.980 .046** 5.490 
technician or trade -.329 .273 .720  -.641 .351 3.331 .068* .546 .819 .444 .505 1.726 
community or personal service -.104 .683 .902  -.337 .361 .871 .351 1.512 .924 2.679 .102 4.537 
clerical/administration or sales .074 .758 1.077  -.157 .324 .235 .628 1.375 .745 3.405 .065* 3.953 
SERVICE:  .021  .037   19.310 .004   9.321 .156  
2 up to 5 years -.280 .323 .756  -.044 .320 .019 .891 .219 .724 .092 .762 1.245 
5 up to 10 years -.091 .744 .913  .208 .333 .389 .533 .790 .682 1.341 .247 2.203 
10 up to 15 years -.656 .038** .519  -.300 .382 .618 .432 -.576 .870 .438 .508 .562 
15 up to 20 years -.202 .610 .817  .135 .453 .089 .765 -2.211 1.202 3.381 .066* .110 
20 years and over .069 .845 1.072  .793 .421 3.544 .060* -.255 .945 .073 .787 .775 
not identified -1.038 .003** .354  -1.076 .407 6.991 .008** .208 .890 .054 .816 1.231 
RECORD:  .002  .029   8.560 .014   .424 .809  
previous offences .661 .003** 1.937  -.612 .219 7.792 .005** -.287 .538 .284 .594 .751 
not identified .094 .675 1.099  -.511 .257 3.960 .047** -.331 .582 .324 .569 .718 
STATUS (part-time) .267 .380 1.307 .002 .389 .384 1.026 .311 -.477 1.123 .180 .671 .621 
ARBITRATOR_GENDER (female) .002 .989 1.002 .000 .122 .251 .236 .627 .345 .630 .301 .583 1.413 
ARBITRATOR_BACKGROUND:  .005  .025   11.158 .004   5.594 .061  
  
 




SIMPLE REGRESSIONS HIERARCHICALLY ARRANGED, MULTIPLE REGRESSION 
UNADJUSTED, SINGLE PREDICTOR 
MODELS 












Union work background .655 .001** 1.924  .808 .242 11.122 .001** 1.282 .581 4.879 .027** 3.606 
No strong preference .309 .150 1.362  .287 .258 1.241 .265 .950 .628 2.293 .130 2.587 
ARBITRATOR_EXPERIENCE -.113 .060** .893 .008 -.104 .075 1.896 .169 -.431 .177 5.905 .015** .650 
ARBITRATOR_SENIORITY -.036 .708 .964 .000 .137 .126 1.174 .279 .171 .306 .313 .576 1.187 
PROPERTY_DEVIANCE  .363 .084* 1.437 .007     -1.819 .853 4.545 .033** .162 
PRODUCTION_DEVIANCE  -.201 .235 .818 .003     -2.189 .779 7.898 .005** .112 
PERSONAL_AGGRESSION  -.170 .343 .844 .002     -2.922 .833 12.314 .000** .054 
POLITICAL_DEVIANCE .155 .657 1.168 .000     -1.952 .977 3.989 .046** .142 
SEVERITY -.519 .000** .595 .073     -.003 .338 .000 .992 .997 
WORKPLACE_RELATED .166 .335 1.180 .002     1.078 .886 1.483 .223 2.939 
PERSONAL_INSIDE -.212 .363 .809 .002     .889 .851 1.092 .296 2.434 
PERSONAL_OUTSIDE -.103 .646 .902 .001     /
a /a /a /a /a 
COMPLEXITY -.008 .959 .992 .000     -1.611 .782 4.239 .040** .200 
REMORSE .774 .001** 2.169 .025     -.761 .739 1.061 .303 .467 
WORKER_ADVOCACY:  .005  .033       14.168 .003  
represented by union .797 .006** 2.219      2.095 .885 5.608 .018** 8.129 
represented by independent lawyer .984 .000** 2.676      2.559 .793 10.418 .001** 12.925 
representation not clear .843 .006** 2.324      .725 1.008 .517 .472 2.065 
EMPLOYER_ADVOCACY:  .084  .016       7.864 .049  
represented by association .129 .737 1.137      1.270 1.084 1.372 .241 3.561 
represented by independent lawyer -.510 .065* .600      -.989 .794 1.551 .213 .372 
representation not clear -.358 .245 .699      -.808 .845 .914 .339 .446 
POOR_EVIDENCE_OR_REASON 21.994 .995 NP .426     /
b /b /b /b /b 
  
 




SIMPLE REGRESSIONS HIERARCHICALLY ARRANGED, MULTIPLE REGRESSION 
UNADJUSTED, SINGLE PREDICTOR 
MODELS 












MITIGATING_FACTORS  21.545 .998 NP .125     28.034 4369.13 .000 .995 NP 
MANAGEMENT_CONTRIBUTED 3.055 .000** 21.212 .156     6.443 2.740 5.530 .019** 628.405 
PROBLEMATIC_INVESTIGATION 1.849 .000** 6.355 .084     3.805 1.914 3.949 .047** 44.906 
PROBLEMATIC_ALLEGATION 1.332 .000** 3.789 .066     1.145 2.000 .328 .567 3.142 
PROBLEMATIC_RESPONSE 1.848 .000** 6.349 .162     7.562 2.040 13.745 .000** 1924.22 
PUNISHMENT_TOO_HARSH 22.008 .995 NP .433     28.313 2330.17 .000 .990 NP 
female arbitrator  / female worker          -1.551 1.465 1.120 .290 .212 
worker_gender by occupation: 
          8.119 .087  
female / manager or professional          -5.395 2.426 4.946 .026** .005 
female / technical or trade worker         9.258 25735.7
H
 .000 1.00 10486.5 
female / community/personal service         .986 1.644 .359 .549 2.680 
female / clerical/admin or sales worker          -1.721 1.671 1.061 .303 .179 
female / part-time worker         1.937 1.732 1.251 .263 6.935 
management_contributed  / severity         -.428 .895 .228 .633 .652 
problematic_investigation / severity         .177 .639 .077 .782 1.193 
problematic_allegation / severity         .545 .744 .537 .464 1.725 
problematic_response / severity         -1.583 .704 5.054 .025** .205 
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 HIERARCHICALLY ARRANGED, MULIPLE REGRESSION 
BASE MODEL FULL MODEL 
Hierarchical model: Summary statistics 
-2 log likelihood 
Cox & Snell R Square 









                                    Alternate goodness-of-fit statistic 
Hosmer and Lemeshow Test 
Chi-square df Sig. 
9.914 8 .271 
 
Chi-square df Sig. 
3.761 8 .878 
 
                                    Classification tables 
  Cut value at 0.50 

















234 77 75.2 
Employer 
Win 
295 16 94.9 
Worker 
Win 
126 128 50.4 
Worker 
Win 
28 226 89.0 
Overall %   64.1 Overall %   92.2 
Explanatory notes: 
*  p < .1 (2-tailed test) **  p < .05 (2-tailed test).  The hypothesis tests required 1-tailed p values which are obtained by halving the 2-tailed p-value. 
  
# 
  internal values for the independent variable were 0 = employer‘s favour (as the comparison group) and 1 = worker‘s favour (included in the model) 
 
NP not possible as a zero count cell in the variable‘s matrix produced extremely high standard errors (SE), resulting in an infinite odds ratio (discussed in the 








variable not included in the hierarchical model to avoid complications of ‗perfect prediction‘ (discussed in methodology chapter, section 5.9.3) 
 
H 
 extremely high standard error resulted from a low cell count in this variable‘s matrix: only two female technicians/trade workers in the dataset 
 
T
 comparison groups for categorical variables in the models: SECTOR = private; INDUSTRY = agriculture, mining; FIRM_SIZE = up to 19 (small); 
HR_EXPERTISE = No HR expert; SUPPORT = union present; WORKER_GENDER = male; OCCUPATION = operator, driver or labourer; SERVICE = 
up to 2 years; RECORD = unblemished record; STATUS = full-time worker; ARBITRATOR_GENDER = male; ARBITRATOR_BACKGROUND = 
management background; WORKER_ADVOCACY = self-represented; EMPLOYER_ADVOCACY = self-represented; all other dummy variables = 
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6.2.2  Model fit diagnostics  
Before describing how much influence the independent variables have on the 
arbitration decision - as exhibited in Table 6.3 – the model fit is explained to validate 
that the final model can provide sound answers to the hypotheses. This is achieved 
by considering the statistics reported in the overall summary statistics at the end of 
the Table 6.3, which provide measures for the multivariate model. To either accept or 
reject each alternate hypothesis is determined solely on the final block of the 
multivariate models. Thus, for brevity, the Nagelkerke R
2
 was the sole summary 
statistic reported in Table 6.3 for each of the simple models. 
 
First listed in the summary statistics are the -2 log likelihood statistics. Menard 
(2010) suggested this test was useful for determining the parameters of the model 
where larger values in the -2 log likelihood function indicate the independent 
variables have poorer predictive ability of the dependent variable. A perfect fitting 
model would have -2 log likelihood equal to zero (SPSS 2010). Thus, the decrease in 
the -2 log likelihood between the base model (692.9) and full model (205.3) reported 
for the hierarchical model in Table 6.3, suggests that the independent variables of 
interest – introduced in the full model - vastly improved the fit of the model.  
 
Second, the Nagelkerke R
2
 indicated how much the variability between decisions can 
be explained by the predictors in the model, as it is based on the comparison between 
the observed model and a model in which there is no predictors (Menard 2010). 
Multiplying the Nagelkerke R
2 
by a hundred provides a percentage of variance 
explained. Scholars in the behavioural science literature suggested the following 
‗conventions‘ for effect sizes identified by R2 tests: around 1 percent variance 
explained accounts for a small effect; around 10 percent indicates a medium effect; 
and around 25 or more precent indicates a large effect (Cohen 1988; Murphy 2002, 
p. 127). However, Cohen (1988) also cautioned that the amount of variance 
explained should be contextualised to the research problem and not to ignore very 
small values that may have cumulative effects. Therefore, reflecting first on the 
simple models presented in Table 6.3, apart from SEVERITY of the offence 
accounting for 7 percent of the variation in decisions, the scores reveal that the 
majority of the variables, on their own standing, had a small effect on the arbitration 
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decision. However, the mistakes made in the dismissal by the employer reveal to be 
very strong explanatory factors in their own right. Large effects are found for the 
variables POOR_EVIDENCE_OR_REASON and PUNISHMENT_TOO_ HARSH, 
with each accounting for 43 percent of the variation in decisions.  
 
Turning attention towards the Nagelkerke R
2
 scores for the hierarchical models, the 
combined effects of the moderator variables housed in the base model account for 
18.6 percent of the variations in the decisions, which suggest ‗medium‘ explanatory 
power based solely on the demographic features associated with each decision. The 
addition of the second block in the model that housed the major variables of interest, 
reveal a strong improvement in the explanatory power of the model, with the 
Nagelkerke R
2
 indicating that 85.2 percent of the decisions are explained by the full 
model. As a comparison, Table 6.3 also provides the Cox and Snell’s R2 statistics for 
the base and full model of 13.9 percent and 63.7 percent. Cox and Snell’s R2 
normally has a lower measure than Nagelkerke’s R2 because, unlike Nagelkerke’s R2, 
it cannot achieve a maximum range of 1 (or 100% explanatory power) (Burns & 
Burns 2008; Menard 2010). Nevertheless, Cox and Snell’s R2 conservative estimates 
also suggest that the final model possesses strong explanatory properties.  
 
Hosmer and Lemeshow’s goodness-of-fit statistic is reported as an alternative 
goodness-of-fit statistic to the -2 log likelihood (Burns & Burns 2008). It indicates 
how well the predicted values accurately represent the observed values by grouping 
observations and calculating chi-square statistics from the contingency table of 
observed and estimated frequencies (Hosmer & Lemeshow 1989). Under this test, 
well fitting models actually show a non-significant result (p > .05) because it 
indicates there is no difference between observed values and model-predicted values 
(Burns & Burns 2008; Hosmer & Lemeshow 1989; SPSS 2010). Thus, an 
insignificant chi-square statistic suggests that the predictions made by the model are 
not significantly different from the actual observations entered into the model. 
Desirable, non-significant Hosmer and Lemeshow statistics are detected in this 
analysis and are reported in Table 6.3, with the base model possessing a p-value of 
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The final model summary statistic appearing in Table 6.3 is the classification table. 
The classification table offers an alternative to the goodness of fit statistics. Instead 
of using chi-square foundations (as used in the -2 log likelihood and Hosmer and 
Lemeshow’s goodness-of-fit), it uses percentages to reveal the proportion of cases 
that have been predicted correctly (Burns & Burns 2008; SPSS 2010). The 
classification table results reported in Table 6.3 suggest that the full model performs 
strongly at predicting the outcome overall, with it classifying correctly 92.2 percent 
of the observations entered into it. The classification tables also reveal that both 
models are better at predicting decisions favouring the employer more so than 
‗worker wins‘. However, the full model shows a strong improvement in its ability to 
predict ‗worker wins‘ with the percentage of correct predictions improving from 50.4 
percent in the base model to 89.0 percent in the full model.  
 
A visual demonstration of these classification predictions is provided in Figure 6.28. 
The clear clustering of observations at either end of the X axis shows that the cases 
were well-differentiated by the model allowing it to correctly classify the cases. The 
absence of cases around the midpoint (.5) on the X axis suggests that the model is apt 
at classifying the more ‗difficult‘ cases (Burns & Burns 2008, p. 583). In essence, the 
classification tables and classification plot indicate clearly that the additional 





Figure 6.28  SPSS classification plot of observed and predicted arbitration decisions  
        for the full model in the hierarchical logistic regression 
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6.2.3  Independent variable diagnostics 
For each of the independent variables entered into both the simple and hierarchical 
models, Table 6.3 provides the log odds (B) or logit; its exponentiated value (odds 
ratio or Exp(B)); and significance values. The following explanations of these 
statistics were informed by Burns and Burns (2008). The B value is the logistic 
coefficient (log odds or logit) that indicates a negative or positive relationship with 
the dependent variable and performs the same function as b values in linear 
regression for calculating a predictive formula. In Table 6.3, SECTOR‘s logit (in the 
full model) is B = 1.026. This means that a worker from the public sector has 
increased log odds of receiving a favourable decision by 1.026. Whilst quoting such 
a statistic offers modest enlightenment to the reader, the log odd statistic is the point 
of origin from which odds ratios and percentages can be calculated.  
 
The odds ratio is exponentiated B and indicates the change in the odds each time the 
predictor is raised by one unit. Thus, referring to Table 6.3 for SECTOR, the odds 
ratio in the full model of 2.789 indicates that the odds of a public sector worker 
receiving a favourable decision are 2.798 times more likely than a private sector 
worker. The odds ratio also denotes the direction of the relationship. Whereby if its 
value exceeds 1, the odds that the event of interest will occur increases (a positive 
relationship), and if it is less than one, the odds decrease (a negative relationship). 
 
Two additional statistics are provided in the hierarchical models in Table 6.3: 
standard errors (SE), and the Wald statistic. Standard errors are the ‗best indicator of 
numerical problems in logistic regression‘ (Hosmer & Lemeshow 1989, p. 29). Very 
large standard errors indicate problems with the data structure – such as 
multicollinearity or zero cell counts. As anticipated in the methodology chapter, large 
standard errors occur in the full model, attributable to zero cell counts, for the 
following variables: MITIGATING_FACTORS (SE = 4369.13); PUNISHMENT_ 
TOO_HARSH (SE = 2330.17); and POOR_EVIDENCE_OR_REASON (SE = not 
possible). The large standard error for the interaction effect between female workers 
and technical or trade occupations (SE = 25,735.7) is attributed to the presence of 
only two cases that possessed these attributes. Otherwise, the standard errors for the 
remaining variables in the model are low. 
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The Wald statistic must be interpreted with the p-value associated with it as it 
indicates the significance of each independent variable in the model. It is this statistic 
that leads to, ultimately, the acceptance or rejection of alternate hypotheses presented 
in this thesis. When the p-value is below the a priori significant level of .05, the 
variable is not considered to be to statistically significantly influencing the dependent 
variable. The p-values associated with the Wald statistics indicate ‗merely the 
strength of evidence that there is some effect, not the magnitude of the effect‘ 
(Thompson 2009, p. 2). For this reason, it is essential to consider the odd ratios to 
determine the magnitude of the effect. To avoid redundancy in the discussion, rather 
than commenting here about the independent variables that showed significant 
effects based on the Wald tests, commentary has been made under the results section 
pertaining to each of the individual hypothesis tests. 
 
6.2.4  Observations drawn from comparing the simple and multivariate models 
The simple and multivariate models allow for comparisons to be drawn between the 
unadjusted effects and controlled effects of each independent variable. Importantly, 
as suggested by Hosmer and Lemeshow (1989), the simple modelling provided 
insights about the three, zero-count independent variables discussed in the 
methodology chapter: sub-section 5.9.3 for which it were impossible to calculate 
their odds ratios (POOR_EVIDENCE_OR_REASON, PUNISHMENT_TOO_ 
HARSH, MITIGATING_FACTORS). However, it can be stated that POOR_ 
EVIDENCE_ OR_REASON possesses a log odds (B) factor of 21.994 in the simple 
model. Recounting that this variable needed to be excluded from the multivariate 
model, we can at least tell from this log odd statistic that the odds of a favourable 
decision to the worker increased by 21.994 units when this condition was present. 
Further comparisons of the simple to the multivariate model show that the log odds 
in the simple model for MITIGATING_FACTORS show 21.545 and increased by 7 
units to 28.034 in the full model. A similar result occurs for PUNISHMENT_ 
TOO_HARSH with log odds = 22.008 in the simple model and increasing by 6 units 
to 28.313 in the full model. The conclusion here is that the presence of any of these 
three variables has an extremely powerful influence on an arbitration decision falling 
in the worker‘s favour.  
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The comparative layout of the simple and multivariate models in Table 6.3 reveals 
different patterns of statistical significance amongst a number of the independent 
variables. There are variables for which a significant effect remained persistent 
across the models (arbitrator background, worker advocacy, property deviance) 
whilst other significant effects in the simple model disappeared in the full model (HR 
expertise, formality, previous offences, remorse, employer advocacy). There are 
those that were statistically significant in the multivariate but not in the simple 
models (support, production deviance, political deviance, personal aggression, 
complexity), and finally a variable that waxes and wanes across the models 
(arbitrator experience). To avoid repetition, relevant observations about the 
persistency or deviations of the effects have been incorporated with the hypotheses 
results. 
 
6.2.5  Conversion of odds ratio to percentage probability 
The odds of an event occurring (odds ratios or exponentiated B) reported in Table 6.3 
- whilst easier to interpret than the log odds (B) - are still not as easily interpreted as 
percentages for conveying the amount of influence of an effect. Therefore, the odds 
ratios reported for each of the effects in Table 6.3 were subsequently converted to 
percentage probabilities. Table 6.4 thus reports the percentage chance a worker has 
of winning a claim and whether they have better or worse chances compared to the 
expected likelihood of a successful claim. To calculate these insights, it was first 
necessary to identify the starting point – the baseline chance – of a worker winning a 
claim (SPSS 2010).  
 
To determine this baseline chance, initial reference was made to the statistics from 
the annual reports of the federal industrial tribunal which were presented in chapter 3 
in Table 3.6. These statistics revealed that from 2000 to 2010 the chance of an 
employee convincing an arbitrator to overturn management‘s dismissal action was, 
on average, 48 percent with the highest success rate occurring in 2005-06 at 56 
percent and the lowest success rate occurring in 2008-09 with only 38 percent of 
claims favouring the employee. Notably, this statistic took into account arbitration 
decisions over dismissals for reasons in addition to misbehaviour, such as 
redundancy and work performance. As the investigation in this thesis focuses only on 
misbehaviour-related dismissals, reference was further made to the descriptive 
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statistics presented in this chapter which suggested that for the same ten year period, 
the population of decisions on misbehaviour related claims showed that workers won 
favourable decisions in 45 percent of cases, or, 9 in 20 claims. Thus it was 
determined - on the basis that the 45 percent chance of a worker win for 
misbehaviour-related dismissal claims was not too far removed from the 48 percent 
baseline for all types of claims - to use the 45 percent chance as the baseline chance 
for further calculations.  
 
A 45 percent baseline means the starting odds of a worker ‗win‘ is 45/55 (55 being 
the chance of not winning a claim), or odds of .82. To clarify, the odds are not 
suggesting that the worker has an 82 percent chance of winning– recalling that the 
baseline chance is actually 45 percent - but rather the odds that a worker will win a 
claim are .82, which is the same as stating the probability/chance a worker will win a 
claim is 9 in 20 (or 45 percent). Out of interest, employers receive favourable 
decisions 55 percent of the time, or 11 in 20 claims. Thus it can be stated that the 
odds that an employer receives a favourable decision are 1.22. However, for 
consistency, the analysis assumes the perspective of ‗worker wins‘, or put another 
way, ‗arbitration decisions favourable to the worker‘. 
 
Thus, in Table 6.4, the relative probability for each variable is calculated from a 
biased estimate of the baseline odds: .82 (45/55 or worker wins 9 of every 20 
claims). An unbiased estimate of the probably would use baseline odds of 1 or 50/50 
(the same as workers winning 10 of every 20 claims). To satisfy the author‘s 
curiosity, an unbiased, baseline odds of 1 was also calculated for each of the 
independent variables in the model to discover it resulted in only minor variations in 
the likelihood of between two and five percent, compared to those calculations using 
the biased, baseline odds. This is not surprising because the biased, baseline odds 
(.82) of a worker winning a claim were close to unbiased, baseline odds of 1. 
 
Returning to the opening point in this section, the log odds and odds ratios of an 
event occurring are more complex to interpret than percentages and relative 
likelihood of an event occurring. According to SPSS (2010) the non-linear nature of 
the logistic regression means that the probability calculated from the odds ratio 
changes depending upon the baseline probability of a case. As an example from 
Table 6.3, SECTOR showed an odds ratio of 2.789. This means the model estimated 
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that the odds of a worker receiving a favourable decision increased by a factor of 
2.789 if the worker came from the public sector. With baseline odds of .82, 
increasing the odds by a factor of 2.789 results in a relative odds ratio of 2.286 [that 
is, .82 x 2.789] for SECTOR. The consequent increase in the probability of a public 
SECTOR employee winning a claim can be calculated by using the probability 
formula: odds/(1 + odds) (Southey & Innes 2010; SPSS 2010). Inserting the revised 
public sector odds ratio into the formula [2.286/(1+2.286) = .695] equates to public 
sector workers possessing a 70 percent higher chance of winning their claim than 
private sector workers. However, recalling that the baseline chance of a worker 
winning a claim was 45 percent, the relative increase in the probability of a public 
sector worker winning a claim is actually only 25 percent higher than a private sector 
worker. 
 
Establishing that the ‗starting odds‘ of .82 for a worker ‗win‘, it is possible to 
calculate the probability and relative probability of worker ‗wins‘ for each of the 
independent variables. Table 6.4 reports odds ratios for these individual predictor 
variables converted to the ‗percentage probability‘ of a worker win and the 
percentage ‗relative probability‘ of a worker win. Again, Table 6.4 with its 
comparative layout offers insights into simple regression percentage probabilities 
alongside the percentage probabilities for multivariate relationships.  
 
To give an example of a percentage probability and relative probability, using the 
first independent variable entered into the model, SECTOR, the simple model 
suggests workers from the public sector had a 40 percent chance of winning their 
claim. However, in relative terms, when workers expect to only win 45 percent of 
their claims in the first place, this means that workers in the public sector are actually 
facing a 5 percent reduced chance of winning their claim compared to workers in the 
private sector. In the multivariate model, when all variables are considered, we see a 
reversal of fortune for public sector workers with a 70 percent chance of winning 
their claim. Using again the starting chance of 45 percent, this translates to a 25 
percent improved chance of a public sector worker wining a claim over a private 
sector worker. The relative probabilities reported in Table 6.4 are referred to 
throughout the discussions explaining the results of the individual hypothesis tests.  
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Table 6.4  Probabilities and relative probabilities of misbehaviour-related unfair dismissal arbitration decisions in the worker’s favour: a 
                  comparison of simple and multivariate regression models 
 
INDEPENDENT VARIABLES  
SIMPLE REGRESSION MODELS THE FINAL-BLOCK OF THE MULTIVARIATE MODEL 
Odds ratio 
Probability of a  
‘worker win’ 
(using 45/55 odds) 
Relative probability 
of a ‘worker win’ 
(using a 45% baseline) 
Odds ratio 
Probability of a  
‘worker win’ 
(using 45/55 odds) 
Relative probability 
of a ‘worker win’ 
(using a 45% baseline) 
SECTOR (public) .798 40% 5% less likely 2.789 70%  25% more likely 
INDUSTRY:       
manufacture, wholesaling 1.559 56% 11% more likely 7.678* 86% 41% more likely 
construction, utility supply 1.778 59% 14% more likely 7.774 86% 41% more likely 
retail 1.469 55% 10% more likely 5.117 81%   36% more likely 
hospitality, recreation 1.237 50% 5% more likely .396 25% 20% less likely 
transport, postal, warehousing 1.364 53% 8% more likely 15.026** 92% 47% more likely 
communication, technical, professional ser. 1.778 59% 14% more likely 5.997 83%  38% more likely 
administration & support services 2.598* 68% 23% more likely 2.175 64% 19% more likely 
public administration & safety 1.541 56% 11% more likely 1.000 45% equal chance 
education, health, social assistance 1.067 47% 2% more likely 1.930 61% 16% more likely 
FIRM_SIZE:       
20 to 199 workers (medium) .711 37% 8% less likely .417 25% 20% less likely 
200 plus workers (large) .613 33% 12% less likely 2.227 65% 20% more likely 
not identified 1.051 46% 1% more likely 1.902 61% 16% more likely 
HR_EXPERTISE:       
yes, HR expert .596** 33% 12% less likely .918 43% 2% less likely 
not identified 1.049 46% 1% more likely 4.014 77% 32% more likely 
FORMALITY: .817** 40% 5% less likely .570 32% 13% less likely 
SUPPORT:       
companion present .761 38% 7% less likely .030** 2% 43% less likely 
worker unaccompanied 1.737** 59% 8% more likely 1.787 59% 14% more likely 
  
 
Southey: Employee misbehaviour and unfair dismissal arbitration                                        Page 258 
INDEPENDENT VARIABLES  
SIMPLE REGRESSION MODELS THE FINAL-BLOCK OF THE MULTIVARIATE MODEL 
Odds ratio 
Probability of a  
‘worker win’ 
(using 45/55 odds) 
Relative probability 
of a ‘worker win’ 
(using a 45% baseline) 
Odds ratio 
Probability of a  
‘worker win’ 
(using 45/55 odds) 
Relative probability 
of a ‘worker win’ 
(using a 45% baseline) 
not identified 1.155 49% 4% more likely .767 39% 6% less likely 
WORKER_GENDER (female) .917 43% 2% less likely 5.704 82% 37% more likely 
OCCUPATION:       
manager or professional .789 39% 6% less likely 5.490** 82% 37% more likely 
technician or trade .720 37% 8% less likely 1.726 59% 14% more likely 
community or personal service .902 43% 2% less likely 4.537 79% 34% more likely 
clerical/administration or sales 1.077 47% 2% more likely 3.953* 76% 31% more likely 
SERVICE:       
2 up to 5 years .756 38% 7% less likely 1.245 51% 6% more likely 
5 up to 10 years .913 43% 2% less likely 2.203 64% 19% more likely 
10 up to 15 years .519** 30% 15% less likely .562 32% 13% less likely 
15 up to 20 years .817 40% 5% less likely .110* 8% 37% less likely 
20 years and over 1.072 47% 2% more likely .775 39% 6% less likely 
not identified .354** 22% 23% less likely 1.231 50% 5% more likely 
RECORD:       
previous offences 1.937** 61% 16% more likely .751 38% 7% less likely 
not identified 1.099 47% 2% more likely .718 37% 8% less likely 
STATUS (part-time) 1.307 52% 7% more likely .621 34% 11% less likely 
ARBITRATOR_GENDER (female) 1.002 45% equal chance 1.413 54% 9% more likely 
ARBITRATOR_BACKGROUND:       
Union work background 1.924** 61% 16% more likely 3.606** 75% 30% more likely 
No strong preference 1.362 53% 8% more likely 2.587 68% 23% more likely 
ARBITRATOR_EXPERIENCE .893** 42% 3% less likely .650** 35% 10% less likely 
ARBITRATOR_SENIORITY .964 44% 1% less likely 1.187 49% 4% more likely 
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INDEPENDENT VARIABLES  
SIMPLE REGRESSION MODELS THE FINAL-BLOCK OF THE MULTIVARIATE MODEL 
Odds ratio 
Probability of a  
‘worker win’ 
(using 45/55 odds) 
Relative probability 
of a ‘worker win’ 
(using a 45% baseline) 
Odds ratio 
Probability of a  
‘worker win’ 
(using 45/55 odds) 
Relative probability 
of a ‘worker win’ 
(using a 45% baseline) 
PROPERTY_DEVIANCE  1.437* 54% 9% more likely .162** 12% 33% less likely 
PRODUCTION_DEVIANCE  .818 40% 5% less likely .112** 8% 37% less likely 
PERSONAL_AGGRESSION  .844 41% 4% less likely .054** 4% 41% less likely 
POLITICAL_DEVIANCE 1.168 49% 4% more likely .142** 10% 35% less likely 
SEVERITY .595** 33% 12% less likely .997 45% equal chance 
WORKPLACE_RELATED 1.180 49% 4% more likely 2.939 71% 26% more likely 
PERSONAL_INSIDE .809 40% 5% less likely 2.434 67% 22% more likely 
PERSONAL_OUTSIDE .902 43% 2% less likely NP NP NP 
COMPLEXITY .992 45% equal chance .200** 14% 31% less likely 
REMORSE 2.169** 64% 19% more likely .467 28% 17% less likely 
WORKER_ADVOCACY:       
represented by union 2.219** 65% 20% more likely 8.129** 87% 42% more likely 
represented by independent lawyer 2.676** 69% 24% more likely 12.925** 91% 46% more likely 
representation not clear 2.324** 66% 21% more likely 2.065 63% 18% more likely 
EMPLOYER_ADVOCACY:       
represented by association 1.137 48% 3% more likely 3.561 74% 29% more likely 
represented by independent lawyer .600* 33% 12% less likely .372 23% 22% less likely 
representation not clear .699 36% 9% less likely .446 27% 18% less likely 
POOR_EVIDENCE_OR_REASON NP NP NP NP NP NP 
MITIGATING_FACTORS  NP NP NP NP NP NP 
MANAGEMENT_CONTRIBUTED 21.212** 95% 50% more likely 628.405** 99.8% 54.8% more likely 
PROBLEMATIC_INVESTIGATION 6.355** 84% 39% more likely 44.906** 97% 52% more likely 
PROBLEMATIC_ALLEGATION 3.789** 76% 31% more likely 3.142 72% 27% more likely 
PROBLEMATIC_RESPONSE 6.349** 84% 39% more likely 1924.22** 99.9% 54.9% more likely 
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INDEPENDENT VARIABLES  
SIMPLE REGRESSION MODELS THE FINAL-BLOCK OF THE MULTIVARIATE MODEL 
Odds ratio 
Probability of a  
‘worker win’ 
(using 45/55 odds) 
Relative probability 
of a ‘worker win’ 
(using a 45% baseline) 
Odds ratio 
Probability of a  
‘worker win’ 
(using 45/55 odds) 
Relative probability 
of a ‘worker win’ 
(using a 45% baseline) 
PUNISHMENT_TOO_HARSH NP NP NP NP NP NP 
female arbitrator  / female worker     .212 15% 30% less likely 
worker_gender by occupation: 
      
female / manager or professional     .005** .004% 44.996% less likely 
female / technical or trade worker    10486.5 99.9% 54.9% more likely 
female / community/personal service    2.680 69% 24% more likely 
female / clerical/admin or sales worker     .179 13% 32% less likely 
female / part-time worker    6.935 85% 40% more likely 
management_contributed  / severity    .652 35% 10% less likely 
problematic_investigation / severity    1.193 49% 4% more likely 
problematic_allegation / severity    1.725 59% 14% more likely 
problematic_response / severity    .205** 14% 31% less likely 
*  p < .1 (2-tailed) **  p < .05 (2-tailed) 
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6.3  Responses to the hypotheses 
By using the regression results derived in the hierarchical model (in Table 6.3), each 
hypothesis deduced from the literature under each of the major research questions 
and sub-questions, is now addressed directly with a response. It is worth noting four 
points about how it was determined to either reject or retain the null hypothesis.  
 
First, each hypothesis predicted the direction in which the independent variable 
would influence the outcome, which required one-tailed significance testing. SPSS 
presents p-values for two-tailed significance tests, thus it was necessary to divide in 
half, the p-value presented in Table 6.3, to obtain the one-tail p-values required for 
directional hypotheses (UCLA 2012b). Throughout the following results, only the 
one-tail p-values associated with each hypothesis are reported and considered. 
 
Second, an a priori p-value of .05 was used to determine either the rejection or 
retention of the null hypothesis. For this determination to occur, reference was made 
to the p-value in the final block of the hierarchical model, which assessed the 
influence of each independent variable whilst holding constant logical, prior 
conditions. Note, this will not preclude references throughout these discussions, to 
other statistically significant items in either the simple regressions or base model.  
 
Third, the statistics observed and reported to inform each hypothesis were the log 
odds (B), degrees of freedom (df) and the actual p-value for the independent 
variable/s implicated by the hypothesis. The log odds (or logit) are reported because 
it is the original term in the model (SPSS 2010) and it is from this coefficient that the 
odds ratio, and subsequently, chance probabilities, were calculated.  
 
And, fourth, the discussion under each hypothesis also incorporates the odds ratio 
conversion to percentage probabilities reported in Table 6.4 because these statistics 
offer a more intuitive understanding of the degree of influence each variable has on 
the arbitration decision. Importantly, these discussions assume that a worker entered 
arbitration with a 45 percent baseline chance of winning a claim. Thus the improved 
or reduced chances quoted in the discussions are relative to this 45 percent starting 
point (as shown in the final column in Table 6.4).  
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6.3.1  Research question 1 – hypothesis 1 (re: type of misbehaviour) 
Research question one considered: How does the type of misbehaviour in which 
the worker engaged influence the arbitrator’s decision to either overturn or 
uphold management’s action to dismiss the worker?  The first hypothesis under 
this question was: 
 
H0(1) The type of misbehaviour in which the worker engaged will not 
influence arbitration decisions favouring the worker. 
 
H1(1) All four categories of Robinson and Bennett’s typology of 
misbehaviours will be negatively related to arbitration decisions 
favouring the worker.  
 
Result: Reject H0(1),  p < .05 in favour of H1(1)  
 
PROPERTY_DEVIANCE:   B = -1.819  df = 1     p = .002 
PERSONAL_AGGRESSION:  B = -2.922   df = 1     p = .000 
PRODUCTION_DEVIANCE:  B = -2.189  df = 1     p = .003 
POLITICAL_DEVIANCE:   B = -1.952  df = 1     p = .023 
 
All types of misbehaviour are strongly statistically significant, with one-tailed p-
values of < .05, and they all display negative relationships with arbitration decisions 
favouring the worker. The results suggest that it is acts of personal aggression that 
are least tolerated by the arbitrators, with a reduction of 2.922 in the log odds of a 
worker wining a claim when this behaviour was present (which converts to a worker 
being 41 percent less likely to win when this behaviour was a factor), followed by 
production deviance (37 percent less likely); political deviance (35 percent less 
likely) and property deviance (33 percent less likely). 
 
6.3.2  Research question 1 – hypothesis 2 (re: severity of misbehaviour) 
H0(2) The severity of the misbehaviour will not influence arbitration decisions 
favouring the worker. 
 
H1(2) The severity of the misbehaviour act will be negatively related to 
arbitration decisions favouring the worker. 
 
Result: Do not reject H0(2),  p >.05  
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The null hypothesis is retained because the influence of severity as a factor in the 
arbitration decision is statistically insignificant in the final block of the hierarchical 
model, with a one-tail p-value of .496. Further, the model reveals it possesses an 
extremely weak negative relationship (-.003). Markedly, severity is strongly, 
statistically significant in the simple regression, with a p-value of .000. This suggests 
that whilst the severity of the offence is considered an extremely important factor in 
isolation, arbitrators appear to have offset the severity of the misbehaviour with other 
factors during their deliberations. To put this finding into percentage chance terms, it 
can be said that, when considered in isolation, for each unit increase in the severity of 
the misbehaviour (on a 1 to 5 scale), workers decrease their chance of a favourable 
decision by 12 percent. But, when severity is considered in conjunction with other 
factors at play, the workers incur a negligible reduction - suffice to say no reduction - 
in the chance of receiving a favourable decision.  
 
6.3.3  Research question 1 – hypothesis 3 (re: service, apology, disciplinary record) 
H0(3) There is no statistically significant relationship between the years of 
service by the worker; the presence of an apology; or a clean 
disciplinary record and arbitration decisions favouring the worker. 
 
H1(3)  Each of these factors will have a separate, positive relationship with 
arbitration decisions favouring the worker: 1) years of service 2) a 
clean disciplinary record; 3) the presence of an apology from the 
worker.  
 
Result:  1) Do not reject H0(3), p > .05 for SERVICE 
   2) Do not reject H0(3), p > .05 for DISCIPLINARY RECORD 
   3) Do not reject H0(3), p > .05 for REMORSE 
 
SERVICE:   
2 up to 5 years B =      .219 df = 1 p = .381 
5 up to 10 years B =      .790 df = 1 p = .124 
10 up to 15 years B =    -.576 df = 1 p = .254 
15 up to 20 years B =  -2.211 df = 1 p = .033 
20 years and over B =    -.255 df = 1 p = .394 
 
RECORD:    
Previous offences B =    -.287 df = 1 p = .297 
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Apart from service period between 15 and 20 years, the remaining three factors are 
statistically insignificant in the final block in the hierarchical model, thus the null 
hypothesis is retained. However, it is of interest to note the following about each of 
the variables considered under this hypothesis. 
 
Three points are made first in relation to the worker‘s period of service. First, the full 
model showed that workers are positively associated with a favourable arbitration 
decision until they had ten years of service, after which, they are negatively related to 
receiving favourable decisions. This reversal of chances for the longer serving 
workers runs counter to the anticipated direction in the alternate hypothesis. 
 
Second, workers with 15 to 20 years of service are statistically significant with a one-
tail p-value of .033. It is thus worthwhile considering the impact of this factor on the 
arbitration decisions, which possesses a negative relationship with decisions that 
favour the worker. This negative relationship is counter to the direction anticipated in 
the alternate hypothesis. The model shows these workers are 37 percent less likely to 
receive a favourable arbitration decision compared to workers with up to 2 years 
service.  
 
Third, uncontrolled effects measured in the simple regression reveal that it is workers 
with 10 up to 15 years service that are significantly less likely to win a claim (p = 
.038). These workers have a 15 percent lower chance of winning a claim compared 
to workers with up to 2 years of service.  
 
In matters of the worker’s disciplinary record, specifically, the presence of a 
previous offence, it is found to be strongly statistically significant in both the simple 
regression (p = .003), and the base model of the hierarchical regression (p = .005). 
However, these effects disappear in the final block of the hierarchical model which 
controlled for other factors. Further, the direction of the relationship changes across 
the models. That is, previous offences are positively related to decisions favourable 
to the worker in the simple model; but reverses in the hierarchical model to show a 
negative relationship with favourable decisions. As well as being statistically 
insignificant in the full model, the degree of influence is mild, whereby workers with 
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a previous offence endure only a 7 percent reduced chance of receiving a favourable 
decision compared to workers with a clean disciplinary record. 
 
Finally, remorse demonstrated by the worker during the arbitration proceedings, is 
strongly statistically significant in the simple regression (p = .001). It is positively 
associated with favourable decisions (B = .774) to the degree that a worker is 19 
percent more likely to win a claim than a worker who does not demonstrate remorse. 
However, this effect disappears in the hierarchical model which controlled for other 
factors. The effect becomes statistically insignificant (p = .303) and the direction of 
the relationship reverses (B = -.761) whereby workers showing remorse have a 17 
percent reduced chance of receiving a favourable decision compared to those 
workers who do not exhibit remorse or do not apologise. 
 
6.3.4  Research question 2 – hypothesis 4 (re: worker’s explanation) 
Research question two considered: How does the explanation provided by the 
dismissed worker influence the arbitrator’s decision to either overturn or 
uphold management’s action to dismiss the worker? The first hypothesis under 
this question was: 
 
H0(4) There is no statistically significant relationship between the type of 
explanation rendered by the worker and arbitration decisions favouring 
the worker. 
 
H1(4a) ‘Workplace-related’ explanations will be positively related to 
arbitration decisions favouring the worker. 
H1(4b) ‘Personal-inside’ explanations will be negatively related to arbitration 
decisions favouring the worker.  
 
Result: Do not reject H0(4a) and (4b), p > .05 
 
WORKPLACE_RELATED:       B = 1.078    df = 1     p = .112  
PERSONAL_INSIDE:        B =   .889    df = 1      p = .148 
 
Explanations proffered by the worker for their behaviour are statistically 
insignificant in the hierarchical model, thus the null hypothesis is retained. Although 
statistically insignificant, the direction of the relationship between type of 
explanation and arbitration decision suggests that workers who use an externally-
attributed explanation, in the form of a workplace-related reason, improve their 
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chance of winning a claim by 26 percent. In comparison, where a personal-inside 
reason is included in their explanation, workers improve their chance of winning a 
claim by only 22 percent. 
 
6.3.5  Research question 2 – hypothesis 5 (re: complexity of explanation) 
H0(5) There is no statistically significant relationship the number of 
explanations provided by the worker and arbitration decisions 
favouring the worker. 
 
H1(5) The number of explanations to explain behaviour will be negatively 
related to decisions favouring the worker. 
 
Result: Reject H0(5), p < .05 in favour of H1(5)  
 
COMPLEXITY: B = -1.611  df = 1     p = .020 
 
The model suggests that each time an extra category is incorporated into a worker‘s 
explanation (the three categories being workplace-related reasons, personal-inside 
reasons and personal-outside reasons) the log odds a decision favouring the worker 
decreases by 1.611. In probability terms, this equates to a substantial decrease of 31 
percent for each additional category invoked. As workers can incorporate up to three 
different categories in their defences, the cumulative effect of using multiple 
explanations has a serious negative impact on a worker‘s chance of winning a claim. 
 
6.3.6  Research question 3 – hypothesis 6 (re: errors in the dismissal process) 
The third research question considered: How does the dismissal procedure used by 
the employer influence the arbitrator’s decision to either overturn or uphold 
management’s action to dismiss the worker? The first hypothesis under this 
question was: 
 
H0(6) There is no statistically significant relationship between the type of 
errors in judgement or processes in actioning the dismissal and 
arbitration decisions favourable to the worker. 
 
H1(6) Errors in judgement or processes in actioning the dismissal will be 
positively related to arbitration decisions favourable to the worker. 
 
 
Results: Reject H0(6), p < .05 in favour of H1(6) for each type of error 
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MITIGATING_FACTORS_IGNORED:   B = 28.034   df = 1     p = .000 
MANAGEMENT_CONTRIBUTED:   B =   6.433   df = 1     p = .000 
PROBLEMATIC_INVESTIGATION:   B =   3.805   df = 1     p = .000 
PROBLEMATIC_ALLEGATION:   B =   1.145   df = 1     p = .000 
PROBLEMATIC_RESPONSE:    B =   7.562   df = 1     p = .000 
PUNISHMENT_TOO_HARSH:    B = 28.313   df = 1     p = .000 
 
All errors committed by employers in discharging the dismissal display a strong, 
statistically significant influence on arbitrators finding in favour of the worker. This 
result supports a logical and intuitive expectation of the phenomena. Perhaps of more 
interest is that the results of the analysis allow the ranking of the errors according to 
their influence on arbitrator‘s decisions to overturn the dismissal actioned by 
employers.  
 
Due to the infinite odds ratios resulting from the extremely large log odds, it is not 
possible to calculate probabilities for MITIGATING_FACTORS_IGNORED and 
PUNISHMENT_TOO_HARSH, although the controlling effects of these two errors 
are incorporated into estimates for the errors ranked above. However, the descriptive 
statistics reveal that the arbitration decision favours the worker in every case where 
these two errors occur, along with the POOR_EVIDENCE_OR_REASON error. 
This is clear grounds for suggesting that workers who endure any one of these three 
errors, have an improved chance of winning a claim by 55 percent. Given the 
baseline probability of a worker to win a claim is 45 percent; a 55 percent 
improvement results in a perfect prediction of 100 percent. Thus, it is safe to suggest 
that POOR_EVIDENCE_OR_REASON; MITIGATING_FACTORS_IGNORED 
and PUNISHMENT_TOO_HARSH, share equal billing for first place in 
demonstrating the arbitrators‘ tolerance for managerial mistakes during the dismissal 
process.   
 
Therefore, it is concluded, notwithstanding the absence of a controlling effect for 
errors concerning POOR_EVIDENCE_OR_REASON (as discussed in chapter 5 
section 5.9.3), the errors associated with most improved chance for workers to win 









POOR_EVIDENCE_OR_REASON improved chances by 55 percent 
MITIGATING_ FACTORS_IGNORED improved chances by 55 percent 
PUNISHMENT_TOO_HARSH improved chances by 55 percent 
2nd PROBLEMATIC_RESPONSE improved chances by 54.9 percent 
3rd MANAGEMENT_CONTRIBUTED improved chances by 54.8 percent 
4th PROBLEMATIC_INVESTIGATION improved chances by 52 percent 
5th PROBLEMATIC_ALLEGATION improved chances by 27 percent 
 
  
6.3.7  Research question 3 – hypothesis 7 (re: interact severity of offence*errors) 
H0(7) Regardless of the severity of the offence, there is no statistically 
significant relationship between the type of error made by the employer 
in actioning the dismissal and arbitration decisions favourable to the 
worker. 
 
H1(7) As the severity of the misbehaviour increases, errors in the employer’s 
dismissal process, will be negatively related to arbitration decisions 
favouring the worker. 
 
 
Results: Do not reject H0(7), p > .05 for MANAGEMENT_CONTRIBUTED x 
SEVERITY where B = -.428  df = 1  p = .317 
               Do not reject H0(7), p > .05 for PROBLEMATIC_INVESTIGATION x 
SEVERITY where B = .177  df = 1  p = .391 
               Do not reject H0(7), p > .05 for PROBLEMATIC_ALLEGATION x 
SEVERITY where B = .545  df = 1  p = .232 
               Reject H0(7),  p < .05 in favour of H1(7) for PROBLEMATIC_ RESPONSE x 
SEVERITY where B = -1.541  df = 1  p = .013 
 
The interaction effects between the severity of the offence and the different types of 
errors management could make in administering their dismissals reveals that the 
severity of the offence lessens the impact of the mistake made by management in 
only one type of error: weaknesses in allowing the worker to respond to the 
allegations of misconduct (PROBLEMATIC_RESPONSE). In the event 
management commits such an error, decisions that favour the worker are reduced by 
1.541 in the log odds for every point increase in severity of the offence: meaning 
workers are 31 percent less likely to win their claim for every point increase in 
severity. Apart from this error, the non-significant results for the other management 
  
 
Southey: Employee misbehaviour and unfair dismissal arbitration                                        Page 269 
errors suggest the severity of the offence does not appear to lessen the impact of 
managerial errors on the final arbitration decision.   
 
6.3.8  Sub-question (a) – hypothesis 8 (re: union advocacy for worker) 
The first sub-question asked: Is the arbitration decision influenced by the 
presence of expert advocates representing the parties? The first hypothesis under 
this sub-question was: 
 
H0(8) There is no statistically significant relationship between union 
advocacy and arbitration decisions favourable to the worker. 
 
H1(8) Union advocacy will be positively related to arbitration decisions 
favourable to the worker.  
 
Result: Reject H0(8),  p < .05 in favour of H1(8) 
 
WORKER ADVOCACY: 
Represented by union           B = 2.095    df = 1     p = .009 
 
There is a statistically significant, positive relationship between workers who were 
represented at the arbitration table by a union advocate and arbitration decisions that 
ultimately favour the worker. The log odds increase by a unit of 2.095 for a worker 
win when they engage a union advocate, instead of self-representing, which equates 
to a 42 percent improved chance of winning a claim. 
 
6.3.9   Sub-question (a) – hypothesis 9 (re: legal advocacy for worker) 
H0(9) There is no statistically significant relationship between the type of 
advocacy used by the worker and arbitration decisions favourable to 
the worker. 
 
H1(9) Worker advocacy by independent lawyers will have a greater positive 
relationship to decisions favouring the worker than other advocacy 
services, who in turn will have a greater positive relationship to those 
workers that self-represent their claim at the arbitration hearing.  
  
 
Result: Reject H0, p < .05 in favour of H1(9) 
 
WORKER ADVOCACY: 
      Represented by union       B = 2.095    df = 1     p = .009 
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The alternate hypothesis is accepted because both union advocates (who may use a 
lawyer) and independent lawyers show a strong, statistically significant influence on 
the arbitration decision and independent lawyers display a stronger positive 
relationship to ‗worker wins‘ than union advocates. Compared to workers who self-
represented at the hearing, the log odds show a unit increase of 2.095 to 2.559 when 
they use an independent lawyer as an advocate instead of a union advocate. Thus, 
compared to self-representing, a worker improves his or her chance of winning a 
claim by 46 percent if an independent lawyer is used, and 42 percent if a union 
advocate is used.    
 
6.3.10   Sub-question (a) – hypothesis 10 (re: employer advocacy) 
 
H0(10) There is no statistically significant relationship between the type of 
advocate used by the employer and arbitration decisions favouring the 
worker. 
 
H1(10) Employer advocacy by independent lawyers will have a more negative 




Result: Do not reject H0(10), p > .05 
 
EMPLOYER ADVOCACY: 
  Represented by association           B = 1.270      df = 1     p = .121 
  Represented by independent lawyers    B =  -.989      df = 1     p = .107 
 
Acceptance of the alternate hypothesis fails in this case because the choice of 
advocate used by the employer is not of statistical significance in the arbitration 
decision - even though the direction of the hypothesised relationships appears 
correct. Although not statistically significant, the model indicates that employers 
who engage independent lawyers reduce the chance of workers winning their claims 
by 22 percent. Whereas, employer advocates from either employer or industry 
associations (who may use a lawyer) actually put the employer at a disadvantage. In 
such cases, the chance of a favourable outcome to the worker improves by 29 percent 
when an employer‘s defence is presented by an association representative.  
 
It is also of interest to note that independent legal counsel for employers during the 
arbitration proceedings, is statistically significant in the simple regression (p = .065). 
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It is negatively associated with favourable decisions to the degree that a worker‘s 
chance of a win is reduced by 12 percent if an employer uses a legally qualified 
advocate. However, this significant effect disappears in the hierarchical model which 
controlled for other factors.  
 
6.3.11  Sub-question (a) – hypothesis 11 (re: self-representation) 
H0(11) There is no statistically significant relationship between self-
representation and arbitration decisions favouring the worker. 
 
H1(11a)  ‘Self-representation’ by a dismissed worker will reflect the strongest, 
positive relationship with decisions favouring the worker. 
H1(11b) ‘Self-representation’ by an employer will reflect the strongest, positive 
relationship with decisions favouring the employer. 
 
Result: Do not reject H0(11a and 11b), p > .05 
 
WORKER ADVOCACY: 
               Represented by union           B = 2.095    df = 1     p = .009  
    Represented by independent lawyers    B = 2.559    df = 1     p = .001  
 
EMPLOYER ADVOCACY: 
    Represented by association                  B = 1.270    df = 1    p = .121  
    Represented by independent lawyers      B =  -.989    df = 1    p = .107  
 
Acceptance of the alternate hypothesis fails for two reasons. First, the employer 
advocacy types fail to reach statistical significance. Second, the directions of the 
relationships are, in the main, opposite to the anticipated directions. To explain, the 
model applied ‗self-representation‘ as the reference group for advocacy. Workers 
who self-represent display the weakest relationship with decisions favouring workers 
on the basis of positive relationships observable for the alternative forms of worker 
advocacy: unions and independent lawyers. Unions (who may engage a lawyer) and 
independent lawyers are more likely to incur a worker win than a self-represented 
worker. Note that these relationships are also statistically significant.  
 
From the employer‘s perspective, whilst the influences of advocacy tested 
statistically insignificant, if one still wished to ponder the direction of the 
relationships it can be seen that self-representing employers have a lower chance of 
successfully defending the dismissal action compared to those employers using legal 
advocates that hold the strongest chance for an employer ‗win‘. This is in spite of 
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some employers using their own legally-qualified staff to ‗self-represent‘. This 
conclusion is drawn by taking the converse of the model coefficients suggesting 
employers with legal advocates possess a negative relationship with worker ‗wins‘ 
(B = -.989).  Thus, self-represented employers held the mid-position in terms of 
impact, with independent lawyers showing the strongest relationship with decisions 
favouring the employer and association advocates possessing the weakest 
relationship with decisions favouring the employer (the converse of possessing a 
more positive relationship with worker wins in the model, B = 1.270). 
 
6.3.12  Sub-question (b) – hypothesis 12 (re: worker gender) 
The second sub-question considered: Is the arbitration decision influenced by 
characteristics of the dismissed worker? The first hypothesis considered under this 
question was: 
 
H0(12) There is no statistically significant relationship between the worker’s 
gender and arbitration decisions favouring the worker.  
 
H1(12) Females will be more positively related to decisions favouring the 
workers than males. 
 
Result: Do not reject H0(12), p > .05 
 
WORKER GENDER:       B = 1.741    df = 1     p = .087 
 
The null hypothesis is retained for this hypothesis because the p-value did not come 
within the a priori significance level. Although it is observed that worker gender is 
approaching statistical significance with a one-tail p-value of .087. Furthermore, the 
direction the relationship predicted in the alternate hypothesis is correct in that 
female workers have a 37 percent improved chance of a favourable decision 
compared to male workers. 
 
6.3.13  Sub-question (b) – hypothesis 13 (re: arbitrator gender) 
H0(13) There is no statistically significant relationship between the 
arbitrator’s gender and arbitration decisions favouring the worker.  
 
H1(13) Male arbitrators will be more positively related to awarding arbitration 
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Result: Do not reject H0(13) p > .05 
 
ARBITRATOR GENDER:  B = .345    df = 1    p = .292 
 
The null hypothesis is again retained for this hypothesis because arbitrator gender 
displays an unacceptable one-tailed p-value of .292. And, high p-values again occur 
in both the bivariate and multivariate models. Further, the hypothesised direction of 
the influence of the arbitrator‘s gender is also inaccurately predicted in the alternate 
hypothesis. Compared to male arbitrator decisions, the log odds (.345) of female 
arbitrator decisions favouring the worker indicate that female arbitrators – and not 
male arbitrators – provide workers a better chance of receiving a favourable decision. 
This is to the tune of a 9 percent higher chance. 
  
 
6.3.14  Sub-question (b) – hypothesis 14 (re: gender interaction effects) 
H0(14) There is no statistically significant relationship between female 
arbitrators and arbitration decisions favouring  female workers.  
H1(14) Females will be positively related to favourable arbitration decisions 
from female arbitrators. 
 
Result: Do not reject H0(14), p > .05 
 
FEMALE ARBITRATOR * FEMALE WORKER:   B = -1.551   df = 1   p = .145 
 
This hypothesis specifically measures the interaction effect between female 
arbitrators determining claims for women. Although the relationship between gender 
and arbitration decision moves in a negative direction, that is, appearing before a 
female arbitrator reduces a female claimant‘s chance of a favourable decision by 30 
percent; such a pattern is statistically insignificant.  
 
6.3.15  Sub-question (b) – hypothesis 15 (re: interact employment status*worker 
gender) 
 
H0(15) There is no statistically significant relationship between employment 
status, gender and arbitration decisions favourable to the worker.  
 
H1(15) Females that performed part-time hours will be positively related to 
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Result: Do not reject H0(15), p > .05 
 
FEMALE * STATUS:         B = 1.937     df = 1     p = .132 
 
The null hypothesis is retained, as the interaction effect between arbitration decisions 
and female workers dismissed from part-time working hours (STATUS) was 
statistically insignificantly. Although insignificant, the direction of the relationship 
predicted by the alternate hypothesis is correct, with the model revealing that part-
time females have a 40 percent improvement in winning their claim.  
 
6.3.16  Sub-question (b) – hypothesis 16 (re: interact occupation*worker gender) 
 
H0(16) Women dismissed from jobs typically performed by men, are not 
statistically significantly related to arbitration decisions favourable to 
the worker.  
 
H1(16a) Females employed in an area of male dominated work, will be 
negatively related to favourable arbitration decisions. 
H1(16b) Females working in female dominated occupations will be positively 
related to favourable arbitration decisions. 
 
Result: Reject H0(16a), p < .05 in favour of H1(16a)  (managerial or  professional work) 
  Do not reject H0(16b), p > .05  
 
 
WORKER GENDER * OCCUPATION:        
female / manager or professional  B = -5.395 df = 1 p =   .013 
female / technical or trade worker B =  9.258 df = 1 p =   .500 
female / community/personal service B =    .986 df = 1 p =   .275 
female / clerical/admin or sales worker  B = -1.721 df = 1 p =   .152 
 
To explain the results of Hypothesis 16 it is necessary to recap on how jobs in 
Australia are occupationally segregated. The list below displays the percentage of 
females according to the collapsed occupational categories used in this analysis, 
based on labour force statistics produced by the ABS (2012a). 
 
female / managers and professionals 46%  = male dominated 
female / technical or trade worker 14%  = male dominated 
female / community/personal service 68%  = female dominated 
female / clerical/admin or sales worker  71%  = female dominated 
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This hypothesis tested the interaction effects between gender and occupational 
category on arbitration decisions favouring the worker. It uses as a reference 
category, females working as machinery operators, drivers and labours. The model 
reveals that females working in managerial or professional positions are negatively 
related to favourable arbitration decisions. As managers and professionals are 
marginally dominated by male workers in Australia (only 46 percent female), this 
finding reflects the negative direction of the relationship anticipated in the alternate 
hypothesis and is statistically significant with a one-tailed p-value of .013. Thus the 
null hypothesis is rejected in favour of the alternate hypotheses for this particular 
occupational group. The conversion of odds ratio to percentage chance suggests the 
females in managerial or professional positions have a 44.96 percent lower chance of 
a favourable decision compared to females working as operators, drivers or 
labourers.  
 
The null hypothesis is retained for women working as tradespeople and technicians. 
The model does not accurately estimate the interaction between female workers in 
this category, as the descriptive statistics show there are only two cases in this 
category. Because both cases return favourable decisions to the female worker, the 
odds ratio conversion to percentage shows that females in trade or technical work are 
54.8 percent more likely to win a claim compared to females working as operators, 
drivers or labourers. However, this finding is discounted because it is highly 
statistically insignificant (p = .5), based on a couple of cases. 
 
Furthermore, due to the high one-tailed p-values the null hypothesis is also retained 
for women working in the female-dominated job categories of community or 
personal services work (p = .275) and clerical, administration or sales work (p = 
.152). Bearing in mind the lack of statistical significance, out of interest, women 
dismissed from community and personal service related occupations are shown by 
the model to possess a positive relationship with favourable arbitration decisions (as 
anticipated in the alternate hypothesis). These women possess a 24 percent improved 
chance of a favourable arbitration decision. Conversely, women dismissed from 
clerical, administration or sales work are negatively related to favourable claims, 
whereby the model indicates a 32 percent decreased chanced of a favourable decision 
for them, compared to women working as operators, drivers or labourers. 
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6.3.17  Sub-question (b) – hypothesis 17 (re: occupation) 
 
H0(17) There is no statistically significant relationship between the worker’s 
occupation and arbitration decisions favouring the worker.  
 
H1(17) Lower-skilled occupations will be more positively related to arbitration 
decisions favouring the worker than higher-skilled occupations. 
 
Result:  Do not reject H0(17), p > .05 
 
OCCUPATION: 
manager or professional B = 1.703 df = 1 p = .023 
technician or trade B =   .546 df = 1 p = .252 
community or personal service B = 1.512 df = 1 p = .051 
clerical/administration or sales B = 1.375 df = 1 p = .033 
 
The null hypothesis is retained as the direction of influence is incorrectly predicted. 
The model utilises the lowest-skilled occupational category of ‗operator, driver or 
labourer’ as the reference group and by comparison, the other four occupational 
groups all possess positive log odds. This suggests that operators, drivers and 
labourers are the least likely to receive a favourable arbitration decision of all the 
occupational groups, which is counter to the alternate hypothesis.  
 
Importantly, three of the occupational groups actually possess statistically significant 
one-tailed p-values: manager or professionals (p = .023); clerical/administration or 
sales workers (p = .033); and, with minor tolerance on the a priori p-value, 
community or personal service workers (p = .051). These three occupational groups 
indicate that a statistically significant difference exists between higher skilled groups 
compared to the lower skilled group in terms of favourable decisions awarded to the 
worker, yet the strength of the positive relationship actually declines for the lower 
skilled workers. When the odds are converted to chance, the model reveals that 
compared to operators, drivers and labourers, dismissed workers that had been 
engaged as managers or professionals have a 37 percent improved chance of 
receiving a favourable arbitration decision; whilst community and personal service 
workers show a 34 percent improved chance of a favourable decision. And, at the 
same time, clerical and administrative workers have a 31 percent improved chance of 
a win. Out of interest, the occupational group that acquires a statistically insignificant 
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p-value is the technician and trade workers who possess a 14 percent improved 
chance of a win compared to the lower skilled workers. 
 
6.3.18  Sub-question (c) – hypothesis 18 (re: arbitrator work background) 
The third sub-question considered: Is the arbitration decision influenced by 
characteristics of the arbitrator? The first hypothesis under the question was: 
 
H0(18) There is no statistically significant relationship between an arbitrator’s 
work background and arbitration decisions favouring the worker. 
 
H1(18) A union background will be more positively related to decisions 
favouring the worker than a management background. 
 
Result: Reject H0(18), p < .05 in favour of H1(18) 
 
ARBITRATOR BACKGROUND: 
 Union work background B = 1.282    df = 1 p = .014 
 No strong preference  B =   .950    df = 1 p = .065 
 
The alternate hypothesis is accepted on the basis that arbitrators with a previous work 
history of employment with union bodies are statistically significantly more likely to 
find in the worker‘s favour than arbitrators with a management history. This 
statistical significance holds constant in the simple regression, as well as in the two 
blocks of the hierarchical model. The constancy of its significance indicates it is a 
robust predictor remaining steadfast even when other factors are controlled for in the 
final model. In the final block of the hierarchical model, workers that appeared 
before arbitrators with a union background show a 30 percent improved chance of a 
favourable decision.  
 
The background of arbitrators with ‗no strong preference‘ toward either union or 
managerial positions before their appointment to the tribunal approaches statistical 
significance (p = .065) and the direction of the relationship is also positive for this 
characteristic, but to a lesser degree than arbitrators with a union background. 
Workers show a 23 percent improved chance of a favourable decision if they appear 
before arbitrators without a prior tendency towards either union or management 
positions. In summary, if arbitrators are ranked for returning favourable decisions to 
workers, on the basis of their work backgrounds, the odds suggest that arbitrators 
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with a management background are the least likely to make decisions favouring the 
worker, those with a union background most likely to decide in favour of the worker, 
and those with ‗no strong preference‘ holding mid-position.  
 
6.3.19  Sub-question (c) – hypothesis 19 (re: arbitrator experience and seniority) 
 
H0(19) There is no statistically significant relationship between either the 
experience an arbitrator has in determining unfair dismissal claims or 
their seniority, and arbitration decisions favouring the worker. 
 
H1(19) Each of these factors has a separate, negative relationship with 
arbitration decisions favouring the worker: 1) decision making 
experience; 2) seniority. 
 
Result: Reject H0(19), p < .05 in favour of H1(19) for EXPERIENCE 
  Do not reject H0(19), p > .05 for SENIORITY 
 
ARBITRATOR_EXPERIENCE: B = -.431     df = 1 p = .008 
ARBITRATOR_SENIORITY: B =  .171     df = 1 p = .288 
 
Arbitrator experience, measured via the number of decisions made in relation to 
misconduct-related unfair dismissal claims, is strongly statistically significant (p = 
.008) with the arbitration decisions favouring the worker. The anticipated negative 
direction of the relationship between experience and decisions is also upheld; with 
the model revealing that the chance of a worker receiving a favourable decision 
decreases by 10 percent, as each level of experience increases. It is also notable that 
this characteristic holds constant in terms of statistical significance, in the both the 
bivariate model and the final block of the hierarchical model. The constancy of its 
significance indicates it is a robust predictor remaining steadfast even when other 
factors were controlled for in the final model. 
 
Arbitrator seniority displays a statistically insignificant one-tailed p-value of .288, 
thus the null hypothesis that the seniority of the arbitrator will not influence the 
arbitration decision, was retained. Furthermore, the direction of the relationship is 
opposite to that hypothesised, such that the more senior the arbitrator, the more likely 
they are to find in favour of the worker. The probabilities calculated show that 
workers see an improvement in their chance of a win by 4 percent for each status 
increase of the arbitrator. 
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6.3.20  Sub-question (d) – hypothesis 20 (re: formality and support person) 
The fourth sub-question considered: Is the arbitration decision influenced by 
characteristics of the employer?  The first hypothesis under this question was: 
 
H0(20) There is no statistically significant relationship between the formality of 
the dismissal process; or the presence of a support person for the 
worker during the dismissal process; and arbitration decisions 
favouring the worker. 
 
H1(20) Each of these factors has a separate, negative relationship with 
arbitration decisions favouring the worker: 1) the formality of the 
process; 2) presence of a support person for the worker. 
 
Result: Do not reject H0(20), p > .05 for FORMALITY 
 Reject H0(20), p < .05 in favour of H1(20) for SUPPORT 
  
FORMALITY :            B =   -.563     df = 1     p = .113 
 
SUPPORT: 
 companion present  B = -3.518     df = 1     p = .019 
 worker unaccompanied B =    .581     df = 1     p = .174  
 
Formality of the dismissal process fails to reach statistical significance in the final 
block of the model (p = .113), thus the null hypothesis in respect of formality of the 
dismissal process by the employer, is retained. Interestingly, it is statistically 
significant in the simple regression (p = .017) and the base block of the hierarchical 
model (p = .000). Its dispersion from a strongly significant result in the base model, 
to a highly statistically insignificant result, suggests that when other factors about the 
dismissal are taken into account by the arbitrators, the degree of formality has a 
decreased influence on the arbitrator. Although statistically insignificant, the 
direction of the relationship is negative - as anticipated in the alternate hypothesis - 
with the chance of an arbitration decision favourable to the worker decreasing by 13 
percent for each increase in the degree of formality (measured on a three point scale). 
 
Support for the worker during the dismissal process, specifically in the form of the 
worker being allowed to have a ‗companion‘ of their choice present, is found to be a 
statistically significant factor in the arbitration decision (p = .019). Thus the alternate 
hypothesis is accepted for this predictor variable. Utilising ‗union delegate present‘ 
as the comparison group, the model reveals that workers with the feature of having a 
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companion present during their dismissal, endure a 42 percent decrease in their 
chance of receiving a favourable decision compared to a worker that has either a 
union representative present. The remaining option measured under the SUPPORT 
variable is that the worker is ‗unaccompanied‘, with the finding that unaccompanied 
workers have a 14 percent improved chance of a favourable decision, compared to 
those workers who have the union present. This specific relationship is statistically 
insignificant in the hierarchical model, although is statistically significant as an 
unadjusted factor in the simple regression (p = .013) wherein unaccompanied 
workers also show a 14 percent improvement in their chance of a favourable 
decision. 
 
6.3.21  Sub-question (d) – hypothesis 21 (re: HR expertise and firm size)  
 
H0(21) There is no statistically significant relationship between the presence of 
HR expertise and/or the size of the business; and arbitration decisions 
favouring the worker. 
 
H1(21) Each of these factors has a separate, negative relationship with 
arbitration decisions favouring the worker: 1) employers with HR 
experts; 2) larger businesses. 
 
Result: Do not reject H0(21), p > .05 for HR EXPERTISE 




     yes, HR expert   B =  -.085     df = 1    p = .459 
     not identified   B = 1.390     df = 1    p = .113 
 
FIRM_SIZE: 
     20 to 199 workers (medium) B =  -.874     df = 1 p = .188 
     200 plus workers (large) B =   .801     df = 1 p = .207 
     not identified   B =   .643     df = 1 p = .270 
 
The null hypothesis is retained because both factors fail to reach statistical 
significance. Only one aspect shows statistical significance in the simple regression, 
and that was employers with HR expertise are negatively related to arbitration 
decisions favouring the worker (p = .019) which equates to 12 percent reduced 
chance for a worker win if the employer engages an HR expert. However, this effect 
is dispersed in the hierarchical model to the point of showing an extreme statistically 
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insignificant influence (p = .459) and where the chance of a favourable decision for 
the worker decreases by a mere 2 percent if an HR expert is involved.  
 
Firm size is also statistically insignificant with each size category, from smallest to 
largest, containing one-tail p-values of .188; .207; and .270 respectively. Although 
statistically insignificant, the model utilises small businesses (up to 19 workers) as 
the comparison group. The model coefficients suggest that workers from a large 
business (200 plus workers) have a 20 percent improved chance of winning their 
claim compared to the small business worker. At the same time, workers from 
medium sized businesses (19 to 200 workers) had a 20 percent decreased chance of 
winning a claim compared to small business workers. 
 
6.3.22  Sub-question (d) – hypothesis 22 (re: type of industry) 
 
H0(22) There is no statistically significant relationship between the type of 
industry in which the employing business operated and arbitration 
decisions favouring the worker. 
 
H1(22) Employees dismissed from workplaces associated with either the 
manufacturing industry or service industries will be more positively 




Result: Reject H0(22), p < .05 in favour of H1(22) for transport, postal and warehousing 
 
INDUSTRY:    
manufacture, wholesaling B = 2.038 df = 1 p = .096 
construction, utility supply B = 2.051 df = 1 p = .134 
retail B = 1.633 df = 1 p = .155 
hospitality, recreation B =  -.925 df = 1 p = .312 
transport, postal, warehousing B = 2.710 df = 1 p = .039 
communication, technical, professional ser. B = 1.791 df = 1 p = .140 
administration & support services B =   .777 df = 1 p = .328 
public administration & safety B =   .000 df = 1 p = .500 
education, health, social assistance B =   .658 df = 1 p = .343 
 
The alternate hypothesis is accepted for two reasons. First on the basis that the 
transport, postal and warehousing – an industry associated with manufacturing and 
service provision - returns a p-value of .039 in the final block of the hierarchical 
model. Furthermore, the manufacturing and wholesaling industries demonstrate that 
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they are approaching statistical significance with a p-value of .096. Workers 
dismissed from the transport, postal and warehousing industry have a 47 percent 
improved chance of winning a claim, compared to workers in the reference industries 
of agriculture and mining. Meanwhile, workers in manufacturing and wholesaling 
industries show similar output, possessing a 41 percent improved chance of winning 
a claim. 
 
The second reason is, as predicted, that those with the strongest positive relationship 
with successful claims will be workers in manufacturing and service related 
industries. The results show that higher B values are possessed by industries 
associated with: transport, postal and warehousing; manufacture; wholesaling; 
construction; utility supply; retail; communication, technical and professional 
services. In comparison, smaller B values, indicating a weaker positive relationship, 
are possessed by the non-manufacturing and non-service related industries of: 
education; health; social assistance; public administration and safety; administration 
and support services.   
 
A further insight, although statistically insignificant (p = .312), is that workers from 
the hospitality and recreation industry are the only group to possess a negative 
relationship with favourable decisions – with these workers facing a 20 percent 
reduced chance of a favourable decision.  
 
Finally, the simple regressions reveal that only the administration and support 
services worker industry was statistically significant, with a one-tail p-value of .042, 
(B = .955). Workers in this industry have a 23 percent improved chance of a 
favourable decision compared to agriculture and mining workers. However, this 
effect is tempered to insignificance when other factors are taken into account in the 
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6.3.23  Sub-question (d) – hypothesis 23 (re: private and public sector) 
H0(23) There is no statistically significant relationship between the sector in 
which the employing business operated and arbitration decisions 
favouring the worker. 
 
H1(23) The private sector will be more positively related to arbitration 
decisions favouring the worker than those from the public sector. 
 
Result: Do not reject H0(23), p > .05 (NB. approaching statistical significance at .07) 
 
SECTOR:   B = 1.026 df = 1     p = .07  
 
The null hypothesis is retained because, whilst sector reveals to be approaching 
statistical significance (p = .07), the direction of the relationship was incorrectly 
predicted in the alternate hypothesis. The results suggest that it is actually public 
sector workers who are more positively associated with favourable decisions. Public 
sector workers hold a 25 percent improved chance of a favourable decision compared 
to private sector workers.  
 
6.4  Chapter 6 conclusion 
This chapter initially provided the reader with insights into the descriptive statistics, 
followed by a full review of the logistic regression analyses performed on the data 
collected from the unfair dismissal arbitration decisions. The culmination of the 
analysis was to determine whether or not it was possible to accept the alternate 
hypotheses proposed under each of the research questions. A number of statistically 
significant matters warrant discussion in the next and final chapter.  Not to be 
discounted are the findings into the arbitral decision making dynamics offered by the 
alternate hypotheses that were not accepted because they either had statistically 
insignificant p-values, or the direction of influence ran counter to that hypothesised. 
These too will be considered in the next chapter. 
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CHAPTER 7 
DISCUSSION AND CONCLUSIONS 
 
7.0  Introduction 
The discussions and investigations presented in the previous chapters in this thesis 
contributed toward addressing the major research objective: 
 
To identify factors influencing the arbitral decisions of members in 
Australia’s federal industrial tribunal when they determine unfair 
dismissal claims from workers who have been terminated from their 
employment due to ‘misbehaviour’. 
 
This final chapter contains the discussions and conclusions drawn from the 
investigation that addressed the above research objective. To do so, this chapter 
discusses first, the findings ascertained with a high degree of statistical confidence. 
These findings are divided into two dimensions: those contributing new and original 
knowledge to the literature, and those which confirm or deny prior research 
literature. Then, attention will be paid to the variables in the analysis that were either 
statistically insignificant, or statistically significant but counter to the hypothesised 
direction of influence. These variables reveal insights by the fact that they did not 
meet hypothesised expectations. Throughout these discussions, the author will 
provide reasons that may explain each of the findings. 
 
The final aspect of this chapter presents the author‘s conclusions for the total 
research effort detailed in this thesis. First, a summary response to the research 
objective is presented, before discussing the theoretical implications of these findings 
from three perspectives: immediate discipline theories, parental theories, and broader 
disciplinary perspectives. After this discussion, the implications of the findings on 
policy and practice are provided. Two additional limitations that arose during the 
implementation of the investigation are noted, before finalising this thesis with 
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7.1   Breakthrough insights revealed by the arbitral decision-making model 
This section focuses purely on discussing statistically significant findings not 
identified by previous empirical investigations. Recall in chapter 3 that existing 
theories of arbitral decision-making in relation to termination of employment claims 
were examined. Namely, the decision making models developed by Nelson and Kim 
(2008), Gely and Chandler (2008), Ross and Chen (2007), Chelliah and D‘Netto 
(2006), along with the seminal Bemmels‘ investigations between 1988 and 1991, 
were reviewed. Whilst each of these models and investigations possessed differing 
strengths and weaknesses (as discussed in chapter 3), collectively, they failed to 
identify the following points to which the author‘s model contributes original 
insights: 
 
7.1.1  New insight: influence of misbehaviour type on decisions (question 1)  
The first research question sought insight as to how the type of misbehaviour 
influenced the arbitrator‘s decision. The application of Robinson and Bennett‘s 
(1995) employee deviance typology of personal aggression, production deviance, 
political deviance and property deviance provided suitable distinctions for assigning 
all acts of misbehaviour to a framework, from which it was possible to identify the 
tolerance for such behaviours within the context of the arbitration decisions. This 
differed to previous studies that focused on either a single or a few specific acts of 
misconduct, thus narrowing their discoveries into the influence of the narrowly 
defined misconduct acts on arbitral decisions. In essence, this investigation 
successfully united a theory developed originally to describe norm breaking, 
intentional acts of employee behaviour within the organisational behaviour literature, 
to a broader application of situations where ‘reprimandable offences’ – as defined in 
chapter 2 – were committed by employees and examined through the lens of the 
arbitral decision-making associated with the industrial relations. 
 
The author noted in chapters 1 and 2 that arbitrators‘ decisions pertaining to 
misbehaviour in the workplace could set the public standard (Donaghey 2006) and 
reflect societal values (Wright 2002) for how tolerant employers and unions must be 
towards employees who engage in, or who are believed to have engaged in 
misbehaviour. The author can now progress this position and present insights on 
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arbitral tolerance for various misbehaviours. This is because the investigation 
measured - with strong statistical significance - the amount of influence the various 
types of misbehaviour had on the arbitration decisions when controlling for factors 
concerning employer, worker and arbitrator characteristics. It is noted that all four 
categories of misbehaviour were negatively related to favourable decisions to the 
workers, so upfront, it can be stated that none of the behaviours were considered 
acceptable in Australian workplaces. However, as this thesis delves into the ‗dark-
side‘ of workplace behaviours (Griffin & O'Leary-Kelly 2004), the results provide 
insights about which of these dark-side behaviours are more tolerated and those 
which are less tolerated, when it comes to arbitrators determining claims for 
employees who have lost their job because they engaged, or supposedly engaged, in 
some form of misbehaviour. 
 
The author contends that the lowest level of tolerance for a particular category of 
employee misbehaviour is synonymous with the category that was least likely to 
result in decisions favourable to the workers - which happened to be acts of personal 
aggression. This means these behaviours possessed the strongest negative 
relationship with favourable decisions. At the other extreme, acts under the banner of 
property deviance were found to be those most tolerated by arbitrators as these 
behaviours were most likely to result in decisions favourable to the worker. This 
means these behaviours possessed the weakest negative relationship with favourable 
decisions. According to the Robinson and Bennett (1995) typology, acts of personal 
aggression are targeted at individuals within the organisation whilst acts of property 
deviance are targeted at the organisation itself. Therefore, a picture emerges as to 
what factor may be framing the extremities of the arbitrators‘ tolerance for the 
misbehaviours: the target of the behaviour.  
 
Table 7.1 presents the tolerance exhibited by arbitrators toward the four categories of 
misbehaviour in ascending order. It can be seen in Table 7.1 that arbitrators had the 
least tolerance, and were least likely to overturn a dismissal, where the behaviour 
involved personal aggression such as fighting, verbal abuse and sexual harassment. 
Between the two extremes were acts of production and political deviance. At the 
other extreme, arbitrators‘ greatest tolerance was for behaviour involving property 
deviance targeted towards the material nature of the business‘ physical assets, such 
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as pilfering the employer‘s property or wilful damage to equipment. When such 
behaviours occurred the arbitrators were more inclined to overturn dismissals. 
Because aggressive acts against individuals are more heavily influencing the 
arbitrators to sustain the employer‘s punishment than property related misdeeds, this 
suggests people are valued over property; a welcome finding from a humanistic 
perspective.  
 














the worker harmed or potentially 











the worker harmed or potentially 







the worker damaged or 
misappropriated the employer’s  
physical assets 
 
(Source: Developed for thesis) 
 
Personal aggression, as the behaviour least tolerated, reflects Collin‘s (1992) 
suggestion that people in the workplace are entitled to dignity, which means 
respecting each person‘s attempt to bring meaning to their life through work. It was 
noted in chapter 3 that employees causing dysfunction in the workplace need to be 
removed because a dysfunctional worker infringes on the autonomy and dignity 
rights of the engaged and loyal employees (Collins 1992). And, the Wheeler and 
Rojot (1992) international investigation into employer responses to serious 
misconduct identified a global alliance in terms of personal aggression, whereby a 
worker instigating a physical fight causing injury to the other party, would likely be 
dismissed, even if it was a first offence. The low tolerance for personal aggression 
also reflects tenets of retributive justice. Recalling from chapter 4 that retributive 
justice seeks actions that can be done for the victim and to the harm-doer to remove 
or deal with an injustice (Darley & Pittman 2003), arbitrators have a role to restore 
justice to those harmed. Acts of personal aggression are high impact behaviours as 
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they tend to inflict abrupt and palpable harm (Baron & Neuman 1996; Bennett 1998; 
Bjorkqvist, Osterman & Lagerspetz 1994; Hershcovis & Barling 2010; LeBlanc & 
Kelloway 2002; Neuman & Baron 2005; O'Leary-Kelly & Newman 2003). It appears 
acts of personal aggression lend themselves to high visibility retribution, 
demonstrated by arbitrators being most willing to support employer decisions to 
terminate perpetrators when these types of behaviours occur in the workplace.  
 
After personal aggression, the second least tolerated behaviour was production 
deviance. Production deviance involves behaviours which are directly harmful to the 
employer‘s business, but excludes property and asset damages (Robinson & Bennett 
1995). Thus production deviance captures behaviours – typically covert in nature - 
that threaten the prosperity and profitability of the business, such as wasting 
resources and dishonest reporting of worked hours. The lower tolerance for 
production deviance is perhaps influenced by the broad economic context of the 
employer-employee relationship, wherein labour market efficiencies are supported 
with balanced institutional regulation so as to support societal goals of economic 
competitiveness and growth (Collins 1992; World Economic Forum 2010). 
Recognising that employers exist within a competitive economy and, in most cases, 
are motivated by profit (Alexander, Lewer & Gahan 2008) combined with the 
fundamental common law understanding of the exchange of fair day‘s work for a fair 
day‘s pay (Collins 1992; Compton, Morrissey & Nankervis 2002; Riley 2005), the 
arbitral decisions in relation to production deviance appear to reinforce a societal 
standard that workers should not behave deceitfully so as to harm the viability of 
their employers business.  
 
Acts of misconduct under the political deviance umbrella revealed to be more 
tolerated than acts of personal aggression and production deviance. The Robinson 
and Bennett (1995) typology suggests political deviance targets one or more people 
as victims of covert type behaviour, such as gossiping or showing favouritism. 
Political deviance is conceived to be ‗minor‘ in nature according to Robinson and 
Bennett (1995) and it appears the arbitral decisions reflected a similar position on 
such offences, with it being the second most tolerated category of misbehaviour. 
Under this category, workers engage in unethical and/or insidious type behaviour 
towards another person causing harm or potentially harming the person‘s character or 
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prospects, although the immediate impact of the behaviours may not be evident or 
significant (Edwards & Greenberg 2010; Kish-Gephart, Harrison & Trevino 2010). 
The nebulous nature of politically deviant acts may make it more challenging for 
either the employer to present a sound case defending the dismissal, and/or the 
arbitrator to comfortably support an employer‘s ejection of the perpetrator from the 
workplace. This may explain why an arbitrator could show a higher tolerance for this 
type of behaviour, resulting in a reversal of the dismissal. 
 
Interesting on several counts is the finding that property deviance, such as damages 
to and theft of employer property, was the most tolerated of all the behaviours – 
wherein workers that were dismissed for such offences were the most successful in 
their claims. Wheeler and Rojot‘s (1992) international research revealed that 
employers from the ten countries examined, agreed unanimously that theft of product 
from the employer should be met with instant dismissal. This suggests that whilst 
globally employers have a low tolerance for property deviance, it is in discord with 
the arbitrators‘ level of tolerance. Further, if a societal expectation exists that 
employees should not undermine the profitability of the business, à la production 
deviance, property deviance can also threaten the employer‘s viability – although 
indirectly. Such points run counter to the result produced by the investigation. Two 
suggestions are proffered as to why property deviance appears to be the most 
tolerated. 
 
First, arbitral rulings are more likely to support the employer‘s decision to terminate 
the worker‘s employment where the employer produces strong evidence of the 
dismissed employee‘s misconduct to support the employer‘s retaliatory action of 
dismissing the employee (Klass, Mahony & Wheeler 2006). Thus, one explanation 
for property deviance being the most tolerated may be that the material, objective 
nature of property related offences may make them the simplest cases for arbitrators 
to identify weaknesses in employer investigations and rationales leading to a 
dismissal. If this is the case, then it is not a situation of arbitrators having a high 
tolerance for property deviance, but rather a weakness in the employers‘ ability to 
execute fair and just investigations and dismissal processes when it is believed 
employees engaged in acts of property deviance. However, an alternative explanation 
for this result may be, simply, that deviant acts against a piece of property are 
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tolerated more than acts of aggression against people; and the forced ranking in the 
statistical modelling brings this to the fore. 
 
7.1.2  New insight: influence of employee explanations on decisions (question 2) 
The second research question sought to find out how the explanation employees 
provided for their behaviour influenced the arbitrator‘s decision. This question 
progresses the conceptual work of the author on the employee explanation typology 
(Southey 2010), where any conceivable explanation could be categorised according 
to whether they were workplace-related reasons, personal-inside reasons or personal-
outside reasons. Incorporating the employee‘s explanation into the arbitral decision 
making model offers another major enhancement to the arbitral decision-making 
models present in the current literature. Although Nelson and Kim (2008) made 
reference to ‗contested and uncontested facts‘ and Gely and Chandler (2008) referred 
to ‗factual strength of the case‘, both only captured partially and indirectly some 
form of the employee defence. This thesis‘ model was the first to incorporate the 
employee explanation as a distinct element of arbitral decision making.  
 
The statistical modelling provided strong statistical confidence that the complexity 
of the workers‘ explanations influence the arbitration decisions, when factors are 
held equal in terms of the type of misbehaviour, employer, worker and arbitrator 
characteristics. This breakthrough finding suggests that for each additional category 
of explanation from Southey‘s (2010) three domain typology which was incorporated 
into a workers‘ defence, workers experienced a consequent decrease in the chance of 
winning their claim. This means the best chance for workers to win their claim of 
unfair dismissal was to draw their defence from only a single category in the Southey 
(2010) typology. As the three categories of explanations address three discrete 
domains, it is reasoned that the most logical explanations are concentrated, focused 
explanations, such as: the misbehaviour occurred as a result of poorly maintained 
equipment (a workplace-related explanation); or frustration due to a confrontation 
with a colleague (a personal-inside reason) or because of a illness in the family (a 
personal-outside reason).  It appears that providing an explanation that canvases two, 
particularly three, categories – addressed in Southey‘s typology as a ‗conflated 
rationale‘ – destabilises the worker‘s explanation, perhaps on the basis that it could 
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sound either muddled or over-orchestrated, ultimately disadvantaging the worker at 
the arbitration table. 
 
It was also suggested in chapter 4 that during the deliberations about whether or not 
to uphold a dismissal, arbitrators need to process information-rich, inter-related 
pieces of evidence by forming a mental summary framed by their own mental model, 
orientations and prior experiences, incurring – quite likely – any biases resulting 
from the cognitive heuristics used to draw inferences from the material before them 
(Das & Teng 1999; Hastie & Pennington 2000; Korte 2003; Malin & Biernat 2008; 
Sangha & Moles 1997; Tversky & Kahnemann 2000). It is reasonable to suggest that 
the clarity of a single explanation provided less opportunity for an arbitrator to 
experience a cognitive bias that might otherwise occur whilst trying to assess 
explanations pulled from two or three different explanatory domains. Potentially, 
conflated explanations obstruct the arbitrator‘s mental summarising, increasing the 
chance of cognitive biases, that may make arbitrators less inclined to reverse the 
employers‘ dismissal actions. 
 
7.1.3  New insight: influence of employer’s dismissal process (question 3)  
 
Research question three focused on identifying the influence of the employer‘s 
dismissal process on the arbitration decision. It is the arbitrators‘ obligation to assess, 
retrospectively, the delivery of natural justice to the worker whilst they were being 
scrutinised by their employer for their purported misbehaviour, enabling arbitrators 
to form opinions on the consequent quality of the organisational justice delivered to 
the worker (Brown, Bemmels & Barclay 2010; Forbes 2006; Greenberg 1990). This 
investigation measured the arbitral assessments of the quality of the employer‘s 
dismissal process by identifying errors that employers tended to make in dismissing 
workers, based on the work of Blancero and Bohlander (1995) and Australian 
legislative requirements under the Fair Work Act 2009. It is recalled that Table 4.3 in 
chapter 4 demonstrated the author‘s view of how breaches in natural justice and 
organisational justice were reflected in the managerial errors in Blancero and 
Bohlander‘s (1995) typology as well as Australia‘s legislative protections against 
‗unfair, unjust or unreasonable‘ dismissal. Thus, an absence of errors in the 
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employer‘s process was considered synonymous with an appropriate, fair and 
reasonable dismissal process having been executed. 
 
Whilst this is not the first study to incorporate the employer‘s process into dismissal- 
related arbitral decision-making models; it is, possibly, the most comprehensive. For 
instance, Gely and Chandler (2008, p. 292) incorporated the employer‘s ‗due 
process‘ and ‗equal protection‘ as variables in the arbitral decision-making process in 
the form of  dummy variables where problems in these areas were either identified, 
or not identified, for each case. These variables were found to be significant 
influences in decisions, but such a collective measurement of due process prevented 
the identification of the individual effects of various procedural errors on the 
arbitration decisions. Chelliah and D‘Netto (2006) also paid attention to factors 
relevant in the employer‘s decision to discharge and found two statistically 
significant influences in cases of misconduct: failure to apply progressive discipline 
and improper promulgation of rules. The Chelliah and D‘Netto study also found that 
‗procedural errors‘ and ‗unequal treatment‘ were not statistically significant 
influences on the arbitration decision. 
 
With links to procedural, distributive and interactional justice theories and legislative 
demands, this thesis identified seven statistically significant measures of weaknesses 
in the employer‘s dismissal process. Each error demonstrated a very strong positive 
relationship with arbitration decisions favouring the worker, and that committing any 
one of them is likely to find the arbitrator overturning the employer‘s dismissal 
action. By comparing the degree of influence each had on the arbitration decision, 
the significant new insight garnered in this study is that the arbitral decision-making 
process appears to reflect a ‗stepped‘ process. Figure 7.1 displays the seven 
influential errors, demarcated into two stages by the arbitrator‘s initial assessment of 
the employer‘s reason or evidence to dismiss the worker, the harshness of the 
dismissal penalty and, associated with harshness, whether the employer neglected to 
take into account any mitigating circumstances rendering the dismissal harsher than 
if those circumstances were not present. It appears these fatal errors act as a set of 
preliminary ‗filters‘ used by arbitrators. Errors caught by this preliminary filtering 
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Figure 7.1  The influence of managerial errors on arbitration decisions 
(Source: Developed for thesis) 
 
The challenges borne out in the statistical modelling due to the zero counts for 
decisions favouring the employer where these errors occurred, as discussed in the 
methodology chapter, section 5.9.3, attest to the strength of these errors as ‗perfect 
predictors‘ (Hosmer & Lemeshow 1989) of arbitration decisions favourable to the 
worker. This viewpoint is also supported by requirements under Australia‘s federal 
legislation to take into account whether there was a valid reason for the dismissal 
(Part 3-2 Section 387 of the Fair Work Act 2009) and for which arbitrators use, as a 
preliminary point in their deliberations, Justice Northrop‘s in Selvachandran v 
Peteron Plastics Pty Ltd (1995) description of a ‗valid‘ reason (discussed in section 
4.5.4). The POOR_EVIDENCE_OR_REASON variable parallels the ‗valid reason‘ 
requirements. Appendix 8, containing an analysis of influences on the arbitrator 
finding weaknesses in the evidence or reason an employer used to dismiss a worker, 
revealed the arbitrator is less inclined to identify poor evidence or reason if the 
worker: had a companion present during workplace meetings, had a previous offence 
on the record, committed a more serious offence, or gave a more complex 
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explanation. At the same time, arbitrators were more inclined to identify poor 
evidence or reason as a managerial error if the worker possessed up to ten years 
experience and/or relied upon a union or legal advocate during arbitration. 
 
Except for the worker‘s disciplinary record, these statistically significant, influential 
factors are mirrored in the full arbitral decision analysis central to this thesis and thus 
discussion of them is incorporated throughout this chapter. However, it is worth 
reflecting on the worker‘s disciplinary record. Whilst it was found to be an 
influential factor by previous investigators (Bemmels 1988a, 1991b; Harcourt & 
Harcourt 2000; Klass, Mahony & Wheeler 2006; Simpson & Martocchio 1997), the 
disciplinary record was not identified in the hierarchical model as an influence on the 
final arbitration decision (although was a significant predictor in the simple 
regression). On the surface, the lack of effect concurs with Chelliah and D‘Netto‘s 
(2006) Australian study. Yet new insight is offered by the analysis in Appendix 8.  
 
A worker‘s disciplinary record was found to influence the determination of whether 
the employer had a ‗sound reason or evidence for the dismissal‘ (a valid reason) and 
because such an error forms one of the ‗fatal‘ errors used as a preliminary filter, it is 
fair to suggest that a worker‘s disciplinary record is - ultimately - influencing the 
arbitration decision. So whilst the impact of a worker‘s disciplinary record was 
obscured in the full model, the findings suggest that the existence of a previous 
offence by the worker increases significantly the strength of the employer‘s evidence 
to support a valid reason for the dismissal. This finding is consistent with the premise 
of corrective-progressive discipline (Fenley 1998; Holley, Jennings & Wolters 2009; 
Huberman 1964) (discussed in section 2.3.1), where an employee has offended 
previously and the employer attempts to ‗reform‘ the behaviour by recording a 
warning rather than administering a dismissal. The arbitrator may take this as an 
indication the employer took a considerate approach before the eventual dismissal. 
 
Figure 7.1 next shows that three of the remaining four errors associated with the 
subsequent filtering of the employer‘s dismissal process, possessed near to a 100 
percent chance of the arbitration decision favouring the worker, with it only being on 
rare occasions that the employer can commit these errors and the arbitrator finds for 
the employer. However one proviso was discovered. As the severity of the offence 
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increases, arbitrators became less willing to overturn dismissals if the employers‘ 
mistake concerned weaknesses in providing opportunities for the workers to respond 
to allegations. Severity was measured on a four-point scale anchored as: somewhat 
serious, serious, very serious and extremely serious. It was only for this type of error 
that the interaction between severity and managerial error was statistically 
significant, with the modelling estimates suggesting the chance of a decision 
favouring the worker decreased a considerable 31 percent for every incremental 
increase in the severity of the offence.  
 
This significant interaction suggests the intensity of serious and extremely serious 
misconduct can mitigate, to some degree, weaknesses in the process management 
used to provide the worker with an opportunity to respond. And, as the arbitrator 
hears all evidence, the employee can be finally afforded an opportunity to provide a 
considered response via the arbitration hearing, albeit it occurs in retrospect. Perhaps, 
as employers are required to take into account mitigating circumstances when 
considering the dismissal of a worker, so too arbitrators may accommodate for 
procedural mistakes by employers when dealing with particularly grave offences. 
However, the scope for employers to mitigate procedural errors based on the severity 
of the offence is very narrow, recalling that this finding was significant only if 
weaknesses occurred in providing the worker an opportunity to respond to the 
allegation.   
 
The error that exhibited least influence on the arbitration decision was a managerial 
lack of clarity in the allegation and/or reason for the dismissal. The analysis showed 
that employers had a 28 percent chance of escaping any sort of penalty in the face of 
this mistake. Two reasons may explain such a finding. First, the descriptive data 
revealed that at least 31 percent of workers were supported in the workplace during 
the dismissal process by a union delegate, and at least another 8 percent by a work 
colleague or friend. It may be that arbitrators anticipate the support person assisted 
the worker to clarify allegations and reasons, and facilitate the worker‘s 
understanding of the situation. Second, the finding also implies that whilst arbitrators 
are still highly likely to find in favour of the worker if this error occurs, arbitrators 
anticipate employees possess some innate understanding of why they were 
investigated and/or dismissed, even if management were not careful in the detail. 
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Such an expectation might hark back to the low ‗power-distance‘ and high 
‗individualism‘ characteristics of Australia‘s national culture (Hofstede 2001). These 
eminent features presuppose the typical worker is, first, not fearful of questioning 
authority and second, self-sufficient in managing his or her work life. The 
implication of these national features suggests workers are not passive passengers in 
the employer-employee relationship; particularly if one were being investigated or 
questioned about misconduct. Such an implication may temper – only slightly - the 
demands on employers to be clear and direct in presenting allegations and reasons for 
the dismissal. 
 
A final point concerning the influence managerial errors have on the arbitration 
decision is made. Figure 7.1 depicts a noticeable division between ‗content‘ and 
‗process‘ errors. The three areas of weaknesses shown in the initial filter consider the 
‗content‘ of the dismissal. These faults address the actual act of misbehaviour itself, 
and the context in which it occurs. This suggests a preliminary concern for 
distributive justice principles to be upheld for the worker, and confirms Australia‘s 
legislative concerns under Section 387 of the Fair Work Act 2009 requiring a ‗valid 
reason‘ for dismissal. 
 
The subsequent filter reflects then four areas of weaknesses associated with 
management‘s ‗process‘ used in the discharge of the investigations and dismissal. 
This reflects a second order concern for the procedural and interactional justice 
ideals being afforded to the worker, reflected in the ‗unfair‘ requirements noted in 
Section 387 of the Fair Work Act 2009. The filtering process appeals to Wheeler‘s 
(1976) theory of humanitarian arbitration – considered in section 3.2.5 - in view of 
the weight arbitrators‘ place on the behaviour and circumstances of the event, ahead 
of the rules of dismissal. It also crosses the boundary to Wheeler‘s corrective 
arbitration because arbitrators, in addressing the ‗harshness‘ requirements of the 
legislation, place significant weight on the circumstances surrounding the dismissal 
and attempt to rectify the situation for the worker if they have concerns about the 
worker‘s career and/or income earning opportunities.  
 
To conclude this section, it was established through research question one that 
employees engaging in any of the four categories of misconduct possessed extremely 
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low chances of winning their claim (between 4 and 12 percent were reported in Table 
6.4). Considered in conjunction with the results for research question 3, we can see 
that the amount an act of misbehaviour influences the arbitration decision is 
influenced by the employer‘s treatment of the situation. Clearly, an incident viewed 
by the employer as a ‗reprimandable offence‘ will, in most instances, be viewed 
differently by the arbitrator if the employer was negligent in its obligations to 
provide natural, distributive and procedural justice to the worker. 
 
7.1.4  New insight: sub-questions a, b, c and d  
Pioneering insights were not identified for the four sub-research questions; however, 
a number of statistically significant findings contributing to prior research were 
identified through them and are addressed in the next section. 
 
7.2  Statistically significant results that either confirm or refute prior research 
This section is devoted to improving our knowledge of arbitral decision-making 
involving cases of employee misconduct, by considering findings that were not only 
statistically significant but also supported their relevant hypotheses as presented in 
chapter 4. These are findings that occurred in addition to those covered in the 
previous section. 
 
7.2.1  Further significant findings: research questions 1, 2 and 3 
Research questions 1, 2 and 3 provided original insights which were discussed in the 
previous section, rendering it unnecessary to recount them in this section. However, 
the sub-research questions focused on the moderating variables that were captured in 
previous investigations. Thus, a number of statistically significant insights can be 
discussed in this section in relation to them.  
 
7.2.2  Further significant findings: worker’s advocacy (sub-question a) 
Sub-research question (a) sought insights about the influence of advocates, used by 
both employers and workers at the arbitration table, on arbitration decisions. Whilst 
the investigation found the type of advocate used by the employer bore no 
statistically significant influence on the arbitration decisions (when controlling for 
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other factors), workers significantly improved their chances of winning a claim by 
electing to use either independent lawyers or a union representative (that can at times 
be a lawyer), rather than attempting to present their own claim. The use of a lawyer 
improved the chance of a favourable decision by 45 percent and 42 percent where a 
union advocate appeared on the worker‘s behalf. A number of important discussion 
points can be made of these findings. 
 
The first point worth discussing is how exit/voice theory is substantiated by the 
significance of the success experienced by workers represented by an advocate. 
Descriptions of this theory tend to place ‗voice‘ behaviours as those behaviours 
workers perform whilst within the employment relationship (Cappelli & Chauvin 
1991). However, the context of this investigation places the employee outside the 
employment relationship. Provision exists within exit/voice theory for a third person 
or advocate to provide ‗voice from without (after exit)‘ (Hirschman 1970; Luchak 
2003) affording the worker a formal, representative voice to show dissatisfaction 
with the treatment received from their employer. This allows the dismissed worker to 
still exhibit ‗voice‘ behaviours. Moreover, it supports the proposition that advocates 
are an essential resource for accessing this ‗voice‘ behaviour, particularly as self-
represented workers – attempting for themselves to access ‗voice from without‘ - 
were significantly less likely to receive favourable decisions.  
 
The next notable point is that independent lawyers were found to offer greater 
advantage than other sources of advocates, such as industrial relations consultants 
and union representatives (for which the Australian legislation permits them to be 
lawyer). The benefit of an independent lawyer reflects the discoveries of Crow and 
Logan (1994) and Block and Stieber (1987). Scholars have built a collection of 
explanations for such phenomena which, for the sake of brevity, will not be repeated 
here as they were discussed in section 4.6.2. However, the author will add to these 
discussions a comment about the effectiveness of union advocacy evidenced in the 
results. With a world-wide decline in union membership (Bender & Sloane 1999; 
Broadbent 2005; Gall, Hurd & Wilkinson 2011), which in Australia has been 
attributed to neo-liberal political agendas, precarious labour markets and an increase 
in lower-unionised, knowledge-based service jobs (Bray & Underhill 2009; Burgess 
2000; Campbell & Brosnan 1999; Cooper 2005; Gall, Hurd & Wilkinson 2011; 
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Lewis 2004; Wooden 2002), one might think union advocates would be less 
resourced than they once were to provide effective advocacy services. However, 
quite the opposite appears to be happening. The union advocates are nearly matching 
the effectiveness of independent lawyers for unfair dismissal applicants. This may 
indicate unions, challenged by a decreasing presence in the workplace, are investing 
in training and skilling their advocates to demonstrate the benefits of union 
membership to current and potential members, as they etch a response to neo-liberal 
forces shaping the industrial relations environment. 
 
A further point is the finding that non-represented workers were disadvantaged 
compared to represented workers, which is consistent with the research of Mesch and 
Dalton (1992), Bingham and Mesch (2000) and Gely and Chandler (2008). In 
addition to the points raised in the previous paragraphs about the benefits of 
advocacy, a further contingency in play may be that skilled advocates have the 
experience and prowess to expose new information that can change the outcome. For 
instance, the Australian legislation allows parties, during arbitration, to bring to light 
facts that were previously uncovered; in colloquial terms, ‗a second bite of the 
cherry‘. A precedent often cited by tribunal members is McLauchlan v Australia 
Meat Holdings Pty Ltd (Appeal No. 40215)1998 AIRC, stating that arbitrators are 
bound to assess the ‗evidence in the proceeding before it‘ provided such evidence 
was in existence when the dismissal was rendered. These new facts, which can be 
exposed through skilful advocacy, could influence the arbitrator‘s willingness to 
render the dismissal harsh, unjust or unreasonable. As an example, see Daniel V 
Hurstville Community (U2009/11308) 2010.  
 
The final point to be made is that, in spite of Australia‘s federal legislative aims to 
limit (and possibly remove) the involvement of legal representation in unfair 
dismissal proceedings (Forsyth 2012; Mourell & Cameron 2009), the results show 
that this has not been the case, with 37 percent of workers represented by 
independent lawyers and only 15 percent self-representing (the remainder being 
presented by unions at 27 percent, and consultants or non-certified legal officers at 
21 percent). The findings confirm that to limit legal representation would be 
disastrous for the worker with the results confidently showing independent legal 
advocates produce better outcomes for the workers. Regardless of the government‘s 
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ambitions, this investigation indicates that the unfair dismissal arbitration process has 
clearly failed to be one that can be efficiently navigated by a layperson. Furthermore, 
Mourell and Cameron (2009) argued that restricted representation is detrimental not 
only to the dismissed workers emotionally; it increases the work demands on tribunal 
members, and the public at large financially. In closing, based on the complexity of 
the emotional, financial and technical dimensions of the employment contract, 
perhaps it is unrealistic to expect that the typical layperson could cope, let alone 
succeed, in the arbitration arena without the support system provided by experienced 
advocates. 
 
7.2.3  Further significant findings: worker’s gender (sub-question b) 
Sub-research question (b) addressed characteristics about the worker that may be 
influencing the arbitration decision, with the statistically significant finding that 
gender – specifically women working in managerial and professional work – were 
negatively related to favourable arbitration decisions: to the point that they were 45 
percent less likely to win a claim compared to their male counterparts. Along similar 
lines, Brescoll and Uhlmann (2008) detected a negative bias against professional 
women who expressed anger in the workplace – which some employers may see as 
analogous to misconduct - with the consequence that the women were considered 
incompetent. Harsh assessments of women professionals has not changed over thirty 
years, with Larwood, Rand and der Hovanessian (1979) finding that ‗career‘ women 
had little margin for error to make mistakes – regardless of their field - unlike their 
male counterparts performing traditional male roles. 
 
With 46 percent of professional and managerial positions in Australia occupied by 
women (ABS 2012a), it indicates gender desegregation at this broad occupational 
level (Moskos 2012; Wirth 2001); which is consistent with patterns found in a 
number of ILO countries (Wirth 2001). It is odd – and unfortunate - that as women 
steadily increased their presence in professional and managerial occupations since 
1987 (ABS 2006), they failed to receive outcomes at the arbitration table that 
matched those given to male professionals and managers. This finding is reminiscent 
of Ryan and Haslam‘s (2007, p. 566) conclusion that ‗having a more inclusive 
playing field does not necessarily mean that the field is any more level‘. 
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As a potential explanatory factor for this finding, we consider the horizontal 
segregation, or the ‗glass wall‘ that exists between male and female professionals and 
managers. This segregation reinforces the community-work related expectations of 
females so that women professionals are found concentrated in nursing and teaching, 
and women managers in service related industries (Tiessen 2007; Wirth 2001). For 
instance, in 2011–12, Australian women were employed in managerial positions of 
the type concerning child care centre managers (96 percent), health and welfare 
services managers (78 percent) and school principles (48 percent) (ABS 2012b). 
Meanwhile women professionals represented the majority of early childhood 
teachers (97 percent), primary school teachers (86 percent), counsellors (82  percent), 
welfare, recreation and community arts workers (80 percent) and nurses (95 percent) 
(ABS 2012b).  
 
How we as individuals, and society at large, develop a cultural awareness of the 
rights and obligations associated with a job, is thought to be shaped by identity-based 
role theories. These theories explain how occupations become socialised roles so that 
the incumbent can meet the expectations of their client and apply the logic of what is 
and is not appropriate in their line of work (Leavitt et al. 2012; Sluss, van Dick & 
Thompson 2011). To this end, women managers and professionals find themselves 
working in occupations that require the performer to possess a high degree of 
‗natural morality‘ and for which societal expectations reinforce that women are 
suited because they have the disposition to ‘uphold [the] moral standards and care 
about the needy perhaps because of their innate nurturance [and] perform good 
works in service orientated occupations such as social work and nursing’ (Reskin & 
Hartmann 1986, p. 41).  
 
The implication for women working in the type of community related, professional 
and managerial fields in which they are stereotyped, exposes them to a largely 
vulnerable clientele, such as the elderly, the sick and children, which demands 
superior standards of moral judgements and ethical behaviours. It is conceivable that 
acts of misbehaviour in these work fields carry a very low tolerance threshold for 
worker misbehaviour from the perspective of employers, society and ultimately, 
arbitrators. Furthermore, the ‗evil woman‘ theory contends that a transgressing 
female is judged more harshly because she engaged in ‗unladylike‘ behaviour that 
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offended the female stereotype that women are good and moral beings (Herzog & 
Oreg 2008; Moulds 1978; Nagel & Hagan 1983; O'Neil 1999). Either separately or in 
combination, these factors may explain the poorer arbitration outcomes received by 
female professionals and managers who were dismissed for misbehaviour, compared 
to their male counterparts. 
 
Before departing this discussion, it is noted that female workers, when considered in 
totality to also include intermediate and lower skilled women workers, were revealed 
to have a 37 percent improved chance of winning their claim compared to male 
grievants. This statement can be made with the confidence associated with a p-value 
of .087, which, in relation to the typical .05 p-value, may mean it is questioned by 
some. However, as the analysis accounted for the population of misconduct related 
arbitration decisions for the ten year period, the risk of incorrectly generalising 
patterns of behaviour from a sample to the population is reduced. Thus, we consider 
why female grievants can be more optimistic of a win than male grievants, 
particularly in light of the previous finding that females in the professional and 
managerial fields are unlikely to win their claim. This implies that females within the 
intermediate and lower skilled occupations are heavily weighted to winning a claim.  
 
As a starting point, noted first are previous empirical investigations that identified a 
general finding that women are treated more favourably than men in workplace 
arbitration decisions: Knight and Latreille (2001), McAndrew (2000), Bingham and 
Mesch (2000) (in terms of the amount of  backpay), Saridakis et al. (2006), Wagar 
and Grant (1996), Caudill and Oswald (1993), Bemmels  (1988b, 1988a, 1988c, 
1990b, 1990a, 1991a), Dalton and Todor (1985b), Oswald and VanMatre (1990) and 
for workers in small and medium enterprises in Southey and Innes (2010). This 
research adds to this list of studies supporting the presence of gender effects in 
dismissal arbitration favouring female grievants. However, other studies did not 
detect favourable conditions for women grievants: Gely and Chandler (2008), 
Chelliah and D‘Netto (2006), Harcourt and Harcourt (2000), Dalton et al. (1997), 
Thornicroft (1995b), Bemmels (1991b), Scott and Shadoan (1989), Block and Stieber 
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Two reasons may explain why there are studies inconsistent with the finding in this 
thesis. First, the different conditions and methodologies applied in the studies were 
extensive. To explain: there were studies that measured gender effects when dealing 
with a particular behaviour leading to the dismissal such as: alcohol and drug use 
(Crow & Logan 1994); workplace voilence (Gely & Chandler 2008), refusing unsafe 
work (Harcourt & Harcourt 2000) and sexual harassment (Oswald & Caudill 1991). 
Others identified a number of specific misconduct-related reasons: Block and Stieber 
(1987), Thornicroft (1995b). Then there were studies that incorporated reasons for 
dismissal in addition to misconduct, such as redundancy or work performance: 
Chelliah and D‘Netto (2006); Dalton et al. (1997); Scott and Shadoan (1989). There 
was a study that did not include in the analysis the reason the case was before 
arbitration: Dalton et al. (1997). Other studies included lesser disciplinary actions 
such as suspensions: Steen, Perrewe and Hochwarter (1994); Dalton, Owen and 
Todor (1986); Malin and Biernat (2008). The majority of studies used actual 
arbitration decisions for investigation, but other investigators were experimental and 
used hypothetical cases that were assessed by a range of participant ‗decision-
makers‘ (including students), see for example: Bingham and Mesch (2000); 
Bemmels (1990a, 1991a); Malin and Biernat (2008); Oswald and Caudill (1991); and 
Bigoness and DuBose (1985).  
 
Second, the country of origin – and its associated dispute resolution culture - was the 
United States: Bemmels (1988a, 1990b, 1990a), Crow and Logan (1994), Steen, 
Perrewe and Hochwarter (1994), Bingham and Mesch (2000), Dalton et al. (1997), 
Malin & Biernat (2008), Block and Stieber (1987), Oswald and Caudill (1991), 
Bigoness and DuBose (1985), Dalton, Owen and Todor (1986); Canada: Bemmels 
(1988b, 1988a), Thornicroft (1995b), Harcourt and Harcourt (2001) and Australia: 
Chelliah and D‘Netto (2006). Interestingly, the studies conducted in the United 
Kingdom: Knight and Latreille (2001); Saridakis et al. (2006) and New Zealand: 
McAndrew (2000) were consistent with finding that women were more likely to 
receive favourable outcomes, which may be due to a closer cultural alignment 
between Australia and these two countries. 
 
Particular attention must be paid to the Australian study by Chelliah and D‘Netto 
(2006), which did not find the worker‘s gender influenced the arbitration result. This 
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investigation incorporated decisions dealing with redundancy and poor performance 
as additional reasons for dismissal, whilst the current study sought direct insights on 
only misconduct related offences. This factor alone could account for the variation in 
the finding, as workers subjected to disciplinary dismissals may face bias not applied 
to workers who were dismissed because they struggled to meet performance 
expectations or who were laid-off due to downsizing. 
 
Considered briefly is the psycho-sociological premise that attempts to explain why 
females achieve better arbitration outcomes. As the majority of decisions were made 
by male arbitrators, one may think the ‗paternalism and chivalry‘ thesis is at play 
(Franklin & Fearn 2008; Herzog & Oreg 2008; Staines, Tavris & Jayaratne 1974). 
Under this scenario, male arbitrators harbour a fatherly or protective role toward 
females while female arbitrators similarly provide maternal support for women under 
the ‗maternalism‘ thesis (Luthar 1996; Southey & Innes 2010), as they project their 
own gendered challenges to succeed in the workplace, to the plight of other women 
(Eveline 2005; Gutek, Cohen & Tsui 1996). However, these explanations must be 
treated with caution, as the hypothesis test performed in this investigation for 
interaction effects between arbitrator gender and worker gender failed to be 
statistically significant. 
 
Perhaps, therefore, one does not assume the bias sits with the arbitrators, and instead 
consider whether the bias might be occurring in the workplace. Although the 
descriptive statistics indicate male and female workers appear to be committing 
offences of similar severity (see Appendix 9, Table A9.1), women may be subject to 
a higher standard of behaviour by their employers, compared to male workers. 
Within the western traditions of a ‗masculine‘ type workplace (Tiessen 2007; Watson 
& Newby 2005) the results may be showing that women were terminated for 
behaviour their employers perceive to be an offence warranting such extreme 
discipline, however the merits of the employer‘s case fails to withstand scrutiny by 
an arbitrator. Furthermore, the weaknesses in the merits of the employer‘s case may 
be reflecting procedural justice errors when dismissing females, rather than 
distributive justice errors. This suggestion is supported by the cross-tabulation 
appearing in Appendix 9, Table A9.2 between gender and employer errors in the 
dismissal. The largest disparity between the genders occurs with 18 percent of 
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females found to have been subjected to poor presentation of allegations from 
management, as opposed to only 13 percent of male workers experiencing this during 
the dismissal (a procedural justice error). Meanwhile, 21 percent of males were 
exposed to ‗too harsh a punishment‘, compared to only 15 percent of females (a 
distributive justice error). When it comes to deciding whether to dismiss a female 
worker, it is postulated that management is not as thorough in informing women 
workers of the reason for their dismissal. 
  
7.2.4  Further significant findings: arbitrator’s background and experience (sub-
question c) 
 
Sub-research question (c) considered a range of attributes associated with the 
arbitrators that may influence their decisions. The effects of two of these attributes 
were correctly hypothesised. First, arbitrators would be influenced by their work 
background to the extent that those with union backgrounds were more inclined to 
favour workers, compared to arbitrators with a management background (as 
discussed in section 4.8.2). Second, arbitrators toughened their stance on finding in 
favour of the worker as their experience in making arbitration decisions increased 
(discussed in section 4.8.6). 
 
Considered first is the work background of the arbitrator where the finding in this 
investigation supported the previous findings by Southey and Fry (2010, 2012) and 
Crow and Logan (1994). Other scholars have also identified the arbitrator‘s work 
background as an influential factor on their decisions, although notably these studies 
used different occupational categories or political ideology, such as legal 
background, academic background or ‗conservatism/liberalism‘ (Bemmels 1990b, 
1990a; Biernat & Malin 2008; Bingham & Mesch 2000).  
 
On the other hand, arbitrator background, in two investigations identified from the 
literature, did not identify a significant relationship between work background and 
arbitration decisions (Heneman III & Sandver 1983; Nelson & Kim 2008). Nelson 
and Kim (2008) measured background by identifying whether or not being an 
arbitrator was their primary occupation. Whilst the earlier study by Heneman III and 
Sandver (1983) contained a sample where only 3.6 percent of the arbitrators had a 
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union background and the arbitration decisions were not limited to disciplinary 
dismissal cases. On balance, the evidence appears to be mounting that work history 
influences are apparent, particularly in the Australian context, taking into account the 
leading interest taken by the author of this thesis. 
 
Judicial and activist arbitration theories suggest arbitrators remain neutral and 
impervious to the effects of their personal sentiments, agendas and attributes 
(Dabscheck 1980, 1983b; Perlman 1954; Romeyn 1980). Under such theories it 
should be inconsequential whether the arbitrator worked previously for either the 
interests of workers or employers, as it should have no influence on his or her 
decision. Yet Dabscheck (1981) and Perlman (1954) also proposed arbitrators, under 
the auspices of accommodative, autonomous or administrative arbitration, might 
submit to either the power of the stronger party or promote their own agenda. In 
addition, Carlston (1952) and Wheeler (1976) also conceived arbitration theories 
beyond a neutral framework, whereby arbitrators engage in educative, mediative, 
humanitarian or even disciplinarian roles. Within any of these alternate frameworks, 
the arbitrator may not always act as the ‗neutral‘ third party – no doubt elevating 
scholarly interest on the predisposition of each arbitrator. In Australia, the persistent 
claims that successive governments have ‗stacked‘ the tribunal echo the sentiments 
of these alternate arbitration theories, as stakeholders fear their interests may not be 
recognised by the arbitrators and the federal tribunal at large.  
 
It is thought that a person‘s prior experiences, orientations and mental models 
inherently influence the cognitive heuristics and selectively used to assess 
information for decision making (Das & Teng 1999; Korte 2003; Sangha & Moles 
1997; Tversky & Kahnemann 2000). Perhaps the reason why the arbitrators‘ 
professional work background was found to influence their decisions is the human 
impossibility to detach from the subconscious influences of their personal attributes, 
which inescapably shape their interpretations of the evidence, and subsequent 
decisions.  
 
Second, experience in arbitral decision-making over unfair dismissal claims was 
found to be an influential factor on the arbitrator‘s decision. As discussed earlier, the 
result that more experienced arbitrators tend to support the employer‘s actions are in 
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line with previous investigations (Caudill & Oswald 1993; Nelson & Curry 1981; 
Nelson & Kim 2008; Oswald & Caudill 1991; Simpson & Martocchio 1997). As 
discussed earlier. 
 
This negative relationship might be explained by the suggestion that arbitrators, as 
they make more arbitration decisions, become correspondingly accustomed to the 
psychological discomfort of administering a decision that has punitive consequences 
for a worker. Additionally, recalling that Collins (1992) suggests the fundamental 
principle of unfair dismissal laws are to support workers in their quest for dignity and 
autonomy in the employment relationship, the arbitrator‘s early decisions might 
express an austere application of these principles. Simply, less experienced 
arbitrators may err on the side of caution and support the party that, in the main, has 
lesser power: the worker. Inevitably, as they determine more claims, it is proposed 
their construction of these principles evolves, influenced by: their increasing 
expertise in the legislative minutiae, the decisions made by their colleagues and, as 
suggested by Nelson and Kim (2008), their improving ability to detect whether 
someone is telling the truth. As this experience increases, the arbitrator refines their 
decision-making so that they can balance more distinctly (Bemmels 1991a) the rights 
of the worker against the economic considerations for the employer‘s business. In 
this realm, we see arbitrators being more assured of upholding dismissals that, in 
effect, sustain the punitive consequences for the worker. 
 
7.2.5  Further significant findings: collegial support and industry (sub-question d) 
Sub-research question (d) concerned itself with descriptive factors about the 
employer that could be influencing the arbitration decisions. Collegial support in the 
workplace during meetings and industry were found to carry significant influences 
on the arbitration outcome. 
 
It was found that workers, who were permitted by their employer to have a 
colleague, a friend or a companion present at meetings prior to and at the dismissal, 
tended to be less likely to win their unfair dismissal claim. This is possibility the first 
Australian study to have sought and detected such a finding. It is also one which is 
consistent with Saundry, Jones and Antcliff (2011) UK cross-industry analysis of 
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worker representation in disciplinary matters in the workplace. The statistical model 
estimated that accompanied workers were 43 percent less likely to win their claim 
compared to workers supported by union representatives or delegates. Discussed next 
are two insights that herald from this finding.  
 
First, the employer, by allowing the worker to be supported by a companion during 
meetings associated with the dismissal, may be viewed by arbitrators as having made 
efforts towards administering a just and fair dismissal process. Additionally, the 
simple regression result of ‗unaccompanied‘ workers being statistically significantly 
more likely to receive favourable arbitration decisions also supports the contention 
that the presence of a support person for the worker provides an indication of the 
employer‘s ambition to follow a procedurally fair process. Allowing the worker a 
support person during proceedings has been associated with the application of more 
‗formalised‘ disciplinary and dismissal procedures (Antcliff & Saundry 2009) and is 
recommended as a practice, provided the support person is not a lawyer, by 
Australia‘s Fair Work Commission (FWC 2013a).  
 
Second, this finding suggests that workers supported by union representatives or 
delegates during the dismissal process, were more successful in their claims 
compared to those that relied on friends or colleagues to be present. It has been 
identified that Australian workplace union delegates are, in the majority, exposed to 
training opportunities which can improve delegates‘ activism and their confidence in 
‗organising‘ behaviours (Peetz & Pocock 2009; Peetz, Webb & Jones 2002). Thus, 
having a friend or colleague by the worker‘s side probably offers less effective 
protection against unfair dealings, as opposed to the assistance of a union delegate 
(or representative) who are anticipated to be more attuned to identifying and noting 
irregular treatment to the worker. Such shortfalls in the employer‘s treatment of the 
worker during the dismissal can then be provided by the union advocate to the 
arbitrator during the hearing. Even if well-intentioned, a colleague or friend is 
unlikely to possess similar know-how. 
 
Sub-question (d) also ascertained that the type of industry in which the employer 
operates can have a significant influence on the decision. There was a trend 
indicating that workers engaged in the transport, postal, warehousing, manufacturing 
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and wholesaling industries are winning around 86 percent of their claims. This claim 
is somewhat tentative as the manufacturing and wholesaling industries possessed a 
.096 p-value. The same argument for confidence as per the gender effects finding 
discussed in section 7.2.3 may also offer a reason to give some brief thoughts on this 
finding. 
 
These findings are congruent with scholarship suggesting secondary industries 
characterised by lower skill sets, physically demanding work and/or harsh work 
environments, are more likely to adopt aggressive disciplinary approaches (Antcliff 
& Saundry 2009; Green & Weisskopf 1990). In particular, the manufacturing 
industry has been identified as a high dismissal industry (Green & Weisskopf 1990; 
Klass, Brown & Heneman III 1998).  The vulnerability of workers in these industries 
has further increased with the decline in union presence in the workplace when the 
evidence suggests unions have potential to facilitate resolutions rather than escalate 
disputes (Antcliff & Saundry 2009; Campbell III 1997; Klass, Brown & Heneman III 
1998; Pyman et al. 2010). It is postulated that these high disciplinary industries have 
a culture of administering dismissal as a disciplinary response to behaviours viewed 
by management as ‗reprimandable offences‘, which, by arbitrators‘ standards, are 
considered too harsh and who consequently restore justice to the workers by issuing 
decisions in their favour.  
 
A further point from this aspect of the investigation worthy of comment is that the 
solitary negative relationship with favourable arbitration outcomes was identified for 
workers in the hospitality and recreation industries. Akin to the secondary industries 
discussed above, the hospitality industry is also described in the literature as one that 
has historically applied ‗hard‘ human resource practices (Head & Lucas 2004; 
Korczynski 2002; Mills & Dalton 1994). However it is also one that is complicated 
by its sole reliance on the intangible, human involvement in its delivery and where 
social and moral aspects of the work differ from product-related industries 
(Korczynski 2002; Lucas 2004). Although the negative relationship identified in this 
thesis cannot be stated with any statistical confidence (p-value of .3), it presents an 
oddity perhaps worthy of further investigation, that out of all the industries – where 
the customer cannot be taken out of the equation (Lucas 2004) - hospitality and 
recreation workers were negatively related to winning their claims.  
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7.3  Insights from retained, null hypotheses and unexpected influences 
The final aspects to be discussed from the investigation performed in this thesis are 
those findings which ran counter to the alternate hypothesis, or alternatively, where 
unexpected negative or positive relationships occurred between certain variables and 
the arbitration decisions. These items will be discussed in relation to relevant 
literature and where necessary, possible explanations for the phenomena provided. 
Again, these insights will be discussed under the banner of their relevant research 
question. 
 
7.3.1  Statistical insignificance: service periods and remorse (question 1)  
Not supported was the prediction that workers could mitigate the allegation of 
misbehaviour by demonstrating loyalty on the basis of serving a lengthy period of 
employment (Chelliah & D'Netto 2006; Knight & Latreille 2001; Saridakis et al. 
2006; Simpson & Martocchio 1997). In effect, the opposite was found, whereby 
workers with 15 to 20 years service were statistically significantly the least likely to 
win a claim. The general pattern observed in the analysis - although not statistically 
significant for the remaining service periods - showed workers with service periods 
up to ten years were more likely to win their claim and those with ten years or more 
service were less likely to win their claim.  
 
Two possible interpretations might explain this finding about length of service. First, 
long-serving employees can be considered power-brokers in the informal learning 
that occurs in organisations (Wee & Lee 2010). With this in mind, it may be that 
longer-serving employees are expected to be role models to employees of less 
experience, and who should ‗know better‘ about behaviour that offends the codes of 
conduct and idiosyncrasies with the norms of acceptable behaviour for their 
particular employer. Alternatively, as longer-serving employees come to recognise 
weaknesses in company processes and/or monitoring systems (Ermongkonchai 2010) 
they may attempt to exploit such faults - with disastrous consequences.  
 
More challenging to explain is the failed prediction that showing remorse or making 
an ‗apology‘ for one‘s behaviour will soften the sentence. The simple regression 
model confidently revealed that remorse would improve the chance of a favourable 
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decision to the worker by 19 percent, yet this effect disappeared in the ‗all things 
considered equal‘ context of the full model. The finding thus opposes the expectation 
presented in the literature that a demonstration of contrition can improve relations 
and soften the punishment (Brownlee 2010; Eylon, Giacalone & Pollard 2000; 
Friedman 2006; Skarlicki & Kulik 2005).  
 
The dissolving influence of remorse between the simple and full model suggests that 
whilst there may be some combination of factors in which contrition can influence 
the arbitrator to find in the worker‘s favour, in the main, remorse is unlikely to 
improve the worker‘s ability to win his or her claim. A couple of factors might 
explain this negative relationship. First, it was shown in a previous finding that 
increasing the complexity of an explanation reduces the likelihood of win. Thus an 
apology may add another layer of complexity to workers‘ defences. Second, it is 
possible that an apology has the affect of compromising or undermining workers‘ 
explanations to justify why they engaged in the behaviour. It might be that through 
showing remorse or apologising, the workers‘ culpability for their behaviour is 
reinforced to the arbitrators.  
 
7.3.2  Statistical insignificance: employee explanations (question 2) 
The second research question concerning the workers‘ explanation for their 
behaviour – predicated on attribution theory (discussed in section 4.4.2) - showed 
that the anticipated relationships between the three types of explanation (work 
related, personal-inside, and personal-outside) and favourable arbitration decisions to 
the workers were predicted correctly – however they approached, but did not 
achieve, statistical significance (p-values of .112 and .148). Thus the null hypothesis 
stood, suggesting that there is no particular explanation that can be used to improve 
the chances of a favourable decision. If the null hypothesis is in fact true, the 
disconcerting implication is that the content of the explanation proffered by the 
workers has minor consequence in the dynamics of arbitral decision-making. Instead, 
based on the other significant findings in this study, the worker‘s explanation would 
be overshadowed by the complexity of the explanation, the actual type of 
misbehaviour and the dismissal process itself. This suggests worker advocates focus 
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on presenting a simplified defence aimed at discrediting the employer‘s process, and 
less concern about the content of the worker‘s explanation. 
 
However, the argument presented previously promoting the benefits of analysing the 
population of misconduct related decisions, lessening the impact of the a priori p-
value for rejecting the null hypothesis (noted in sub-section 7.2.3), is noted again to 
support the suggestion that the directions of influence shown by the different 
explanations, with p-values of .112 and .148, might possibly be actual patterns and 
not random observations. If the alternate hypothesis is the truth, the influential 
elements of arbitral decision-making combine to present a more balanced approach 
than suggested in the previous paragraph. Arbitral decision-making under this 
interpretation would then also incorporate the internal and/or external attributions the 
workers attributed their behaviour – according to the Southey (2010) employee 
explanation typology - which reflects explanations that either implicated the 
operations of the workplace and/or personal issues to which the workers succumbed.  
 
This interpretation of the finding also places the employer in an even more culpable 
position than in the scenario under the null hypothesis. According to attribution 
theory, a situation caused by external factors beyond the control of the individual 
lessens judgements of responsibility on the individual (Heider 1958; Judge & 
Martocchio 1996; Klass, Mahony & Wheeler 2006; Robbins et al. 2011). Thus, 
employers are potentially exposed to being incriminated if workers plead externally-
attributed, workplace-related reasons for their behaviour. And, where this happens, 
the workers are better placed to win their claim than if they relied on personal 
motivations to explain their behaviour.  
 
7.3.3  Statistical insignificance: severity of the offence (question 3) 
It was predicted that employers could mitigate weaknesses in their dismissal process 
if workers committed a severe offence. Severity of the offence is believed to be an 
important control measure when analysing arbitral decision-making (Dalton et al. 
1997; Mesch 1995; Scott & Shadoan 1989). However, the analysis supported this 
contention in only one error - where the employer was lax in seeking the worker‘s 
response to the allegation. This finding was discussed in section 7.1.3. For the 
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remaining six errors, the null hypothesis was retained. This means employers are 
unable to claim that the offence was so obnoxious in nature that they expedited the 
dismissal and may have (even if inadvertently) missed steps in natural and 
procedural justice. These insights are positive as it suggests that arbitrators hold 
employers to workplace justice practices congruent with the societal expectation that 
‗everyone deserves a fair trial‘. Despite the fact that a worker may have actually 
engaged in serious and offensive misconduct, the modelling shows that the employer 
must show the worker the respect of following a procedurally fair process to 
investigate the incident and determine a course of action, if the employer aims to not 
have its actions overturned at arbitration. 
 
7.3.4  Statistical insignificance: employer’s advocacy (sub-question a) 
The investigation did not support the prediction that employers would benefit from 
engaging advocacy services at the arbitration table. A similar finding was produced 
by Kirschenbaum, Harel and Sivan (1998) whilst findings suggesting employer 
advocates provide no advantage when facing unrepresented workers were noted by 
Harcourt (2000) and Thornicroft (1994). On balance, the finding in this thesis is 
counter to the overall trend reported in prior examinations that advocates are 
beneficial in representing workers and employers, particularly if an imbalance in the 
representation exists between the opposing parties (Block & Stieber 1987; Crow & 
Logan 1994; Knight & Latreille 2001; McAndrew 2000).  
 
Whilst this investigation found workers benefited significantly by using advocates 
(discussed in section 7.2.2), it did not find the same for employers. If the null 
hypothesis can be accepted, an explanation as to why advocacy services do not 
appear to benefit Australian employers could point to the political agenda for unfair 
dismissal claims to be resolved without the parties resorting to expensive, legal 
advocacy (Mourell & Cameron 2009). With the legislative onus to subdue the 
reliance on legal advocacy, the tribunal may more arduously scrutinise employers 
that use advocates to defend their dismissal of a worker, than employers that self-
represent their defence. In effect, despite the superior advocacy skills of independent 
legal counsel, their influence over the employers‘ defence is neutralised by the anti-
legal agenda. At the same time workers, due to their lower power (Mourell & 
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Cameron 2009), are afforded the benefit of an advocate to adequately present their 
claim. 
 
Even though the results sustained the null hypothesis, it is worth considering the 
direction of influence revealed in the analysis, because the implications from this 
perspective are quite different from those discussed in the previous paragraph. The 
modelling showed that the direction of influence for employers that engaged 
independent lawyers decreased the chances of the worker winning a claim by 22 
percent (confidence equals a p-value of .107). Subsequently, taking into account the 
previous scholarly discoveries promoting the effectiveness of legal advocacy, and the 
fact that the p-value is not excessively high, a cautious argument could be made that 
advocacy by independent lawyers may be beneficial for employers. This would bring 
Australia into line with the majority of previous empirical investigations.  
 
However, more concerning for the efficiency of employer advocacy is that - bearing 
in mind the lack of statistical confidence - a worker had a 29 percent improved 
chance of winning a claim if the employer used an advocate from an industry or 
employer association (p-value of .121). An explanation may be that associations feel 
duty-bound to support an employer at arbitration, regardless of the strength of the 
case and regardless of the fact that they may be lawyers themselves. Perhaps there 
are more complex reasons, even though explanations are challenging due to limited 
scholarship about the behaviour of employer associations (Barry & Wilkinson 2011).  
 
One train of thought is that employer associations are facing membership and 
renewal challenges, similar to unions, as they adapt to the decentralised industrial 
relations landscape (Hearn Mackinnon 2009; Sheldon & Thornthwaite 2004). And, 
although associations serve as the employers‘ counterbalance to the workers‘ unions 
(Barry & Wilkinson 2011), this investigation hints at the possibility that they may 
have fallen behind the unions‘ performance as advocates at the unfair dismissal 
arbitration table. Unions have engaged in a proactive advocate training (Brown & 
Yasukawa 2010) allowing performance for dismissed workers at arbitration. Perhaps 
similar training and development efforts are not mirrored by employer associations. 
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Yet the employer associations‘ performance may not be a matter of skill but rather a 
matter beyond the control of association advocates: in the form of cognitive biases on 
behalf of the arbitrator. It may be that arbitrators are influenced by stereotypical, 
preconceptions about the advocate‘s incentive to appear on behalf of a party at the 
arbitration table. To explain, legal counsel advocates may be viewed as having 
‗mercenary‘ interests, ready to sell their advocacy expertise to a willing party 
(Daniels & Martin 2012); unions advocates may be seen as campaigners pursuing an 
honourable fight to restore the underdog worker with the opportunity to attend the 
workplace; whereas employer association advocates may be seen as ‗capitalist 
delegates‘ bolstering the managerial prerogative of the power-wielding employer. In 
an industrial mechanism that aims to counterbalance the employer‘s power; of these 
three scenarios, one might anticipate that employer association advocates face the 
largest barrier to winning a favourable response for their client.  
 
7.3.5  Statistical insignificance: employment status (sub-question b) 
Discussed under this sub-question is the employment status of the worker for which 
the alternate hypothesis was not supported. Recognising that both full-time and part-
time employment can be precarious in nature – this factor was considered because of 
the increase in part-time work being performed in Australia. Part-time workers may 
be associated with job insecurity if one deduces that part-time workers may be more 
likely to be engaged on a casual or non permanent basis. Precarious employment is 
associated with substandard employment security, conditions and rights (Campbell 
2010) and lower union membership (ABS 2011c).  
 
Without guidance from previous empirical studies on this factor in relation to 
arbitration decisions, it was contended that substandard conditions and lower union 
membership may impact treatment of part-time workers during investigation, 
dismissal and pursuit of a claim. However, the null hypothesis was retained because 
the analysis (with a high p-value of .335) did not confidently support the notion that 
people performing part-time hours would be more likely to win their claim. This is 
an optimistic finding, as it suggests that part-time workers appear to be in neither a 
better nor worse situation with their arbitration outcomes than their full-time 
counterparts: in spite of lower union presence amongst such workers.  
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Noting that women are disproportionally engaged to perform the work of precarious 
part-time employment (Vosko, MacDonald & Campbell 2009), an interaction was 
performed to consider if women in part-time employment were facing 
disproportionate disciplinary hardships. Again the null hypothesis was retained, with 
the p-value at .132. While the direction of influence suggested women of part-time 
status are (40 percent) more likely to win their claim over women of full-time status, 
the p-value provides weak evidence to make such a claim with statistical 
assuredness.  
 
7.3.6  Unexpected direction of influence: occupational skill level (sub-question b) 
In relation to the occupational skill level held by the dismissed worker, the null 
hypothesis was retained because the directions of influence were incorrectly 
predicted. The analysis in this thesis could not sustain the alternate hypothesis that 
lower-skilled workers, due to their vulnerability in the workplace and labour market, 
would be more likely to receive favourable decisions than higher-skilled workers (as 
detected in Southey 2008b; Southey & Innes 2010). Two reasons are attributed for 
the lower-skilled worker‘s reversal of fortune from those reported in the author‘s 
previous investigations (in  Southey 2008b; Southey & Innes 2010). The earlier 
investigations included dismissals on the basis of redundancy and unsatisfactory 
performance, whereas this investigation is tied solely to misconduct related 
dismissals. The cross-section of dismissal reasons incorporated into the prior studies 
is likely to impose different influences on the arbitration decisions. Second, the 
investigation in this thesis incorporated a broader range of control variables which 
sculpted a different, ‗level‘ field from the prior studies, for detecting nuances in the 
arbitration decisions.   
 
However, in spite of retaining the null hypothesis, the modelling for this thesis 
revealed a statistically significant trend that as skill level decreased, the chance that a 
worker would receive a favourable arbitration decision also decreased (this is 
opposite to the direction originally hypothesised). Such a finding is consistent with 
those suggested by Rosenthal and Budjanovcanin (2011), Antcliff and Saundry 
(2009), Cappelli and Chauvin (1992) and Block and Stieber (1987) and Bemmels 
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(1988b). Several schools of thought can assist with developing plausible reasons for 
this finding.  
 
First, the organisational deviance literature suggests market power can legitimatise 
misconduct at the organisational level. It suggested more powerful, high status 
organisations are able to construct public accounts that legitimise their actions, 
particularly if there is demand for its product or service (Vaughan 1999). If this 
presumption about the influence of status and competitiveness is applied to 
individuals within organisations, it is argued that higher skilled staff, on the basis of 
their stronger labour power, can present more persuasive defences for their behaviour 
compared to lower skilled workers who have less labour power. 
 
Add to this the suggestion that the quality of resources people can access for 
assistance bear a strong influence on successful case outcomes (Rosenthal & 
Budjanovcanin 2011). Compared to lower skilled workers, people dismissed from 
higher skilled occupations presumably have access to better resources to assemble 
their claim. This is a point supported by the descriptive statistics collected for this 
thesis, with 51 percent of professionals and managers engaging legal counsel to 
perform their advocacy at arbitration, as opposed to 33 percent of labourers, drivers 
and operators doing the same (cross-tabulations appear in Appendix 9 Table A9.3). 
And, as discussed in section 7.2.2 it was found that employees who used legal 
counsel had, statistically significantly, the strongest chance of winning their claim.  
 
Second, class and occupational status are irretrievably linked, as well established in 
the literature – with seminal works by Marx and Weber – that a person‘s social class 
is defined by their occupation (Hyman 2006; Inkeles & Rossi 1956; Watson 2008; 
Weber 1978). Keeping this point in mind, a second plausible explanation is sourced 
through insights found in the criminology literature. Frequently premised on the 
seminal works by Merton (1938), who suggested that the social structure directly 
pressures particular groups to engage in deviant behaviour, criminology scholars 
have argued that social class influences both people‘s tendency to commit crime, and 
the type of crime they are likely to engage (Clelland & Carter 1980; Farnworth et al. 
1994). Typically, white-collar crime associated with the ‗powerful‘ class is 
distinguished from lower-class ‗street crime‘ against people and property, such as 
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burglary and theft  (Schwartz & DeKeseredy 2010, p. 108). Further, the harsh 
conditions associated with low-skilled, repetitious work are believed to make such 
workers susceptible to particular deviant behavioural responses (Bruursema, Kessler 
& Spector 2011). Thus, it may be that certain types of misbehaviour are associated 
more commonly with particular occupational contexts. And, it may be that these 
types of misbehaviour may also be the behaviours that are the least tolerated by the 
arbitrators and society at large. 
 
The findings discussed in section 7.1.1 contended that acts of personal aggression 
followed by acts of production deviance were the least tolerated acts of 
misbehaviour. The descriptive statistics collected for this thesis also show that the 
lower-skilled occupations of operator, driver or labourer committed the higher 
percentage of such least tolerated acts. The cross-tabulations are contained in 
Appendix 9 Table A9.4, however in summary, they revealed that 50 percent of the 
personal aggression incidents were performed by a person in the operator, driver or 
labourer category (lower skilled), whereas only 14 percent of such incidents were 
performed by a person in the managerial or professional category (higher skilled). 
Meanwhile, 45 percent of production deviance incidents were performed by a person 
in the operator, driver or labourer category, compared to 12 percent by a person in 
the managerial or professional category. These figures appear to support the 
proposition that variations in the type of offences may account for workers of lower 
occupational status receiving decisions that are less frequently in their favour, 
because they engaged in behaviours under the least tolerated categories. 
 
7.3.7  Statistical insignificance: arbitrator’s  gender and seniority (sub-question c) 
The arbitrator’s gender was not an influential factor in the arbitration decision. This 
suggests that a male arbitrator is no more or less likely than a female arbitrator to 
find in favour of the worker or employer. Also not detected in the analysis were 
interaction effects between the gender of the dismissed worker and that of the 
alternate gendered arbitrator. This suggests that male arbitrators are no more or less 
likely than a female arbitrator to find in favour of a female grievant and a female 
arbitrator is no more or less likely than a male arbitrator to find in favour of a male 
grievant. This finding is consistent with works such as Gely and Chandler (2008), 
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Malin and Biernat (2008), Chelliah and D‘Netto (2006), Thornicroft (1995b), Crow 
and Logan (1994), Oswald and Caudill (1991), Bemmels (1991b), Bigoness and 
DuBose (1985). The retention of these null hypotheses is positive for the federal 
tribunal, as it bolsters the tribunal‘s ability to promote that its arbitration decisions 
are not a product of the arbitrator’s gender. Note though, section 7.2.3 discusses the 
significant influence of the worker’s gender on the arbitration outcome. 
 
The seniority of the arbitrator, as per the appointment hierarchy of the Australian 
federal industrial tribunal, is not statistically significant as a factor in the arbitration 
decisions. This prediction was underpinned by the logic that more experienced 
arbitrators would be appointed at higher levels of seniority. The insight offered from 
the failed prediction is that the arbitrator‘s status (commissioner, deputy commission, 
senior deputy commission, vice president) is not analogous to arbitrator‘s experience 
– which we recall was a significant factor influencing the arbitration decision 
(discussed in section 7.2.4). The implication is not to assume a senior arbitrator is 
more experienced at arbitral decision-making (in unfair dismissal matters) than a 
junior arbitrator. 
 
7.3.8  Statistical insignificance: employer characteristics (sub-question d) 
This section will consider four variables concerning employer characteristic that 
failed to support the acceptance of the alternate hypotheses addressing formality of 
the dismissal process, the presence of HR expertise, business size and business 
sector. 
 
Initially addressed are the three variables: the formality of the dismissal process, the 
presence of HR expertise and the size of the employer‘s business. These three 
features are inextricably linked, because the size of the employer‘s business is likely 
to predicate whether a human resource expert is appointed to the firm, which is likely 
to influence the formality of the dismissal process (Antcliff & Saundry 2009; Harris 
2002; Kotey & Slade 2005; Mazzarol 2003; Saridakis et al. 2006; Southey 2007). 
These three factors were, in the end, statistically insignificant in the final block of the 
hierarchical model, yet two factors, HR expertise and formality of the dismissal 
process, were statistically significant in the simple regression (and formality in the 
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base model of the multiple regression), with both showing a negative relationship to 
decisions favouring the worker. Thus, in fundamental terms, it is beneficial for 
employers to have the expertise of a human resource officer, and to apply formal 
dismissal processes, such as documenting meetings, providing written and 
informative advice to the worker of the situation, and allowing collegial support for 
the worker. However, when HR expertise and formality are considered with a range 
of other variables that might also influence arbitral decision making, these factors are 
eclipsed by stronger influences. 
 
There appears to be a dearth of empirical investigations about the direct influence of 
these factors on dismissal related arbitration decisions, although the statistical 
significance of formality in the simple and base models is consistent with Knight and 
Latreille (2001); and with Southey and Innes (2010) regarding HR expertise in the 
simple regression. The dissolution of the statistical significance for these factors 
within the final block of the hierarchical model (p =.113 for formality and .459 for 
HR expertise), rendering them incongruent with previous scholarship, is attributed to 
the fact that a broader range of control variables was introduced into the modelling 
for this thesis, compared to those incorporated in earlier studies. For instance, the 
earlier studies did not take into account factors such as arbitrator work history and 
experience, worker explanations, and type of misconduct.  
 
In relation to the business size, Earnshaw, Marchington and Goodman (2000) noted  
small business-sized employers where quite successful at arbitration, which 
contradicted Saridakis (2006) finding that the employer‘s chance of a favourable 
decision decreased as the business size became smaller. Both scholars presented 
findings that resembled the direction of influence for firm size detected in this thesis. 
Bearing in mind the finding in this thesis is statistically insignificant (p = .188, .207), 
the pattern detected was that, small businesses (up to 19 workers) were more likely to 
win than medium business (20 to 199 workers), but less likely to win than large 
business (200 plus workers). Therefore, smaller businesses, compared to medium 
business, are more successful at arbitration (as per Earnshaw, Marchington and 
Goodman‘s finding), but compared to large business, less successful (as per 
Saridakis‘ finding). Moreover, these findings reflect previous work of the author, in 
Southey (2007), that businesses employing between 50 and 100 staff had a 
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significantly lower number of cases determined in favour of the employer. However, 
this result was founded on simple, bivariate analysis for two years worth of 
decisions, dealing with dismissal for an array of reasons of which misconduct was 
only one reason. 
 
Subsequently, without the assurance of statistically significant p-values, it may be the 
detected directions of influence are incidental, in which case the lack of statistical 
significance in the final model surrounding these three variables may be reflecting 
Australia‘s commitment to the ‗fair go all round‘ principle (The Fair Work Act 2009, 
Section 382). To this end, under Section 387 of The Act, arbitrators must consider 
the employer‘s position in relation to: 
 
(a)  the degree to which the size of the employer‘s enterprise would be likely to 
impact on the procedures followed in effecting the dismissal; and 
(b)  the degree to which the absence of dedicated human resource management 
specialists or expertise in the enterprise would be likely to impact on the 
procedures followed in effecting the dismissal. 
 
These provisions were adopted from the preceding legislation and were initially 
legislated via the Workplace Relations Amendment (Termination of Employment) Act 
2001. This means the HR expertise and business size provisions were in place for 
most of the ten year period of arbitration decisions examined in this thesis. The 
‗Small Business Fair Dismissal Code‘ introduced in the 2009 Act further recognised 
the challenges of small business operations, specifically, their limited HR expertise 
and redeployment opportunities (Chapman 2009). However, as the intent of this 
Code is complementary to, rather than counter to, Section 387 provisions, its 
existence during the 2009 and 2010 decisions included in the dataset, is unlikely to 
have significantly altered the results. In spite of scholarship to the contrary, the 
retention of the null hypotheses suggesting no relationship exists between arbitration 
decisions and business size, HR expertise and formality – may be viable. It suggests 
the legislative controls are effective at fettering arbitral decision-making so that small 
business are not disadvantaged on the basis that the formalised procedures associated 
with HR expertise evades them.  
 
This leads to the final variable to be addressed under this section, the sector in which 
the employer operates: be it the public sector or private sector. The null hypothesis 
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was retained, mainly as it was hypothesised incorrectly that private sector workers 
would be more likely to win a claim than public sector workers. However with a p-
value of .07 it could be argued that the actual finding, which was that public sector 
workers had a 25 percent improved chance of winning a claim compared to private 
sector workers, is possibly an accurate insight. It appears this investigation - if the p-
value of .07 is accepted as statistically significant - runs counter to previous works 
incorporating the public/private sector variable in the arbitration of dismissal claims. 
None of the identified studies detected statistically significant effects for sector 
(Bemmels 1988b; Block & Stieber 1987; Caudill & Oswald 1992; Knight & Latreille 
2001; Thornicroft 1994; Wagar 1994). These studies were conducted on arbitration 
decisions made in the United States, United Kingdom and Canada, that incorporated 
a variety of methodologies, and were not necessarily limited to misconduct related 
dismissals. These factors may account for the variation. However, two further 
explanations can be tendered. 
 
First, the outcomes might reflect variations in advocacy used between public and 
private sector workers. It was revealed previously that legal counsel, followed by 
union representation, benefited the worker at the arbitration table, whilst self- 
representation was least successful (see section 7.2.2). Thus, if public sector workers 
are more likely to hire legal and union advocacy and less likely to self represent, 
compared to private sector workers, it may explain the better success rate for public 
sector workers.  
 
The descriptive statistics support this suggestion about use of advocacy by public 
sector workers. Cross-tabulations presented in Appendix 9 Table A9.5, show that a 
total of 72 percent of public sector workers used legal counsel (50 percent) and 
unions (22 percent) for advocacy, compared to only 63 percent from the private 
sector (35 percent legal and 28 percent unions). Meanwhile, only 11 percent public 
sector workers were likely to employ the least successful strategy of self-
representation, compared to 16 percent in the private sector. An interesting point is 
that private sector workers used union representation (28 percent) more often than 
public sector workers (22 percent). Paradoxically, union density in the private sector 
at 14 percent, is much lower than the public sector at 41 percent (ABS 2010c). 
Perhaps unionised workers in the private sector are more acutely aware of their rights 
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to pursue unfair dismissal, or it may indicate differences in vigilance, and/or 
operational strategies between private and public sector unions. And, not to be 
overlooked is that the private sector contains particular industries that culturally, are 
more union organised than others. For instance, in 2010 union membership was 41 
percent in electricity, gas and water, 32 percent in transport, postal and warehousing, 
and 21 percent in manufacturing (ABS 2010b). 
 
Second, for public sector workers to have been more successful in their claims, it 
means public sector management were either making more mistakes in the dismissal 
process and/or were administrating harsher punishment than private sector 
management. The descriptive statistics in Appendix 9 Table A9.6 suggest both of 
these factors are occurring. Public sector management were more susceptible to two 
of the three ‗fatal‘ errors discussed in section 7.1.3, compared to private sector 
management. First, public sector managers were guilty of ignoring mitigating 
circumstances in 15 percent of the cases compared to only 5 percent in the private 
sector. The risk of ignoring mitigating circumstances is that a punishment is open to 
being judged as too harsh. To this end, public sector dismissals were considered too 
harsh a punishment by the arbitrator in 26 percent of cases, compared to 19 percent 
of private sector cases.  
 
The variations in dismissal errors between public and private sector managers may 
be the consequence of equity obligations of the public sector to administer decisions 
through a framework of ‗precedents‘. Public sector managers ‗can be hamstrung by 
precedent and constrained by well-intentioned bureaucratic practices‘ (Du Gay 2000; 
Goldsmith & Eggers 2004, p. 56). Thus, a public sector employee could be dismissed 
for taking home the staff newspaper from the tearoom at the end of the day – because 
the policy states theft will result in summary dismissal. So whilst one may have 
doubts whether dismissal is warranted for taking home the newspaper, public sector 
managers may be reluctant to take into account mitigating circumstances, such as the 
minor value of the newspaper, or that maybe that is was not habitual behaviour and 
the worker wanted an extra copy for an article of personal interest. For the public 
sector manager, to not dismiss the worker could be viewed as deviating from a 
disciplinary precedent, and/or setting a new, unwanted precedent. However, 
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arbitrators can detach their deliberations from such bureaucratic traditions and 
consider the dismissal for its severity in relation to the offence. 
 
7.4  Conclusions about the research problem 
The previous sections in this chapter contained comprehensive discussions for each 
of the research hypotheses. This section provides a summary conclusion for the 
whole research effort (Perry 1998), to identify factors influencing the arbitral 
decisions of members in Australia‘s federal industrial tribunal, when they determine 
unfair dismissal claims from workers who have been terminated from their 
employment due to ‗misbehaviour‘. At the commencement of this investigation, it 
was unclear how different types of misbehaviour events that occasion a dismissal 
might vary the arbitration decisions. It was not known how the employee‘s 
explanation influenced the decision, and it was unclear how much managerial 
mistakes in the dismissal process influenced arbitration decisions. Even less was 
known about unfair dismissal arbitral decision-making in the Australian legislative 
and cultural context. The evidence uncovered in this investigation suggests that 
Australia‘s federal tribunal arbitration decisions are a product of three primary 
inputs: (1) the nature of the offence committed by the worker; (2) the complexity of 
the worker’s explanation; and (3) the employer’s facility to, first, make the 
assessment that dismissal was an appropriate punishment, and second, administer a 
sound process to action the dismissal. At the same time, secondary factors of a 
biographical and demographical nature inject nuances into the arbitrator‘s decision-
making and these factors can be categorised according to the advocacy mechanisms 
utilised during arbitration, worker characteristics, employer characteristics, and the 
arbitrator‘s experience and political orientation. 
 
Paramount in the findings is that the Australian arbitration decisions reflect patterns 
that people are valued more than property. In essence, behaviours deemed harmful to 
people are less tolerated than behaviours committed against property. Employee 
defences for their behaviour should be minimalist in complexity to provide them 
with best chance for a favourable decision. At the same time, employers are assessed 
foremost on their delivery of distributive justice (whether the dismissal was rational), 
and thereafter on the procedural justice elements involved in their administering of 
  
 
Southey: Employee misbehaviour and unfair dismissal arbitration                                        Page 326 
the dismissal (whether the dismissal was conducted in a procedurally fair manner). 
During arbitral assessments of distributive justice, a previous misbehaviour incident 
recorded against the worker improves the employer‘s justification to dismiss. 
However, misjudgements in distributive justice result in reversals of the employer‘s 
dismissal. By the same token, within arbitrators‘ assessment of procedural justice, 
employers are afforded minor scope to make errors in administering a dismissal. In 
particular, the most heinous offences have potential to offset the employer‘s 
obligation to provide the worker with the opportunity to respond to the allegation.  
 
To improve their chance of a favourable arbitration decision in the federal tribunal, 
Australian workers should use either legal counsel or union advocates to present their 
claim to the arbitrators, yet employers are not likely to receive similar advantages if 
they rely on advocacy services. Workers will also benefit at the arbitration table, if 
they engaged the union before the actual dismissal, so that a delegate or 
representative was present during investigations and meetings, rather than seeking 
this support from colleagues, friends or family. Save for women in managerial and 
professional work, a positive bias towards women workers, in general, appears to be 
at play. Workers with longer service periods, workers from the private sector and 
those with lower skill sets can anticipate tougher arbitration outcomes compared to 
workers with shorter service periods, those dismissed from the public sector, or those 
in higher skilled occupations. However, workers engaged in the transport, postal and 
warehousing industries can anticipate positive gains at the arbitration table. Finally, 
as arbitrators determine more unfair dismissal decisions they become increasingly 
more likely to support the employer‘s decision to dismiss a worker. And it appears 
arbitrators have yet to fully detach their decisions from their predispositions towards 
either the power-poor worker or managerial prerogative of the employer. 
 
Both theoretical and empirical reasons existed for incorporating further secondary 
variables that should influence the decisions of arbitrators over unfair dismissal 
claims. Nevertheless, all variables considered, the impact of the following factors on 
the decisions of Australia‘s arbitrators, could not be stated with confidence: the 
content of the worker‘s explanation implicating the employer and/or personal 
reasons, the state of the dismissed worker‘s disciplinary record, whether the worker 
was hired as a full-time or part-time employee, the arbitrator‘s gender, the 
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arbitrator‘s seniority, the severity of the offence, whether the worker demonstrated 
some form of apology or remorse, the type of advocacy services used by the 
employer, various industry sectors, the size of the employer‘s business, the degree of 
formality in the employer‘s dismissal processes, and whether the employer‘s 
operations included a human resource expert. In simpler versions of the arbitral 
decision-making model, it occurred that the following factors could significantly 
influence the arbitration decision: HR expertise, formality, the administrative and 
support services industries, the worker‘s disciplinary record, and the severity of the 
offence. However, when allowing for the constraints of the other factors in the full 
modelling process, opposing and suppressing effects of different variables come into 
play, and the impact of these separate variables was surpassed by those outlined in 
the previous two paragraphs. 
 
7.5  Implications for theory 
The objective for the remainder of this chapter is to ‗make sense‘ of this new 
knowledge within theoretical and practical contexts surrounding employee 
misbehaviour and unfair dismissal arbitral decision-making. This section on 
implications for theory will consider first the implications of this research on the 
immediate theories used to build the conceptual model concerning employee 
misbehaviour and arbitral decision making (discussed in sections 2.2 and 3.7) 
combined with the theories used in developing the hypotheses (discussed throughout 
chapter 4). This will be followed by comment on the implications of the findings on 
the parental theories of industrial discipline, employee grievance scholarship, and 
dignity and autonomy values (discussed in sections 2.3 and 3.1 to 3.4). Finally, the 
discussion will turn to consider the implications of this research for related 
disciplines within the broad field of study concerning employee misbehaviour 
(discussed in Section 2.1).  
 
7.5.1  Implications for immediate theories used to develop the conceptual model 
This thesis combines the employee deviance typology and the arbitral decision 
making literature to arrive at a conceptual model incorporating these two fields of 
scholarship. The conceptual model fundamental within this thesis is now furnished 
with variables found to be influencing the arbitrator‘s final decision. Figure 7.2 
  
 
Southey: Employee misbehaviour and unfair dismissal arbitration                                        Page 328 
displays the conceptual model, refined to identify the final array of variables that 
statistically significantly influenced arbitration decisions. This new model 
contributes substantially to theories on arbitral decision-making, specifically when 
arbitration decisions are made over misbehaviour event based, unfair dismissal 
grievances. This claim is made on the basis that the model was produced from a 
comprehensive conceptual model in which each element represented a research 
question that emerged from theory and practice.  
 
 
Figure 7.2  A model of arbitral decision making concerning unfair dismissal claims 
from workers dismissed due to misbehaviour  
(Source: Developed for thesis) 
 
It is now clear that the employee deviance typology (Bennett & Robinson 2000) 
which was verified for measuring employee deviance by organisational behaviour 
scholars (Stewart et al. 2009), also provides a suitable framework for categorising 
any variety of employee misbehaviour acts to measure their influence on disciplinary 
actions directed at workers in an industrial relations context. This typology was 
successfully incorporated as an essential element in the arbitral decision-making 
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model presented in Figure 7.2, which is a process that ultimately determines whether 
or not the disciplinary actions of the employer were appropriate.  
 
Further theoretical knowledge gained is that the complexity of the explanation used 
by the worker to defend their behaviour has an impact on the arbitration decision. To 
this end, the concept of a ‗conflated rationale‘ within the employee explanation 
typology (Southey 2010) was successfully incorporated as an essential element in the 
arbitral decision-making model. A further theoretical implication arising from this 
aspect of the investigation is the use of attribution theory to underpin the 
categorisation of the explanations. The investigation did not support the contention 
that externally attributed causes (explanations involving workplace related triggers 
for the behaviour) would be the most successful defence for a worker. The 
implication arises that the application of attribution theory, when used in the context 
of arbitral assessments of employee dismissals due to misbehaviour in Australia, may 
alter its efficacy as a predictive theory of human decision-making. Alternatively, the 
implication for arbitral decision-making theory is that the content of the workers‘ 
defences have, in reality, limited impact on the arbitration decisions.  
 
The impact of the quality of the employer‘s actions in administering a dismissal on 
the arbitration decisions demonstrated consistency with the theories of distributive, 
procedural and interactional justice expectations (Brown, Bemmels & Barclay 
2010; Greenberg 1990; Rawls 1972, 1999) with the added insight that distributive 
justice appears to have a stronger emphasis on the determination of arbitration 
decisions, followed closely by procedural and interactional justice. Managerial errors 
reflecting failures in administering these forms of justice, using as a basis Blancero 
and Bohlander‘s (1995) typology, was successfully incorporated as an essential 
element in the arbitral decision making model.  
 
Additional theories were used to determine some of the moderating effects that 
secondary characteristics may have on arbitration decisions. It is now clear the 
investigation corroborated exit-voice theory (Budd & Colvin 2008; Hirschman 1970; 
Luchak 2003) within the  arbitral decision-making context, clearly indicating that 
workers benefited most when they used a third party advocate to represent their 
‗voice from without‘ following their ejection from the employer-employee 
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relationship. Perhaps the continued relevance of exit-voice theory in the workplace is 
being underscored by this investigation. It alludes to the importance of a method to 
provide workers with a ‗voice‘ in present industrial relations, as neo-liberal agendas 
of the government expose workers to less protective regulations, combined with 
higher expectations that workers self-navigate the demands of their employer within 
the workplace forum. Also corroborated by the results of the research was the award 
orientation theory (Crow & Logan 1994) which is the extent to which an arbitrator 
determines decisions that either favour management or the union, on the premise that 
people have a subliminal preference for the philosophical stance of either union or 
management.  
 
The findings also have implications for the gamut of gender interaction theories 
used to deduce hypothesis about the influence of the arbitrator‘s gender when 
judging female offenders: ‗paternalism/chivalry‘ (Staines, Tavris & Jayarantne 
1974), ‗queen bee‘ (Cooper 1997), ‗evil women‘ (Moulds 1978) and the ‗Garden of 
Eden effect‘ (Hartman et al. 1994). As these interaction effects were not detected 
(although worker gender alone still appears to influence outcomes), it may indicate 
that these theories may not extend to arbitral judgements of dismissal cases, or 
alternately to the Australian context. This is a promising finding as it could be 
evidence that arbitrators are aware of and contain the affects of their personal gender-
generated experiences and opinions, so as to not influence their decision making. 
Enlightenment from ongoing feminist scholarship identifying inequality between 
men and women in the workplace may be causing attitudinal shifts, over time, which 
may mean these theories are becoming less significant in judgements of women in 
the arbitration of rights disputes in the industrial relations context.  
 
7.5.2  Implications for theories in the parental literature 
Integral to this thesis is the occurrence of the harshest form of discipline - dismissal - 
being enacted by management on an employee who had, or may have, misbehaved.  
To this end, the corrective-progressive discipline and punitive discipline theories, 
under the umbrella of industrial discipline, were discussed in section 2.3 as relevant 
parental theories. It was discovered that employers who provided evidence that the 
worker had committed at least one previous offence, were more likely to have the 
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arbitrator judge the employer had a valid reason for the dismissal. The implication 
for theory is that the use of progressive discipline – reflected in cases where the 
employee had offended before but not dismissed – influences the employers‘ ability 
to defend their dismissal actions at arbitration. Additionally, scholars advocate the 
use of progressive discipline over punitive discipline, even though both disciplinary 
approaches provide scope for terminating the employment relationship. This thesis 
uncovered that workers who engaged in acts of personal aggression were least likely 
to convince the arbitrator they were dismissed unfairly. This finding has implications 
for industrial discipline theory, as it signifies that personally aggressive behaviours 
are the type of ‗heinous behaviour‘ that scholars suggests warrants dismissal over 
progressive-corrective discipline (Heery & Noon 2001; Holley, Jennings & Wolters 
2009, p. 529; Huberman 1964; O'Reilly & Weitz 1980). Extending this line of 
thinking to property deviance, which was the type of misbehaviour found to be most 
tolerated by the arbitrators, alludes to the fact that such behaviour might be best met 
with a corrective-disciplinary response from employers. 
 
Various arbitration theories describing how industrial arbitrators administer their 
role were considered in section 3.2, with the discussion demonstrating that ‗there is 
no single mode of adjudication in the tribunals and different functions call for 
different methods‘ (Rathmell 2011, p. 606). It was determined that judicial 
arbitration (Dabscheck 1980; Perlman 1954; Romeyn 1980), Wheeler‘s (1976) 
industrial arbitration and Thornthwaite‘s (1994) regulatory and containment 
functions of bureaucratic structures could be isolated as theories that were relevant to 
the situation of a rights dispute arising from an employee appealing his or her 
dismissal.  
 
Common to these three arbitration theories is the expectation of arbitral neutrality. 
Whilst this thesis confirmed that arbitrators‘ decision making experience can predict 
their decisions, a major implication that runs counter to the neutrality tenets of these 
theories is that influences from the arbitrators‘ award orientations were detected in 
their decisions. Sub-section 3.6.4 presented opposing positions as to whether 
Australia‘s federal tribunal members show bias in their decisions. The knowledge 
gathered in this investigation calls into question the practicality of the impartiality 
assumption of the judicial thesis, insofar that the human decision-making reflected in 
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this study failed to be nonpartisan - even if unwittingly - on two grounds: previous 
work history and previous experience in determining unfair dismissal claims. 
 
Recalling that this thesis straddles both industrial relations scholarship and 
organisational behaviour scholarship, discussed in section 3.3 was the importance for 
organisational behaviour researchers to inject theory into scholarship on the 
employee grievance process. This recommendation has been observed in this thesis 
by incorporating Bemmels and Foley‘s (1996) suggestions to consider testing, among 
others, exit-voice theory, attribution theory, and procedural and distributive justice 
theories for their applicability in grievance procedure research. For brevity, the 
author refers to the comments regarding the applicability of these theories discussed 
previously in sub-section 7.5.1.  
 
Section 3.4 addressed the ideals of dignity and autonomy, within the limits of a 
sustainable business operation, being afforded to workers. Whilst dignity and 
autonomy are aspirational principles rather than theories, these tenets are believed to 
provide sound reasons for regulatory authorities or governments to provide unfair 
dismissal protection mechanisms where common law protections fail to reach. This 
thesis revealed that, in the small majority of cases, employers were supported in their 
prerogative to dismiss misbehaving workers. The implication of this finding is that a 
large number of remaining workers still became victims of a misuse of managerial 
prerogative, stripping these workers of the dignity and autonomy ideals of the 
employment relationship. In these instances, the unfair dismissal protection 
mechanism assisted them to restore a sense of dignity and autonomy by either 
enabling them to re-attend the workplace, or to move on in their life with some 
reparation. 
 
Several misbehaviour-related arbitral decision-making theories were presented in 
section 3.7. Each of these models has application to one or a few specific 
misbehaviour events. For instance, an alcohol fuelled event in Nelson and Kim 
(2008), physical or verbal violence in Gely and Chandler (2008), breach of 
confidentially in Ross and Chen (2007), insubordination, alcohol and dishonesty in 
Chelliah and D‘Netto (2006).  The major enhancement the model in Figure 7.2 
provides is that it is a generalised misbehaviour model, measuring how categories of 
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misbehaviour influence arbitral decisions. This thesis now informs scholarship so 
that we can suggest that misbehaviour events categorised according to the target of 
the behaviour (discussed in section 7.1.1, particularly Table 7.1.) can significantly 
influence the arbitration decision.  
 
A second significant enhancement to our knowledge not captured in previous 
models, is that increasing the complexity of the worker‘s explanation will 
significantly influence the arbitration decision to the worker‘s detriment. Gely and 
Chandler (2008) identified that unions are best to focus on inconsistencies in the 
employer‘s treatment of the worker or due process in administering the investigation 
and dismissal, to overshadow the misbehaviour event committed by the worker. The 
evidence agrees with these scholars. A further implication from the modelling in this 
thesis is that unions will also benefit the worker by presenting a single reason for the 
behaviour, as opposed to giving two or three reasons why the event occurred.  
 
Finally, there are implications for our theoretical understanding about the effect of 
how management administers the dismissal on the arbitration decision. Earlier 
models providing insight in this area were by Gely and Chandler (2008) in their 
measurement of the employer‘s proportionate response and disciplinary consistency; 
and Chelliah and D‘Netto‘s (2006) measurement of failure to apply progressive 
discipline, failure to provide warnings and improper promulgation of rules. With 
reference to the discussion in sub-section 7.1.3, particularly Figure 7.1, the 
implication for arbitral decision-making theories is that arbitrators separate errors in 
distributive justice from errors in procedural justice and filter their decisions 
according to these two frames of reference. Importantly, distributive justice errors are 
fatal to the employer‘s defence of a dismissal, whilst there is minor scope for 
employers to commit procedural errors and still find the dismissal is sanctioned by 
the arbitrator. 
 
7.5.3  Implications for broad disciplinary perspectives of misbehaviour 
Section 2.1 acknowledged the scholarship being conducted on the phenomenon of 
employee misbehaviour, from a range of disciplinary perspectives. Beyond the 
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implications for the immediate and parental theories relevant to this thesis, the 
findings also produced a range of propositions that may be of interest these scholars. 
 
Feminism 
Gender and feminist theorists can be informed by this thesis‘ exposition of the 
experience of women seeking arbitral intervention into their dismissal. It appears that 
the government endorsed mechanism of the federal industrial tribunal is empowering 
women with a useful avenue to appeal actions of their employer, provided the 
woman is not from a professional or managerial occupation. For most female 
workers, their positive chance of success may indicate that women from medium and 
lower skilled occupations faced harsh disciplinary actions by employers in the first 
place. The quandary for female professionals and managers facing poorer outcomes 
to male counterparts reminds us of the gendered nature of work in Australia. Women 
professionals and managers are associated with ‗caring‘ work which demands high 
moral and ethical standards and therefore carries lower tolerance for acts of 
misbehaviour.   
 
Political science 
Political science scholars can be informed by this thesis‘ demonstration of an 
example of a control mechanism on employer prerogative, set in place by the 
Australian government via the federal industrial tribunal (currently The Fair Work 
Commission). This federal institution umpires individual conflicts between dismissed 
workers and their employers, with the small majority of decisions favouring 
employer prerogatives to dismiss workers that misbehaved.  In spite of the balance of 
interest tipped slightly towards employers, the lack of extremity in the overall results 
indicates the tribunal provides a significant justice mechanism for workers to redress 
the imbalance of power they experience when they find themselves ejected from the 
workplace due to apparent misbehaviour. In relation to judging acts of misbehaviour 
in the workplace, over the last decade, Australia appears to have mastered a delicate 
balance between politics, legislation, authorities, unions and industry so that the 
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Political scientists may also be interested to note that public servants appear to draw 
harsh disciplinary penalties for engaging in misbehaviour, administered by the 
government departments employing them. This alerts us to difficulties or even 
conflicts of interest, faced by a government when performing competing roles: policy 
maker, regulator, umpire, and in this case, as a major employer in the economy. 
 
Anthropology 
Anthropologists can take note of the suggestions that the national culture of a country 
produces expectations about how employers and employees are to conduct 
themselves during investigations and meetings associated with a worker‘s actual or 
purported misbehaviour. Particularly, the low power-distance and high individualism 
profile of Australia‘s national culture is thought to have implications for employees 
so that they take responsibility for understanding their rights and obligations during 
investigations and dismissals, as well as expectations associated with behavioural 
standards in the workplaces, particularly for people working in service industries. 
 
Sociology  
Sociologists, with their interest in understanding the wider societal context of 
employee misbehaviour, can draw insights about societal values on how people are 
to conduct themselves in the workplace. The pattern shown by the arbitrators‘ 
decisions can be viewed as a measure of the public‘s tolerance towards different acts 
of misbehaviour, so that in descending order, acts of personal aggression are seen as 
the most abhorrent, followed by acts that harm the viability of the employer‘s 
business, followed by acts that harm a person‘s reputation or career potential, and 
finally those acts against the employer‘s physical property. 
 
Psychology 
Psychology scholarship describes misbehaviour as ‗irrational‘ behaviour (Collinson 
& Ackroyd 2005). This thesis offers insights about the personal perspective that 
comes into play when determining the rationality of one‘s behaviour. This thesis 
alerts us to the knowledge that behaviours, which are viewed by some as irrational 
behaviour, can be viewed by others as justifiable behaviour. The concept of 
‗reprimandable offences‘ presented in this thesis, establishes that employers will 
view misbehaviour as unreasonable. However, through the appeal mechanisms 
provided by an industrial tribunal, a number of workers are able to rationalise their 
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behaviour to third party advocates and arbitrators, to the point of having the 
employer‘s disciplinary actions overturned. The implication is that the misbehaviour, 
in some instance, can be dissolved of its irrational element.   
 
7.6  Implications for policy and practice 
This section will first address the implications arising in this thesis for policy makers 
in government, industry and unions.  The second section will address the practice 
implications for employers, workers and unions. 
 
7.6.1  Policy implications 
First, this investigation considered the dark side of workplace behaviours, and it is 
evident that all four categories of deviance are intolerable to arbitrators, which 
would be reflective of our general societal values. If we can reduce the occurrence of 
these behaviours, economic efficiencies, happier workplaces and healthier workers, 
hopefully ensue. Personal aggression in the workplace is considered the most 
offensive behaviour in which a worker can engage. With this knowledge, policy 
efforts can be concentrated on reducing these behaviours by promoting national 
workplace cultures that reinforce the societal intolerance for personally aggressive 
acts. The recent announcement by the Workplace Relations Minister that the 
government will seek to give the Fair Work Commission powers to resolve 
workplace bullying complaints (ABC News 2013) provides an example of a political 
move that may contribute to such a culture.  
 
Industry associations can promote similar behavioural expectations by providing 
resources such as running awareness sessions that support employers in the 
implementation or revision of codes of conduct, with a view to reinforcing the 
vilification of personally aggressive behaviours. Unions could offer similar support, 
but in particular could engage with employers to develop workplace ‗behaviour 
charters‘. And, as the remaining three deviance categories - production, political and 
property – were only marginally less abhorred, they too can inform future codes of 
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Second, the arbitration decisions revealed that the arbitrators disagreed with 
employers‘ actions to dismiss ‗misbehaving‘ workers in nearly half of the cases. This 
means workers and unions have a reasonable incentive to pursue arbitration if they 
felt conciliation failed to achieve a satisfactory resolution. The federal tribunal‘s 
arbitration system thus provides a sound justice mechanism for the lesser-powered, 
ill-accused worker, as intended ideologically, legislatively and in the ILO 
conventions. However, it also means a gap exists between employers‘ and 
arbitrators‘ beliefs about what constitutes appropriate applications of an employer‘s 
managerial prerogative when employees ‗misbehave‘. Employers appear to hold 
workers to higher standards of behaviour than those expected by people in broader 
circles of society, and this incongruence has financial and emotional implications for 
the worker and employer, as well as economic impacts on the taxpayer dollars 
funding the federal tribunal to adjudicate these grievances.  
 
It is not the act of misbehaviour itself that acts as a catalyst for arbitration; rather it is 
the employer‘s choice of dismissal as a disciplinary response to misbehaviour that 
means arbitration may be sought. Consequently, the onus falls upon employers to 
first, determine when a dismissal is appropriate for misbehaviour, and second, 
administer these dismissals in an appropriate manner. It would be a benefit for all 
stakeholders if the dissonance between employer standards and public standards 
could be reduced. Policy needs to incorporate proposals that focus on aligning 
employer understandings of behaviours that signal the death knell of the employment 
relationship and those which may warrant a lesser discipline without over-
compromising business viability. Just as important, policy needs to incorporate 
proposals that bolster employers‘ appreciation for natural justice, procedural justice 
and workplace investigations. 
  
Third, the knowledge that decisions are influenced by the arbitrator’s work history 
for either a union or management employer is relevant to the opinions expressed by 
industrial relations stakeholders that respective government appointments to the 
tribunal are biased towards the ideals of the party in power. Legislative and 
systematic measures are in place to provide transparency and limit the opportunity 
for bias, such as providing an appeals avenue, holding public arbitration hearings and 
providing publicly accessible decisions. And, in recent times, public advertisements 
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have appeared for appointments to the tribunal ‗meaning for the first time any 
appropriately qualified Australian can put him or herself forward to be considered 
for appointment to the nation’s workplace relations tribunal‘ (Gillard 2010). This 
initiative could be extended to also include the selection of commission members by 
government employees and administering appropriately validated psychometric tests 
to candidates as part of their selection.  
 
The FWC website could provide a summary of the work history of each of their 
members along with its official tally of employer and union appointments. 
Consideration could be given to the annual publication of arbitration decision metrics 
for each FWC member according to type of claim, whether lodged by the union or 
employer and whether upheld or overturned. Such measures might improve the 
impression amongst Australians that appointments to the tribunal consist of people 
that have the temperament and attitude for the impartial demands of their work. 
 
Fourth, legislators in Australia aimed to avoid legalising the unfair dismissal 
arbitration process by incorporating legislative provisions which can be used to limit 
legal representation by the parties. However we now have further knowledge from 
this study that legal advocacy is most beneficial for workers (and possibly 
employers). It is unfortunate that legal advocacy costs can be prohibitive for many 
workers and with declining union representation in the workforce, the number of 
workers (and small business employers) attempting to self-represent, to their own 
detriment, may only increase. Consideration of tribunal appointed advocates may be 
an option, for workers and employers that meet a set of hardship criteria. Although 
this option may come at public expense, these expenses may be offset by efficiencies 
achieved when hearings are not delayed as arbitrators‘ take time to accommodate 
inexperienced, self represented applicants and respondents. 
 
Fifth, The Small Business Fair Dismissal Code, an employer resource available 
from the Fair Work Commission (2013a) website, states: 
 
It is fair for an employer to dismiss an employee without notice or warning 
when the employer believes on reasonable grounds that the employee‘s conduct 
is sufficiently serious to justify immediate dismissal.... In other cases, the small 
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Reflecting on the results of this investigation, it is the author‘s contention that this 
wording may mislead employers, regardless of whether they are small business 
employers or medium and larger business employers who may also refer to this 
resource for information. For those unfamiliar with the technicalities of ‗warnings‘ 
and ‗notice‘, the wording is open to being misconstrued so that the employer is 
excused from providing the worker with the allegations before them and moreover, 
that they do not need to investigate the incident, in essence, that the employee has no 
right to natural justice.  
 
The results of this thesis revealed that employers are never excused from conducting 
an appropriate investigation about the ‗misbehaviour‘ event in order to determine 
whether a sound or valid reason exists to dismiss the worker. Furthermore, the results 
were clear that weaknesses in providing the worker with a chance to respond to the 
allegation were also highly likely to see the dismissal overturned by the arbitrator. 
The advice needs to be revised so that employers, even in the event of serious 
misconduct, are aware of the requirement to obtain the facts using appropriate 
processes, and give the worker the right of response, before determining whether a 
dismissal is to be sanctioned. Employers need to be advised that only after fulfilling 
these obligations, might it be appropriate to consider a summary dismissal – a 
dismissal without notice or warnings. 
 
Sixth, the recent Australian work-life index for women managers and professionals 
revealed women professionals and managers worked the longest hours of all female 
workers, anticipating women professionals will experience, to a higher degree, their 
work interfering with their personal lives, compared to their male counterparts 
(Pocock, Skinner & Pisaniello 2010). This thesis further uncovered the knowledge 
women managers and professionals are unlikely to win their unfair dismissal claims. 
In essence, if women managers and professionals are experiencing tougher work-life 
balance issues, we can anticipate these challenges have the potential to cause them 
distress. Such distress may be associated with behaviours unacceptable in the 
workplace. Governments, industry associations, professional associations and unions 
representing these women need to remain mindful of the pressures under which 
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7.6.2  Practice implications 
This research provides a better understanding about the circumstances in which 
employee misbehaviour may be, and may not be, viewed as an appropriate signal to 
end the employer-employee relationship. The following points provide guidance to 
managers and unions when determining an employee‘s future with the organisation, 
due to an incident of employee misbehaviour: 
 
1) If the misbehaviour constituted production deviance, political deviance or 
property deviance and it is the worker‘s first incident, meaning that no other 
recorded occurrence of misconduct exits on the employee‘s record – it is 
recommended that management avoids dismissal and applies progressive 
discipline. In such a circumstance, all parties may be best served if management 
issues a written warning to the worker advising that no further acts of 
misbehaviour will be tolerated and that dismissal is a potential result in the event 
the worker commits a further incident. 
 
2) When prior misbehaviour offences are recorded, management is better situated to 
consider dismissal – even if the misbehaviour event was for a different reason – 
for instance, the first event was for unexplained absence and the next event was 
for theft. Practice wisdom tends to suggest the offences need to be of the same 
nature, however, the modelling discovered that any previous offence on record 
was positively related to the employer being able to justify the dismissal.  
 
3) If the misbehaviour involved an act of personal aggression, the employer has the 
strongest prerogative to consider dismissing the worker, even if the worker has 
no other offences on record. The employer still remains obligated to ensure the 
worker receives natural justice in the course of determining whether or not to 
terminate the employment relationship. 
 
Employers - and the associated industry and employer bodies - as they hold the 
greater power in the employer relationship, are obligated to transact a just dismissal 
and have regard for the dignity and autonomy of their employees. This research 
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1) Dismissing workers for incidences of either property deviance or political 
deviance places employers at the highest risk of having the dismissals overturned 
by arbitrators. Managers must take particular caution in administering a 
dismissal, particularly if it is the first instance for these behaviours, carefully 
considering the process used to gather evidence, and ensuring they present the 
evidence to the worker to respond. 
 
2) Employers should seriously consider settling at conciliation, if on reflection, they 
erred in using doubtful information on which to ‗convict‘ the worker, or they 
dismissed the worker in spite of a unique or special circumstance surrounding the 
case. In such instances, management can anticipate they made the type of error 
that makes it impossible to justify they had a valid reason for the dismissal. 
 
3) Industry and employer associations could assist employers in ensuring natural 
justice is provided to accused workers, by providing training programs on 
conducting workplace investigations. Current practice wisdom tends to be 
directed at making the employer aware of fulfilling the procedural obligations 
associated with the enacting of the dismissal itself. However, the seminal 
information about the incident on which an employer bases the decision to 
dismiss is often flawed. And, when the premise for the dismissal or method of 
collecting the evidence is flawed, the employer can anticipate their actions will 
be overturned at arbitration. If employers improve their investigative techniques, 
they may see fewer dismissals overturned on the basis they had an ‗invalid‘ 
reason to dismiss the worker. 
 
4) To ensure their advocates are best able to serve their clients, industry and 
employer associations may wish to consider undertaking an evaluation of the 
selection, training and development processes used to identify and prepare their 
advocates for representing employers in the unfair dismissal arena.  
 
5) To ensure their disciplinary processes are not too harsh or procedurally flawed, 
employers in the transport, postal, warehousing, manufacturing and wholesaling 
industries may wish to evaluate the investigative, disciplinary and decision-
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6) Workers engaged in lower-skilled occupations appear to have a higher propensity 
to engage in personally aggressive acts. The value of management providing 
employee assistance programs is underscored by such a finding. Training 
programmes addressing conduct expectations and consequences are vital, but 
such efforts need to be supported by effective leadership from immediate 
supervisors. Thus supervisors could be exposed to leadership programmes that 
include coaching and mentoring, as well as techniques for managing distressed 
workers.  
 
Employers could also consider providing more immediate means within the 
workplace that enable workers to relieve frustrations that may arise during the 
work day, such as installing a punching bag, allowing a 20-minute time release 
for a distressed worker to go for walk, run or to drink cold water, putting up 
posters depicting deep breathing exercises, or implementing workplace health 
and wellbeing programs which could incorporate relaxation techniques. Also 
consider job re-design to reduce frustrations, referring to Hackman and Oldham‘s 
(1976) job characteristics theory, with a view to providing work for employees 
that is more psychologically engaging and intrinsically rewarding.  
 
7) Within a culture that champions precedent, public sector employers should be 
mindful of engaging in pattern disciplinary practices and administering a 
dismissal for misbehaviour, at the risk of ignoring mitigating circumstances. 
 
Helpful insights for workers (and their unions) facing disciplinary actions were also 
garnered from this investigation:  
 
1) Workers need to be alert to their right to obtain the support of another person 
during workplace investigations and meetings with management. Support at this 
early stage of the disciplinary journey provides the worker with information and 
evidence about the employer‘s process to be presented in the event the worker 
decides to pursue a dismissal claim. 
 
2) The most effective support person is a union delegate or representative, more so 
than a family member, friend or colleague; unless these support people have 
expertise in the procedural requirements of a fair disciplinary process.  
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3) In the event of pursuing an unfair dismissal claim through to arbitration, it is 
important to use the services of either a legal or union advocate to present the 
claim to the arbitrator, rather than attempting to self-represent a claim.  
 
4) In providing an explanation for the behaviour that led to the dismissal, identify a 
single, critical cause for the behaviour – possibly one that implicates conditions 
about the working situation - rather than implicating a number of reasons drawn 
from personal circumstances. Further, workers should try to avoid inadvertently 
admitting guilt by apologising for their behaviour.  
 
5) Longer serving employees (over fifteen years of service) need to be mindful that 
arbitrators expect they have gained a good understanding of the workplace 
culture, policy and rules in relation to appropriate conduct, thus they should 
avoid any defence that alerts to weaknesses in this area. 
 
7.7  Limitations 
In addition to the anticipated limitations of this thesis that were outlined in chapter 1, 
several further limitations became apparent as this investigation unfolded. These 
limitations were curiosities relating to the statistical analysis and dataset.  
 
The first to note was the non-occurrence of arbitral decisions favouring the employer 
when the employer committed one or more of three particular errors (as discussed in 
the methodology chapter in sub-section 5.9.3). When these errors occurred, due to 
their ability to ‗perfectly predict‘ an outcome, the modelling process faltered. The 
author followed classic conventions for managing this - not uncommon - challenge 
associated with logistic regression modelling. It is noted that this aspect of the data 
analysis could be managed with more ‗analytical finesse‘, such as Firth's penalised 
likelihood approach, to reduce the potential bias that might have occurred in the 
estimates by following the methods employed in this analysis. 
 
The statistical model presented in this thesis incorporated a wide range of control 
factors for which scholars and practitioners are interested in knowing the impact. 
Australian research of this type is extremely limited and many questions need 
answering.  In seeking to answer a number of them within a dataset of 565 cases, it 
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came at the cost of ‗working the data hard‘ in the modelling computations. The 
recommended ratio for logistic modelling is at least 10 cases per variable. If one 
takes into account the number of individual values within each variable, in this study 
the ratio was around 7.8 cases per variable in the analysis.  
 
The wide variety of factors at play in arbitration ultimately forced the investigator to 
sacrifice the inclusion of variables that could have broadened our knowledge even 
further, in order to run both a well controlled and stable statistical model. 
Misbehaviour was modelled using the Robinson and Bennett‘s (1995) four domain 
typology, and employee defences using Southey‘s (2010) employee explanations 
with a three domain typology. Whilst these typologies provided significant new 
insights on the influence of misbehaviour and explanations on arbitral decisions, our 
understandings would have been enhanced if the dataset were sizeable enough to 
have delved into a further level of data describing the actual reprimandable offences 
and explanations. Data at these finer descriptive levels were collected and described 
in the results chapter, but the size of the dataset would need to have been at least four 
times the size in order to have supported their inclusion in the regression analysis. At 
this point in time, such a vast number of misconduct related, substantive arbitration 
cases heard by the federal tribunal are unavailable. Even if these decisions had 
existed to enlarge the dataset, the data extraction method via a content analysis is 
expensive and labour intensive, a sure impediment to future research of this nature. 
 
The size of the dataset also prevented analysis of the data according to the distinct 
shifts over the three legislative regimes covered during the 10 year period. Dividing 
the dataset into three periods so that decisions made under the Workplace Relations 
Act 1996, were isolated from those made under the Work Choices Act 2005 and 
more recently, The Fair Work Act 2009, was simply not possible in this analysis. The 
different legislative regimes may have ‗filtered‘ some of the cases that qualified for 
arbitration on basis of the information supplied in Tables 3.4 and Table 3.5. 
Although the majority of the guidelines and practices for determining a claim, such 
as the presence of procedural fairness and a number of the items under the fair-go-
all-round considerations, were in some form, in place across the study period.  
Having stated this limitation, it makes sense to investigate the potential nuances 
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between legislative regimes, and this could be achieved in future research, at the cost 
of reducing the number of explanatory and/or control variables in the model. 
 
Another variable that felt the fate of the data limitations was the apology or remorse 
variable. Whilst a measure of the genuineness of a worker‘s apology or remorse 
would have provided an extra layer of insight about how apologies might affect the 
outcome, it was not incorporated into the variable measurement design. Many 
arbitration decisions will identify that the worker either apologised or was 
remorseful. However, far fewer decisions record whether the arbitrator believed the 
apology or remorse had substance. To measure the degree of sincerity would have 
ultimately resulted in vast amounts of missing data, reducing the variable‘s viability 
in the analysis. Again, this aspect is worthy of further investigation. 
 
Whilst this is possibly the first Australian study to attempt to measure the impact of 
arbitral decision making experience on the unfair dismissal decision outcome, there 
were limitations that occurred as a result of using the current dataset as a measure of 
experience in arbitral decision making. First, a long-serving AIRC member may have 
been treated as inexperienced if they retired early in the period being studied. 
Further, the experience of dual appointees or "transfers" from State tribunals was not 
captured. Once again, it would be a useful future study which could involve 
supplementing the information available in decisions with general knowledge on 
members‘ arbitral decision making experience. 
 
In relation to the ‗work history‘ analysis of members in the federal tribunal, 
undoubtedly people will debate the assignment of whether a particular member 
should be considered ‗union‘, ‗employer‘ or ‗other‘. The author has responded to this 
issue previously in Southey and Fry (2012) and Southey and Fry (2010).  
 
7.8  Implications for further research 
Several research suggestions have already been identified in the limitations. The 
following comments are in addition. This investigation employed a quantitative 
methodology using non-self reported data, to determine general patterns of arbitral 
decision-making over misbehaviour-related unfair dismissal claims. To detect 
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nuances in people‘s experiences, these generalised findings can provide insights for 
qualitative explorations into the perceptions of participants that have been involved 
in this type of unfair dismissal arbitration process.  
 
This study was limited to termination due to misbehaviour. However, for IR scholars 
interested in the efficacy of the operations of the federal industrial tribunal and the 
arbitration mechanism, redundancy and under-performance are other reasons workers 
are faced with involuntary termination. As the root cause for the dismissal is 
different, it would be reasonable to assume variations exist in the factors at play in 
the arbitration decision. Furthermore, the statistics on the performance of the federal 
tribunal unfair dismissal dealings reveal that presently around 81 percent of unfair 
dismissal claims are settled via conciliation. Limited research exits on conciliation, 
as these proceedings occur privately. Advancements in knowledge about managerial 
responses to misbehaviour in the workplace and its impact on the employment 
relationship could be obtained by determining whether the variables that influence a 
bipartisan settlement are different from those variables that influence a third party‘s 
arbitral determination.  
 
This thesis acknowledged the potential influences of national culture on the 
Australian tolerance for misbehaviour in the workplace. The research propositions 
arising from this connection would be to measure the relationship between the 
features of Hofstede‘s national culture, the types of misbehaviours prevalent in 
various workplaces, and the disciplinary treatments they attract. 
 
It was discovered that women are, overall, receiving better arbitration outcomes, yet 
not so for professional or managerial women. Scholars could pursue explanations as 
to why these women have little success at redeeming themselves of misbehaviour 
related offences. It may be worth gathering insights about gender interaction effects 
within the workplace discipline setting, with particular interest in the gender of the 
supervisors and/or those people making the decision to dismiss these professional 
women. Another hypothesis worthy of further investigation is whether the typical 
‗caring‘ nature of the work performed by highly skilled women – premised by role 
identity theory - associates them with highly moralistic work, with limited tolerance 
for misbehaviour.  
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This investigation appears to be the first Australian study to statistically measure the 
degree to which advocates influence the termination of employment arbitration 
decisions; and it appears the influence of Australian advocates is not unlike the 
effects of their counterparts in the United States, Canada and the United Kingdom. 
However, the advocacy service provided by employer and industry associations was 
not competitive with independent legal counsel for both employers and workers, or 
union organisations for workers. Further research could be conducted into the 
operations and ambitions of employer and industry associations to assist them best 
serve their clients. 
 
It was articulated in section 1.2 that arbitrators‘ decisions pertaining to misbehaviour 
in the workplace set the public standard (Donaghey 2006) and reflect societal values 
(Thornicroft 1989; Wright 2002) for how tolerant employers and unions must be 
towards employees who engage, or who are believed to have engaged in 
misbehaviour. Now that an order of tolerance for misbehaviour categories has been 
determined in this study, it would be worthwhile to measure whether arbitrators are 
congruent with societal values by surveying the general public for their opinions 
about the type of misbehaviour events for which dismissal would be appropriate.  
 
Full Bench appeal decisions also provide an avenue for further investigation. The 
research objective and quantitative methodology in this thesis required the isolation 
of single arbitrator decisions. However, appeal decisions are significant for setting 
precedents. They can provide insights on the decisions that were arbitrated by single 
members of the tribunal that were either reversed or affirmed on different grounds to 
those originally given. 
 
This investigation focused on misbehaviour at the terminal stage of the employment 
relationship. It appears that in many cases, employees are well intentioned people 
placed into workplace situations that triggered a misbehaviour event, or alternatively 
they were people mismatched for the work they were performing or the culture of the 
organisation in which they worked. For organisational behaviour and HR scholars, 
much can be gained by investigating whether employers can mitigate the occurrence 
of misbehaviour in their organisations – ultimately sparing workers the drama of a 
dismissal and employers the replacement costs of an employee - by modelling the 
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relationship between the types of recruitment, selection, training and development 
practices and the occurrence and type of misbehaviour in which employees behave. 
 
Finally, for international scholars, this thesis provides detailed information about the 
contextual nature of arbitral decision-making over unfair dismissal claims in 
Australia. It also provides information about Australia‘s legislative guidelines, and 
finally, about statistically influential variables in the determination of unfair 
dismissal claims arising from terminations due to misbehaviour. These insights can 
provide a point of comparison with other countries. Furthermore, the use of the 
deviance typology as a measure of misbehaviour can be replicated in studies beyond 
Australia‘s boarders, as well as the features of the employee explanation typology 
and managerial errors in the dismissal process. Comparative scholarship in these 
aspects of arbitral decision-making would provide insights about international 
variations and similarities in the tolerance for misbehaviour in the workplace.  
 
7.9  Concluding statement  
This thesis contains an investigation that delved into the most contentious aspect of 
the power dynamics in the employment relationship: managerial prerogative to 
dismiss a purportedly misbehaving employee in order to maintain business viability, 
against the employee‘s right to respectful, dignified and just treatment and to retain 
his or her employment. This quantitative research revealed that neutral, third party 
arbitral determinations as to whether the worker should remain employed or whether 
the employer was justified to dismiss the worker, are influenced by variables beyond 
those appearing in the current literature.  From here, further research into the impact 
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Depictions of ‘employee misbehaviour’ in the literature. 
 
Table A1.1  Sixteen depictions of ‘employee misbehaviour’ in the literature 
(3 of 16) 




(organisational  / 
employee) 
Definition 
Any behaviour that brings harm 
or that is intended to bring 
harm to an organisation, its 
employees, or to the 
organization’s stakeholders  
(1997) 
Wilful behaviours by 
employees that have the 
potential to harm an 
organisation, its members 
or both (Krischer, Penney 
& Hunter 2010) 
Intentional acts initiated by org. 
members that violate norms of 
the organisation and have the 
potential to harm the 
organisation or its members 




- Theoretical opposite of pro-
social  
  behaviour;  
- social learning theory;  
- justice theories;  
- job performance feedback 
- justice theories;  
- personality  
- cognitive ability 
(intelligence) 
- job satisfaction 
- organisational citizenship 
- justice theories 




- external  
  stakeholders 
- employee/s 
- organisation 
- external  
  stakeholders 
Either  
- individual employees (known 
as  interpersonal deviance) or  
- the firm (organisational 
deviance) 
Actor 
Generally an individual 







Actor must either cause harm or 
intend to cause harm  
Must be intentional (non 
accidental) 
Voluntary behaviour with a 
wide range of motivations such 
as perceived injustice; job 




Single or multiple incidents, or 
persistent over a period of time 
Can be a once only action 
or sustained behaviour 





Not a mandatory element of  
anti-social behaviour, however, 
it is implicated in certain types 
of  behaviour 
Power differences not 
necessary. It can occur 
between employees at same 
level 
Power differences not 
necessary. It can occur between 
employees at same level. 
Role of 
norms 
The necessity to violate a norm 
appears not to be a feature in 
the literature although is 
perhaps implicit in the construct 
Not necessary for a norm to 
be violated 
Organisational, or in its absence 
a societal norm, must be 
violated or non-conformed. 
BUT organisational norm has 
authority over societal norms 
Severity 
Can be verbal and/or physical 
and range from less severe to 
being severe 
Mild to high severity:  
- verbal and covert to  
- physical and overt 
Scaled from minor to serious: 
(production & political on the 
‘minor’ side of the scale) & 




outcomes for individuals and 
organisations 
Unproductive but debated 
that it can have productive 
outcomes (eg, coping 
mechanism for individual 
workers) 
Threatens the well being of 
individuals and/or the entire 
organisation.  
Has scope for constructive 
outcomes 
Sources 
(Giacalone & Greenberg 1997; 
O'Leary-Kelly & Newman 
2003) 
(Krischer, Penney & Hunter 
2010; Spector & Fox 2010; 
Spector et al. 2006) 
(2000, 2003); (Griffin & Lopez 
2005) 
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6. Workplace incivility 
Definition 
Adverse reactions to perceived 
unfairness by disgruntled 
employees toward their 
employer (Skarlicki & Folger 
2004) 
Pervasive and for the most 
part, intentional work related 
behaviour mostly (yet not 
necessarily) which defies and 
violates shared org. norms 
and expectations, and/or core 
societal values and standards 
of proper conduct (Vardi, Y 
& Weitz 2004) 
Low-intensity deviant (rude, 
discourteous) behaviour with 
ambiguous intent to harm the 
target in violation of 
workplace norms for mutual 
respect (Pearson, Andersson 
& Porath 2005) 
Theoretical 
Influences 
- justice theories 
- social exchange theory 
- deontic emotions 
Moral development; locus of 
control; ego/ identity; social 
bonding; org culture; 
cohesiveness; social 
information; job design / 
satisfaction 
power / resistance; affect and 
emotions; technological  
impact and coping with 
change; societal irreverence; 
psychological contract 
Target 
Typically the firm but can also 
be targeted at co-workers 
- the work itself  
- the firm’s property  
- co-workers 
- the organisation  
- external stakeholders 
Individual employee 
- tend to be lower level 
workers 
Actor 
An individual employee 
reacting to another individual’s 
or the organisation’s 
provocation   
‘most members of work 
organisations it appears 
engage in some form of 
misbehaviour’ (Vardi & 
Wiener 1996) 
Individual employee 
- tend to be high performers 





Intended in a desire to restore 
justice, equity to someone who 
has done harm or in ‘moral 
retaliation’ to those who violate 
the system of social rules  
Must be intended to benefit:  
- self (type S); or  
- the organisation (type O in 
loyalty to  
  the firm); or 
- to hurt others/inflict damage 
(type D) 
Can be ambiguous in its intent 
to do harm. May be in 
resistance to authority/ power 
structures or in response to 





Can be a once only action or 
sustained behaviour 
Can be a once only action or 
sustained behaviour 
Generally, more of a process 




Implicated as it is integral to 
the quality of the exchange 
relationship 
Not directly identified as 
integral but inherent in certain 
acts such as sexual 
harassment, bullying 
Implicated as generally aimed 
at people with less power 
Role of 
norms 
Not necessary that a norm is 
violated if that behaviour is 
typical of the workplace 
Must violate core societal 
and/ or organisational norms 
but does not have to be both. 
Behaviour ‘legitimatised’ by 
the business is still OMB if it 
violates a societal norm 
Violates norms of mutual 
respect and dignity 
Severity 
Can range from small and 
minor (but this may just be the 
‘tip of the iceberg’) to large 
and serious (violence and 
aggression) 
Benign to high - based on: the 
centrality of the value or 
norm; the degree of planning 
involved and strength of the 
intention to engage 
Minor and low intensity 
(verbal, passive, indirect) but 
it can accumulate and trigger 
more severe negative 
behaviours 
Outcome 
Can result in functional 
outcomes such as change 
improvement or accountability 
Organisation unlikely to be 
successful in the long run if 
violating rules of larger 
society. But also it can have 
constructive outcomes eg, 
whistleblowing 
- Increased stress, turnover, 
job dissatisfaction 
- a toxic work environment 
- can have a negative effect 
on profits 
Sources (Skarlicki & Folger 2004) 
(Ackroyd & Thompson 1999; 
Vardi, Y & Weitz 2004; 
Vardi, Yoav & Wiener 1996) 
(Pearson, Andersson & Porath 
2005; Penney 2007; Reio & 
Ghosh 2009) 
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9. Workplace violence 
Definition 
Action, inaction or process 
whereby individuals within a 
power structure engage in 
behaviours stemming from their 
opposition to, or frustration 
with, enactments of power. 
Deviant behaviour is one such 
form of resistance (Lawrence & 
Robinson 2007) 
Motivated behaviour by an 
employee or group of 
employees that has negative 
consequences for an 
individual within an 
organisation itself (Griffin, 
O'Leary-Kelly & Collins 
1998) 
Instances of direct physical 
assault or threats of physical 
assault (Griffin & Lopez 
2005)  Covert forms of 




- power and resistance theories  
- reactance theory 
- justice theories 
- social identity 
Conceived as the theoretical 
opposite to ‘pro-social’ 
behaviours: thus a wide range 
of social psychology and 
behavioural science theories 
underpin this concept 
Personal characteristics; job 
characteristics theory; 
affective commitment; stress; 
egotism; justice; 
organisational culture;  HR 
practices; neutralisation  
Target 
The source blamed becomes the 
target, ie, Individuals where 
they exercise ‘episodic’ power  
and  the organisation where it 
flexes ‘systematic’ power 
- an individual 
- a group of individuals 
- the organisation 
May be the person or group 
that is perceived by the actor 
to be responsible lack of 
freedom or who needs to be 
punished 
Actor 
Can involve any organisational 
members – not just ‘unique 
deviant members’ 
- An employee 
- A group of  
  employees 
- Co-worker initiated 





Intentional: to protect the 
actor’s needs for autonomy and 
sense of self-respect and 
fairness 
Intends or is aware that their 
behaviour will have negative 
implications on the target 
Intended to harm the victim, 
while incurring as little 
danger to themselves: the 




 ‘episodic’ power related to 
individual deviance act whereas  
‘systematic’ power related to 
organizational deviance 
Single or multiple incidents, 
or persistent over a period of 
time 




Central tenet to this construct: 
Organisational power has the 
potential to incite deviance 
Not a mandatory element of 
dysfunctional behaviour, 
however, it is implicated in 
certain types of dysfunctional 
behaviour 
Perceptions of powerlessness 
and/or control over a work 
situation or private situations 
that spill over into the 
workplace, may motivate 
actors to engage in violence 
Role of 
norms 
Deviance as a form of 
resistance implicates norms, as 
deviant behaviour are 
behaviours that violate 
important organisational norms 
To capture a broader array of 
behaviours, dysfunctional acts 
do not have to breach ‘norms’ 
as required (for example) in 
‘deviance’ 
Violent behaviour conflicts 
with societal, legal and 
organisational norms 
Severity 
Severity of resistance positively 
associated to respond again the 
degree of power being enacted 
Two classifications: 
- non-violent (gossiping, 
absence, theft) 
- violent (physical & verbal 
abuse) 
Can be verbal (yelling 
swearing) and/or physical 
(hitting, sexual assault) and 
range from less severe to 
extreme severity 
Outcome 
Serves in part to cause harm / 
wreak revenge on the target. 
Inherently perceived as 
dysfunctional to the 
organisation but may be 
functional to perpetrators 
Costs to the individual, 
groups and/or the organisation 
itself. Costs can be direct and 
measurable, and/or indirect 
and subjective. Has scope for 
‘functional’ outcomes 
Dysfunctional and costly 
outcomes for individuals and 
organisations  
Sources 
(Lawrence & Robinson 2007; 
Sims 2010) 
(Griffin & Lopez 2005; 
Griffin, O'Leary-Kelly & 
Collins 1998) 
(Baron & Neuman 1996; 
Bennett, R. 1998; Bjorkqvist, 
Osterman & Lagerspetz 1994; 
LeBlanc & Kelloway 2002; 
O'Leary-Kelly & Newman 
2003) 
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Any behaviour directed by one 
or more persons in the 
workplace toward the goal of 
harming one or more (or the 
entire organisation) in ways the 
targets would want to avoid  
(Neuman & Baron 2005) 
Harassing, offending, socially 
excluding someone or 
negatively affecting 
someone’s work ... repeatedly 
over a period of time ... 
escalating until the victim 
ends in an inferior position 
(Zapf & Stale 2005) 
Any organizational member 
action that violates widely 
accepted (societal) moral 
norms (Kish-Gephart, 
Harrison & Trevino 2010) 
Theoretical 
influences 
General affective aggression 
model (GAAM) which 
incorporates: cognitive, 
affective and physiological 
processes, plus past experience 
and culture 
- leadership 
- work design 
- social climate 
- conflict theory 
- stress theory 
- power theory 
- group dynamics 
- affect and emotions 
- cognitive moral development 
- Idealism/relativism 
- Machiavellianism 
- locus of control 
- job satisfaction 
- moral intensity 
- organisational climate & 
culture 
Target 
Another person(s) not 
welcoming the act/s (does not 
include aggressive actions 
towards inanimate objects) 
An individual – can occur to 
workers, supervisors, middle 
and senior management – 
similar risks at all levels 
- an individual within the 
organisation 
- the organisation as a whole 
- external stakeholders 
Actor Individuals 
Individuals but generally by 
groups of perpetrators – more 
participate the longer the 
duration. Can be colleagues as 
much as supervisors 
Individuals or groups 







Must be intended to cause harm 
to another or group of others  
- affective -reactionary 
- instrument - to obtain a 
desired end  
Harmful intention is not an 
essential element (although 
some scholars disagree) 
- May be more impulsive 
behaviour  
  rather than deliberate 
- to avoid punishment 




Single or multiple incidents 
Ongoing and persistent – for a 
long period of time 
- a single incident   
- multiple single incidents; or   
- persistent/ spiralling 





Could be in the pursuit of 
power – social power between 
co-workers. Aggression from 
supervisors with formal power 
has most detrimental effect on 
employees 
Imbalance of power is a 
central feature:  the target has 
‘little control’ or is 
‘defenceless’ 
Can be invoked if worker(s) 
are being directed by 
superiors and fear punishment 
Role of 
norms 
Societal norms regulate 
aggression where it is 
condemned  when used against 
weak or helpless victims 
The necessity to violate a 
norm appears not to be a 
feature in the literature 
although is perhaps implicit in 
the construct 
Widely accepted moral or 
societal norms are violated 
yet organisational norms may 
not 
Severity 
Can be overt or covert. 
Other scholars argue it is high-
intensity and physical 
(violence) 
Moderate to high intensity, 
physical and non-physical 
aggression. Individual acts 
may be minor but impact 
accumulates 
Measured by the construct of  
‘moral intensity’ which 
incorporates the magnitude of 
consequences 
Outcome 
- retaliatory aggression from the  
victim 
- it may produce benefits for the 
aggressor by successfully 
forcing opponent to yield 
Focus is on the victim: 
-  psychological illness 
-  physical illness 
- career distress 
Dysfunctional outcomes can 
occur across societal sectors 
Sources 
(Hershcovis & Barling 2010; 
Neuman & Baron 2005; 
Pearson, Andersson & Porath 
2005) 
(Pearson, Andersson & Porath 
2005; Zapf & Stale 2005) 
(Kish-Gephart, Harrison & 
Trevino 2010) 
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(15 of 16) 
DIMENSION 13. Corruption 





Pursuit of interests by one or 
more org. actors through the 
intentional misdirection of 
org. resources or perversion 
of org. routines (Lange 2008) 
Intentionally harmful, legal, 
subtle but pervasive forms of 
deviance repeated over time 
(Edwards & Greenberg 
2010b) 
Approaching non-task 
behaviours (as opposed to focal 
task behaviours) in a way that 
produces negative implications 
for the organisation (Puffer 





- trait theory 
- agency theory 
- individual traits  
- social learning  
- org. culture 
- socialisation 
- individual & collective trust 
- displaced aggression 
- retaliatory behaviour 
- social competence 
- negative affectivity 
- social learning theory 
- gender role theory 
- personality 
- culture 
Motivational factors such as the 
need for achievement and 
situational factors such as 
competition in the workplace 
Reciprocity 
Herzberg’s dual factor theory 
Target 
- The firm if it is an 
organisation of corrupt  
  individuals (OCI); 
- competitors, public or share 
holders if it is a ‘corrupt 
organisation’ (CO) 
Generally individuals but can 
be directed toward the 
organisation 
Generally the organisation but 
can be directed towards 
individuals 
Actor 
- Individual (OCI) 
- executives or those with 
opportunity 
- colluding groups (CO) 






- Greed/enhance own interests 
- Competitive pressure 
-To benefit self (OCI) or 
organisation (CO) 
Must intend to cause harm to 
the target 
- Ignorance of rules or how to 
apply them in specific 
situations; but is generally 
deliberate in order to: 
- To achieve personal gain; or 
- ‘Principled’ non-compliance 




OCI – continuous tend to 
slowly escalate 
CO – may be discrete incidents 
Repetitive with cumulative 
effects 
Single or multiple acts (such as 
taking sales from others, being 




Implicated with one definition 
of corruption being ‘illicit use 
of one’s position or power’ 
Lower level positions at risk 
but supervisors can also 
become targets. Can also 
occur in a form that is 
‘contrapower’ (lower level 
upwards) 
Not essential. Actor can invoke 




Societal norms always in CO/ 
organisational usually in OCI. 
Org norms may encourage if 
there is an unbridled push to 
make profit 
The necessity to violate a 
norm appears not to be a 
feature in the literature – it 
appears this behaviour is 
often ‘under the radar’ of 
what is considered 
unacceptable norms of 
behaviour 
Central tenant as it involves not 
complying with established 
rules and norms set by the 
organisation 
Severity 
Increases as it becomes 
‘normalised’ in the firm’s 
culture. Extreme cases can 
lead to’ sudden death’ of the 
organisation 
- Does not breach legal rules 
- Low-level acts which on 
their own may seem of little 
impact or significance 
Can range from subtle to severe 
Outcome 
OCI - dysfunctional 
CO – the firm may benefit 
initially but can ruin the firm 
- Anxiety and post-traumatic 
stress for victims 
- ‘bottom line’ impact on 
organisation 
Negative image of the 
organisation 
Sources 
(Ashforth et al. 2008; Lange 
2008; Pinto, Leana & Pil 
2008) 
(Edwards & Greenberg 
2010a, 2010b) 
(Puffer 1987) 
[Appendix 1: Page A6] 
 
(16 of 16) 
DIMENSION 16. Serious misconduct 
Definition 
Wilful or deliberate behaviour by an 
employee that is inconsistent with the 
continuation of the contract of 
employment (Donaghey 2006) 
Theoretical 
influences 
Concept underpinned by industrial 
legislation and precedents of the Industrial 
Commission (Australia). 
Guiding principles: valid reason - fairness, 
justice, harshness; gravity of behaviour, 
mitigating factors that lead to the 
behaviour (such as the employee’s work 
record, supervisory status of the 
employee, provocation); burden of 
proof/balance of probability  
Target 
Other individual/s 
The employer’s business 




Deliberate or wilful intentions 
Duration of 
incident/s 
Generally a single incident (eg, theft, 
assault, fraud, intoxication, refusal to carry 
out a reasonable instruction) 
Role of power 
or status 
Not essential. Actor can invoke behaviour 
towards co-worker of same status 
Role of norms 
Implicit. Misconduct occurs counter to the 
behaviour/values/expectations implied 
when party to an employment contract 
Severity 
Serious results or cause imminent and 
serious risk 
Outcome 
- Immediate dismissal of the employee 
- behaviour resulted in risk to health or 
safety of a person; or Reputation, 
viability or profitability of the 
employer’s business 
Sources (Donaghey 2006) 
  




Australia’s evolution of unfair dismissal arbitration 
 
This appendix contains an account of industrial relations history pertaining to the evolution of 
Australia’s system of unfair dismissal arbitration, commencing with federation in 1901. 
 
The Commonwealth of Australia Constitution Act: Records in the Parliamentary Library of 
Australia show that prior to the 1900s, the states in Australia were operating autonomously, each 
under a ‘responsible government’ (Bennett, S. 1999). The passing of the Commonwealth of Australia 
Constitution Act 1900 (the Constitution) established the jurisdiction for an additional system of an 
overarching federal government from January 1901. For the players in Australia’s industrial relations 
environment this Act resulted in a dual layer of state and federal government, separately empowered 
to regulate industrial issues, with the federal legislation overriding State legislation where 
discrepancies occurred (Dabscheck 1998; Walker 1970). Above all, the High Court of Australia held 
definitive power to determine disputes that arose in relation to the Constitution and conflicts between 
the state and federal systems (Dabscheck 1980). The Constitution prescribes ‘heads of power’ on 
which the Federal government can make legislation. The ‘labour power’ of the Constitution [Section 
51(xxxv)] permits the federal government to make laws with respect to the ‘conciliation and 
arbitration for the prevention and settlements of industrial disputes’. However, for the next century 
and beyond, the federal government resorted to using different heads of power outside the ‘labour 
power’ used to form Australia’s seminal federal industrial relations legislation (McCallum 2005) to 
regulate the employment relationship.  
 
1904 - Australia’s first federal tribunal – the Commonwealth Court of Conciliation and 
Arbitration: Bound by the ‘labour power’ parameters of the Commonwealth of Australia 
Constitution Act 1900, the first major initiative of the Federal Government on industrial issues was to 
enact the Commonwealth Conciliation and Arbitration Act (1904) and establish the Commonwealth 
Court of Conciliation and Arbitration. This court had power that was limited to preventing and settling 
industrial disputes that crossed State boundaries or industrial matters relating to international relations 
or corporations (Cooper & Ellem 2008; Dabscheck 1980; Walker 1970).  
 
In relation to termination of employment matters, it was interpreted by the High Court of Australia 
that neither the Constitution nor the Conciliation and Arbitration Act allowed the federal level tribunal 
to provide arbitration services in relation to unfair dismissal practices (Stewart 1989). For instance, the 
High Court ruled that a claim from a single employee, was a local matter and outside the federal 
tribunal’s jurisdiction. Secondly, awarding reinstatement to a dismissed worker was assessed by the 
High Court to be a ‘judicial’ decision which could only be handed down by a judicial court - a status it 
did not attribute to the Commonwealth Court of Conciliation and Arbitration. Thus the federal 
tribunal, could only ‘entertain’ claims and ‘recommend’ reinstatement of either unfairly or unlawfully 
dismissed workers, (O'Donovan 1976, p. 639). For most of the 20
th
 century, unfair dismissal was a 
matter for the States and their respective industrial tribunals. 
The role of state tribunals: Unlike the federal government that was bound by the parameters of the 
Constitution originally, the state governments were free to legislate on any industrial matter, such as 
those pertaining to wages, hours and conditions directly impacting the work environment (Dabscheck 
1980, 1998). Each installed a state industrial tribunal to conciliate and arbitrate over state employment 
matters. Thus state regulation occurred through the tribunal’s authority to settle intra-state disputes 
and make collective contracts binding on workers in similar occupations or industries, called 
(occupational) ‘awards’ (Barry & Wailes 2004; Petzall, Abbott & Timo 2007; Sappey et al. 2009).  
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The award system traditionally consisted of state and federal awards. Workers could have conditions 
prescribed by both jurisdictions, with state awards conditions applicable if the federal award was 
silent on the matter (Stewart 2009). As to which industries or occupational type were covered by 
either a state or federal award reflected the federal Government’s labour powers under the 
Constitution. The labour powers allowed the federal tribunal to make awards that applied to interstate 
industries on the understanding that an ‘industry’ involved industrial processes or manual labour 
(McCallum 2005). In addition, the federal government used its ‘trade and commerce’ power to 
regulate the employment of sailors, waterside workers and airline crews. Much later the High Court’s 
decisions on cases such as The Motor Accident’s Case in 1981 and the Australian Social Welfare 
Union Case in 1983 broadened the interpretation of ‘industry’, after which white-collar unions and 
workers began to seek federal award coverage (Briggs, Meagher & Healy 2007; McCallum 1982). In 
general, for the majority of the 20
th
 century, the individual states made awards that pertained to 
occupational groups such as white collar, administrative workers and professional workers such as 
teachers and academics (Bray, Waring & Cooper 2011; McCallum 1982, 2005).  
 
The states legislated over the largest sector of the Australian workforce for the majority of the 20
th
 
century. Around half of Queensland, New South Wales and South Australia’s workers had pay and 
conditions set by a state award, the majority covering female workers due to the, typically, small 
business sector work they performed (Sappey et al. 2009). In 1990, the Australian Bureau of Statistics 
(ABS) reported that 39.7 percent of employees were employed under federal awards, 48.4 percent 
under state awards, and 20.1 percent were not identified either way (O'Neil 1995). The Fair Work 
Ombudsman (2012) reports that by January 2011 most employers in Australia became part of the 
national workplace relations system, underpinned by the Fair Work Act 2009. Under the national 
system ‘modern awards’ apply. Modern awards are occupational and industry based awards that have 
been installed to reduce confusion about minimum employment entitlements. Respective state 
legislation remains in only several areas: Western Australian non-constitutional corporations; State 
government public sector entities; and some local government entities. The swing toward federal 
award domination occurred as a consequence of federal legislative changes in 2005, which are 
discussed later in this sub-section.  
 
With particular reference to termination of employment matters, each of the states installed legislation 
that provided the various state tribunals with jurisdiction to reinstate and/or compensate employees of 
a state award who they determined had been unfairly and/or wrongfully dismissed (Pittard & 
Naughton 2010; Sherman 1989). Table A2.1 outlines inaugural legislation that provided some form of 
redress to workers who believed they had been unfairly dismissed..  
 
Table A2.1  Original state legislation providing unfair dismissal rights 
State Year Name of legalisation 
Inaugural tribunal remedies 
for unfair dismissal 
New South 
Wales 
1940 Industrial Arbitration Act (NSW) 
Reinstatement to job 
Reinstatement of lost wages 
Queensland 1987 Industrial Conciliation and Arbitration Act (QLD) Reinstatement to job 
South 
Australia 
1972 Industrial Conciliation and Arbitration Act Re-employment * 
Tasmania 1975 Industrial Relations Act (Tas) Reinstatement to job 
Western 
Australia 
1979 Industrial Relations Act (WA) Re-employment or  
Victoria 1979 Industrial Relations Act (Vic) 
Reinstatement to job 
Reinstatement of lost wages 
* Jurisdiction to hear claims was vested originally in the SA Industrial Court 
  
Adapted from: (Termination, Change and Redundancy Case  1984; Pittard 1998; Pittard & Naughton 
2010; Stewart 1989) 
[Appendix 2: Page A9] 
 
The various state Acts underwent revisions to their respective unfair dismissal provisions over the 
years, for instance, in 1984 South Australia transferred jurisdiction from its Industrial Court to its 
Industrial Commission to hear unfair dismissal claims. As another example, Queensland amended 
legislation in 1999 favourably toward employees. It repealed the small business exclusion, increased 
the range of remedies available to the Commission, and upon request, the arbitrator did not need to 
take into account the effect of any remedy on the viability of the employer’s business (Chapman 
2000). And, as a final example, a substantial change occurred in 1996 in Victoria when it referred its 
industrial relations powers to the federal government and the people of Victoria came under the 
jurisdiction of the Workplace Relations Act 1996 (Commonwealth).  
 
Originally, unfair dismissal in the state was a collectively initiated system (Bray & Underhill 2009; 
McCallum 2002; Sherman 1989; Stewart 1992). An individual could not lodge an unfair dismissal 
claim with a tribunal on their own standing and a person needed to have union support and if obtained, 
it was the union that notified the tribunal of an ‘industrial dispute’. For instance, Victoria’s industrial 
tribunal was restrained from hearing individually-instigated claims on the basis of the 1990 Victorian 
Supreme Court’s Downey decision which held that without union support a claim was not of the 
character of an industrial dispute that could be resolved in the state tribunal (Bourke 1990). This 
collectivist approach to unfair dismissal bolstered union membership, yet times were to change for the 
union’s ability to gate keep access to unfair dismissal claims. In 1972 South Australia was the first to 
establish an individually initiated unfair dismissal claim process that operated alongside union-
initiated claims and in 1979 Western Australia installed a similar system (Sherman 1989). In 1991, 
NSW amended its legislation to allow the state industrial commission to resolve all dismissal claims - 
ending the unions’ ‘monopoly’ on access to unfair dismissal for NSW workers (Stewart 1992, p. 72). 
Whilst people employed under state awards were being afforded varying degrees of unfair dismissal 
protections, until 1984 federal award employees had limited protection from unfair dismissal unless 
the federal award contained a saving clause permitting the jurisdiction of state industrial authorities on 
matters of unfair dismissal, yet the federal Commission rarely approved of such clauses into federal 
awards (Termination, Change and Redundancy Case  1984). 
 
 1956 - Separating the powers - The Commonwealth Conciliation and Arbitration Commission 
and the Commonwealth Industrial Court: The 1956 Boilermaker’s decision by the High Court and 
Privy Council reinforced its position that the Commonwealth Conciliation and Arbitration 
Commission did not have the authority to engage in both judicial and non-judicial arbitral judgements 
(McCallum 2005; Shaw 1994; Stewart 1989). In order to abide by the High Court ruling, the federal 
government amended the Conciliation and Arbitration Act 1904 by abolishing the Commonwealth 
Court of Conciliation and Arbitration (Pittard & Naughton 2010). The Commonwealth Conciliation 
and Arbitration Commission was established to perform non-judicial services and, separately, the 
Commonwealth Industrial Court was established to address cases requiring common law judicial 
decisions. Throughout this time though, unfair dismissal claims were primarily the responsibility of 
the states. 
 
1973 - A new name for the Commission – The Australian Conciliation and Arbitration 
Commission: The name of the Commonwealth Conciliation and Arbitration Commission was 
changed to the Australian Conciliation and Arbitration Commission (Australian Industrial Relations 
Commission 2006). 
 
1984 - The Termination Change and Redundancy (TCR) Case: A full bench of the Australian 
Conciliation and Arbitration Commission heard a log of claims from the Australian Council of Trade 
Unions (ACTU) to improve employment security for workers under federal awards. The Commission 
took lengthy submissions from the ACTU, one being that in the United Kingdom under its 
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Employment Protection Act 1980, federal employees had the right to complain of unfair dismissal to 
an industrial tribunal and that the tribunal had the power to order reinstatement, re-employment or 
compensation. A further arm of the ACTU’s submission was the recent introduction of the 
International Labor Organisation’s (ILO) Convention 158, Recommendation 166 on Termination of 
Employment standards. In its TCR Decision, the Australian Conciliation and Arbitration Commission 
stated: 
 
We acknowledge the desirability of one Federal tribunal being vested with all the powers to 
deal with complaints about unfair dismissal relating to employees under Federal awards ... if 
anything is to be done in this area for Federal award employees then it should be done by, 
and confined to, Federal tribunals ... Further, although we are of the opinion that the present 
log of claims would not enable the Commission to order re-employment, reinstatement or 
compensation for wrongful dismissal to employees unfairly dismissed, we do believe that the 
Australian Parliament could give an appropriate tribunal jurisdiction to award compensation 
to, or order reinstatement of, employees dismissed in breach of an award (Termination, 
Change and Redundancy Case  1984, p. 10). 
 
The Commission prescribed fair dismissal standards in federal awards (Pittard 1994a) and indicated 
its willingness to exercise arbitral powers (de facto jurisdiction) and if necessary provide remedies for 
successful unfair dismissal claims. However, the High Court of Australia was not yet of the same 
opinion, although this opinion was soon to change. Nevertheless, at this point in time, Australia had a 
dual system where federal award provisions offered protection for federal employees whilst the state 
provisions covered workers employed under state awards. Yet, whilst state employees had access to 
remedies from their relevant state tribunals, federal employees still had to access the Commonwealth 
Industrial Court for absolute judgements. Further, whilst the TCR decision installed fair dismissal 
standards in federal awards, such standards were yet to be enshrined in federal legislation. 
 
1984 to 1989 - A changing attitude from the High Court:  Several decisions by the High Court of 
Australia indicated that it was softening its interpretation towards limiting the federal tribunal 
arbitrating unfair dismissal claims (Pittard & Naughton 2010; Stewart 1989). The literature reflects a 
number of decisions from the High Court that considered the jurisdiction of the Australian 
Conciliation and Arbitration Commission over unfair dismissals (see Pittard & Naughton 2010, 
Stewart 1989). For conciseness, two landmark cases are discussed here. The first landmark decision 
came in 1987 in the High Court’s decision over the Ranger Uranium Case. This High Court decision 
recorded: 
 
A finding that a dismissal is harsh, unjust or unreasonable involves the finding of relevant 
facts and the formation and expression of a value judgment in the context of the facts so 
found. Although findings of fact are a common ingredient in the exercise of judicial power, 
such findings may also be an element in the exercise of administrative, executive and arbitral 
powers... The power of inquiry and determination is a power which properly takes its legal 
character from the purpose for which it is undertaken. Thus inquiry into and determination of 
matters in issue is a judicial function if its object is the ascertainment of legal rights and 
obligations. But if its object is to ascertain what rights and obligations should exist, it is 
properly characterized as an arbitral function when performed by a body charged with the 
resolution of disputes by arbitration (Ranger Uranium Mines Case  1987, pp. 10-1). 
 
In this case, the High Court appeared willing to let the federal Commission reinstate unfairly 
dismissed workers because it considered that unfair dismissal claims related to disputes about the 
rights and obligations that should exist between employers and employees when a termination turns 
awry – an arbitral function, as opposed to ascertaining if a legal right existed in the first place – a 
court function.  
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The second landmark case is that of the Wooldumpers Case in 1989. Recalling that the Constitution 
only allowed the federal government to put in place conciliatory and arbitral systems to deal with 
‘interstate disputes’ – and on which the Ranger Uranium case remained silent – it was still a hurdle 
preventing the Commission from exercising arbitral power on unfair dismissal claims. However, the 
High Court decision in the Wooldumpers Case implied that the Australian Conciliation and 
Arbitration Commission’s ability to conciliate and arbitrate an unfair dismissal claims ‘might be 
conducive to preventing an interstate dispute’ (Smith 1990, p. 120). 
 
1988 - The Industrial Relations Act and the new Australian Industrial Relations Commission: 
The Hawke Labor government introduced new federal industrial legislation and renamed the 
Conciliation and Arbitration Commission to the Australian Industrial Relations Commission (AIRC). 
The role of the AIRC remained, primarily, to prevent and settle interstate labour disputes and 
certifying enterprise agreements (Plowman 1992). At the same time, the Industrial Division of the 
Federal Court dealt with matters arising from the federal awards (which now included the fair 
dismissal conditions in federal awards as a result of the TCR case). For Australia’s IR environment, 
the 1988 Act signalled the commencement of a neo-liberal agenda, by providing some scope for 
unions and employers to enter into enterprise agreements (Bray & Underhill 2009; Pittard & 
Naughton 2010; Plowman 1992). The succeeding Keating Labor government would continue the 
deregulated, decentralised agenda commenced by the 1988 Act in its 1993 revisions to the industrial 
legislation that saw federal awards being downgraded to a safety net of minimum conditions to protect 
those employees without an enterprise bargaining agreement (Pittard & Naughton 2010). 
 
1993 - The Industrial Relations Reform Act – federal unfair dismissal standards and the setting 
up of the Industrial Relations Court of Australia:  Coinciding with the High Court’s interpretations 
indicating the Commission held quasi-judicial powers over matters of unfair dismissal, were the 
statutory remedies for unfairly dismissed employees that were introduced in the next wave of federal 
government industrial legislation. The Keating Labor government, in 1993 amended the 1988 
Industrial Relations Act to meet Australia’s obligations under the International Labour Organization’s 
(ILO) Termination of Employment Convention 158 (Forsyth et al. 2008). The convention required 
ILO members to provide employees with an appeal process to an impartial body, such as a court, 
labour tribunal, arbitration committee or arbitrator in the event of a termination (ILO 1982). Titled 
The Industrial Relations Reform Act 1993, it directly adopted the full wording of ILO’s 
Recommendation No. 166 to meet this obligation. Although Recommendation No. 166 identified 
three categories of excluded employees - specified period employees, specified task employees, and 
short term casuals - it was the first time that Australia’s federal legislation provided protection to 
employees in the event they were dismissed on ‘harsh, unjust or unreasonable’ grounds (Pittard & 
Naughton 2010).  
 
The manner by which the federal government legislated on a matter that was traditionally outside its 
labour powers ambit under the Commonwealth of Australia Constitution Act 1900 was to invoke the 
‘external affairs’ power of the Constitution Section 51 (xxix) (Pittard 1994b). The external affairs 
power provided the Australian government with the ambit to make legislation addressing the 
country’s obligations under international treaties and conventions (DFAT 2011). As a member 
country of the ILO, Australia was obligated to adopt Recommendation 166. It came to be that federal 
statute law prescribed minimum unfair dismissal standards for employees under federal awards or 
those under state awards that did not have a comparable minimum.  
 
Facts recounted by Pittard (1994b) about the dismissal standards legislated in the 1993 Act were: first, 
affording appropriate notice of termination of employment (or payment in lieu of notice), however, 
immediate dismissal was appropriate in cases of ‘misconduct’. Second, a person could not be 
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dismissed on the following grounds: temporary absence from work because of illness or injury, 
grounds relating to colour, sex, race, pregnancy, of the employee, and participation in union activity or 
non-membership of a union. Breach of either of these two requirements would be the basis of 
wrongful dismissal. Third, there must be a valid reason on the basis of the employee’s conduct or 
capacity or for operational requirements of the business in order to terminate an employee. Fourth, 
employees facing dismissal on the basis of their conduct or capacity must be given an opportunity to 
defend their position before the employer decides to dismiss them. Breach of the third or fourth 
standard could be the basis of an unfair dismissal claim and such claims would be judged on the basis 
of the harshness, unjustness or unreasonableness of the employer’s actions. The 1993 Act also 
prescribed remedies for wrongful or unfair dismissals. They were: reinstatement to the job the 
employee held; or re-employment in a job of similar standing; or, compensation to a maximum of six 
months wages/salary. 
 
However, the administration of these judgements was not yet given to the Australian Industrial 
Relations Commission (AIRC). Instead, the Keating government created the Industrial Relations 
Court of Australia, a superior court of law that was to specialise in industrial relations matters (Shaw 
1994). It had equal status to the Federal Court of Australia and the Family Court of Australia (The 
Federal Court of Australia 2009). In terms of termination of employment matters, the Industrial 
Relations Court of Australia could hear claims that pertained to unlawful termination but, in the main, 
only after the Australian Industrial Relations Commission (AIRC) had attempted conciliation with the 
parties (Pittard 1994a; Shaw 1994). The 1993 Act gave authority to the Industrial Relations Court of 
Australia to reinstate and/or compensate an employee who was found to have been terminated: on 
prohibited grounds; for an invalid reason; or in a ‘harsh, unjust or unreasonable’ manner (Pittard & 
Naughton 2010) on the proviso the claimant had no adequate alternative remedy (such as those 
provided in the state laws). Shaw (1994) suggested that the unfair dismissal remedies available to the 
Industrial Relations Court potentially overrode the state laws for unfair dismissal. The downside of 
this system was that dismissed employees would be subjected to the formality and expense of court 
processes.  
 
1996 - The Workplace Relations Act and passing of the torch to The Australian Industrial 
Relations Commission: As legislation stood, a dismissed worker who had been employed under a 
federal award who was seeking an absolute finding and remedy for their dismissal had only recourse 
through common law or the specialist Industrial Relations Court. In 1996, Australia elected a Liberal-
National Coalition government under Howard’s leadership and it introduced The Workplace Relations 
Act 1996. The Howard government relied less on the ‘external affairs’ power to qualify its legislative 
ambit over the 1996 Act. Instead the ‘corporations power’ (Section 51 xx) was used as the foremost 
Constitutional basis of the legislation (Territories power and trade and commerce power also featured) 
(Dabscheck 2001; Gray 1996; McCallum 2005). The ‘corporations power’ provided the federal 
government the ambit to legislate on the operations of a foreign, trading or financial corporation 
within Australia. The government harnessed the wider industrial relations regulation that could be 
achieved through the ‘corporations power’ compared to the ‘external affairs power’. 
 
The 1996 Workplace Relations Act also conferred power to the Australian Industrial Relations 
Commission (AIRC) to fully adjudicate dismissals that were thought to be harsh, unjust or 
unreasonable in nature (Donaghey 2006). The power given to the AIRC to arbitrate unfair dismissal 
claims was a break-through in Australia’s arbitration history after repeated attempts by unions and 
employers to bring unfair dismissal claims before the Commission. The result was that the various 
state unfair dismissal legislations became of limited utility with federal unfair dismissal legislation the 
primary source of appeal for dismissed employees. Furthermore, the 1996 Act transferred the 
jurisdiction of the Industrial Relations Court of Australia to hear wrongful dismissal claims - 
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dismissals occurring on prohibited grounds - to the Federal Court of Australia (Pittard & Naughton 
2010; The Federal Court of Australia 2009). The Industrial Relations Court of Australia now only 
exists in name until the judges appointed to the Court resign or retire. 
 
The 1996 Workplace Relations Act also instigated the ‘fair go all round’ principle in response to 
employers’ concerns that the ILO conventions were weighted in favour of the employees (Pittard & 
Naughton 2010; Robbins & Voll 2005). Thus, the AIRC conciliated and arbitrated unfair dismissal 
claims taking into account the harshness, unjustness or unreasonable of the claim (Section 170CA).  
 
2005 - The Work Choices glitch to unfair dismissal rights: In 2004 the Howard Coalition 
government won its fourth term in office, this time with control of both the Senate and the House of 
Representatives. This allowed the government to pass the overtly neoliberal legislation, the Workplace 
Relations Act 1996 (Work Choices) Act of 2005 built on principles of deregulating and individualising 
the labour market (Bray & Underhill 2009; Waring & Bray 2006) and directly limiting union access 
and representation in the workplace (Alexander, Lewer & Gahan 2008). This legislation was based on 
the premise it would build a competitive, sustainable economy by increasing jobs, providing 
employers with ‘flexibility’ and improving the balance of work and family life for Australians (Lloyd 
Walker 2007).  
 
Furthermore, active campaigning from employer and industry bodies resulted in this legislation 
excluding additional categories of workers from making unfair dismissal claims. This 2005 Act 
prohibited claims from, among others, workers employed in businesses with 100 or less employees, 
seasonal workers and those terminated for a ‘genuine operational reasons’ (Southey 2008). The 100 
employee Work Choices exemption was legislated on the premise that small and medium sized 
businesses were restraining from increasing their workforces in fear of potential unfair dismissal 
claims, although the literature questioned the strength of the job growth-unfair dismissal link used to 
underpin this exemption (Department of the Senate 2005; Freyens & Oslington 2007; Robbins & Voll 
2005). The impact of these unfair dismissal restrictions was that, as the high majority of Australian 
business had fewer than 100 employees, the majority of Australian workers were without unfair 
dismissal protection (Abbott et al. 2007). 
 
The 2005 reforms used the same constitutional premise of the corporations power as the previous 
(1996) Act but, presumably because of the extreme deregulatory impact of the Work Choices 
legislation - through the provisions for AWAs, union restrictions and unfair dismissal limitations - it 
caused a much larger reaction. The corporations power had in fact been used as early as 1977 by the 
federal government to outlaw secondary boycotts and in the 1993 legislation to allow enterprise 
flexibility agreements (McCallum 2005). In any event, all the states, the Australian Workers Union 
and Unions NSW legally challenged Work Choices on the basis of the federal government’s reliance 
on the corporations power to regulate employment standards for employees in constitutional 
corporations (Australia Workplace Insight 2011). The High Court, however, concurred with the 
government’s interpretation that an employer, as a trading business entity that employs at least one 
other employee, is a constitutional corporation (Gray 1996). Also, within this definition of a 
constitutional corporation are commonwealth government and authorities; flight crew, maritime and 
waterside workers; and employing entities in a Territory in Australia. Thus, state legislation was left 
to cover employees in unincorporated businesses, not for profit corporations and state government 
employees (Peetz 2007).  
 
The net effect of the corporations power was that the federal government legitimately included the 
majority of Australian workers under the coverage of its 1996 Act. The Howard government’s use of 
the corporations power to legally override the power of the states, combined with a country of sitting 
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Labor state governments pledging their commitment to ‘co-operative federalism’, put estimates that 
the unfair dismissal provisions covered between 75 percent (Stewart 2009) and 85 percent of 
Australian workers (CCH Australia Limited 2008). 
 
2009 – 2013 Current times under the Fair Work Act and Fair Work Amendment Act 2012: The 
next wave of industrial legislation at the federal level brings this discussion of Australia’s evolution of 
its unfair dismissal system to its present situation under the Fair Work Act. Due to its currency, the 
implication of the Fair Work Act on unfair dismissal is addressed in the body of the thesis.  
 
To conclude this account, it appears Australia’s industrial relations environment has moved from 
highly regulated, via a myriad of detailed industry awards, compulsory arbitration and centralised 
wage setting mechanisms, through to the current, largely deregulated, system of ‘modern’ simplified 
awards and enterprise agreements unpinned by a dominant piece of federal legislation: the Fair Work 
Act 2009. It has taken over a century for Australia to develop a national system for providing unfair 
dismissal protections to workers. It was destined to be complicated by a variety of factors, such as 
early interpretations of the federal government’s authority under the Constitution Act to directly 
legislate on individual employment matters, combined with reluctance from the High Court to grant 
power to a federal tribunal to make quasi-judicial decisions that award remedies to unfairly dismissed 
workers.  
 
The states had made their respective advances in providing unfair dismissal provisions to employees 
within their territories and whilst the states were duly capable of continuing to provide this service, the 
unions were attracted to obtaining federal awards from the federal tribunal from which unions could 
necessitate broad representation and subsequent influence over a nation-wide industry. By 
implication, federal award coverage offered unions a stronger bargaining position. Furthermore, the 
state tribunals could be directed by their respective state governments to adopt particular positions, 
thus were more susceptible (than the federal tribunal) to political interference, whereas the federal 
tribunal – in theory - could not have its positions directed by the federal government (Dabscheck 
1980).  
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The purpose of a ‘measures document and coding protocol’ 
A ‘measures document’ is used in conjunction with a secondary data source to ‘describe a set of 
variables that can be used in a consistent fashion’ in a research project (Willms 2011, p. 35). In 
this research thesis, a range of variables need to be identified and recorded from each 
arbitration decision, in order to run statistical analysis on the hypotheses. Each variable 
contains a number of ‘values’ capturing the relevant ‘hypothetical construct’ that each variable 
aims to convey (Collis & Hussey 2003). The values provide a set of criteria, or behavioural 
analogues, for isolating the variables from the text of the arbitration decisions. The values for 
each variable are based on the literature relevant to each research question. This ‘measures 
document’ therefore contains the coding protocols with a view to increasing consistency in the 
identification of the appropriate value for each variable, from each decision.  
 
Completing the coding sheet 
Associated with this ‘measurement document’ is the corresponding ‘coding sheet’ that contains 
the code for every value within each variable. A sample of the coding sheet is provided at the 
end of this document. A separate coding sheet is required for each arbitration decision. The 
coding sheet requires completion as the ‘coder’ reads each decision and identifies occurrences 
in the text that are analogous to the variables described in this ‘measures document’. The 
completed coding sheet for each decision is not unlike a completed survey capturing responses 
to the variables of interest from each research participant (Kelly 1999).  
 
To complete the coding sheet, the selected value is to be circled, as per example: 
 
8:  OCCUPATION 
1  Manager  
2  Professional  
3  Technician or trade  
4  Community & personal service worker  
5  Clerical &  admin worker  
6  Sales worker  
7  Machinery operator or driver  
8  Labourer  
 
Occasionally, variables require data to be recorded, for example: 
 
11:  LENGTH OF SERVICE 




The following information must be collected in case the need arises to revisit the decision for 
which the coding sheet has been completed. This information enables an easy internet search in 
the event the original decision needs to be located. 
 
Decision number: This is recorded on the top left of the front page of the decision. In most cases, 
it starts with an alphabetical code such as ‘PR’. 
 
Dismissed worker: The decision displays the name of the dismissed worker in a central heading 
on the front page. Occasionally, the name of the representing union will appear in place of the 
dismissed worker’s name.  It is only necessary to record the worker’s surname or family name. 
 
Multiple grievants:  Occasionally, more than one worker lodges a claim. Complete a separate 
coding sheeting for each grievant in a claim. 
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Employer: The employer’s business name is recorded in a central heading on the front page of 
the decision. It is only necessary to record an abbreviated or shortened version of the 
employer’s name, for example, ‘USQ’ instead of ‘University of Southern Queensland’. There is no 
need to record Pty Ltd. 
 
 
Variable 1: Year of decision AND Variable 2: Region 
1:  YEAR  2: REGION  
1  2000  1  Adelaide  
2  2001  2  Brisbane  
3  2002  3  Canberra  
4  2003  4  Hobart  
5  2004  5  Melbourne  
6  2005  6  Newcastle  
7  2006  7  Perth  
8  2007  8  Sydney  






Variable 1: Year of decision 
 
This is the year in which the decision was made and can be identified on the top, right corner on 
the first page of the decision document.   
 
 
Variable 2: Region 
 
The region is identified on the front page on towards the top right side of each decision. 
The Fair Work Australia (2011) website lists the location of sitting members in: (A) Adelaide, 
(B) Brisbane, (C) Canberra, (H) Hobart, (M) Melbourne, (N) Newcastle, (P) Perth, (S) Sydney, 
(W) Wollongong.  
 
On the suggestion regional variations within a country may exist, several authors have 
considered regional areas in their studies of arbitral decision-making, such as McAndrew 
(2000); Crow and Logan (1994); Wagar (1994); and Bemmels (1990). 
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Variable 3: Industry 
 
3:  INDUSTRY  
1 Agriculture, forestry, fishing 
2 Mining 
3 Manufacturing 
4 Electricity gas water & waste services  
5 Construction 
6 Wholesale trade 
7 Retail trade 
8 Accommodation & food services  
9 Transport, postal and warehousing  
10 Information media & telecommunications  
11 Financial and insurance services  
12 Rental, hiring & real estate services  
13  Professional, scientific & technical services  
14  Administrative & support services  
15  Public administration & safety  
16  Education and training  
17  Health care & social assistance  
18  Arts and recreation services  
19  Other services  
 
The type of industry in which the employment relationship occurred is classified according to 
the 19 major industrial categories identified in the most recent version of the Australian and 
New Zealand Standard Industrial Classification (ANZSIC). ANZSIC was developed for use in the 
compilation and analysis of industry statistics in Australia and New Zealand. It was jointly 
developed to improve the comparability of industry statistics between the two countries and 
with the rest of the world (Australian Bureau of Statistics 2006). The 19 values in this variable 
reflect the 19 ANZSIC classifications at the major group level. Industry examples for each major 
group follow: 
 
Value 1. Agriculture, forestry and fishing 
Horticulture and fruit growing; grain, sheep and beef cattle farming; dairy cattle farming; poultry farming; 
other livestock farming; other crop growing; services to agriculture; hunting and trapping; forestry and 
logging; marine fishing; aquaculture 
 
Value 2. Mining 
Coal mining; oil and gas extraction; metal ore mining; non-metalic mineral mining and quarrying, 
exploration and other mining support services 
Value 3. Manufacturing 
Food product manufacturing; Meat and meat product manufacture; dairy product; fruit and vegetable 
processing; oil and fat manufacturing; flour mill and cereal food; bakery product; other food 
manufacturing; beverage and malt; tobacco product; textile fibre, yarn and woven fabric manufacturing; 
textile product; knitting mills; clothing; footwear; leather and leather product; log sawmilling and timber 
dressing; other wood product manufacturing; paper and paper product; printing and services and printing; 
publishing; recorded media manufacturing and publishing; petroleum refining; petroleum and coal 
product manufacturing basic chemical; rubber; plastic; glass; ceramic; cement; lime; plaster; concrete 
product; non-metallic mineral product; iron and steel; non-ferrous metal; motor vehicle and parts; other 
transport equipment; photographic and scientific equipment; electronic equipment; electrical equipment 
and appliance; industrial machinery and equipment; furniture; other manufacturing. 
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Value 4. Electricity, gas, water and waste services 
Electricity supply; gas supply; water supply; sewerage and drainage services; waste collection, treatment 
and disposal services 
 
Value 5. Construction 
Building construction; non-building construction; site preparation services; building structure services; 
installation trade services; building completion services; other construction services 
 
Value 6. Wholesale trade 
Basic material wholesaling; Farm produce; mineral, metal and chemical; builders supplies; machinery and 
equipment; motor vehicle; food, drink and tobacco; textile, clothing and footwear; household good; other 
wholesaling 
Value 7. Retail trade 
Supermarket and grocery stores; fuel retailing; specialised food; department stores; clothing and soft good 
retailing; furniture, house ware and appliances; recreational goods; other personal and household goods; 
household equipment repair services; motor vehicle; motor vehicle services; non-store retailing and retail 
commission-based buying and or selling. 
Value 8. Accommodation and food services 
Accommodation; pubs, taverns and bars; cafes and restaurants; clubs (hospitality); food and beverage 
services 
Value 9. Transport, postal and warehousing 
Road freight; road passenger; rail; water; air and space transport; other transport; services to road 
transport; services to water transport;  services to air transport; other services to transport; Postal and 
courier pick up and delivery services; warehousing and storage. 
Value 10. Information media and telecommunications 
Publishing (except internet and music publishing); motion picture and sound recording activities; 
broadcasting (except internet); internet publishing and broadcasting; telecommunication services; internet 
service providers, web search portals and data processing services; library and other information services 
Value 11. Financial and insurance services 
Banks; deposit taking financiers; other financiers; financial asset investors; life insurance and 
superannuation funds; other insurance; services to finance and investment; services to insurance 
Value 12. Rental, hiring and real estate services 
Property operators and developers; real estate agents; non-financial asset investors; machinery and 
equipment hire and leasing; scientific research; technical services; computer services; legal and accounting 
services; marketing and business management services; other business services 
Value 13. Professional, scientific and technical services 
Architectural services; engineering services; surveying and mapping services; legal services; advertising 
services; accounting services; market research services; management consulting; photographic services; 
veterinary services; computer design services 
Value 14. Administrative and support services 
Labour supply services; call centre services; document preparation services; administrative support 
services; credit reporting and debt collecting services; building cleaning services; pest control services; 
gardening services; packaging services 
 
Value 15. Public administration and safety 
Local, state, federal Government administration; public order – police, fire, other inspectorial safety and 
regulatory services; justice; foreign government representation; defence 
Value 16. Education and training 
Pre-school; primary, secondary school; tertiary education; other adult education; sports and physical 
education services; arts education; education support services 
Value 17. Health care and social assistance 
Hospitals and nursing homes; medical and dental services; other allied health services; ambulance; child 
care services; community care services 
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Value 18. Arts and recreation services 
Heritage activities; creative and performance arts activities; Film and video; radio and television; theatre; 
museums; parks and gardens; arts; services to the arts; sport; gambling services; other recreation services 
Value 19. Other services 
Repair and maintenance services: cars; electronics; appliances; machinery; clothing repair;  other personal 
services – hairdressing, beauticians; weight and diet services; parking services; brothels and prostitution 
services; funeral services; religious services and organisations; interest groups; private households 
employing staff. 
(Examples sourced from: Australian Bureau of Statistics, 2006 Australian and New Zealand Industrial 
Classification (ANZIC), Revision 1, Canberra, Catalogue no. 1292.0) 
 
 
Variable 4: Business sector 
 
4:  BUSINESS SECTOR 
0 Public (Government or Gov. Authority)  
1  Private  
 
This variable collects information pertaining to the major industrial sector in which the 
employment relationship occurred: either the public (government) sector or the private sector. 
In addition to larger firms having the potential resources to influence a claim, Kirschenbaum, Harel & 
Sivan (1998) argued that public sector employers are most likely to be challenged because it is 
the largest, most diverse employer. There are two values in this variable: 
 
Value 1. Public sector 
The public sector consists of employers where their operations are ‘either in State ownership or under 
contract to the State, plus those parts which are regulated and/or subsidised in the public interest’ (Flynn 
2007, p. 2). The following definition by Dolton & Makepeace (2011, p. 274) might also assist in discerning 
whether to code a business as public or private sector.  
 
The definition of the public sector is those workers who are employed by an organisation 
that is financed by the government and for which the government has direct financial 
responsibility. All other individuals work in the private sector. This definition places some 
institutions in the private sector, such as universities that receive large amounts of public 
money ... together with many people providing services to the public sector such as many 
cleaners in hospitals. Further, some public sector services, such as refuse collection, will be 
contracted out to the private sector. 
 
Value 2. Private sector 
The private sector in Australia includes all business operating as sole proprietors, partnerships, trusts, or 
companies. At June 2009, there were 670,951 (32.7%) companies in Australia, followed by 605,015 
(29.5%) sole proprietors, 414,020 (20.2%) trusts and 360,228 (17.6%) partnerships. There were a 














A number of the arbitration decisions included information about the size of the business – that 
is the number of employees working in the firm. Kirschenbaum, Harel & Sivan (1998) argued that 
5:  BUSINESS SIZE  
1  4 or less workers (micro)  
2  5 to 19 workers (small)  
3 20 to 199 workers (medium) 
4 200+ workers (large) 
5  Not identified  
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business size may be associated with  the resources and ability to influence a decisions. Arbitrators in 
both the AIRC and FWA, under Section 170CG(3)(da) of the Workplace Relations Act 1996, and 
later under Section 387 of the Fair Work Act 2009, are to consider: ‘the degree to which the size 
of the employer’s undertaking, establishment or service would be likely to impact on the 
procedures followed in effecting termination’. As a consequence, a reference to the size of the 
employer, in terms of staff headcount appears in many of the cases as part of the arbitrator’s 
final deliberations. 
 
For example, in Habachi vs City of Melbourne (2005), Commissioner Grainger mentions ‘As at 30 
June 2005, COM has 1,105 employees and employs qualified human resources expertise and 
these provisions do not require to be taken into account in this matter’. In Belic vs Air Direct 
Transport (2005), Commissioner Grainger states ‘Direct Air employs about 20 people and may 
be characterised as a small employer’.  And, as a final example, Commissioner Lloyd, in 
Papegeorgiou vs McKinnons Decorative Finishers (2005), states, ‘Alliance Painting Services is 
small to medium sized firm that in November 2004 employed about 25 painters’. 
 
There are five values for the business size variable (as shown above) reflecting the definitions 
supplied by the Australian Bureau of Statistics, (2002), Small Business in Australia, Catalogue 
no. 1321.0. The fifth value has been provided in the event the decision does not refer to the size 
of the business. 
 
 
Variable 6: HR expertise of employer 
 
6:  HR EXPERTISE  OF EMPLOYER 
1 No HR expert  
2 YES HR expert  
3 Not identified 
 
This variable captures whether the employer had the ‘benefit’ of human resource management 
expertise, either through some type of HR manager/officer or if the employer approached a 
HR/legal consultant to take advice about administering a dismissal. It may be that the HR 
manager was not directly involved in the dismissal, particularly in a large corporation where 
dismissal guidelines could be developed by the HR experts but executed by line management. In 
such instances, the employer still had the benefit of HR expertise. This value is included on the 
basis that the literature suggests HR specialist function could underpin formal notions of 
disciplinary procedures (Antcliff & Saundry 2009). Three values occur in this variable.  
 
Value 1: NO HR expert 
Decisions may record whether or not there was a HR expert involved in the dismissal. This is because 
arbitrators in both the AIRC and FWA, under Section 170CG(3)(db) of the (Workplace Relations and other 
Legislation Amendment Act (Cth)  1996) and later under Section 387 of the (The Fair Work Act (Cth)  2009), 
are to consider: ‘the degree to which the absence of dedicated human resource management specialists or 
expertise in the undertaking, establishment or service would be likely to impact on the procedures followed in 
effecting termination’ when arbitrating whether a termination was harsh, unjust or unreasonable. As a 
consequence, a reference to the existence or non-existence of dedicated human resource expertise can 
appear in the cases as part of the arbitrator’s deliberations. 
 
Value 2: YES HR expert 
Additional clues can be found in the decisions as to whether HR expertise existed. For instance, the initial 
listing of any witnesses and their position may give an indication. For example, in Cameron and North 
Goonyella Coal Pty Ltd (2004) heard by Commissioner Richards, states, ‘The respondent’s only witness was 
Mr Richard Williams Reid (Human Resource Manager).’ In addition, references are often made by the 
arbitrator in their decisions about the human resource practitioner. For example, in Follett v EDS (Services) 
Pty Limited (2004), the only reference that the employer had HR expertise was found in the following 
statement by the arbitrator when summarising the facts and evidence. In it, Commissioner Cargill states 
‘There is an exchange of e-mails between the applicant and the various Human Resources personnel about 
this mater at Exhibits Applicant 27 and 28’.  As another example, in Collier vs Palm Springs (NSW) Pty Ltd 
(2004), Senior Deputy President Duncan mentions ‘evidence in support of the respondent’s position was 
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given by Ms S. Oriander, manager, human resources of the respondent’. And, as a final example, in De Santis 
vs MWT Australia (2004), Commissioner Simmonds states: 
 
Ms Carney was cross-examined by Mr McDonald, for the applicant, about the way in which the 
second agreement was drawn up.  She said that the agreement had been created by the 
respondent’s human resources person and that she had no input in its creation. 
 
Occasionally, the same respondent is involved in a hearing and the earlier case contains information about 
the presence of HR expertise. For example, the previously cited case involving North Goonyella Mines Pty 
Ltd as the respondent, contained the information on dedicated HR that was also applied to the Milburn vs 
North Goonyella Coal Mines Pty Ltd heard by Commissioner Bacon. 
 
Value 3: Not identified 
A third value has been provided in the event the decision is not clear as to whether a HR expert was in 
some way involved in the dismissal. 
 
Variable 7: Worker gender 
 
7:  WORKER GENDER 
0 Male 1 Female 
 
Values for this variable are dichotomised using the dummy coding protocol of ‘0’ for male and ‘1’ 
for female. Extensive literature exists in the effort to ascertain whether or not gender effects are 
occurring in arbitral decision-making, which is discussed in Chapter four of the thesis. The 
dismissed worker’s name is generally listed on the decision. However, a name is not necessarily 
gender specific. Thus the gender of the aggrieved employee can be determined further from the 
text of the decisions where the arbitrator makes reference to gender inherently through the use 
of pronouns such as ‘he/she’ or ‘his/her’ when referring to the dismissed employee.  
 
 
Variable 8: Occupation 
 
8:  OCCUPATION  
1  Manager  
2  Professional  
3  Technician or trade  
4  Community & personal service worker  
5  Clerical &  admin worker  
6  Sales worker  
7  Machinery operator or driver  
8  Labourer  
 
Occupational groups are classified according to the Australian and New Zealand Standard 
Classification of Occupations (ANZSCO). In ANZSCO, occupations are grouped on the basis of 
their skill level and skill specialisation. There are eight ‘major’ groups at the broadest level of 
ANZSCO which are meaningful and useful for most (statistical and administrative) purposes 
(Australian Bureau of Statistics 2009).Thus, there are eight values in this variable reflecting the 
eight ANZCO classifications at the major group level. The following descriptions and examples 
have been sourced from: Australian Bureau of Statistics, 2009 Australia and New Zealand 
Standard Classification of Occupations (ANZSCO), 1st ed, Revision 1, Canberra, Catalogue no. 
1220.0: 
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 setting the overall direction and objectives of organisations and departments 
within organisations  
 formulating, administering and reviewing policy and legislation to ensure 
organisational and departmental objectives are met  
 directing and coordinating the allocation of assets and resources  
 directing, controlling and coordinating the activities of organisations and 
departments, either personally or through senior subordinate staff  
 monitoring and evaluating overall organisational and departmental 
performance, and adjusting policies, rules and regulations to ensure 
objectives are met  
 representing the organisation at official occasions, in negotiations, at 












service manager  
 
Value 2. Professionals 
Typical Tasks Occupational Examples 
 communicating ideas through language, printed and electronic media, 
and artistic media including the visual and performing arts  
 providing services in financial accounting, human resource 
development, publicity and marketing, and the efficient operation of 
organisations  
 flying aircraft, and controlling and directing the operation of ships, 
boats and marine equipment  
 conducting and analysing research to extend the body of knowledge in 
the field of the sciences and developing techniques to apply this 
knowledge  
 designing products, buildings and other physical structures, and 
engineering systems  
 researching and developing curricula, and teaching students in a range 
of educational settings  
 identifying, treating, and advising on, health, social, and personal issues; 




brokers, HR professionals, 
IT-database professionals, 
, librarians, engineers;  
doctors, nurses, teachers, 
chemists; scientists, vets, 
social workers, 
psychologists, economists, 
solicitors, photographers,  
pilots 
 
Value 3. Technicians and trades workers 
Typical Tasks Occupational Examples 
 carrying out tests and experiments, and providing technical support to 
Health Professionals, Natural and Physical Science Professionals and 
Engineering Professionals  
 providing technical support to users of computer hardware and software  
 fabricating, repairing and maintaining metal, wood, glass and textile 
products  
 repairing and maintaining motor vehicles, aircraft, marine craft and 
electrical and electronic machines and equipment  
 constructing, repairing, fitting-out and finishing buildings and other 
structures  
 operating printing and binding equipment  
 preparing and cooking food (not fast food: labourer) 
 shearing, caring for, training and grooming animals, and assisting 
Veterinarians ; propagating and cultivating plants, and establishing and 
maintaining turf surfaces for sporting events  
 cutting and styling hair  
 operating chemical, gas, petroleum and power generation equipment  
 providing technical assistance for the production, recording and 





safety inspectors, ICT 
support technicians, all 
trades workers such as 
motor mechanics, panel-
beaters, bricklayers, 
painters, tilers, butchers, 
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Value 4. Community and personal service workers 
Typical Tasks Occupational Examples 
 attending accidents, planning and implementing leisure activities for 
individuals in health care and the community, and providing nursing care 
for patients;  
 advising clients on emotional, financial, recreational, health, housing and 
other social welfare matters  
 planning and conducting educational and recreational activities to 
encourage the development of children  
 assisting Professionals in the provision of care and support to aged and 
disabled persons, patients in hospitals, clinics and nursing homes, and 
children in residential care establishments  
 serving and selling food and beverages in bars, cafes and restaurants, 
supervising staff in hotels, carrying luggage maintaining public order and 
safety and providing specialised military services to the defence forces  
 protecting, patrolling and guarding properties & security advice  
 providing a range of personal services such as beauty therapy, teaching 
people to drive, arranging funerals, and organising and providing advice 
about travel and accommodation; physical fitness goals and outdoor 
adventure, participating in and officiating at sporting competitions 
Police, fire fighters, 
ambulance officers, 
defence forces, prison 
officers, security guards 
dental hygienists, massage 
therapists, welfare 
support workers, child 
care workers, aged care 
workers, bar attendants, 








Value 5. Clerical and administration workers 
Typical Tasks Occupational Examples 
 administering contracts, programs and projects  
 setting, reviewing and controlling office functions  
 performing clerical, secretarial, organisational and 
other administrative functions  
 entering, processing and editing text and data  
 greeting clients and visitors, and responding to 
inquiries and requests for information  
 producing, recording and evaluating financial, 
production, stock and statistical information  
 receiving, processing and sending mail, documents 
and information 
Office managers, practice managers, personal 
assistants, secretaries, general clerks, data 
input operators, call centre workers, 
receptionists, book-keepers, accounting clerks, 
payroll clerks, bank workers, loans officers, 
insurance clerks, couriers, mail sorters, survey 
interviewers, switchboard operators, 
purchasing clerks, logistics clerks, despatch 
clerks, conveyancers, court and legal 
clerks/executives, debt collectors, HR clerks, 
inspectors, regulatory officers, insurance 
investigators, loss adjustors, risk surveyors 
library assistants 
 
Value 6. Sales workers 
Typical Tasks Occupational Examples 
 promoting and selling goods and services, properties 
and businesses to potential buyers  
 engaging prospective buyers ; determining buyers' 
requirements  
 receiving and processing payments for goods and 
services, properties and businesses purchased by a 
variety of payment method 
Auctioneers, insurance agents, sales 
representatives, street vendors, motor 
vehicle salesperson, checkout operators, 
office cashiers, sales demonstrators, retail 
and wool buyers, service station 
attendants telemarketers, ticket 
salespersons, visual merchandisers 
 
Value 7. Machinery operators and drivers 
Typical Tasks Occupational Examples 
 setting up, controlling and monitoring the 
operation of machines, plant and equipment  
 cleaning machines, plant and equipment and 
performing minor repairs  
 transporting passengers and freight to set 
destinations;  
 receiving, loading, unloading and despatching 
goods 
Machine operators such as: processing machines 
operators, photographic developers, sewing machinists; 
Stationary plant operators: crane, hoist and lift 
operators, miners, drillers, shot firers, Mobile plant 
operators: forklift drivers, earthmoving, horticultural, 
forestry, agricultural plant operators; Road and rail 
workers, bus drivers, train drivers, delivery drivers, 
truck drivers, store-persons 
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Value 8. Labourers 
Typical Tasks Occupational Examples 
  cleaning commercial, industrial and domestic premises, 
vehicles and machines  
 spreading, levelling and finishing concrete and bituminous 
paving materials, and assembling and erecting scaffolding 
and rigging  
 loading and unloading machines, assembling components, 
and grading, inspecting and packing products  
 assisting with cultivating and harvesting crops, plants and 
forests, and with livestock production  
 processing meat and seafood, and assisting with producing 
and preparing food  
 loading and unloading freight from trucks, trains and 
ships, and stocking shelves in stores and supermarkets 
Cleaners – commercial, domestic, laundry 
workers, car detailers, factory process 
workers: food and drink factory workers, 
slaughterers, packers, product assemblers, 
process workers in metal engineering, 
timber, plastics and rubber factories, 
forestry and logging workers, garden and 
nursery labourers, livestock workers, farm 
workers, fast food cooks, kitchen hands, 
shelf fillers, furniture handlers, caretakers, 
deck and fishing hands, handypersons, 
rubbish and recycling collectors, vending 
machine attendants. 
 





The arbitrator generally discloses the job title as part of stating facts at the outset in a decision, 
for example, ‘truck driver’ or ‘receptionist’. This ‘string’ variable provides a simple context that 
might be of interest whilst coding, data inputting and interpreting the data. Alternatively, clues 
as to the occupation may be gathered throughout the decision.  
 
Variable 10: Employment status 
10: EMPLOYMENT STATUS  
0  Full-time (permanent/casual) 
1  Part-time (permanent/casual) 
 
Wooden (2002) identifies the changing composition in the employment status, from full-time 
standard hours towards non-stand employment, as a one of the major labour market 
movements in recent decades. Values for this variable are dichotomised using the dummy 
coding protocol of ‘0’ for full time and ‘1’ for part-time. It is noted that it is possible to work part-
time with permanency or full-time casually. The legislative exclusions control to some extent the 
presence of short term casuals (be they full-time or part-time) in the decisions. It is anticipated 
that the decisions reflect typically permanent, full-time or part-time workers or long-term 
casuals that performed either full-time or part-time hours. 
 
Assume the worker is ‘full-time permanent’ time unless the decision contains information that 
the employee worked on either part-time or casual basis for the employer. This information 
would normally be noted in the early disclosure of facts in the decision.  
 
Variable 11: Length of service 
11:  LENGTH OF SERVICE  
_____________   years  
 
This variable collects data on how long the employee worked for the employer before his or her 
dismissal.  The arbitration decisions frequently contain this type of information, generally in the 
discovery of facts outlined by arbitrators at the commencement of the decision. The coding 
sheet provides space to record the actual number of year’s service in the first instance. By 
recording the actual amount of service, it will provide information to formulate more reflective 
values, post data collection, if required. 
9:  Job title: 
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Variable 12: Disciplinary record 
 
12:  DISCIPLINARY RECORD  
1 
Unblemished record (Note: in more detailed decisions, select 
this option if no reference was made to previous offences)  
2 Previous offences  
3  Not identified (limited detail in the decision)  
 
This variable is concerned with identifying whether or not the employee had been in the receipt 
of any form of previous warnings from his or her employer – be it verbal or written – for some 
aspect of their behaviour at work. 
 
This variable assesses whether or not an unblemished record exists rather than number of 
previous warnings. This is done on the basis of Chelliah and Tyrone (2010) analysis of 
progressive discipline in Australian unfair dismissal cases which was predicated on whether or 
not a previous warning had been issued by management. They selected for analysis cases 
‘involving progressive discipline incorporating warnings’ (Chelliah & Tyrone 2010, p. 102). 
Bemmels (1988) also used similar measurement values. This variable contains three values: 
 
Value 1. Unblemished record 
This applies if the behaviour that pre-empted the dismissal was the employee’s first offence and the 
employee had an unblemished disciplinary record. 
 
Value 2. Previous offence 
This applies if the decision shows that the employer reports the employee had engaged in previous 
offences. The warning can be informal (such as a brief verbal warning by the supervisor) through to formal 
(written) in nature.  
 
Value 3. Not identified 
The third value has been provided in the event the detail in the decision is too brief to determine whether 
any warnings from previous incidents had been given. 
 
 
Variable 13: Type of misbehaviour 
 
13.  TYPE OF MISBEHAVIOUR 
(SELECT AS MANY MAIN CATEGORIES AS REQUIRED  )  
1  
Property deviance  (harmful to the business) 
1.1    theft from firm  
1.2    sabotaging equipment 
1.3    fraud – tangible assets or property 
1.4    other property deviance 
2  
Production deviance  (harmful to the business) 
2.1    tardiness/absenteeism/lying about hours worked 
2.2    not following procedures or instructions  
2.3    safety violations  
2.4    misusing resources 
2.5    other production deviance 
3  
Personal aggression (harmful to a person) 
3.1   verbal aggression 
3.2   physical aggression 
3.3   sexual harassment 
3.4   theft from co-workers or customers 
3.5   other personal aggression 
4  
Political deviance (harmful to a person) 
4.1   gossiping/breaching confidentiality 
4.2   disreputable actions towards others 
4.3   other political deviance 
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This variable collects information about the misbehaviour the employee allegedly engaged in – 
according to the employer - that led the employer to make the decision to terminate the 
employment contract. Where the employee engaged in a series of misbehaviour incidents over a 
period of time, it is necessary to record the final incident that preceded the dismissal. 
(Variable 12 captures whether or not there have been previous incidents). This variable 
contains four values based on the deviance typology published by Bennett and Robinson 
(Bennett, R. & Robinson 2000; Robinson & Bennett 1995) which was based on the earlier work 
by Hollinger and Clark (1982). 
 
NOTE: Property deviance (value 1) and production deviance (value 2) involve behaviours that 
harm the business. These types of deviance are commonly called organisational deviance. Examples 
of behaviours used to measure such deviance by Robinson and Bennett (2000) were: 
 Taken property from work without permission 
 Spent too much time fantasising or daydreaming instead of working 
 Falsified a receipt to get reimbursed for more money than you spent on business expenses 
 Taken an additional or longer break than is acceptable at your workplace 
 Come in late to work without permission 
 Littered your work environment 
 Neglected to follow your boss's instructions 
 Intentionally worked slower than you could have worked 
 Discussed confidential company information with an unauthorized person 
 Used an illegal drug or consumed alcohol on the job 
 Put little effort into your work 
 Dragged out work in order to get overtime  
 
Meanwhile, personal aggression (value 3) and political deviance (value 4) involve behaviours 
that harm individuals (be it customers, co-workers or supervisors) in the workplace. Examples 
of behaviours used to measure such deviance by Robinson and Bennett (2000) were: 
 Made fun of someone at work 
 Said something hurtful to someone at work 
 Made an ethnic, religious, or racial remark at work 
 Cursed at someone at work 
 Played a mean prank on someone at work 
 Acted rudely toward someone at work 
 Publicly embarrassed someone at work 
 
Value 1. Property deviance 
Property deviance is generally serious in nature and harmful to the organisation. It involves incidents 
‘where employees acquire or damage the tangible property or assets of the work organisation without 
authorisation’ (Hollinger & Clark 1982, p. 333).  
 
Value 2. Production deviance 
Production deviance may be relatively minor in nature but still organisationally harmful. Hollinger and 
Clark (1982, p. 333) describe production deviance as ‘behaviours that violate the formally proscribed norms 
delineating the minimal quality and quantity of work to be accomplished’. It can include doing nothing, or 
little towards the work efforts of the organisation. 
 
Value 3. Personal aggression 
Personal aggression is generally serious in nature and harmful to the individuals within the workplace. 
This is defined as ‘behaving in an aggressive or hostile manner towards other individuals’ (Robinson & 
Bennett 1995, p. 566).  
 
Value 4. Political deviance 
Political deviance may be relatively minor in nature but still harmful to individuals within the workplace. 
This behaviour means to ‘engage in social interaction that puts other individuals at a personal or political 
disadvantage’ (Robinson & Bennett 1995, p. 566).  
 
NOTE: AS THIS VARIABLE IS A MULTIPLE RESPONSE ITEM, THE FOUR MAJOR CATEGORIES WILL BE 
CONVERTED TO DUMMY CODES FOR STATISTICAL ANALYSIS 
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Variable 14: Severity of behaviour 
 
14. SEVERITY OF MOST PROMINENT MISBEHAVIOUR 
(intuitive rating)  
1 Not particularly serious  
2  Somewhat serious  
3 Serious  
4  Very serious  
5  Extremely serious  
 
This variable serves to measure how obnoxious, offensive, harmful and /or violent the 
behaviour. The values reflect a five point scale. Scott & Shadoan (1989) and Bigoness and 
DuBose (1985) used a five point scale to assess the seriousness of the worker’s offense, with the 
scale ranging from ‘not particularly serious’ to ‘extremely serious’. This scale has guided the 
development of the descriptors in this study.  The coder assigns a value based on his/her 
perception – not the arbitrator’s - of the severity of the behaviour. The descriptors for the 
values below can act as a guide. 
 
Value 1. Not particularly serious 
Example: Thoughtless or selfish behaviour that may have trivial or minor impact. The employer may be 
exhibiting an over-reaction to the behaviour. 
 
Value 2. Somewhat serious 
Example: Low intensity, non violent misbehaviour that causes annoyance with each incident. May cause 
several hours of inconvenience, distraction or distress or minor financial loss to the employer.  
 
Value 3. Serious 
Example: Menacing, intimidating behaviour with each incident causing a days-length period of fear, 
distraction and/or lost productivity. 
 
Value 4. Very serious 
Example: Obnoxious, threatening behaviour that may cause a sustained period of inconvenience, 
distraction, distress and/or lost productivity. Employees or organisation exposed to a reasonable risk of 
harm or damage from the behaviour. 
 
Value 5. Extremely serious 
Example: Intolerable, dangerous, abhorrent, extreme or violent behaviour exhibited by the employee. 
Employees or organisation exposed to a high risk of harm or damage from the behaviour. 
 
Variable 15: Worker apology or remorse 
15:  WORKER APOLOGY OR REMORSE  
0  No apology or indication of regret  
1  Yes – apology or regret indicated  
 
This variable reflects whether or not the worker apologised and indicated regret about their 
behaviour or incident leading to their dismissal. Values for this variable are dichotomised using 
the dummy coding protocol of ‘0’ for no apology or remorse and ‘1’ if an apology or regret is 
indicated in the decision. Friedman (2006, p. 2) defined regret or remorse as where the 
wrongdoer ‘wishes she could go back in time and undo the bad deed’ and an apology can occur 
without a demonstration of remorse. We are limited in our ability to assess whether the worker 
was genuine in their apology because while many decisions briefly note an apology, far fewer 
decisions record whether the arbitrator believed the apology or remorse had substance. To 
measure the degree of sincerity will ultimately result in vast amounts of missing data, reducing 
the variable’s viability in the analysis. 
  
The importance of this variable is that it may moderate the arbitrator’s decision, according to 
‘impression management’ tactics by Eylon, Giacalone & Pollard (2000) and Friedman (2006, p. 
8) finding that ‘an apology causes the aggrieved party to have more empathy for the offending 
party. The aggrieved party, then, has less of a need to retaliate and is more likely to forgive’.  
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Furthermore, Skarlicki & Kulik (2005, p. 198) suggest ‘The more contrite a transgressor, the 
greater the third party’s confidence that the individual will not violate the rule again ... the 
violation is seen as less purposeful and less threatening to the social order ... from an equity 
perspective, expressing remorse or providing an explanation can serve as a means of restoring 
equity to the injured party’. Chelliah and D’Netto (2006) also incorporated a variable of this 
nature into their analysis of arbitration decisions. 
 
Variable 16: Formality of the dismissal process 
 
16:  FORMALITY OF THE DISMISSAL PROCESS  
1  
Informal (verbal or a brief/abrupt letter of dismissal that doesn’t explain 
the dismissal)  
2  
Semi-formal (a single written notice alerting worker, most likely an 
explanatory termination letter with reason for dismissal)  
3  
Formal (2 or more written notices re: investigations, suspensions, 
warnings, reasons – genuine attempts to document)  
 
This variable collects insights into the employer’s approach to dismissing the worker. It focuses 
on how well the employer ‘documents’ the dismissal process. Antcliff and Saundry (2009) 
consider the formality of the disciplinary process using, in part, the following descriptor for a 
‘formal’ process: the workplace sets out in writing the reason for taking disciplinary action in 
the form of a letter or memo. This variable, in combination with Variable 7 on companion 
support or union presence at the dismissal, provide an indicator of the level of formality of the 
dismissal process. There are three values for this variable:  
 
Value 1 – Informal 
This reflects a process where the dismissal involved no or extremely limited written advice of the 
dismissal. If written advice was given to the employee – be it a memo, letter, email or SMS text, it is brief or 
abrupt and lacks an explanation of the employer’s reasoning for the dismissal. 
 
Value 2 – Semi-formal 
The process did involve the employee receiving, on a single occasion, written notification of either their 
employment being under investigation or of their dismissal. Importantly, it contains some explanatory 
content as to why the employee is being investigated or dismissed. 
 
Value 3 – Formal 
In this process, it can be seen that the employer provided the worker with written documentation on more 
than one occasion as part of the dismissal process. For example, it may be that the employer provided 
written advice to the worker that he or she is under investigation - or the results of an investigation - and 
then wrote a second letter of dismissal, informing them of their decision. Essentially, two or more stages or 
steps, were documented. 
 
 
Variable 17: Support for worker during dismissal process 
 
17:  SUPPORT FOR WORKER DURING DISMISSAL 
PROCESS  
1   Union present  
2  Companion present  
3  No-one present with worker  
4  Not identified (limited detail in decision) 
 
This variable captures whether the decision reflects the availability or presence of a union 
representative or staff union delegate, friend or companion (Antcliff & Saundry 2009) at any 
time whilst the employee was being investigated and/or terminated. Four values have been 
assigned to this variable. 
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Value 1. Union present 
In decisions where there is no mention of union presence, it may be taken that there was no staff union 
delegate or official union representative present. 
 
Value 2. Companion present 
Indications of whether a union delegate/representative was present may be noted by the arbitrator in the 
listing of the facts or witnesses. Alternatively the text of the decision may produce an indication that a 
union representative or workplace delegate was involved at some point during the investigation and/or 
dismissal. 
 
Value 3. No-one present with worker 
This value should be selected if a detailed decision would suggest there was no person accompanying the 
worker as a support during the dismissal process. 
 
Value 4. Not identified 
The third value is to be used if the coder has doubts as to whether or not a union representative etc was 
present during any of the investigations and/or termination discussions – ie, those decisions where 
information is limited. 
 
Variable 18: Employee’s explanation for misbehaviour 
 
18:  EMPLOYEE’S EXPLANATION  FOR BEHAVIOUR 
(SELECT AS MANY  MAIN CATEGORIES AS REQUIRED)  
1  
Workplace related reasons  
1.1   accepted employer practice 
1.2   poor communication /poor instructions 
1.3   poor  employer policy or practice  
1.4   influence from another person  
1.5   job changes 
1.6   faulty equipment, hazardous conditions 
1.7   unreasonable performance expectations 
1.8   other workplace related reason 
2  
Personal Inside reasons 
2.1   denial 
2.2   felt inequity or tension 
2.3   self defence 
2.4   made a mistake 
2.5   intentional behaviour 
2.6   ignorance of rules 
2.7   frustration 
2.8   other personal inside reason 
3  
Personal Outside reasons  
3.1   personal health issues 
3.2   family commitments or family health issues 
3.3   financial pressures 
3.4   personal tragedy 
3.5   mood altering substances/addictions 
3.6   other personal outside reason 
 
 
This variable is measured using the published work by Southey (2010) which classified the 
reasons/defences employees provide to arbitrators for engaging in misbehaviour. These 
explanations can be found in the decision where either the employee provides their testimony, 
or the arbitrator summarises the employee’s explanation in his or her deliberations. There are 
three main values in this variable reflecting the three major categories in the Southey ‘employee 
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explanation’ model. More than one value category can be selected – that is because employees 
might give multiple explanations.  
 
For each major category selected, also circle the most appropriate specific reason. 
 
Value 1. Workplace related reasons category 
Workplace related reasons are rationales that involve workplace issues or dynamics - either directly or 
indirectly. Examples are 
 
Accepted employer practice  
This is where the worker engaged in activities considered a regular practice in the organisation. As an 
example, an employee found guilty of giving away product defended the action by stating ‘waste grain 
had no value and its disposal to farmers was a cost saving … the practice had gone on for a long time 
without any repercussions on individuals’ [Decision No. PR963731, 2005]. A second example is where an 
employee was dismissed for stealing responded ‘it was normal practice to claim expenses as cash from 
the till’ [Decision No. PR955782, 2005].  
 
Poor communication/poor instructions  
Poor communication refers to defences such as employees claiming they: misunderstood instructions 
‘he saw the letter as implicit permission to absent himself’; poor quality communication with supervisors 
‘she was offered no communication distinguishing her situation from that of her [dismissed] husband’ 
[Decision No. PR952575, 2004]; misinterpreted communication ‘it depends how you think smirking is ... I 
am not sure that you can actually tell whether I am smirking or whether I am trying to hold a hiccough of 
something like that’ [Decision No. PR954650, 2004]; and/or deficient methods of communication ‘there 
had been difficulties in communications ...communication was largely by text messages and emails’ 
[Decision No. PR955782, 2005].  
 Poor employer policy or practice  
This refers to defences accusing the employer of either lacking or poorly implementing a policy or 
procedure. For example one decision cites ‘There were no guidelines or protocols to guide officers on how 
to behave on field trips … This (incident) occurred in circumstances where there were no limits on what he 
could do imposed by the Department’ [Decision No. PR955783, 2005].  In another decision, the employee 
claimed she ‘was not given instructions by (the employer) as to correct procedures to be followed to 
identify a patient, or what to do if a patient was not wearing a wrist band’ [Decision No. PR955288, 2005]. 
 
Influence from  another person  
This occurred in cases where employees attributed their misbehaviour to appeasing the requests of 
others. In one case an employee accused of leaking confidential information ‘provided the information 
not at her own initiative but in response to requests from (her former supervisor)…out of loyalty to her 
former longstanding boss’ [Decision No. PR955944, 2005]. Another employee sent an email of a sexual 
nature to a co-worker who ‘had requested the email be sent to him and was aware of the content’ 
[Decision No. PR959994, 2005]. 
 Job changes  
This occurs where employees argued that their job had changed from their original employment 
contract. For example, an employee ‘complained that his duties had changed and that he was not working 
as a boat builder. He requested confirmation that he would be given boat builder work which he was 
willing to perform’ [Decision No. PR956752, 2005]. A gardener dismissed for not complying with 
instructions claimed ‘the weeding duties did not form part of his contract of employment’ [Decision No. 
947369, 2004]. 
 
Faulty equipment or hazardous conditions  
These employees defended their action by suggesting they were working with faulty equipment, for 
example, ‘The applicant give clear evidence that the machinery was old and was maintained on a patch up 
basis, so as to maintain production’ [Decision No. PR962238, 2005]. 
 Unreasonable performance expectations 
This defence occurred when employees claimed that performance expectations triggered their errant 
behaviour, for example, ‘one reason for her non attendance ... was that she was under pressure to reach 
her target hours’ [Decision No. 947653, 2004]. 
(Source: Southey 2010) 
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Value 2. Personal-inside reasons category 
It was evident that some of the personal reasons were of a non-tangible nature. That is, reasons based on 
cognitive processes, reactions or emotions of the employee. Such reasons were presented as ‘personal-
inside reasons’ in the model. Examples are: 
 
Denial  
A number of employees would not provide explanations for their behaviour and instead denied 
engaging in the accused misbehaviour. A typical example of denial is: ‘That is not my behaviour. I would 
never do that to anybody. I would never get into anybody’s face like that. And it is just not something I 
would do. It is something so – not me’ [Decision No. 954947, 2005]. 
 
Felt inequity or tension  
This theme accounts for employees who built defences on perceptions that they were being treated 
unfairly or felt underlying tension. An example of an unfair treatment occurred when an employer 
reimburses petrol costs via payroll and the employee responded ‘I got to pay tax on that now, and I can’t 
claim it and it’ll bugger up all my returns at the end of the year again… you can’t do that. It’s not fair’ 
[Decision No. PR961549, 2005]. Examples of underlying tension can be found in the employee claiming 
he ‘was omitted from an email list about a meeting … had received calls from employees warning him to 
“watch out”’ and the employee claiming ‘he was allocated an unfair workload and allocated unusual bids’ 
[Decision No. PR958849, 2005]. 
 
Self defence  
This defence identifies those situations where employees felt the need to engage in self protective 
behaviours. In one such case the employee states, ‘Obviously I would have raised my voice. It is a way of 
protecting oneself, but I mean, I’m not being the aggressor, I have not been put (sic) my hand up, but I 
mean, my voice would have been louder, really to stop the argument escalating’ [Decision No. PR957122, 
2005]. 
 Made a mistake  
In some cases the employee’s defence was that he or she made a mistake. Examples of employees 
admitting they made a mistake are: ‘some of the alterations were done in error … he acknowledges the 
breach; apologises and indicates he acted stupidly and carelessly. He expresses sorrow and says he will 
never make this mistake again’ [Decision No. PR958166, 2005].  In another case, ‘the employee had held 
an honest belief that he was not supposed to attend for work when he had a ‘viral illness’’ [Decision No. 
963850, 2005].  
 Intentional behaviour  
This defence captures incidences where the employee admits they behaved with intent to do wrong. For 
example, one employee ‘conceded he had decided to tell a lie during his security interview … he went on to 
concede that most of the information he had given (the employer) in relation to the assault was, in fact, 
untrue’ [Decision No. PR956105, 2005]. In another case, an employee admitted he sent a major 
customer to a competitor with the intent of losing his job in the hope he could ‘get the money (a past co-
worker) got’ as a termination payout [Decision No. PR955902, 2005]. 
 Ignorance of rules  
In this circumstance, employees contend that they did not realise their behaviour breached a company 
policy or procedure, for example, an employee admitted sending inappropriate emails but explained to 
investigators that ‘at the time he did not fully foresee the ramifications of the email and that he was now 
aware of the email policy’ [Decision No. PR959994, 2005].  
 
Frustration  
The emotion of frustration was identified as a defence for wayward behaviour. In one example, the 
employee took issue with a poster and admits ‘he tore it down in the heat of the moment in frustration... 
out of frustration at (the supervisor’s) attitude towards him and the way he had treated him in the past’ 
[Decision No. PR945691, 2004]. 
(Source: Southey, 2010) 
 
Value 3. Personal-outside reasons category 
The remaining personal reasons could be attributed to physical aspects surrounding the employee. These 
dimensions are classified as ‘personal-outside reasons’ in the explanation model and are defined as those 
reasons which are non work related and exist in a tangible or measurable form. Examples are: 
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Personal health issues  
This defence relates to the use of poor personal health triggering some form of misbehaviour. For 
example, one employee failed to contact his employer about his absence because ‘he was “laid up” for 
three days and could barely move’ [Decision No. PR957185, 2005]. In another case the arbitrator cites ‘it 
was the employee’s position that the boil or boils caused him to conduct himself in the manner he did’ 
[Decision No. PR945645, 2004].. 
 Family commitments/health issues  
This sub-value covers defences using family or household responsibilities. In one case an employee 
failed to provide a medical certificate before a set date because ‘his ex-partner and his children moved 
house during this period and he helped them do so’ [Decision No. PR957185, 2005]. Another employee 
indicated ‘his wife was suffering a migraine headache attack and that he had to go home to look after her’ 
[Decision No. PR955063, 2005]. 
 Financial pressures 
Living in a strained financial state was also called upon as a defence. For example, an employee testified 
‘that his financial position became so poor that he could not afford to make telephone calls and says this is 
the reason for any gaps or failure on his part to contact (the employer) as he otherwise should have … he 
could not afford to telephone every day’ [Decision No. PR957185, 2005]. 
 Personal tragedy  
There were occasions were employees defended their behaviour on the basis of a major negative life 
event. For example, one employee’s defence was ‘the approaching anniversary of her son’s death caused 
(the employee) to be initially upset’ [Decision No. PR957079, 2005]. In another example, an employee 
defence for hitting another employee was ‘the comment by (co-worker) about my father was highly 
offensive to me ... At the time of the incident, I had not had the opportunity to properly deal with my father’s 
death’ [Decision No. PR965161, 2005].  
 
Mood altering substance/addictions  
This accounts for defences for misbehaviour due to the use of drugs, alcohol or addictions such as 
gambling. One employee stated ‘now in hindsight, and in light of what has happened to me, I am probably 
in need of some help in addressing my dependence on alcohol’ [Decision No. PR951124, 2004]. A similar 
plea was made by the employee reported in Decision No. PR952429 in [2004], ‘The applicant’s defence 
was that he had a serious problem with alcohol and gambling. The transgressions by him in Brisbane and 
Darwin were the result of being intoxicated which seriously hampered his judgement’ 
(Source: Southey, 2010) 
 
NOTE: AS THIS VARIABLE IS A MULTIPLE RESPONSE ITEM, IT WILL BE CONVERTED TO DUMMY CODES 
FOR STATISTICAL ANALYSIS  
 
Variable 19: Complexity of explanation 
 
19:  COMPLEXITY OF EXPLANATION  
1  Single category explanation  
2  Dual category explanation  
3  Triple category explanation  
 
The Southey (2010) typology of explanations also contends that multiple, cross categorical 
explanations can given.  This variable collects summary data from the previous variable 
(employee explanation for misbehaviour). Each value represents how many categories were 
invoked by the worker’s explanation. 
 
Value 1. Single category explanation 
The worker’s explanation came from only one of the categories. 
Values 2. Dual category explanation 
The worker’s explanation drew from two categories: ie, workplace related and personal-inside; or 
workplace related and personal-outside; or personal-inside and personal-outside. 
Value 3. Triple category explanation 
The worker’s explanation drew on all three categories  
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Variable 20: Managerial errors in the dismissal process 
 
22:  MANAGERIAL ERRORS IN THE DISMISSAL PROCESS  
(SELECT AS MANY AS REQUIRED )  
1  Poor or flawed evidence or reason  
2   Mitigating factors ignored  
3  Rules violation (eg rules not  well communicated)  
4  Denied union/support person  
5  Problematic investigation  
6  Problematic response  
7  Problematic allegation  
8  Punishment too harsh  
9  Management  contributed  
 
This variable summarises the arbitrator’s assessment of managerial errors in the way in which 
the employer administered the dismissal process. Based on insights by Blancero and Bohlander 
(1995) about reasons arbitrators reverse or modify managerial action in dismissal cases. 
 
It does occur that even when an arbitrator favours the employer in the final decision, they can still 
find fault with the employer’s process. Nine values occur in this variable: 
 
Value 1. Poor or flawed evidence or reason: 
This means the charge of wrongdoing was not supported by enough substantive evidence. It may be that 
the employer had not gathered enough evidence to uphold the discipline imposed. Or the employer may 
have acted on strong suspicion of misconduct without solid documentation or collaborative evidence. This 
value is related not to the quality of the investigation but how the employer chooses to use the evidence 
resulting from an investigation – if it conducts one.  
 
Value 2. Mitigating factors ignored 
This means the arbitrator acknowledged the misbehaviour but considered additional circumstances that 
reduced the severity of the discipline imposed. Examples of mitigating circumstances could be: 
 The employee was otherwise considered a good corporate citizen 
 The employee was seen to be genuinely remorseful 
 The employee had a long and satisfactory work record 
 The employee was experiencing difficult personal/family situations 
 
Value 3. Rules violation 
Whilst management has the power to make the workplace rules and policies, they are responsible for four 
matters when making their rules: 
(a) to make rules only within the boundaries necessary for safe and efficient operations of the business 
(b) to make rules which are clear and unambiguous 
(c) to effectively communicate these rules to all employees 
(d) to enforce rules consistently and without bias 
Rules violation therefore means that the employer breached one or more of these rule-making 
responsibilities. 
 
Value 4. Denied union/support person 
Concerned with natural justice, this value means the employer failed in some way to provide a 
procedurally fair process to the worker when considering dismissing him or her by not notifying the union 
of the matter or denying the employee representation/ support during the investigation/dismissal process 
 
Value 5. Problematic investigation 
Concerned with natural justice, this value means the employer failed in some way to provide a 
procedurally fair process to the worker when considering dismissing him or her by not taking corrective 
action within an appropriate time period of completing the investigation or not conducting an 
investigation or conducting an inappropriate investigation. 
 
Value 6. Problematic response 
Concerned with natural justice, this value means the employer failed in some way to provide a 
procedurally fair process to the worker when considering dismissing him or her by not giving the 
employee the opportunity to respond to investigation findings and allegations  
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Value 7. Problematic allegation 
Concerned with natural justice, this value means the employer failed in some way to provide a 
procedurally fair process to the worker when considering dismissing him or her by not clearly detailing to 
the employee the alleged offences or making it apparent the worker’s job was a risk of being terminated. 
 
Value 8. Punishment too harsh 
This means the arbitrator considered that whilst procedurally the dismissal was executed correctly, the 
dismissal from the workplace was too severe (or harsh) for the degree of seriousness of the misbehaviour.  
 
An example of this would be Webster v Mercury Colleges (2011) where SDP Drake (the arbitrator) ruled: 
‘The termination of Mr Webster’s employment was harsh because of the serious financial consequences to Mr 
Webster and the social dislocation which was clearly inevitable on summary termination of his employment. 
Mr Webster was required to leave the country and dislocate his life within twenty-eight days of the 
termination of his employment. As an employer of sponsorship visa employees I have concluded that the 
employer was likely to know of these consequences. Termination of employment in these circumstances, with 
this knowledge, was harsh.’ 
 
Value 9. Management contributed 
The arbitrator may find that management’s own conduct contributed to the incident for which the 
employee was dismissed. Typical management infractions of this nature are: 
 
(a) The employee acted on bad or wrong information provided by a supervisor or the employee acted 
under direction of someone assumed to be - but was not - in authority 
(b) Management (or supervisor) neglected to provide the necessary equipment or materials to perform 
the work or maintain equipment to a standard to perform 
(c) Where management (or supervisor) concurred with the rules violations (often considered ‘custom 
and practice’ that fly in the face of organisational rules) 
(d) Where manager (or supervisor) and employee were involved jointly in the incident but only the 
employee was disciplined. 
 
NOTE: AS THIS VARIABLE IS A MULTIPLE RESPONSE ITEM, IT WILL BE CONVERTED TO DUMMY CODES 
FOR STATISTICAL ANALYSIS  
 
Variable 21: Worker advocacy at hearing 
 
21:  WORKER ADVOCACY AT HEARING  
1  Self represented  
2  Represented by union  
3  Represented by independent lawyer  
4  Representation not clear  
 
This variable captures whether an advocate appeared on behalf of the dismissed worker at the 
arbitration hearing itself. Sherman (1989) dichotomised the  Australian context of advocacy into 
either union employed ‘industrial officers’ or the unions’ use of ‘outside legal counsel’. Legal 
representation (by a professionally qualified lawyer/solicitor) is subject to approval by the 
arbitrator. Section 596(1) of (The Fair Work Act (Cth)  2009) limits when a person may be 
represented in a matter before FWA only if the arbitrator considers: 
a) it is a complex matter that may be dealt with more effectively by legal experts; or 
b) one of the parties is unable to represent him or herself effectively; or 
c) the ‘power balance’ between the two parties would make it unfair for one not to be 
represented. 
 
Legal representation is separated from the non-legal representative, because Crow and Logan 
(1994, p. 181) suggest that lawyers ‘are probably more eloquent in their presentation than 
advocates with non-legal backgrounds ... this may have a significant impact on decisions when 
the issues are clouded by uncertainty.’  Four values have been assigned to this variable. 
 
Value 1. Self represented 
The employee may self-represent. In this case, it is likely to be noted by the arbitrator in the introductory 
sections of the decision. Alternatively turn to the end of the decision for the listing of ‘appearances’. 
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Value 2. Represented by union OR Value 3. Represented by independent lawyer 
Alternatively, the dismissed employee has an advocate represent his or her. The final page of the decision 
generally lists ‘Appearances’ and the person appearing for the applicant (the dismissed worker) and the 
respondent (the employer). The ‘appearances’ listing may indicate if it was a union 
representative/industrial officer or legal counsel which we will take as an independent lawyer.  
 
Value 4. Representation not clear  
If it is not specifically clear if the representative is ‘legal counsel’ it means it is probably an IR consultant or 
a legal associate acting under instructions. 
 
 
Variable 22: Employer advocacy at hearing 
22:  EMPLOYER ADVOCACY AT HEARING  
1  Self represented:  by a member of management  
2  Represented by employer or industry association  
3  Represented by independent lawyer  
4  Representation not clear  
 
This variable is a counter-balance to Variable 20 identifying the status of advocacy for the 
worker. The arbitrator’s introductory paragraphs may also provide insight into representation. 
 
Value 1. Self represented 
The employer, particularly if it has HR expertise on board, may well self-represent. Self representation is 
where any employee of the business or the business owner presents their case. It may be noted by the 
arbitrator in the introductory sections of the decision. Alternatively turn to the end of the decision for the 
listing of ‘appearances’. 
 
Value 2. Represented by Association OR Value 3. Represented by independent lawyer 
Alternatively, the respondent employer may engage the expertise of an advocate to represent its case. The 
‘appearances’ listing may indicate if it was an employer association or industry association representative 
or legal counsel which we will take as an independent lawyer. The attempt to separate legal representation 
from the other advocacy services is supported by Crow and Logan (1994, p. 181) suggest that lawyers ‘are 
probably more eloquent in their presentation than advocates with non-legal backgrounds ... this may have 
a significant impact on decisions when the issues are clouded by uncertainty.’ 
 
Value 4. Representation not clear:  
If it is not specifically clear if the representative is ‘legal counsel’ it means it is probably an IR consultant or 
a legal associate acting under instructions. 
 
Variable 23: The arbitration decision 
 
23:  THE ARBITRATION DECISION  
0  Employer’s favour  
1  Worker’s favour  
 
This variable is the dependent variable in this study. 
 
This study dichotomises the final arbitration decision (which is the same as the outcome/results 
of the arbitration hearing) into either one which was favourable to the aggrieved worker, or one 
that was favourable to the employer. These values have been adapted from the Research Manual 
of Industrial Law (CCH 2007) and the Termination of Employment – General Information Guide 
(AIRC 2007). These dichotomous values are recorded using dummy codes of 0 and 1, where: 
 
Value 0. Employer’s favour  
The worker’s claim for unfair dismissal was dismissed because the arbitrator found in favour of the merits 
of the employer’s case. That is, the arbitrator agreed with the employer. The dismissed worker may be 
ordered (although very rarely) to pay the employer’s legal costs if the arbitrator found that the worker 
was acting vexatiously, continued the claim with no reasonable prospect of success or due to an 
unreasonable act or omission in connection with the conduct of the proceedings by the employee.   
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Value 1. Worker’s favour 
The worker’s claim for unfair dismissal was upheld by the arbitrator. That is the arbitrator agreed with the 
worker. The arbitrator overturns management’s decision to dismiss the worker in any of the following 
ways: 
(a) He or she makes a reinstatement order which means the employee is to be returned to the same 
position held before his or her dismissal. They may also order back-pay for lost wages. 
(b) He or she makes a re-employment order that the worker be re-employed by the employer - although 
not the same position. 
(c) He or she makes a compensation order where reinstatement or re-employment is not considered a 
practical resolution. The amount of compensation is calculated based on lost remuneration. 
(d) Costs may be ordered against the employer if the arbitrator found the employer acted unreasonably 
by not settling the claim or due to an unreasonable act or omission in connection with the conduct of 
the proceedings by the employer.  The employer pays the dismissed employee’s legal costs. 
 
 
Variable 24: Remedy awarded 
 
24:  REMEDY AWARDED  
1 Re-employment or reinstatement  
2 Compensation in lieu of reinstatement  
 
Note: This variable only needs to be coded if value 1 in Variable 26 was selected. This variable 
collects data pertaining to successful claims from workers as to the type of remedy awarded by 
the arbitrator. Based on the Research Manual of Industrial Law (CCH 2007) and the Termination 
of Employment – General Information Guide (AIRC 2007), there are two main values reflecting 
the possible remedial outcomes.  
 
Value 1. Re-employment or reinstatement 
The arbitrator orders the worker to be re-employed (although not in the same position) OR the arbitrator 
orders the worker to be returned to the same position he or she held before dismissal. 
 
Value 2. Compensation in lieu of reinstatement  
The arbitrator orders the worker be given financial compensation (because reinstatement or re-
employment was not considered a practical resolution). The amount of compensation is calculated based 
on lost remuneration.  
 
 
Variable 25: Arbitrator gender 
Values for this variable are dichotomised using the dummy coding protocol of ‘0’ for male and ‘1’ 
for female. It is necessary to identify the arbitrator’s name as this allows additional details to be 
collated in relation to his or her gender, work history and arbitration experience. The 
arbitrator’s name appears on the top, left side on the front page of each decision.  
 
On the coding sheet, the listing of arbitrators’ names has been ordered according to their gender 
– 54 males and 15 female arbitrators. 
 
On the coding sheet, circle the gender value that contains the arbitrator’s name AND identify the 
arbitrator’s name on the list and circle its corresponding sub-value. 
 
If the arbitrator’s name does not appear on the list, record their name on the coding sheet. 
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25:  ARBITRATOR GENDER /  
26:  PROFESSIONAL BACKGROUND  /  27:  EXPERIENCE  
0  MALE                        * default values for  26     # default values 27  
Select  1 Bacon 1 Employer  
his  --- -----------------------------    
name  3 Blain 3 Indeterminable  
 4 Blair 2 Union  
 5 Boulton  2 Union  
 6 Cartwright 1  Employer  
 7 Duncan 3 Indeterminable  
 8 Eames 2 Union  
 9 Gay 1 Employer  
 10 Grainger 3 Indeterminable  
 11 Hamberger  3  Indeterminable  
 12 Hamilton 1 Employer  
 13 Hampton 1 Employer  
 14 Harrison G (com) 2 Union  
 15 Hingley  2 Union  
 16 Hodder  2 Union  
 17 Hoffman 1 Employer  
 18 Holmes 3 Indeterminable  
 19 Ives 1 Employer  
 20 Jones 1 Employer  
 21 Kaufman 3 Indeterminable  
 22 Lacy 3 Indeterminable  
 23 Lawler 3  Indeterminable  
 24 Lawson 1 Employer  
 25 Lesses  2 Union  
 26 Lewin  2 Union  
 27 Lloyd 3  Indeterminable  
 28 Mansfield 2 Union  
 29 McCarthy 1 Employer  
 30 Munro 2 Union  
 31 O’Callaghan 1 Employer  
 32 O’Connor 2 Union  
 33 Polites  1 Employer  
 34 Raffaeli  2 Union  
 35  Redmond 2 Union  
 36 Richards 1 Employer  
 37 Roberts 2 Union  
 38 Ross 2 Union  
 39 Simmonds  2 Union  
 40 Smith 1 Employer  
 41 Thatcher 1 Employer  
 42 Tolley  3 Indeterminable  
 43 Watson 1 Employer  
 44 Williams 3 Indeterminable  
 45  Cambridge  2  Union   
 46  Cloghan  3  Indeterminable  
 47  Roe  2  Union   
 48  Ryan  2  Union   
 49  Sams  2  Union   
 50  Simpson  2  Union   
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25:  ARBITRATOR GENDER /  
26:  PROFESSIONAL BACKGROUND  /  27:  EXPERIENCE  
 51 Connor  3  Indeterminable  
 
 52 Jennings  3  Indeterminable  
 
 53 Laing  3  Indeterminable  
 
 54 Wilks  2  Union  
 
1  FEMALE                * default value for 26     # default values 27  
Select  1 Acton 2 Union  
her  2 Cargil  3 Indeterminable  
name  3 Cribb  3 Indeterminable  
 4 Deegan  3 Indeterminable  
 5 Drake 3 Indeterminable  
 6 Foggo  2 Union  
 7 Harrison A (SDP)  3 Indeterminable  
 8 Larkin 1 Employer  
 9 Leary 1 Employer   
 10 Marsh 2  Union  
 11 Spencer 1 Employer  
 12 Whelan 2 Union  
 13 McKenna 2 Union  
 14 Gooley  3 Indeterminable  
 15 Bissett  2 Union  
 
 
Variable 26: Arbitrator professional background 
 
* 26:  DEFAULT VALUES FOR  PROFESSIONAL BACKGROUND  
1  History of working for employers  
2  History of working for unions  
3  Indeterminable - history shows no strong preference  
 
NOTE: No coding required –default values have been assigned to each arbitrator’s name 
 
Professional background captures the arbitrator’s work history before joining the tribunal.  The 
values in this variable used the measures appearing in Southey and Fry (2010). Southey and Fry 
noted it was difficult, at times, to allocate a member’s background to one of the three categories. 
To limit the likelihood of classifying them incorrectly, a conservative approach was taken 
towards assigning a clear union or employer label to the various members. Thus, if their work 
history did not show a clear employer/union alliance, the ‘Indeterminable’ category was 
assigned. Legal appointments were classified also as ‘Indeterminable’ to avoid making a value 
judgement. If one considers we do not think of criminal lawyers defending a client in court to 
also be in agreement with their client’s personal philosophies and principles. Similarly, as 
tempting as it may be, a value judgement cannot be made for IR barristers based on their client 
list. One of three values has been pre-assigned to each arbitrator. 
 
Value 1. History of working for employers 
Arbitrator had worked for an employer association or management of an organisation. 
 
Value 2. History of working for unions 
Arbitrator had worked for a union body. 
 
Value 3. Indeterminable 
Arbitrators were classified as ‘Indeterminable’ where they had worked for both a union and employer 
association. Alternatively, they were considered Indeterminable if they had careers in the legal, academic 
or public service.  
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Variable 27: Arbitrator experience 
# 27:  VALUES FOR ARBITRATOR EXPERIENCE  
1 Up to 5 decisions  
2 6 to 10 decisions  
3  11 to 15 decisions  
4  16 to 20 decisions  
5  21 to 25 decisions  
6  26 or more decisions  
 
NOTE: No coding required – Values for Variable 27 can only be ascertained and assigned to each 
arbitrator after the data collection has taken place which will allow the number of decisions made 
by each arbitrator to be counted 
 
This variable aims to capture data about the amount of experience each arbitrator has in making 
arbitration decisions. Heneman III and Sandver (1983) measured this variable on the basis of 
the number of year’s arbitration experience held by the arbitrator. In this study, such a method 
will not detect arbitrator’s who have been in the tribunal for a period of time, but only heard a 
few unfair dismissal arbitration cases compared to those who may have less tribunal service, 
but frequently preside over unfair dismissal claims. Nelson and Kim (2008) measure this 
variable by considering whether or not arbitrators (in the US and Canada) are eligible members 
of the National Academy of Arbitrators that requires the arbitrator to determine fifty cases 
every five years. However, such a professional body does not exist in Australia.  
 
This study uses the methodology employed by Nelson and Curry (1981),  Crow and Logan 
(1994) and Bingham and Mesch (2000) to measure arbitrator’s experience by calculating the 
number of cases decided by the arbitrator. The coding sheet reflects values for experience in ‘4 
decision’ groupings used by Bingham and Mesch (2000).  
 
 
Variable 28: Arbitrator seniority 
28:  ARBITRATOR SENIORITY  
1 Commissioner  
2 Deputy President  (DP) 
3  Senior Deputy President  (SDP) 
4  Vice President (VP) or Justice  
 
This variable aims to capture data about the status of the arbitrator amongst their tribunal 
peers. It also complements the variable on arbitrator experience, if one were to follow the logic 
that the more senior the arbitrator, the more experienced the arbitrator. 
 
This variable contains four values reflecting the hierarchical structure of the Australian 
Industrial Relations Commission and the current, Fair Work Australia. No information can be 
found to ascertain what characteristics reflect the more senior positions. However, this is not a 
measurement problem for this study as the seniority of the arbitrator is recorded clearly in each 
decision. 
 
The arbitrator’s seniority can be identified beside the arbitrator’s name that appears on front 
page of each decision, on the top left side.  
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Figure A3.1  The coding sheet 
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SPSS output of failed estimation due to the inclusion of 
‘POOR_EVIDENCE_OR_REASON’ variable 
 
  /METHOD=ENTER PublicPrivate_binary Industry_collapsed FirmSize_Collapsed HR_EXPERTISE FORMALITY 
SUPPORT WORKER_GENDER Occupation_collapsed SERVICE_PERIOD DISCIPLINARY_RECORD 
EMPLOYMENT_STATUS ARBITRATOR_GENDER ARBITRATOR_BACKGROUND ARBITRATOR_EXPERIENCE 
ARBITRATOR_SENIORITY 
  /METHOD=ENTER Property_deviance Production_deviance Personal_aggression Political_deviance 
Misbehaviour_severity_collapsed Workplace_explanation PersonalInside_explanation Complexity_3_levels REMORSE 
WORKER_ADVOCACY EMPLOYER_ADVOCACY 
management_contributed investigation_flaw poor_allegation no_response ignored_mitigating too_harsh poor_evidence_or_ 
reason 




  /CONTRAST (PublicPrivate_binary)=Indicator(1) 
  /CONTRAST (Industry_collapsed)=Indicator 
  /CONTRAST (FirmSize_Collapsed)=Indicator(1) 
  /CONTRAST (HR_EXPERTISE)=Indicator(1) 
  /CONTRAST (FORMALITY)=Indicator 
  /CONTRAST (SUPPORT)=Indicator(1) 
  /CONTRAST (WORKER_GENDER)=Indicator(1) 
  /CONTRAST (Occupation_collapsed)=Indicator 
  /CONTRAST (DISCIPLINARY_RECORD)=Indicator(1) 
  /CONTRAST (EMPLOYMENT_STATUS)=Indicator(1) 
  /CONTRAST (ARBITRATOR_GENDER)=Indicator(1) 
  /CONTRAST (ARBITRATOR_BACKGROUND)=Indicator(1) 
  /CONTRAST (ARBITRATOR_EXPERIENCE)=Indicator 
  /CONTRAST (ARBITRATOR_SENIORITY)=Indicator(1) 
  /CONTRAST (Property_deviance)=Indicator(1) 
  /CONTRAST (Production_deviance)=Indicator(1) 
  /CONTRAST (Personal_aggression)=Indicator(1) 
  /CONTRAST (Political_deviance)=Indicator(1) 
  /CONTRAST (Workplace_explanation)=Indicator(1) 
  /CONTRAST (PersonalInside_explanation)=Indicator(1) 
  /CONTRAST (REMORSE)=Indicator(1) 
  /CONTRAST (WORKER_ADVOCACY)=Indicator(1) 
  /CONTRAST (EMPLOYER_ADVOCACY)=Indicator(1) 
  /CONTRAST (management_contributed)=Indicator(1) 
  /CONTRAST (investigation_flaw)=Indicator(1) 
  /CONTRAST (poor_allegation)=Indicator(1) 
  /CONTRAST (no_response)=Indicator(1) 
  /CONTRAST (ignored_mitigating)=Indicator(1) 
  /CONTRAST (too_harsh)=Indicator(1) 
  /CONTRAST (poor_evidence_or_reason)=Indicator(1) 
  /CLASSPLOT 
  /CASEWISE OUTLIER(2) 
  /PRINT=GOODFIT 




[DataSet1] C:\Documents and Settings\southeyk\My Documents\PHD work\PhD data input into SPSS\DATA INPUT 
REFINED FOR PHD.sav 
 
Warnings 
Estimation failed due to numerical problem. Possible reasons are: (1) at least one of the convergence criteria LCON, BCON is zero or 
too small, or (2) the value of EPS is too small (if not specified, the default value that is used may be too small for this data set). 
 
Case Processing Summary 
Unweighted Casesa N Percent 
Selected Cases Included in Analysis 565 100.0 
Missing Cases 0 .0 
Total 565 100.0 
Unselected Cases 0 .0 
Total 565 100.0 
a. If weight is in effect, see classification table for the total number of cases. 
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Dependent Variable Encoding 
Original Value Internal Value 
employer's favour (claim dismissed) 0 
worker's favour (claim upheld) 1 
 
 




(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7) (8) (9) 
Industry  agriculture, mining 25 1.000 .000 .000 .000 .000 .000 .000 .000 .000 
manufacture, wholesaling 122 .000 1.000 .000 .000 .000 .000 .000 .000 .000 
construction, utility supply 30 .000 .000 1.000 .000 .000 .000 .000 .000 .000 
retail 42 .000 .000 .000 1.000 .000 .000 .000 .000 .000 
hospitality, recreation 39 .000 .000 .000 .000 1.000 .000 .000 .000 .000 
transport, postal, warehousing 129 .000 .000 .000 .000 .000 1.000 .000 .000 .000 
communication, technical, 
professional services 
46 .000 .000 .000 .000 .000 .000 1.000 .000 .000 
admin & support services 32 .000 .000 .000 .000 .000 .000 .000 1.000 .000 
public admin & safety 28 .000 .000 .000 .000 .000 .000 .000 .000 1.000 
education, health, social 
assistance 
72 .000 .000 .000 .000 .000 .000 .000 .000 .000 
Arbitrator 
experience  
up to 5 decisions 56 1.000 .000 .000 .000 .000     
6 to 10 decisions 118 .000 1.000 .000 .000 .000     
11 to 15 decisions 98 .000 .000 1.000 .000 .000     
16 to 20 decisions 146 .000 .000 .000 1.000 .000     
21 to 25 decisions 113 .000 .000 .000 .000 1.000     
26 or more decisions 34 .000 .000 .000 .000 .000     
Occupation  manager/professional 76 1.000 .000 .000 .000      
technician/trade 57 .000 1.000 .000 .000      
community/personal service 84 .000 .000 1.000 .000      
clerical/admin/sales 97 .000 .000 .000 1.000      
operator/driver/labourer 251 .000 .000 .000 .000      
Worker advocacy self-represented 87 .000 .000 .000       
represented by union rep 155 1.000 .000 .000       
represented by legal rep 208 .000 1.000 .000       
representation not clear 115 .000 .000 1.000       
Number of staff  up to 19 (small) 44 .000 .000 .000       
20 to 199 workers 63 1.000 .000 .000       
200 plus workers 406 .000 1.000 .000       
not identified 52 .000 .000 1.000       
Support union present 173 .000 .000 .000       
companion present 44 1.000 .000 .000       
no-one present 157 .000 1.000 .000       
not identified 191 .000 .000 1.000       
Employer 
advocacy 
self-represented 63 .000 .000 .000       
represented by Association 49 1.000 .000 .000       
represented by legal rep 322 .000 1.000 .000       
representation not clear 131 .000 .000 1.000       
Arbitrator 
background 
history of working for 
management 
207 .000 .000 
       
history of working for unions 199 1.000 .000        
history shows no strong 
preference 
159 .000 1.000 
       
Disciplinary record unblemished record 218 .000 .000        
previous offences 207 1.000 .000        
not identified 140 .000 1.000        
Arbitrator seniority  commissioner 371 .000 .000        
deputy president 48 1.000 .000        
senior deputy/vice 
president/justice 
146 .000 1.000 
       
Formality  informal 49 1.000 .000        
semi-formal 191 .000 1.000        
formal 325 .000 .000 




HR expertise NO HR expert 104 .000 .000        
YES HR expert 436 1.000 .000        
not identified 25 .000 1.000        
Worker gender male 454 .000         
female 111 1.000         
Full-time or part-
time:  
full-time worker 518 .000         
part-time or casual worker 47 1.000         
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(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7) (8) (9) 
Arbitrator gender male 405 .000         
female 160 1.000         
Poor evidence or 
reason 
no 452 .000         
yes 113 1.000         
property deviance no 444 .000         
yes 121 1.000         
punishment too 
harsh 
no 450 .000         
yes 115 1.000         
ignored mitigating 
circumstances 
no 532 .000         
yes 33 1.000         
due process: 
chance to respond 
no 439 .000         
yes 126 1.000         
due process: 
allegation detailed 
no 483 .000         




no 506 .000         
yes 59 1.000 
        
management 
contributed 
no 506 .000         
yes 59 1.000         
Remorse no apology or indication of 
regret 
480 .000 
        
yes - apology or regret 
indicated 
85 1.000 
        
production 
deviance 
no 287 .000         
yes 278 1.000         
personal 
aggression 
no 373 .000         
yes 192 1.000         
political deviance no 530 .000         
yes 35 1.000         
Workplace reason  no 335 .000         
yes 230 1.000         
Personal Inside 
reason 
no 87 .000         
yes 478 1.000         
Public or private 
sector 
private 483 .000         
public 82 1.000         
 





 THE DECISION: Whether the 
arbitrator decided in favour of the 
worker or employer 
Percentage 
Correct 




Step 0 THE DECISION: Whether the 
arbitrator decided in favour of 
the worker or employer 
employer's favour (claim 
dismissed) 
311 0 100.0 
worker's favour (claim upheld) 254 0 .0 
Overall Percentage   55.0 
a. Constant is included in the model. 
b. The cut value is .500 
 
Variables in the Equation 
 B S.E. Wald df Sig. Exp(B) 
Step 0 Constant -.202 .085 5.731 1 .017 .817 
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Variables not in the Equation 
 Score df Sig. 
Step 0 Variables PublicPrivate_binary(1) .861 1 .354 
Industry_collapsed 6.445 9 .695 
Industry_collapsed(1) .848 1 .357 
Industry_collapsed(2) .196 1 .658 
Industry_collapsed(3) .326 1 .568 
Industry_collapsed(4) .001 1 .970 
Industry_collapsed(5) .261 1 .609 
Industry_collapsed(6) .161 1 .688 
Industry_collapsed(7) .515 1 .473 
Industry_collapsed(8) 2.850 1 .091 
Industry_collapsed(9) .026 1 .872 
FirmSize_Collapsed 5.223 3 .156 
FirmSize_Collapsed(1) .033 1 .855 
FirmSize_Collapsed(2) 3.915 1 .048 
FirmSize_Collapsed(3) 2.706 1 .100 
HR_EXPERTISE 6.880 2 .032 
HR_EXPERTISE(1) 6.868 1 .009 
HR_EXPERTISE(2) 1.289 1 .256 
FORMALITY 31.760 2 .000 
FORMALITY(1) 29.166 1 .000 
FORMALITY(2) .146 1 .703 
SUPPORT 8.936 3 .030 
SUPPORT(1) 2.276 1 .131 
SUPPORT(2) 7.411 1 .006 
SUPPORT(3) .111 1 .739 
WORKER_GENDER(1) .164 1 .686 
Occupation_collapsed 2.251 4 .690 
Occupation_collapsed(1) .616 1 .433 
Occupation_collapsed(2) 1.036 1 .309 
Occupation_collapsed(3) .033 1 .856 
Occupation_collapsed(4) .579 1 .447 
SERVICE_PERIOD 5.091 1 .024 
DISCIPLINARY_RECORD 12.238 2 .002 
DISCIPLINARY_RECORD(1) 3.117 1 .077 
DISCIPLINARY_RECORD(2) 3.790 1 .052 
EMPLOYMENT_STATUS(1) .773 1 .379 
ARBITRATOR_GENDER(1) .000 1 .989 
ARBITRATOR_BACKGROUND 10.594 2 .005 
ARBITRATOR_BACKGROUND(1) 8.574 1 .003 
ARBITRATOR_BACKGROUND(2) .008 1 .928 
ARBITRATOR_EXPERIENCE 21.975 5 .001 
ARBITRATOR_EXPERIENCE(1) 9.386 1 .002 
ARBITRATOR_EXPERIENCE(2) .402 1 .526 
ARBITRATOR_EXPERIENCE(3) 1.762 1 .184 
ARBITRATOR_EXPERIENCE(4) 11.608 1 .001 
ARBITRATOR_EXPERIENCE(5) 2.317 1 .128 
ARBITRATOR_SENIORITY 1.962 2 .375 
ARBITRATOR_SENIORITY(1) 1.929 1 .165 
ARBITRATOR_SENIORITY(2) .005 1 .944 
Overall Statistics 82.811 39 .000 
 
 
Block 1: Method = Enter 
 
Omnibus Tests of Model Coefficients 
 Chi-square df Sig. 
Step 1 Step 90.709 39 .000 
Block 90.709 39 .000 
Model 90.709 39 .000 
 
Model Summary 
Step -2 Log likelihood Cox & Snell R Square Nagelkerke R Square 
1 686.787a .148 .198 
a. Estimation terminated at iteration number 4 because parameter estimates changed by less than .001. 
 
Hosmer and Lemeshow Test 
Step Chi-square df Sig. 
1 7.287 8 .506 
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Contingency Table for Hosmer and Lemeshow Test 
 
THE DECISION: Whether the arbitrator 
decided in favour of the worker or employer 
= employer's favour (claim dismissed) 
THE DECISION: Whether the arbitrator 
decided in favour of the worker or employer 
= worker's favour (claim upheld) 
Total Observed Expected Observed Expected 
Step 1 1 48 47.498 9 9.502 57 
2 42 42.539 15 14.461 57 
3 36 39.324 21 17.676 57 
4 44 36.877 13 20.123 57 
5 31 34.014 26 22.986 57 
6 30 31.123 27 25.877 57 
7 31 28.160 26 28.840 57 
8 24 24.194 33 32.806 57 
9 16 19.420 42 38.580 58 







 THE DECISION: Whether the 
arbitrator decided in favour of the 
worker or employer 
Percentage 
Correct 




Step 1 THE DECISION: Whether the 
arbitrator decided in favour of 
the worker or employer 
employer's favour (claim 
dismissed) 
244 67 78.5 
worker's favour (claim upheld) 120 134 52.8 
Overall Percentage   66.9 
a. The cut value is .500 
 
 
Variables in the Equation 
 B S.E. Wald df Sig. Exp(B) 
Step 1a PublicPrivate_binary(1) .054 .353 .024 1 .878 1.056 
Industry_collapsed   5.983 9 .742  
Industry_collapsed(1) -.055 .598 .008 1 .927 .947 
Industry_collapsed(2) .157 .431 .132 1 .716 1.170 
Industry_collapsed(3) .157 .574 .075 1 .784 1.170 
Industry_collapsed(4) .050 .488 .011 1 .918 1.052 
Industry_collapsed(5) -.016 .479 .001 1 .974 .984 
Industry_collapsed(6) .280 .400 .489 1 .484 1.323 
Industry_collapsed(7) .512 .461 1.234 1 .267 1.669 
Industry_collapsed(8) .917 .512 3.211 1 .073 2.503 
Industry_collapsed(9) .561 .536 1.097 1 .295 1.753 
FirmSize_Collapsed   1.075 3 .783  
FirmSize_Collapsed(1) .101 .472 .045 1 .831 1.106 
FirmSize_Collapsed(2) .191 .474 .162 1 .687 1.210 
FirmSize_Collapsed(3) .466 .501 .866 1 .352 1.594 
HR_EXPERTISE   .795 2 .672  
HR_EXPERTISE(1) -.047 .374 .016 1 .899 .954 
HR_EXPERTISE(2) .401 .541 .548 1 .459 1.493 
FORMALITY   15.643 2 .000  
FORMALITY(1) 1.857 .475 15.293 1 .000 6.405 
FORMALITY(2) .185 .231 .637 1 .425 1.203 
SUPPORT   1.537 3 .674  
SUPPORT(1) -.237 .396 .359 1 .549 .789 
SUPPORT(2) .236 .279 .713 1 .399 1.266 
SUPPORT(3) .040 .242 .028 1 .868 1.041 
WORKER_GENDER(1) -.057 .265 .046 1 .831 .945 
Occupation_collapsed   2.371 4 .668  
Occupation_collapsed(1) -.384 .352 1.191 1 .275 .681 
Occupation_collapsed(2) -.462 .356 1.684 1 .194 .630 
Occupation_collapsed(3) -.223 .356 .391 1 .532 .800 
Occupation_collapsed(4) -.146 .325 .202 1 .653 .864 
SERVICE_PERIOD -.084 .053 2.521 1 .112 .919 
DISCIPLINARY_RECORD   10.542 2 .005  
DISCIPLINARY_RECORD(1) -.590 .220 7.178 1 .007 .554 
DISCIPLINARY_RECORD(2) -.719 .255 7.963 1 .005 .487 
EMPLOYMENT_STATUS(1) .175 .390 .201 1 .654 1.191 
ARBITRATOR_GENDER(1) -.203 .281 .523 1 .469 .816 
ARBITRATOR_BACKGROUND   6.675 2 .036  
ARBITRATOR_BACKGROUND(1) .621 .277 5.047 1 .025 1.862 
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Variables in the Equation 
 B S.E. Wald df Sig. Exp(B) 
ARBITRATOR_BACKGROUND(2) -.001 .286 .000 1 .997 .999 
ARBITRATOR_EXPERIENCE   18.059 5 .003  
ARBITRATOR_EXPERIENCE(1) .655 .592 1.221 1 .269 1.924 
ARBITRATOR_EXPERIENCE(2) -.288 .564 .261 1 .609 .750 
ARBITRATOR_EXPERIENCE(3) .183 .543 .114 1 .735 1.201 
ARBITRATOR_EXPERIENCE(4) -.759 .557 1.856 1 .173 .468 
ARBITRATOR_EXPERIENCE(5) .123 .519 .056 1 .813 1.131 
ARBITRATOR_SENIORITY   3.242 2 .198  
ARBITRATOR_SENIORITY(1) -.155 .427 .132 1 .716 .856 
ARBITRATOR_SENIORITY(2) .434 .273 2.539 1 .111 1.544 
Constant -.181 .851 .045 1 .832 .835 
a. Variable(s) entered on step 1: PublicPrivate_binary, Industry_collapsed, FirmSize_Collapsed, HR_EXPERTISE, 
FORMALITY, SUPPORT, WORKER_GENDER, Occupation_collapsed, SERVICE_PERIOD, DISCIPLINARY_RECORD, 





Block 2: Method = Enter 
 




a. An error was encountered in estimation. 
 
 




Table A5.1   Shared observations:  
High influence cases and outliers (7 of 14) 
VARIABLE OBSERVATION PROFILE 

















































200 plus workers up to 19 (small) 200 plus workers 200 plus workers 







YES HR expert NO HR expert YES HR expert YES HR expert NO HR expert YES HR expert 
Formality semi-formal formal informal semi-formal formal semi-formal formal 

















technician/trade technician/ trade 
Service 
2 up to 5 
years 
20 years and 
over 
up to 2 years up to 2 years up to 2 years up to 2 years 
10 up to 15 
years 













FT / PT full-time full-time full-time part-time/casual part-time/casual full-time full-time 
Arbitrator 
gender 







management management union 
Experience 
21 to 25 
decisions 
21 to 25 
decisions 
21 to 25 
decisions 




6 to 10 decisions 
16 to 20 
decisions 
Seniority SDP/VP commissioner SDP/VP commissioner commissioner SDP/VP commissioner 
Property no no no yes yes no no 
Production no yes yes yes no no yes 
Aggression yes no yes no no yes no 
Political no no no no no no no 
Severity very serious serious 
somewhat 
serious 
serious very serious very serious 
somewhat 
serious 
Workplace no no yes yes no no yes 
Personal Inside yes yes yes no yes yes yes 
Personal 
Outside 






















yes - apology 
or regret 
indicated 
yes - apology or 
regret indicated 
no apology or 
indication of 
regret 
yes - apology or 
regret indicated 
no apology or 
indication of 
regret 
yes - apology or 
regret indicated 






by legal  






















Invalid evidence no no no no no yes no 
Mitigating 
factors 
no no no no no no no 
Management 
contributed 
no no no no no no no 
Investigation 
flaws 
n no no yes yes no yes 
Poor allegation yes no no yes no no no 
No response yes no yes no no no no 
Too harsh no yes no no no yes no 
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Table A5.1 (continued)   Shared observations:  
High influence cases and outliers (14 of 14) 
VARIABLE OBSERVATION PROFILE 











Aust Injecting & 





































admin & support 
services 
Size 
20 to 199 
workers 
up to 19 (small) up to 19 (small) 
200 plus 
workers 
up to 19 (small) up to 19 (small) 
200 plus 
workers 
HR presence NO HR expert YES HR expert NO HR expert YES HR expert NO HR expert NO HR expert YES HR expert 
Formality informal semi-formal informal formal formal semi-formal formal 
Support no-one present union present no-one present 
companion 
present 
no-one present no-one present union present 
















Service up to 2 years not identified 2 up to 5 years up to 2 years up to 2 years 2 up to 5 years 
















FT / PT part-time/casual part-time/casual full-time full-time full-time full-time full-time 
Arbitrator 
gender 
male male female male male male male 









21 to 25 
decisions 
6 to 10 
decisions 
21 to 25 
decisions 
6 to 10 
decisions 
6 to 10 
decisions 
up to 5 
decisions 
6 to 10 
decisions 
Seniority commissioner deputy president commissioner commissioner commissioner SDP/VP commissioner 
Property no no no no no no no 
Production no yes no no no yes yes 
Aggression yes yes yes yes yes no no 




very serious very serious very serious serious very serious 
Workplace no no no no yes yes yes 
Personal Inside yes yes yes yes no yes yes 
Personal 
Outside 
























no apology or 
indication of 
regret 
no apology or 
indication of 
regret 
no apology or 
indication of 
regret 
no apology or 
indication of 
regret 
no apology or 
indication of 
regret 
no apology or 
indication of 
regret 



























no no no no no no no 
Mitigating 
factors 
no no no no no no no 
Management 
contributed 
no no no no no yes no 
Investigation 
flaws 
no no no no no no no 
Poor allegation yes no no yes no no no 
No response yes yes yes yes yes no yes 
Too harsh no yes no no yes no no 
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Table A5.2    Single observations of high influence cases  
(7 of 7 single observations) 
VARIABLE OBSERVATION PROFILE 
























































HR presence YES HR expert NO HR expert NO HR expert YES HR expert YES HR expert YES HR expert YES HR expert 
Formality semi-formal semi-formal semi-formal formal formal formal formal 
Support not identified no-one present no-one present union present union present not identified not identified 
Worker 
gender 














Service up to 2 years 2 up to 5 years 2 up to 5 years 
10 up to 15 
years 
5 up to 10 years 
20 years and 
over 
2 up to 5 years 













FT / PT part-time/casual full-time part-time/casual full-time full-time full-time full-time 
Arbitrator 
gender 
female male female male male female male 
Background union management union union management union management 
Experience 
21 to 25 
decisions 
16 to 20 
decisions 
11 to 15 
decisions 
21 to 25 
decisions 
16 to 20 
decisions 
21 to 25 
decisions 
up to 5 
decisions 
Seniority commissioner SDP/VP commissioner commissioner SDP/VP commissioner commissioner 
Property no yes no yes yes no no 
Production yes yes no no yes no no 
Aggression yes no yes no no yes yes 
Political no no no no no no no 








Workplace yes no no no no no no 
Personal 
Inside 
yes yes yes yes yes yes no 
Personal 
Outside 




















no apology or 
regret indicated 
no apology or 
regret indicated 
no apology or 
regret indicated 
no apology or 
regret indicated 




























no no no no yes no no 
Mitigating 
factors 
no no no no no no no 
Management 
contributed 
yes no no no no no no 
Investigation 
flaws 
no yes no no no yes yes 
Poor 
allegation 
no no no yes yes no no 
No response no no no no no no no 
Too harsh no yes no no no no no 
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Table A5.3    Single observations of outliers (8 of 8 single observations) 
VARIABLE OBSERVATION PROFILE 

























































































NO HR expert 
YES HR 
expert 
Formality formal formal formal semi-formal semi-formal formal formal formal 
Support union present not identified union present not identified not identified not identified union present union present 


















Service up to 2 years 
5 up to 10 
years 
5 up to 10 
years 
up to 2 years 
10 up to 15 
years 
20 years and 
over 
10 up to 15 
years 

















































21 to 25 
decisions 




21 to 25 
decisions 
11 to 15 
decisions 
16 to 20 
decisions 
11 to 15 
decisions 





commissioner SDP/VP commissioner SDP/VP commissioner SDP/VP 
Property no no no no yes no no no 
Production no no no no no no yes yes 
Aggression yes yes yes yes yes no no yes 















Workplace no no no no no yes yes yes 
Personal Inside yes yes yes yes yes no yes yes 
Personal 
Outside 





























no apology or 
regret 
indicated 
no apology or 
regret 
indicated 
no apology or 
regret 
indicated 
no apology or 
regret 
indicated 
no apology or 
regret 
indicated 
no apology or 
regret 
indicated 
no apology or 
regret 
indicated 








































no no no yes yes yes yes yes 
Mitigating 
factors 
no no no no no no yes no 
Management 
contributed no no no no no no no no 
Investigation 
flaws 
no no no no no no no no 
Poor allegation no no no no no no no no 
No response no no no no no no no no 
Too harsh no no yes no yes no yes yes 
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Table A5.4    Extreme leverage cases (5 of 5 single observations) 
VARIABLE OBSERVATION PROFILE 




Woolworths Limited Mayne Group Limited Chubb Security 




worker's favour worker's favour  worker's favour employer's favour employer's favour 
Sector private private private private private 
Industry hospitality, recreation retail 
education, health,  
social assistance 
admin & support 
services 
education, health, 
 social assistance 
Size 200 plus workers 200 plus workers 200 plus workers 200 plus workers 200 plus workers 
HR presence YES HR expert YES HR expert YES HR expert YES HR expert YES HR expert 
Formality semi-formal formal formal formal formal 
Support no-one present union present not identified no-one present companion present 










Service 2 up to 5 years 2 up to 5 years 15 up to 20 years 5 up to 10 years 2 up to 5 years 
Record unblemished record previous offences previous offences previous offences unblemished record 
FT / PT full-time part-time/casual full-time full-time part-time/casual 
Arbitrator gender male male male male male 
Background no strong preference no strong preference management management no strong preference 
Experience 6 to 10 decisions 16 to 20 decisions 16 to 20 decisions 11 to 15 decisions 6 to 10 decisions 
Seniority SDP/VP SDP/VP deputy president deputy president SDP/VP 
Property no yes no no no 
Production no no yes no no 
Aggression yes no no yes yes 
Political no no no no no 
Severity serious somewhat serious somewhat serious extremely serious extremely serious 
Workplace no no no no no 
Personal Inside yes yes yes yes yes 














no apology or regret 
indicated 
no apology or regret 
indicated 
no apology or regret 
indicated 
no apology or regret 
indicated 
no apology or regret 
indicated 
Worker advocacy 
represented by legal 
rep 
not clear not clear self-represented represented by legal 
Employer 
advocacy 
self-represented represented by legal not clear represented by legal represented by legal 
Invalid evidence no yes no no no 
Mitigating factors no no no no no 
Management 
contributed 
no no yes yes no 
Investigation 
flaws 
no yes no no no 
Poor allegation yes yes no no yes 
No response yes no no no yes 
Too harsh yes no yes no no 
 




(This page is intentionally blank) 
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APPENDIX 6 
SPSS output of descriptive statistics 
 
The arbitration decision 
 Count Percent 
 employer's favour (claim dismissed) 311 55.0% 
worker's favour (claim upheld) 254 45.0% 
Total 565 100.0% 
 
Year of arbitration decision  
 
THE DECISION 
Total employer's favour worker's favour  
Year  2001 Count 42 27 69 
% of Total 7.4% 4.8% 12.2% 
2002 Count 25 36 61 
% of Total 4.4% 6.4% 10.8% 
2003 Count 27 37 64 
% of Total 4.8% 6.5% 11.3% 
2004 Count 23 23 46 
% of Total 4.1% 4.1% 8.1% 
2005 Count 19 7 26 
% of Total 3.4% 1.2% 4.6% 
2006 Count 49 33 82 
% of Total 8.7% 5.8% 14.5% 
2007 Count 21 23 44 
% of Total 3.7% 4.1% 7.8% 
2008 Count 32 19 51 
% of Total 5.7% 3.4% 9.0% 
2009 Count 38 25 63 
% of Total 6.7% 4.4% 11.2% 
2010 Count 35 24 59 
% of Total 6.2% 4.2% 10.4% 
Total Count 311 254 565 
% of Total 55.0% 45.0% 100.0% 
 
Location of tribunal  
 
THE DECISION 
Total employer's favour  worker's favour  
City Adelaide Count 8 13 21 
% of Total 1.4% 2.3% 3.7% 
Brisbane Count 34 20 54 
% of Total 6.0% 3.5% 9.6% 
Canberra Count 10 2 12 
% of Total 1.8% .4% 2.1% 
Hobart Count 2 4 6 
% of Total .4% .7% 1.1% 
Melbourne Count 111 114 225 
% of Total 19.6% 20.2% 39.8% 
Perth Count 23 12 35 
% of Total 4.1% 2.1% 6.2% 
Sydney Count 122 89 211 
% of Total 21.6% 15.8% 37.3% 
Wollongong Count 1 0 1 
% of Total .2% .0% .2% 
Total Count 311 254 565 
% of Total 55.0% 45.0% 100.0% 
  





Total employer's favour worker's favour 
Remedy  reinstatement Count 0 104 104 
% of Total .0% 18.4% 18.4% 
compensation Count 0 150 150 
% of Total .0% 26.6% 26.6% 
not applicable Count 311 0 311 
% of Total 55.0% .0% 55.0% 
Total Count 311 254 565 
% of Total 55.0% 45.0% 100.0% 
 
Property deviance  
 
THE DECISION 
Total employer's favour  worker's favour  
Property 
deviance 
no Count 236 208 444 
% of Total 41.8% 36.8% 78.6% 
yes Count 75 46 121 
% of Total 13.3% 8.1% 21.4% 
Total Count 311 254 565 
% of Total 55.0% 45.0% 100.0% 
 
Production deviance  
 
THE DECISION 
Total employer's favour  worker's favour  
Production 
deviance 
no Count 165 122 287 
% of Total 29.2% 21.6% 50.8% 
yes Count 146 132 278 
% of Total 25.8% 23.4% 49.2% 
Total Count 311 254 565 
% of Total 55.0% 45.0% 100.0% 
 
Personal aggression  
 
THE DECISION 
Total employer's favour  worker's favour  
Personal 
aggression 
no Count 200 173 373 
% of Total 35.4% 30.6% 66.0% 
yes Count 111 81 192 
% of Total 19.6% 14.3% 34.0% 
Total Count 311 254 565 
% of Total 55.0% 45.0% 100.0% 
 
Political deviance  
 
THE DECISION 
Total employer's favour  worker's favour  
Political  
deviance 
no Count 293 237 530 
% of Total 51.9% 41.9% 93.8% 
yes Count 18 17 35 
% of Total 3.2% 3.0% 6.2% 
Total Count 311 254 565 
% of Total 55.0% 45.0% 100.0% 
  







Severity of the misbehaviour  
 
THE DECISION 




somewhat serious Count 26 54 80 
% of Total 4.6% 9.6% 14.2% 
serious Count 62 72 134 
% of Total 11.0% 12.7% 23.7% 
very serious Count 150 94 244 
% of Total 26.5% 16.6% 43.2% 
extremely serious Count 73 34 107 
% of Total 12.9% 6.0% 18.9% 
Total Count 311 254 565 
% of Total 55.0% 45.0% 100.0% 
 
Disciplinary record  
 
THE DECISION 
Total employer's favour  worker's favour  
Disciplinary 
record 
unblemished record Count 100 118 218 
% of Total 17.7% 20.9% 38.6% 
previous offences Count 124 83 207 
% of Total 21.9% 14.7% 36.6% 
not identified Count 87 53 140 
% of Total 15.4% 9.4% 24.8% 
Total Count 311 254 565 
% of Total 55.0% 45.0% 100.0% 
 
Length of service 
 
THE DECISION 
Total employer's favour  worker's favour  
Length of 
service 
up to 2 years Count 42 46 88 
% of Total 7.4% 8.1% 15.6% 
2 up to 5 years Count 64 53 117 
% of Total 11.3% 9.4% 20.7% 
5 up to 10 years Count 63 63 126 
% of Total 11.2% 11.2% 22.3% 
10 up to 15 years Count 51 29 80 
% of Total 9.0% 5.1% 14.2% 
15 up to 20 years Count 19 17 36 
% of Total 3.4% 3.0% 6.4% 
20 years and over Count 23 27 50 
% of Total 4.1% 4.8% 8.8% 
not identified Count 49 19 68 
% of Total 8.7% 3.4% 12.0% 
Total Count 311 254 565 
% of Total 55.0% 45.0% 100.0% 
 
Worker remorse  
 
THE DECISION 




no apology or indication 
of regret 
Count 278 202 480 
% of Total 49.2% 35.8% 85.0% 
yes apology or regret 
indicated 
Count 33 52 85 
% of Total 5.8% 9.2% 15.0% 
Total Count 311 254 565 
% of Total 55.0% 45.0% 100.0% 
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Workplace related reason  
 
THE DECISION 
Total employer's favour  worker's favour  
Workplace related 
reason 
no Count 190 145 335 
% of Total 33.6% 25.7% 59.3% 
yes Count 121 109 230 
% of Total 21.4% 19.3% 40.7% 
Total Count 311 254 565 
% of Total 55.0% 45.0% 100.0% 
 
Personal Inside reason  
 
THE DECISION 
Total employer's favour  worker's favour  
Personal Inside 
reason 
no Count 44 43 87 
% of Total 7.8% 7.6% 15.4% 
yes Count 267 211 478 
% of Total 47.3% 37.3% 84.6% 
Total Count 311 254 565 
% of Total 55.0% 45.0% 100.0% 
 
Personal Outside reason  
 
THE DECISION 
Total employer's favour  worker's favour  
Personal Outside 
reason 
no Count 255 212 467 
% of Total 45.1% 37.5% 82.7% 
yes Count 56 42 98 
% of Total 9.9% 7.4% 17.3% 
Total Count 311 254 565 











Count 192 154 346 
% of Total 34.0% 27.3% 61.2% 
dual  
categories 
Count 105 92 197 
% of Total 18.6% 16.3% 34.9% 
triple 
categories 
Count 14 8 22 
% of Total 2.5% 1.4% 3.9% 
Total Count 311 254 565 
% of Total 55.0% 45.0% 100.0% 
 
Poor evidence or reason  
 
THE DECISION 
Total employer's favour  worker's favour  
Poor evidence or 
reason 
no Count 311 141 452 
% of Total 55.0% 25.0% 80.0% 
yes Count 0 113 113 
% of Total .0% 20.0% 20.0% 
Total Count 311 254 565 
% of Total 55.0% 45.0% 100.0% 
 
Mitigating factors ignored  
 
THE DECISION 
Total employer's favour  worker's favour  
Mitigating factors 
ignored 
no Count 311 221 532 
% of Total 55.0% 39.1% 94.2% 
yes Count 0 33 33 
% of Total .0% 5.8% 5.8% 
Total Count 311 254 565 
% of Total 55.0% 45.0% 100.0% 





Total employer's favour  worker's favour  
Management 
contributed 
no Count 307 199 506 
% of Total 54.3% 35.2% 89.6% 
yes Count 4 55 59 
% of Total .7% 9.7% 10.4% 
Total Count 311 254 565 
% of Total 55.0% 45.0% 100.0% 
 
Problematic support/investigation  
 
THE DECISION 
Total employer's favour  worker's favour  
Problematic 
support/investigation 
no Count 300 206 506 
% of Total 53.1% 36.5% 89.6% 
yes Count 11 48 59 
% of Total 1.9% 8.5% 10.4% 
Total Count 311 254 565 





Total employer's favour  worker's favour  
Problematic allegation no Count 288 195 483 
% of Total 51.0% 34.5% 85.5% 
yes Count 23 59 82 
% of Total 4.1% 10.4% 14.5% 
Total Count 311 254 565 





Total employer's favour worker's favour  
Problematic response no Count 283 156 439 
% of Total 50.1% 27.6% 77.7% 
yes Count 28 98 126 
% of Total 5.0% 17.3% 22.3% 
Total Count 311 254 565 
% of Total 55.0% 45.0% 100.0% 
 
Punishment too harsh  
 
THE DECISION 
Total employer's favour  worker's favour  
Punishment too harsh no Count 311 139 450 
% of Total 55.0% 24.6% 79.6% 
yes Count 0 115 115 
% of Total .0% 20.4% 20.4% 
Total Count 311 254 565 
% of Total 55.0% 45.0% 100.0% 
 
  





Total employer's favour  worker's favour 
Worker 
advocacy 
self-represented Count 63 24 87 
% of Total 11.2% 4.2% 15.4% 
union Count 84 71 155 
% of Total 14.9% 12.6% 27.4% 
legal Count 103 105 208 
% of Total 18.2% 18.6% 36.8% 
not clear Count 61 54 115 
% of Total 10.8% 9.6% 20.4% 
Total Count 311 254 565 
% of Total 55.0% 45.0% 100.0% 
 
Employer advocacy  
 
THE DECISION 
Total employer's favour  worker's favour  
Employer 
advocacy 
self-represented Count 29 34 63 
% of Total 5.1% 6.0% 11.2% 
Association Count 21 28 49 
% of Total 3.7% 5.0% 8.7% 
legal Count 189 133 322 
% of Total 33.5% 23.5% 57.0% 
not clear Count 72 59 131 
% of Total 12.7% 10.4% 23.2% 
Total Count 311 254 565 
% of Total 55.0% 45.0% 100.0% 
 
Worker gender  
 
THE DECISION 
Total employer's favour  worker's favour  
Worker 
gender 
male Count 248 206 454 
% of Total 43.9% 36.5% 80.4% 
female Count 63 48 111 
% of Total 11.2% 8.5% 19.6% 
Total Count 311 254 565 
% of Total 55.0% 45.0% 100.0% 
 
Employment status of the worker  
 
THE DECISION 
Total employer's favour  worker's favour  
Full-time or 
part-time 
full-time worker Count 288 230 518 
% of Total 51.0% 40.7% 91.7% 
part-time or 
casual worker 
Count 23 24 47 
% of Total 4.1% 4.2% 8.3% 
Total Count 311 254 565 
% of Total 55.0% 45.0% 100.0% 
 
Public or private sector 
 
THE DECISION 
Total employer's favour worker's favour  
Sector private Count 262 221 483 
% of Total 46.4% 39.1% 85.5% 
public Count 49 33 82 
% of Total 8.7% 5.8% 14.5% 
Total Count 311 254 565 
% of Total 55.0% 45.0% 100.0% 
  






Total employer's favour  worker's favour 
Arbitrator 
gender 
male Count 223 182 405 
% of Total 39.5% 32.2% 71.7% 
female Count 88 72 160 
% of Total 15.6% 12.7% 28.3% 
Total Count 311 254 565 
% of Total 55.0% 45.0% 100.0% 
 
Arbitrator background  
 
THE DECISION 




history of working for 
management 
Count 130 77 207 
% of Total 23.0% 13.6% 36.6% 
history of working for 
unions 
Count 93 106 199 
% of Total 16.5% 18.8% 35.2% 
history shows no 
strong preference 
Count 88 71 159 
% of Total 15.6% 12.6% 28.1% 
Total Count 311 254 565 





Total employer's favour worker's favour  
Arbitrator 
seniority 
commissioner Count 200 171 371 
% of Total 35.4% 30.3% 65.7% 
deputy president Count 31 17 48 
% of Total 5.5% 3.0% 8.5% 
senior deputy 
president 
Count 73 60 133 
% of Total 12.9% 10.6% 23.5% 
vice president or 
justice 
Count 7 6 13 
% of Total 1.2% 1.1% 2.3% 
Total Count 311 254 565 





Total employer's favour  worker's favour  
Occupational 
group 
manager Count 22 15 37 
% of Total 3.9% 2.7% 6.5% 
professional Count 23 16 39 
% of Total 4.1% 2.8% 6.9% 
technician or trade Count 35 22 57 




Count 47 37 84 
% of Total 8.3% 6.5% 14.9% 
clerical or admin 
worker 
Count 30 29 59 
% of Total 5.3% 5.1% 10.4% 
sales worker Count 20 18 38 
% of Total 3.5% 3.2% 6.7% 
machinery 
operator or driver 
Count 65 56 121 
% of Total 11.5% 9.9% 21.4% 
labourer Count 64 56 120 
% of Total 11.3% 9.9% 21.2% 
not identified Count 5 5 10 
% of Total .9% .9% 1.8% 
Total Count 311 254 565 
% of Total 55.0% 45.0% 100.0% 
     






Total employer's favour  worker's favour 
Arbitrator 
experience 
up to 5 decisions Count 20 36 56 
% of Total 3.5% 6.4% 9.9% 
6 to 10 decisions Count 68 50 118 
% of Total 12.0% 8.8% 20.9% 
11 to 15 
decisions 
Count 48 50 98 
% of Total 8.5% 8.8% 17.3% 
16 to 20 
decisions 
Count 98 48 146 
% of Total 17.3% 8.5% 25.8% 
21 to 25 
decisions 
Count 55 58 113 
% of Total 9.7% 10.3% 20.0% 
26 or more 
decisions 
Count 22 12 34 
% of Total 3.9% 2.1% 6.0% 
Total Count 311 254 565 
% of Total 55.0% 45.0% 100.0% 
 
 
Formality of dismissal process 
 
THE DECISION 




informal Count 9 40 49 
% of Total 1.6% 7.1% 8.7% 
semi-formal Count 103 88 191 
% of Total 18.2% 15.6% 33.8% 
formal Count 199 126 325 
% of Total 35.2% 22.3% 57.5% 
Total Count 311 254 565 
% of Total 55.0% 45.0% 100.0% 
 
HR expertise of employer 
 
THE DECISION 




NO HR expert Count 47 57 104 
% of Total 8.3% 10.1% 18.4% 
YES HR expert Count 253 183 436 
% of Total 44.8% 32.4% 77.2% 
not identified Count 11 14 25 
% of Total 1.9% 2.5% 4.4% 
Total Count 311 254 565 
% of Total 55.0% 45.0% 100.0% 
 
Support for worker during dismissal 
 
THE DECISION 
Total employer's favour worker's favour  
Support 
for worker  
union present Count 103 70 173 
% of Total 18.2% 12.4% 30.6% 
companion 
present 
Count 29 15 44 
% of Total 5.1% 2.7% 7.8% 
no-one present Count 72 85 157 
% of Total 12.7% 15.0% 27.8% 
not identified Count 107 84 191 
% of Total 18.9% 14.9% 33.8% 
Total Count 311 254 565 
% of Total 55.0% 45.0% 100.0% 
  





Total employer's favour worker's favour 
Business size up to 19 (small) Count 20 24 44 
% of Total 3.5% 4.2% 7.8% 
20 to 199 workers 
(medium) 
Count 34 29 63 
% of Total 6.0% 5.1% 11.2% 
200 plus workers 
(large) 
Count 234 172 406 
% of Total 41.4% 30.4% 71.9% 
not identified Count 23 29 52 
% of Total 4.1% 5.1% 9.2% 
Total Count 311 254 565 
% of Total 55.0% 45.0% 100.0% 
 








 Agriculture Count 3 4 7 
% of Total .5% .7% 1.2% 
Mining Count 13 5 18 
% of Total 2.3% .9% 3.2% 
Manufacturing Count 59 53 112 
% of Total 10.4% 9.4% 19.8% 
Electricity, gas, water & waste services Count 6 2 8 
% of Total 1.1% .4% 1.4% 
Construction Count 9 13 22 
% of Total 1.6% 2.3% 3.9% 
Wholesale trade Count 6 4 10 
% of Total 1.1% .7% 1.8% 
Retail trade Count 23 19 42 
% of Total 4.1% 3.4% 7.4% 
Accommodation & food services Count 17 12 29 
% of Total 3.0% 2.1% 5.1% 
Transport, postal and warehousing Count 73 56 129 
% of Total 12.9% 9.9% 22.8% 
Information, media & telecommunications Count 8 11 19 
% of Total 1.4% 1.9% 3.4% 
Financial and insurance services Count 7 2 9 
% of Total 1.2% .4% 1.6% 
Rental, hiring & real estate services Count 5 5 10 
% of Total .9% .9% 1.8% 
Professional, scientific & technical 
services 
Count 2 4 6 
% of Total .4% .7% 1.1% 
Administrative & support services Count 13 19 32 
% of Total 2.3% 3.4% 5.7% 
Public administration & safety Count 15 13 28 
% of Total 2.7% 2.3% 5.0% 
Education & training Count 11 6 17 
% of Total 1.9% 1.1% 3.0% 
Health care & social assistance Count 34 21 55 
% of Total 6.0% 3.7% 9.7% 
Arts & recreation services Count 6 4 10 
% of Total 1.1% .7% 1.8% 
Other services Count 1 1 2 
% of Total .2% .2% .4% 
Total Count 311 254 565 
% of Total 55.0% 45.0% 100.0% 
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APPENDIX 7 
Hierarchically arranged logistic regression output of unfair dismissal 




Output Created 18-Jun-2012 16:50:45 
Comments   
Input Data C:\Documents and Settings\southeyk\My Documents\PHD 
work\PhD data input into SPSS\DATA INPUT REFINED FOR 
PHD.sav 
Active Dataset DataSet1 
Filter <none> 
Weight <none> 
Split File <none> 
N of Rows in Working Data File 565 
Missing Value 
Handling 
Definition of Missing User-defined missing values are treated as missing 
Syntax 
 
LOGISTIC REGRESSION VARIABLES ARBITRATION_DECISION 
  /METHOD=ENTER SECTOR INDUSTRY FIRM_SIZE HR_EXPERTISE FORMALITY SUPPORT 
WORKER_GENDER OCCUPATION SERVICE RECORD STATUS ARBITRATOR_GENDER 
ARBITRATOR_BACKGROUND ARBITRATOR_EXPERIENCE ARBITRATOR_SENIORITY 
  /METHOD=ENTER PROPERTY_DEVIANCE PRODUCTION_DEVIANCE 
PERSONAL_AGGRESSION POLITICAL_DEVIANCE SEVERITY WORKPLACE_RELATED 
PERSONAL_INSIDE COMPLEXITY REMORSE WORKER_ADVOCACY EMPLOYER_ADVOCACY 
MITIGATING_FACTORS MANAGEMENT_CONTRIBUTED 
PROBLEMATIC_INVESTIGATION PROBLEMATIC_ALLEGATION PROBLEMATIC_RESPONSE 




  /CONTRAST (SECTOR)=Indicator(1) 
  /CONTRAST (INDUSTRY)=Indicator(1) 
  /CONTRAST (FIRM_SIZE)=Indicator(1) 
  /CONTRAST (HR_EXPERTISE)=Indicator(1) 
  /CONTRAST (SUPPORT)=Indicator(1) 
  /CONTRAST (WORKER_GENDER)=Indicator(1) 
  /CONTRAST (OCCUPATION)=Indicator 
  /CONTRAST (SERVICE)=Indicator(1) 
  /CONTRAST (RECORD)=Indicator(1) 
  /CONTRAST (STATUS)=Indicator(1) 
  /CONTRAST (ARBITRATOR_GENDER)=Indicator(1) 
  /CONTRAST (ARBITRATOR_BACKGROUND)=Indicator(1) 
  /CONTRAST (PROPERTY_DEVIANCE)=Indicator(1) 
  /CONTRAST (PRODUCTION_DEVIANCE)=Indicator(1) 
  /CONTRAST (PERSONAL_AGGRESSION)=Indicator(1) 
  /CONTRAST (POLITICAL_DEVIANCE)=Indicator(1) 
  /CONTRAST (WORKPLACE_RELATED)=Indicator(1) 
  /CONTRAST (PERSONAL_INSIDE)=Indicator(1) 
  /CONTRAST (REMORSE)=Indicator(1) 
  /CONTRAST (WORKER_ADVOCACY)=Indicator(1) 
  /CONTRAST (EMPLOYER_ADVOCACY)=Indicator(1) 
  /CONTRAST (MITIGATING_FACTORS)=Indicator(1) 
  /CONTRAST (MANAGEMENT_CONTRIBUTED)=Indicator(1) 
  /CONTRAST (PROBLEMATIC_ALLEGATION)=Indicator(1) 
  /CONTRAST (PROBLEMATIC_RESPONSE)=Indicator(1) 
  /CONTRAST (TOO_HARSH)=Indicator(1) 
  /CLASSPLOT 
  /PRINT=GOODFIT 
  /CRITERIA=PIN(0.05) POUT(0.10) ITERATE(20) CUT(0.5). 
Resources Processor Time 00 00:00:00.204 
Elapsed Time 00 00:00:00.204 
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Case Processing Summary 
Unweighted Casesa N Percent 
Selected Cases Included in Analysis 565 100.0 
Missing Cases 0 .0 
Total 565 100.0 
Unselected Cases 0 .0 
Total 565 100.0 
a. If weight is in effect, see classification table for the total number of cases. 
 
Dependent Variable Encoding 
Original Value Internal Value 
employer's favour (claim dismissed) 0 
worker's favour (claim upheld) 1 
 
Categorical Variables Codings 
 Frequency 
Parameter coding 
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7) (8) (9) 
Industry_collapsed agriculture, mining 25 .000 .000 .000 .000 .000 .000 .000 .000 .000 
manufacture, wholesaling 122 1.00 .000 .000 .000 .000 .000 .000 .000 .000 
construction, utility supply 30 .000 1.00 .000 .000 .000 .000 .000 .000 .000 
retail 42 .000 .000 1.00 .000 .000 .000 .000 .000 .000 
hospitality, recreation 39 .000 .000 .000 1.00 .000 .000 .000 .000 .000 
transport, postal, 
warehousing 
129 .000 .000 .000 .000 1.00 .000 .000 .000 .000 
communication, technical, 
professional services 
46 .000 .000 .000 .000 .000 1.00 .000 .000 .000 
admin & support services 32 .000 .000 .000 .000 .000 .000 1.00 .000 .000 
public admin & safety 28 .000 .000 .000 .000 .000 .000 .000 1.00 .000 
education, health, social 
assistance 
72 .000 .000 .000 .000 .000 .000 .000 .000 1.00 
Length of service up to 2 years 88 .000 .000 .000 .000 .000 .000    
2 up to 5 years 117 1.00 .000 .000 .000 .000 .000    
5 up to 10 years 126 .000 1.00 .000 .000 .000 .000    
10 up to 15 years 80 .000 .000 1.00 .000 .000 .000    
15 up to 20 years 36 .000 .000 .000 1.00 .000 .000    
20 years and over 50 .000 .000 .000 .000 1.00 .000    
not identified 68 .000 .000 .000 .000 .000 1.00    
Occupation_ 
collapsed 
manager/professional 76 1.00 .000 .000 .000      
technician/trade 57 .000 1.00 .000 .000      
community/personal  84 .000 .000 1.00 .000      
clerical/admin/sales 97 .000 .000 .000 1.00      
operator/driver/labourer 251 .000 .000 .000 .000      
Business size up to 19 (small) 44 .000 .000 .000       
20 to 199 workers 
(medium) 
63 1.00 .000 .000 
      
200 plus workers (large) 406 .000 1.00 .000       
not identified 52 .000 .000 1.00       
Support for worker 
during dismissal 
process 
union present 173 .000 .000 .000       
companion present 44 1.00 .000 .000       
no-one present 157 .000 1.00 .000       
not identified 191 .000 .000 1.00       
Employer 
advocacy 
self-represented 63 .000 .000 .000       
Association 49 1.00 .000 .000       
legal 322 .000 1.00 .000       
not clear 131 .000 .000 1.00       
Worker advocacy self-represented 87 .000 .000 .000       
union 155 1.00 .000 .000       
legal 208 .000 1.00 .000       




history of working for 
management 
207 .000 .000 
       
history of working for 
unions 
199 1.00 .000 
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Categorical Variables Codings 
 Frequency 
Parameter coding 
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7) (8) (9) 
history shows no strong 
preference 
159 .000 1.00 
       
HR expertise of 
employer 
NO HR expert 104 .000 .000        
YES HR expert 436 1.00 .000        
not identified 25 .000 1.00        
Disciplinary record unblemished record 218 .000 .000        
previous offences 207 1.00 .000        
not identified 140 .000 1.00        
Arbitrator gender male 405 .000         
female 160 1.00         
Full-time or part-
time 
full-time worker 518 .000         
part-time or casual  47 1.00         
Punishment too 
harsh 
no 450 .000         
yes 115 1.00         
Worker gender male 454 .000         
female 111 1.00         
Property deviance no 444 .000         
yes 121 1.00         
Problematic 
response 
no 439 .000         
yes 126 1.00         
Problematic 
allegation 
no 483 .000         
yes 82 1.00         
Management 
contributed 
no 506 .000         
yes 59 1.00         
Ignored mitigating 
factors 
no 532 .000         
yes 33 1.00         
Worker apology or 
remorse 
no  480 .000         
yes  85 1.00         
Personal Inside 
reason 
no 87 .000         
yes 478 1.00         
Workplace related 
reason 
no 335 .000         
yes 230 1.00         
Production 
deviance 
no 287 .000         
yes 278 1.00         
Personal 
aggression 
no 373 .000         
yes 192 1.00         
Political deviance no 530 .000         
yes 35 1.00         
Public or private 
sector 
private 483 .000         
public 82 1.00         
 





 THE DECISION: either in favour of 
worker or employer 
Percentage 
Correct 




Step 0 THE DECISION: 
either in favour of 
worker or employer 
employer's favour   311 0 100.0 
worker's favour (upheld)  254 0 .0 
Overall Percentage   55.0 
a. Constant is included in the model.  b. The cut value is .500 
 
Variables in the Equation 
 B S.E. Wald df Sig. Exp(B) 
Step 0 Constant -.202 .085 5.731 1 .017 .817 
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Variables not in the Equation 
 Score df Sig. 
Step 0 Variables SECTOR(1) .861 1 .354 
INDUSTRY 6.445 9 .695 
INDUSTRY(1) .196 1 .658 
INDUSTRY(2) .326 1 .568 
INDUSTRY(3) .001 1 .970 
INDUSTRY(4) .261 1 .609 
INDUSTRY(5) .161 1 .688 
INDUSTRY(6) .515 1 .473 
INDUSTRY(7) 2.850 1 .091 
INDUSTRY(8) .026 1 .872 
INDUSTRY(9) 1.854 1 .173 
FIRM_SIZE 5.223 3 .156 
FIRM_SIZE(1) .033 1 .855 
FIRM_SIZE(2) 3.915 1 .048 
FIRM_SIZE(3) 2.706 1 .100 
HR_EXPERTISE 6.880 2 .032 
HR_EXPERTISE(1) 6.868 1 .009 
HR_EXPERTISE(2) 1.289 1 .256 
FORMALITY 24.498 1 .000 
SUPPORT 8.936 3 .030 
SUPPORT(1) 2.276 1 .131 
SUPPORT(2) 7.411 1 .006 
SUPPORT(3) .111 1 .739 
WORKER_GENDER(1) .164 1 .686 
OCCUPATION 2.251 4 .690 
OCCUPATION(1) .616 1 .433 
OCCUPATION(2) 1.036 1 .309 
OCCUPATION(3) .033 1 .856 
OCCUPATION(4) .579 1 .447 
SERVICE 15.338 6 .018 
SERVICE(1) .007 1 .933 
SERVICE(2) 1.667 1 .197 
SERVICE(3) 2.854 1 .091 
SERVICE(4) .080 1 .778 
SERVICE(5) 1.813 1 .178 
SERVICE(6) 9.044 1 .003 
RECORD 12.238 2 .002 
RECORD(1) 3.117 1 .077 
RECORD(2) 3.790 1 .052 
STATUS(1) .773 1 .379 
ARBITRATOR_GENDER(1) .000 1 .989 
ARBITRATOR_BACKGROUND 10.594 2 .005 
ARBITRATOR_BACKGROUND(1) 8.574 1 .003 
ARBITRATOR_BACKGROUND(2) .008 1 .928 
ARBITRATOR_EXPERIENCE 3.558 1 .059 
ARBITRATOR_SENIORITY .140 1 .708 
Overall Statistics 78.028 38 .000 
 
Block 1: Method = Enter 
Omnibus Tests of Model Coefficients 
 Chi-square df Sig. 
Step 1 Step 84.580 38 .000 
Block 84.580 38 .000 
Model 84.580 38 .000 
 
Model Summary 
Step -2 Log likelihood Cox & Snell R Square Nagelkerke R Square 
1 692.916a .139 .186 
a. Estimation terminated at iteration number 4 because parameter estimates changed by less than .001. 
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Hosmer and Lemeshow Test 
Step Chi-square df Sig. 
1 9.914 8 .271 
 
Contingency Table for Hosmer and Lemeshow Test 
 
THE DECISION: either in favour of 
worker or employer = employer's favour 
(claim dismissed) 
THE DECISION: either in favour of 
worker or employer = worker's favour 
(claim upheld) 
Total Observed Expected Observed Expected 
Step 1 1 47 48.378 10 8.622 57 
2 39 42.771 18 14.229 57 
3 44 38.772 13 18.228 57 
4 37 35.977 20 21.023 57 
5 31 33.654 26 23.346 57 
6 32 32.008 27 26.992 59 
7 26 27.430 31 29.570 57 
8 31 23.365 26 33.635 57 
9 15 18.554 42 38.446 57 








 THE DECISION: either in favour of 








Step 1 THE DECISION: either 
in favour of worker or 
employer 
employer's favour (claim 
dismissed) 
234 77 75.2 
worker's favour (claim 
upheld) 
126 128 50.4 
Overall Percentage   64.1 
a. The cut value is .500 
 
Variables in the Equation 
 B S.E. Wald df Sig. Exp(B) 
Step 1a SECTOR(1) -.125 .353 .126 1 .723 .882 
INDUSTRY   8.004 9 .534  
INDUSTRY(1) .278 .511 .295 1 .587 1.320 
INDUSTRY(2) .368 .633 .338 1 .561 1.445 
INDUSTRY(3) .166 .608 .074 1 .785 1.180 
INDUSTRY(4) -.091 .648 .020 1 .888 .913 
INDUSTRY(5) .258 .512 .255 1 .614 1.295 
INDUSTRY(6) .819 .596 1.887 1 .170 2.267 
INDUSTRY(7) .978 .657 2.219 1 .136 2.660 
INDUSTRY(8) .823 .701 1.377 1 .241 2.277 
INDUSTRY(9) .235 .593 .157 1 .692 1.265 
FIRM_SIZE   1.557 3 .669  
FIRM_SIZE(1) .112 .452 .061 1 .805 1.118 
FIRM_SIZE(2) .229 .462 .245 1 .621 1.257 
FIRM_SIZE(3) .545 .484 1.269 1 .260 1.724 
HR_EXPERTISE   .354 2 .838  
HR_EXPERTISE(1) -.074 .364 .041 1 .840 .929 
HR_EXPERTISE(2) .216 .511 .180 1 .672 1.242 
FORMALITY -.668 .186 12.827 1 .000 .513 
SUPPORT   2.841 3 .417  
SUPPORT(1) -.292 .397 .542 1 .462 .746 
SUPPORT(2) .314 .280 1.261 1 .261 1.369 
SUPPORT(3) .184 .242 .576 1 .448 1.202 
WORKER_GENDER(1) -.109 .265 .168 1 .682 .897 
OCCUPATION   5.733 4 .220  
OCCUPATION(1) -.655 .354 3.434 1 .064 .519 
OCCUPATION(2) -.641 .351 3.331 1 .068 .527 
OCCUPATION(3) -.337 .361 .871 1 .351 .714 
 [Appendix 7: Page A76] 
 
Variables in the Equation 
 B S.E. Wald df Sig. Exp(B) 
OCCUPATION(4) -.157 .324 .235 1 .628 .855 
SERVICE   19.310 6 .004  
SERVICE(1) -.044 .320 .019 1 .891 .957 
SERVICE(2) .208 .333 .389 1 .533 1.231 
SERVICE(3) -.300 .382 .618 1 .432 .741 
SERVICE(4) .135 .453 .089 1 .765 1.145 
SERVICE(5) .793 .421 3.544 1 .060 2.209 
SERVICE(6) -1.076 .407 6.991 1 .008 .341 
RECORD   8.560 2 .014  
RECORD(1) -.612 .219 7.792 1 .005 .542 
RECORD(2) -.511 .257 3.960 1 .047 .600 
STATUS(1) .389 .384 1.026 1 .311 1.475 
ARBITRATOR_GENDER(1) .122 .251 .236 1 .627 1.130 
ARBITRATOR_BACKGROUND   11.158 2 .004  
ARBITRATOR_BACKGROUND(1) .808 .242 11.122 1 .001 2.244 
ARBITRATOR_BACKGROUND(2) .287 .258 1.241 1 .265 1.333 
ARBITRATOR_EXPERIENCE -.104 .075 1.896 1 .169 .901 
ARBITRATOR_SENIORITY .137 .126 1.174 1 .279 1.147 
Constant 1.168 .785 2.216 1 .137 3.216 
a. Variable(s) entered on step 1: SECTOR, INDUSTRY, FIRM_SIZE, HR_EXPERTISE, FORMALITY, SUPPORT, 
WORKER_GENDER, OCCUPATION, SERVICE, RECORD, STATUS, ARBITRATOR_GENDER, 






Block 2: Method = Enter 
Omnibus Tests of Model Coefficients 
 Chi-square df Sig. 
Step 1 Step 487.544 31 .000 
Block 487.544 31 .000 
Model 572.124 69 .000 
Model Summary 
Step -2 Log likelihood Cox & Snell R Square Nagelkerke R Square 
1 205.372a .637 .852 
a. Estimation terminated at iteration number 20 because maximum iterations has been reached. Final 
solution cannot be found. 
 
Hosmer and Lemeshow Test 
Step Chi-square df Sig. 
1 3.761 8 .878 
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Contingency Table for Hosmer and Lemeshow Test 
 
THE DECISION: either in favour of 
worker or employer = employer's 
favour (claim dismissed) 
THE DECISION: either in favour of 
worker or employer = worker's favour 
(claim upheld) 
Total Observed Expected Observed Expected 
Step 1 1 57 56.971 0 .029 57 
2 57 56.729 0 .271 57 
3 55 56.062 2 .938 57 
4 52 53.689 5 3.311 57 
5 49 47.689 8 9.311 57 
6 35 32.206 22 24.794 57 
7 6 7.428 51 49.572 57 
8 0 .226 57 56.774 57 
9 0 .000 57 57.000 57 






 THE DECISION: either in favour 








Step 1 THE DECISION: either in 
favour of worker or 
employer 
employer's favour (claim 
dismissed) 
295 16 94.9 
worker's favour (claim 
upheld) 
28 226 89.0 
Overall Percentage   92.2 
a. The cut value is .500 
 
Variables in the Equation 
 B S.E. Wald df Sig. Exp(B) 
Step 
1a 
SECTOR(1) 1.026 .696 2.173 1 .140 2.789 
INDUSTRY   12.361 9 .194  
INDUSTRY(1) 2.038 1.559 1.711 1 .191 7.678 
INDUSTRY(2) 2.051 1.846 1.234 1 .267 7.774 
INDUSTRY(3) 1.633 1.604 1.036 1 .309 5.117 
INDUSTRY(4) -.925 1.881 .242 1 .623 .396 
INDUSTRY(5) 2.710 1.536 3.113 1 .078 15.026 
INDUSTRY(6) 1.791 1.659 1.166 1 .280 5.997 
INDUSTRY(7) .777 1.736 .200 1 .655 2.175 
INDUSTRY(8) .000 1.759 .000 1 1.000 1.000 
INDUSTRY(9) .658 1.627 .163 1 .686 1.930 
FIRM_SIZE   3.698 3 .296  
FIRM_SIZE(1) -.874 .986 .786 1 .375 .417 
FIRM_SIZE(2) .801 .980 .667 1 .414 2.227 
FIRM_SIZE(3) .643 1.049 .376 1 .540 1.902 
HR_EXPERTISE   1.745 2 .418  
HR_EXPERTISE(1) -.085 .828 .011 1 .918 .918 
HR_EXPERTISE(2) 1.390 1.182 1.381 1 .240 4.014 
FORMALITY -.563 .464 1.469 1 .225 .570 
SUPPORT   7.465 3 .058  
SUPPORT(1) -3.518 1.690 4.331 1 .037 .030 
SUPPORT(2) .581 .619 .882 1 .348 1.787 
SUPPORT(3) -.266 .579 .211 1 .646 .767 
WORKER_GENDER(1) 1.741 1.279 1.852 1 .174 5.704 
OCCUPATION   5.374 4 .251  
OCCUPATION(1) 1.703 .854 3.980 1 .046 5.490 
OCCUPATION(2) .546 .819 .444 1 .505 1.726 
OCCUPATION(3) 1.512 .924 2.679 1 .102 4.537 
OCCUPATION(4) 1.375 .745 3.405 1 .065 3.953 
SERVICE   9.321 6 .156  
SERVICE(1) .219 .724 .092 1 .762 1.245 
SERVICE(2) .790 .682 1.341 1 .247 2.203 
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Variables in the Equation 
 B S.E. Wald df Sig. Exp(B) 
SERVICE(3) -.576 .870 .438 1 .508 .562 
SERVICE(4) -2.211 1.202 3.381 1 .066 .110 
SERVICE(5) -.255 .945 .073 1 .787 .775 
SERVICE(6) .208 .890 .054 1 .816 1.231 
RECORD   .424 2 .809  
RECORD(1) -.287 .538 .284 1 .594 .751 
RECORD(2) -.331 .582 .324 1 .569 .718 
STATUS(1) -.477 1.123 .180 1 .671 .621 
ARBITRATOR_GENDER(1) .345 .630 .301 1 .583 1.413 
ARBITRATOR_BACKGROUND   5.594 2 .061  
ARBITRATOR_BACKGROUND(1) 1.282 .581 4.879 1 .027 3.606 
ARBITRATOR_BACKGROUND(2) .950 .628 2.293 1 .130 2.587 
ARBITRATOR_EXPERIENCE -.431 .177 5.905 1 .015 .650 
ARBITRATOR_SENIORITY .171 .306 .313 1 .576 1.187 
PROPERTY_DEVIANCE(1) -1.819 .853 4.545 1 .033 .162 
PRODUCTION_DEVIANCE(1) -2.189 .779 7.898 1 .005 .112 
PERSONAL_AGGRESSION(1) -2.922 .833 12.314 1 .000 .054 
POLITICAL_DEVIANCE(1) -1.952 .977 3.989 1 .046 .142 
SEVERITY -.003 .338 .000 1 .992 .997 
WORKPLACE_RELATED(1) 1.078 .886 1.483 1 .223 2.939 
PERSONAL_INSIDE(1) .889 .851 1.092 1 .296 2.434 
COMPLEXITY -1.611 .782 4.239 1 .040 .200 
REMORSE(1) -.761 .739 1.061 1 .303 .467 
WORKER_ADVOCACY   14.168 3 .003  
WORKER_ADVOCACY(1) 2.095 .885 5.608 1 .018 8.129 
WORKER_ADVOCACY(2) 2.559 .793 10.418 1 .001 12.925 
WORKER_ADVOCACY(3) .725 1.008 .517 1 .472 2.065 
EMPLOYER_ADVOCACY   7.864 3 .049  
EMPLOYER_ADVOCACY(1) 1.270 1.084 1.372 1 .241 3.561 
EMPLOYER_ADVOCACY(2) -.989 .794 1.551 1 .213 .372 
EMPLOYER_ADVOCACY(3) -.808 .845 .914 1 .339 .446 
MITIGATING_FACTORS(1) 28.034 4369.130 .000 1 .995 1.496E12 
MANAGEMENT_CONTRIBUTED(1) 6.443 2.740 5.530 1 .019 628.405 
PROBLEMATIC_INVESTIGATION 3.805 1.914 3.949 1 .047 44.906 
PROBLEMATIC_ALLEGATION(1) 1.145 2.000 .328 1 .567 3.142 
PROBLEMATIC_RESPONSE(1) 7.562 2.040 13.745 1 .000 1924.222 
TOO_HARSH(1) 28.313 2330.173 .000 1 .990 1.977E12 
ARBITRATOR_GENDER(1) by 
WORKER_GENDER(1) 
-1.551 1.465 1.120 1 .290 .212 
OCCUPATION * WORKER_GENDER    8.119 4 .087  
OCCUPATION(1) * WORKER_GENDER(1) -5.395 2.426 4.946 1 .026 .005 
OCCUPATION(2) by WORKER_GENDER(1) 9.258 25735.685 .000 1 1.000 10486.492 
OCCUPATION(3) by WORKER_GENDER(1) .986 1.644 .359 1 .549 2.680 
OCCUPATION(4) by WORKER_GENDER(1) -1.721 1.671 1.061 1 .303 .179 
STATUS(1) by WORKER_GENDER(1) 1.937 1.732 1.251 1 .263 6.935 
MANAGEMENT_CONTRIBUTED(1) by 
SEVERITY 
-.428 .895 .228 1 .633 .652 
PROBLEMATIC_INVESTIGATION by SEVERITY .177 .639 .077 1 .782 1.193 
PROBLEMATIC_ALLEGATION(1) by SEVERITY .545 .744 .537 1 .464 1.725 
PROBLEMATIC_RESPONSE(1) by SEVERITY -1.583 .704 5.054 1 .025 .205 
Constant -2.198 2.612 .708 1 .400 .111 
a. Variable(s) entered on step 1: PROPERTY_DEVIANCE, PRODUCTION_DEVIANCE, PERSONAL_AGGRESSION, 
POLITICAL_DEVIANCE, SEVERITY, WORKPLACE_RELATED, PERSONAL_INSIDE, COMPLEXITY, REMORSE, 
WORKER_ADVOCACY, EMPLOYER_ADVOCACY, MITIGATING_FACTORS, MANAGEMENT_CONTRIBUTED, 
PROBLEMATIC_INVESTIGATION, PROBLEMATIC_ALLEGATION, PROBLEMATIC_RESPONSE, TOO_HARSH, 
ARBITRATOR_GENDER * WORKER_GENDER , OCCUPATION * WORKER_GENDER , STATUS * WORKER_GENDER 
, MANAGEMENT_CONTRIBUTED * SEVERITY , PROBLEMATIC_INVESTIGATION * SEVERITY , 
PROBLEMATIC_ALLEGATION * SEVERITY , PROBLEMATIC_RESPONSE * SEVERITY . 
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APPENDIX 8 
Logistic regression output of POOR_EVIDENCE_OR_REASON
 #
 
for a dismissal identified by arbitrators prepared in  




B S.E. Wald Sig. Exp(B) 
SECTOR (public) -.310 .542 .326 .568 .734 
INDUSTRY:   4.099 .905  
manufacture, wholesaling .148 .782 .036 .849 1.160 
construction, utility supply .620 .909 .465 .495 1.858 
retail .145 .919 .025 .874 1.156 
hospitality, recreation -.396 1.005 .155 .693 .673 
transport, postal, warehousing .415 .791 .275 .600 1.514 
communication, technical, professional ser. .640 .919 .485 .486 1.896 
administration & support services .900 .982 .841 .359 2.461 
public administration and safety -.050 1.073 .002 .963 .951 
education, health, social assistance .360 .897 .161 .688 1.434 
FIRM_SIZE:   5.828 .120  
20 to 199 workers (medium) .113 .666 .029 .866 1.119 
200 plus workers (large) .427 .648 .434 .510 1.532 
not identified 1.349 .682 3.905 .048** 3.852 
HR_EXPERTISE:   1.089 .580  
yes, HR expert -.143 .501 .082 .775 .867 
not identified -.755 .727 1.079 .299 .470 
FORMALITY: -.423 .272 2.421 .120 .655 
SUPPORT:   7.500 .058  
companion present -1.636 .738 4.910 .027** .195 
worker unaccompanied .285 .432 .435 .510 1.330 
not identified .315 .365 .744 .388 1.370 
WORKER_GENDER (female) .504 .794 .403 .526 1.655 
OCCUPATION:   3.807 .433  
manager or professional .404 .533 .574 .449 1.498 
technician or trade .543 .490 1.227 .268 1.720 
community or personal service .263 .582 .204 .651 1.301 
clerical/administration or sales -.614 .589 1.087 .297 .541 
SERVICE:   6.189 .402  
2 up to 5 years .889 .460 3.731 .053* 2.433 
5 up to 10 years .819 .497 2.714 .099* 2.267 
10 up to 15 years .409 .587 .484 .486 1.505 
15 up to 20 years .264 .706 .140 .709 1.302 
20 years and over .660 .636 1.078 .299 1.936 
not identified .064 .623 .011 .918 1.066 
RECORD:   8.001 .018  
previous offences -.938 .336 7.785 .005** .391 
not identified -.525 .386 1.855 .173 .591 
STATUS (part-time or casual) .020 .670 .001 .976 1.020 
ARBITRATOR_GENDER (female) -.381 .417 .832 .362 .684 
ARBITRATOR_BACKGROUND:   1.756 .416  
Union work background .077 .362 .045 .831 1.080 
No strong preference .518 .401 1.672 .196 1.679 
ARBITRATOR_EXPERIENCE .049 .115 .178 .673 1.050 
ARBITRATOR_SENIORITY -.246 .197 1.550 .213 .782 
PROPERTY_DEVIANCE  -.153 .522 .086 .769 .858 




B S.E. Wald Sig. Exp(B) 
PRODUCTION_DEVIANCE  -.240 .485 .245 .620 .787 
PERSONAL_AGGRESSION .099 .504 .038 .844 1.104 
POLITICAL_DEVIANCE  -.680 .713 .911 .340 .507 
SEVERITY -.615 .235 6.861 .009** .541 
WORKPLACE_RELATED  .356 .527 .457 .499 1.428 
PERSONAL_INSIDE  .575 .549 1.098 .295 1.778 
COMPLEXITY -.959 .449 4.569 .033** .383 
REMORSE -.493 .425 1.349 .246 .611 
WORKER_ADVOCACY:   13.496 .004  
represented by union 2.028 .641 10.001 .002** 7.601 
represented by legal counsel 2.188 .607 12.977 .000** 8.919 
representation not clear 1.685 .674 6.252 .012** 5.391 
EMPLOYER_ADVOCACY:   3.342 .342  
represented by association -.291 .626 .217 .642 .747 
represented by legal counsel -.714 .486 2.154 .142 .490 
representation not clear -.913 .552 2.733 .098* .401 
MITIGATING_FACTORS -2.376 1.623 2.144 .143 .093 
MANAGEMENT_CONTRIBUTED -2.327 1.132 4.223 .040** .098 
PROBLEMATIC_INVESTIGATION 2.388 1.224 3.808 .051* 10.894 
PROBLEMATIC_ALLEGATION -2.376 1.164 4.168 .041** .093 
PROBLEMATIC_RESPONSE 2.014 .964 4.369 .037** 7.494 
PUNISHMENT_TOO_HARSH 1.839 .934 3.877 .049** 6.291 
female arbitrator * female worker  -1.454 .888 2.680 .102 .234 
worker_gender by occupation:   5.204 .267  
female * manager or professional  -1.733 1.271 1.859 .173 .177 
female * technical or trade worker -23.339 27933.0 .000 .999 .000 
female * community/personal service .491 1.049 .219 .640 1.634 
female * clerical/admin or sales worker  .959 1.071 .801 .371 2.609 
female * part-time or casual worker .748 1.009 .550 .458 2.114 
mitigating_factors * severity .846 .610 1.923 .165 2.331 
management_contributed * severity .911 .455 4.014 .045** 2.488 
problematic_investigation * severity -.399 .448 .792 .374 .671 
problematic_allegation * severity  1.317 .452 8.486 .004** 3.733 
problematic_response * severity -.524 .376 1.936 .164 .592 
punishment_ too_harsh * severity -.406 .360 1.269 .260 .666 
Constant -.599 1.563 .147 .701 .549 
Model summary statistics 
-2 log likelihood 
Cox & Snell R Square 





Goodness of fit statistics 
Hosmer and Lemeshow Test 
Chi-square df Sig. 
10.634 8 .223 
 
Classification table  











432 20 95.6 
Yes POOR 
REASON 
69 44 38.9 
Overall  
percentage 
  84.2 
 
#  internal values for the independent variable were 0 = no POOR_EVIDENCE_OR_REASON (the comparison group) and 1 = 
yes POOR_EVIDENCE_OR_REASON (included in the model) 
*  p < .1 **  p < .05  
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T comparison groups for categorical variables in the models: SECTOR = private; INDUSTRY = agriculture, mining; 
FIRM_SIZE = up to 19 (small); HR_EXPERTISE = No HR expert; SUPPORT = union present; WORKER_GENDER = male; 
OCCUPATION = operator, driver or labourer; SERVICE = up to 2 years; RECORD = unblemished record; STATUS = full-time 
worker; ARBITRATOR_GENDER = male; ARBITRATOR_BACKGROUND = management background; 
WORKER_ADVOCACY = self-represented; EMPLOYER_ADVOCACY = self-represented; all other dummy variables = 
condition not present 
 
Comment about this model 
The Hosmer and Lemeshow goodness of fit statistic showed the desired statistical insignificance, and 
the Nagelkerke R
2
 suggests that the model accounted for 40 percent of the variation in cases judged to 
have terminated an employee for an invalid reason. The classification table suggests the model could 
accurately predict 84 percent of the outcomes, with it being clearly better at predicting when a poor-
evidence-or-reason condition was not present with 95 percent accuracy.  
The model performed poorly in classifying cases when the condition was present, with it correctly 
predicting only 39 percent of cases when poor-evidence-or-reason was present. 
Using a priori significance level of .05, the results show that the presence of the employer using poor 
evidence or reason to dismiss the worker, was statistically significantly influenced in the following 
ways: 
1. In a negative direction if the employer permitted the worker to have a companion present 
during the investigation and interviews (p = .027; .195 lower odds than those of an 
unaccompanied worker).  
2. In a positive direction if the worker had 2 to 5 years service (p = .053; 2.433 higher odds than 
those of a worker with less than 2 years service). 
3. In a negative direction if the worker had a previous offence on the record. (p = .005; .391 
lower odds than those of a worker with a clean disciplinary record). 
4. In a negative direction as the severity of the misconduct increased. (p = .009; .541 lower 
odds for each unit increase in the severity of the misconduct – measured on a 1 to 5 scale). 
5. In a negative direction as the complexity of the employee’s explanation increased. (p = .033; 
.383 lower odds for each unit increase in the explanation – measured on a 1 to 3 scale). 
6. In a positive direction when the employee engaged union advocates or legal counsel to 
present their claim at the arbitration table. (p = .002 and .000; 7.601 and 8.919 higher odds 
than those of a worker who self-represents). 
7. In a positive direction if the following errors were also detected: problematic_ investigation; 
problematic_response and punishment_too_ harsh. (p = .051; .037 and .048; 10.894; 7.494 
and 6.291 higher odds than those of a worker where this error was not commitment by 
management). 
8. In a negative direction if the following errors were detected: management_ contributed and 
problematic_allegation. (p = .040 and .041; .098 and .093 lower odds than those of a worker 
where this error was not committed by management). 
9.  In a positive direction if management, when dealing with more severe acts of misconduct, 
made the mistake of management_contributed (p = .045; 2.488 higher odds than acts of 
lower severity and where this error was not committed by management). 
10. In a positive direction if management, when dealing with more severe acts of misconduct, 
made the mistake of a problematic_allegation (p = .004; 3.733 higher odds than acts of 
lower severity and where this error was not committed by management). 
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APPENDIX 9 




Worker gender * Severity of misbehaviour Crosstabulation 
Gender 
Severity of the misbehaviour 
Total for 
gender somewhat 
serious serious very serious 
extremely 
serious 
 male worker 
Count 60 113 192 89 454 
%  13.2% 24.9% 42.3% 19.6% 100.0% 
female worker 
Count 20 21 52 18 111 
%  18.0% 18.9% 46.8% 16.2% 100.0% 
Totals for severity 
of misbehaviour 
Count 80 134 244 107 565 
%  14.2% 23.7% 43.2% 18.9% 100.0% 
 
(Table A9.2) 
Worker gender * Managerial error Crosstabulation 
Type of error 




poor evidence or reason 
Count 88 25 113 
%  18.7% 21.4% 19.3% 
mitigating factors ignored 
Count 27 6 33 
%  5.7% 5.1% 5.6% 
punishment too harsh 
Count 98 17 115 
%  20.9% 14.5% 19.6% 
problematic response 
Count 98 28 126 
%  20.9% 24.0% 21.5% 
management contributed 
Count 50 9 59 
%  10.6% 7.7% 10.0% 
problematic support/investigation 
Count 48 11 59 
%  10.2% 9.4% 10.0% 
problematic allegation 
Count 61 21 82 
%  13.0% 17.9% 14.0% 
  Totals for gender 
Count 470 117 587 
% 100.0% 100.0% 100.0% 
 
(Table A9.3) 










 managerial or 
professional 
Count 13 8 39 16 76 
%  17.1% 10.5% 51.3% 21.1% 100.0% 
technician or trade 
worker 
Count 11 16 17 13 57 
%  19.3% 28.1% 29.8% 22.8% 100.0% 
community, personal 
service worker 
Count 16 24 29 15 84 
%  19.0% 28.6% 34.5% 17.9% 100.0% 
clerical, admin or 
sales worker 
Count 19 17 40 21 97 
%  19.6% 17.5% 41.2% 21.6% 100.0% 
operator, 
driver or labourer 
Count 28 90 83 50 251 
%  11.2% 35.9% 33.1% 19.9% 100.0% 
Totals for type of 
advocacy 
Count 87 155 208 115 565 
%  15.4% 27.4% 36.8% 20.4% 100.0% 
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(Table A9.4) 
Occupation * Type of misbehaviour Crosstabulation 
Occupation 












 managerial or 
professional 
Count 27 34 10 14 85  
%  14.1% 12.2% 28.5% 11.6% 13.6%  
technician or trade 
worker 
Count 16 30 1 15 62  
%  8.3% 10.8% 2.9% 12.4% 9.9%  
community, personal 
service worker 
Count 27 48 3 16 94  
%  14.1% 17.3% 8.6% 13.2% 15.0%  
clerical, admin or  
sales worker 
Count 26 42 18 23 109  
%  13.5% 15.1% 51.4% 19.0% 17.4%  
operator,  
driver or labourer 
Count 96 124 3 53 276  
%  50.0% 44.6% 8.6% 43.8% 44.1%  
 Totals for type of  
 misbehaviour  
Count 192 278 35 121 626  
% 100.0% 100.0% 100.0% 100.0% 100.0%  
 
(Table A9.5) 
Public or Private sector * Worker advocacy Crosstabulation 
Type of advocacy 
Sector 
Totals for type 
of advocate private public 
 
independent lawyer 
Count 167 41 208 
 % 34.6% 50.0% 36.8% 
 
union advocate 
Count 137 18 155 
%  28.4% 21.9% 27.4% 
self-represented 
Count 78 9 87 
%  16.1% 11.0% 15.4% 
type of advocacy not clear 
Count 101 14 115 
%  20.9% 17.1% 20.4% 
Totals for sector 
Count 483 82 565 
%  100.0% 100.0% 100.0% 
 
 (Table A9.6) 
Public or Private sector * Managerial error Crosstabulation 
Type of error 
Sector 
Totals for errors 
private public 
 
poor evidence or reason 
Count 102 11 113 
%  19.6% 16.5% 19.2% 
mitigating factors ignored 
Count 23 10 33 
%  4.5% 14.9% 5.6% 
punishment too harsh 
Count 98 17 115 
%  18.8% 25.5% 19.6% 
problematic response 
Count 118 8 126 
%  22.7% 11.9% 21.4% 
management contributed 
Count 52 7 59 
%  10.0% 10.4% 10.1% 
problematic support/investigation 
Count 52 7 59 
%  10.0% 10.4% 10.1% 
problematic allegation 
Count 75 7 82 
%  14.4% 10.4% 14.0% 
  Totals for sector 
Count 520 67 587 
% 100.0% 100.0% 100.0% 
 
